SHORT HISTORY 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES 
NAVY 






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Book—, 5 BU 

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COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES NAVY 



SIXTH IMPRESSION 



From a photogravure, copyrighted, 1896, by A. W. Elson & Co., Boston 

U. S. S. Constitution 



A SHORT HISTORY 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES NAVY 



BY 



George R. Clark, Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) 
William O. Stevens, Ph.D., Litt.D. 
Carroll S. Alden, Ph.D. 
Herman F. Krafft, LL.B. 



REVISED AND CONTINUED 
BY 

CARROLL S. ALDEN, Ph.D. 




PHILADELPHIA & LONDON 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 



El 1 32. 

cm 



Copyright, 1910, By George R. Clark 
Copyright, 1911, By J. B. Lippincott Company 
Copyright, 1914, By J. B. Lippincott Company 
Copyright, 1916, By J. B. Lippincott Company 
Copyright, 1927, By J. B. Lippincott Company 



Printed by J. B: Lippincott Company 
The Washington Square Press, Philadelphia, U.S.A. 




©CI A999707 



PREFACE TO REVISED EDITION 



Although each profession has its own history, of 
importance to those included in that profession, naval 
history has grown to wider significance. Mahan by 
his Influence of Sea Power Upon History revealed its 
far reaching relations, and obtained for it a recogni- 
tion such as merited a place in every library. 

A survey of the history of the United States Navy, 
especially that of the last quarter of a century, will 
show that the study has its value, not only for thrilling- 
stories of heroism and devotion, but for an under- 
standing of the forces shaping national progress. 
Thus, though it is peculiarly adapted to naval officers, 
it should have, in time, a real meaning for all students 
of American foreign relations. 

This book, in its original form, was written seven- 
teen years ago to meet the needs of the Naval 
Academy. And now, to meet similar needs, it is con- 
tinued to the present year. 

The period is one in which epoch-making events 
have occurred. The United States has had an increas- 
ingly important part in world affairs, especially in 
the World War and in the many problems resulting 
from unsettled conditions in the Mediterranean, the 
Caribbean, and the Far East. In carrying out the 
national policy, the navy has been called upon to take 
a leading role. 

The number of officers and men has been reduced, 
but to compensate for the losses the navy has placed 
an increasing emphasis on the preparation for duty of 
its personnel, from ordinary seaman to rear-admiral, 
which is to be gained through both general and special 

3 



4 



Preface 



education. The number of ships has also been 
reduced, but the remaining ships have been made more 
efficient. The Utopian day when the nation will no 
longer need a navy seems as far distant as that when 
it can dispense with all legislative bodies and courts. 

Thanks are clue to Eear-Admiral George E. Clark, 
TJ. S. Navy (Bet.); Captain Walter S. Anderson, 
L T . S. Navy, and Professor Herman F. Krafft of the 
Naval Academy, for many helpful suggestions in the 
preparation of the last four chapters (the new part 
of the present edition) ; to several members of the 
Department of English of the Naval Academy for 
suggestions relating to the revision of the earlier 
chapters; and to Professor Charles L. Lewis, also of 
the Department of English, for reading the manu- 
script and the proof. 

Cakeoll S. Alden. 

United States Naval Academy, 
April, 1927. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Preface 3 

I. The Navy in the Revolution 9 

II. The Revolution (Continued). The Cruises of 

John Paul Jones 24 

III. The Beginnings of a New Navy and the War 

with France 42 

IV. The War with Tripoli 61 

V. The War with Tripoli (Continued) 76 

VI. The War of 1812. Causes and Early Events... 93 
VII. The Captures of the Guerriere and the Mace- 
donian 109 

VIII. A Victory and a Defeat 126 

IX. The Sloop Actions of the War 144 

X. The Battle of Lake Erie 161 

XI. The Cruise of the Essex 175 

XII. The Battle of Lake Champlain and the Con- 
clusion of the War 189 

XIII. Minor Operations 203 

XIV. The Mexican War. Perry's Expedition to Japan 220 
XV. The Civil War : the First Year 238 

XVI. The Battle of Hampton Roads : the Destruc- 
tion of the Cumberland and the Congress 255 
XVII. The Battle of Hampton Roads (Continued) : the 

Monitor and the Merrimac 273 

XVIII. Operations on the Western Rivers 288 

XIX. Operations on the Lower Mississippi 310 

5 



6 



Contents 



XX. The Battle of Mobile Bay 330 

XXI. The "War on Albemarle Sound 348 

XXII. Actions in Foreign Waters 365 

XXIII. The Blockade and the End of the War 388 ■ 

XXIV. The Navy in the Years of Peace 406 

XXV. War with Spain : the Battle of Manila Bay. . . 426 

XXVI. The West Indian Campaign 445 

XXVII. Emergence of the United States as a World Power 462 
XXVIII. The World War 483 

XXIX. The World War (Continued) 501 

XXX. The Navy and American Foreign Policy 511 

Authorities 534 

Index 541 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



PAGE 

U. S. Ship-of-the-Line Columbus at Anchor 45 

Frigate with her Sails loosed to dry 47 

U. S. Sloop-of-War Albany under full Sail 49 

U. S. S. Louisville 291 

C. S. S. Tennessee 341 

PLATES 

U. S. S. Constitution Frontispiece 

Paul Jones 24 

A 32-Pound Carronade •. 42 

A 24-Pound Long Gun 42 

Edward Preble 70 

Stephen Decatur, Jr 118 

Oliver H. Perry 164 

David Porter 176 

Thomas Macdonough 190 

George Bancroft 218 

Delivery of the President's Letter 232 

Andrew H. Foote 290 

David G. Farragut 310 

David D. Porter 388 

Three Historic Ships Formerly at the Naval Academy 406 

George Dewey 426 

U.S.S. Delaware 462 

Capture of the U-58 by the Fanning 490 

'The Return of the Mayflower" 486 

7 



8 Maps and Diagrams 

Lake Champlain 16 

Cruises of the Ranger and the Bonhomme Richard 28 

The Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis 33 

Scene of the "War with France 55 

The Barbary States 63 

Harbor of Tripoli 79 

The Constitution and the Guerriere Ill 

The United States and the Macedonian 120 

The Constitution and the Java 128 

The Chesapeake and the Shannon 138 

The Frigate and the Sloop Actions of the War of 1812 145 

The Lake Campaigns, 1812-1814 162 

The Battle of Lake Erie 169 

The Cruise of the Essex 181 

The Battle of Lake Champlain 194 

Japan 228 

Battle of Port Royal 246 

Hampton Roads 265 

Transverse Section through 'Turret of Original Monitor 275 

Operations on the Western Rivers 289 

Island No. 10 300 

Battle of Mobile Bay 333 

Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds 349 

Cushing's Launch and Torpedo 357 

The Cruise of the Alabama 373 

The Kearsarge and the Alabama 381 

Second Attack on Fort Fisher 402 

The Arctic Regions 417 

Battles of Manila , 438 

The W 7 est Indian Campaign 448 

America's Strategic Position in the Pacific 467 



A SHORT HISTORY 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES NAVY 



i 

THE NAVY IN THE REVOLUTION 

Causes of Naval Activity in the Colonies 

The Revolution, like most of the wars in which 
America has .been engaged, was one in which the army 
did the greater part of the fighting, but also one in which 
sea power was a deciding factor. Great Britain had the 
most powerful navy of the time, against which no force 
in open battle could have escaped defeat. But she fought 
at a disadvantage against an enemy 3000 miles distant, 
easily hidden in the countless harbors and inlets of an 
extensive coast line. The colonists, on the other hand, 
were of the same stock as the English, even better inured 
to hardship, and ready to take desperate chances as they 
attacked merchantmen or isolated units of the Royal Navy. 

As the Continental Army seemed to spring out of 
the soil, so the navy seemed to spring out of the sea. 
When, on June 12, 1775, a party of Maine Woodsmen, 
armed, for the most part, with pitchforks and axes, and 
fired by the news of the battle of Lexington, captured 
with a lumber sloop an armed British schooner off 
Machias, Me., O'Brien, their leader, quickly armed his 
sloop with the captured cannon and ammunition, and 

9 



f 



10 



The United States Navy 



put to sea in quest of prizes. Without a commission, 
letter of marque, or legal authority of any sort, this free- 
booter captured several prizes and sent them to Machias. 
O'Brien s example was quickly followed by others. Our 
coasts soon swarmed with the privateers of New England, 
and those of Massachusetts were particularly successful. 

The daring and success of these privateers so angered 
Admiral Graves, the commander of the British fleet on 
the coast, that he reduced to ashes the town of Falmouth 
(now Portland) , Me., thus leaving the inhabitants shelter- 
less at the beginning of the bleak New England winter. 
Smarting already under the wrongs that precipitated the 
war, the hardy coast dwellers of the new world, whose 
rights to fisheries and navigation had been curtailed by 
shortsighted acts of Parliament, hardly needed this act 
of Admiral Graves to spur them to building ships of 
war. 

Other causes contributed to the beginning of a naval 
force along the Atlantic coast. The colonists, from their 
origin and environment, were naturally seafarers. Some 
of the New England Colonies even before the Revolution 
had made remarkable progress in ship-building, fishing, 
and commerce ; they were thus not unprepared to furnish 
vessels and daring sailors. Then, too, the country, being 
new and largely agricultural, needed manufactured 
articles, clothing, and munitions of war ; and these things 
had to be either captured from the enemy, or brought 
from European countries, at the risk of seizure by British 
men-of-war. In order to capture from English supply 
ships designed for Boston articles much needed by his 
troops, Washington, in the fall of 1775, fitted out several 
small vessels, manned by soldiers, under the command of 
army officers. Washington had the entire management 
of this fleet. One of these ships, the Lee, whose com- 



The Marine Committee 



11 



mission, as well as that of her captain, John Manly, 
was signed by Washington, captured the Nancy, "an 
ordnance ship . . . containing, besides a large mortar 
upon a new construction, several pieces of brass cannon, 
a large quantity of small arms and ammunition, with all 
manner of tools, utensils, and machines necessary for 
camps and artillery, in the greatest abundance. The loss 
of this ship was much resented in England. ' ' 1 Altogether 
Washington's fleet captured about thirty-five prizes. 2 

Thus not onry the bitter feelings of resentment against 
tyranny, coupled in numerous instances with motives of 
personal gains from prize money, but also the needs of 
the Continental Army quickly gave birth to a hetero- 
geneous collection of ships. This was composed partly 
of privateers, partly of vessels owned and commissioned 
by individual Colonies, and partly of vessels commissioned 
by Congress. 

The Marine Committee 

A letter from General Washington, reporting the burn- 
ing of Falmouth, was read in Congress, November 1, 
1775; and Congress acted promptly. The following day 
it voted $100,000 for a naval armament and appointed a 
committee to buy the ships. A few weeks later it 
appointed a second committee, which suggested a fleet of 
thirteen vessels ranging from 32 to 24 guns, to be ready 
by March, 1776, and recommended the appointment of a 
third committee to supervise their construction and equip- 
ment. The report was adopted by Congress. In the third 
committee, known as the Marine Committee, there were 
thirteen members, one for each colony. Its personnel 
was practically the same as that of the second committee, 



^odsley's Annual Register, London, 1776, p. 147. 

* Paullin, The ~Navy of the American Revolution, p. 65. 



The United States Navy 



and included such men as Robert Morris, John Hancock, 
and Samuel Chase, a remarkable body of men, who worked 
with the greatest ardor and patriotism. 

The Marine Committee administered our naval affairs 
from December, 1775, to December, 1779. It was the 
forerunner of our Navy Department, but its functions 
were far more complex. Like the Congress of its day, it 
exercised legislative, judicial, and executive powers, 
always, however, under the direction of that body; and 
the same weaknesses, the lack of an administrative head 
and of actual authority over the States, hampered the 
committee as they did Congress. 

Some of the confusion with which the Marine Com- 
mittee straggled is suggested by the fact that naval 
officers then, instead of being commissioned by the Presi- 
dent with the consent of the Senate, might be appointed 
in any one of the following ways: by the Marine Com- 
mittee itself, by its subordinate boards at Philadelphia 
and Boston, by any naval commander, by recruiting 
agents, by commissioners abroad, or even by local authori- 
ties in the several States. Further, besides building and 
equipping ships of war and directing their movements, 
the committee had to hold courts-martial, send abroad 
dispatches and diplomatic agents, and trade American 
produce for European munitions of war. Under such 
conditions it is remarkable that the committee accom- 
plished as much as it did. 

As the Marine Committee proved to be a clumsy 
administrative machine, 3 it was superseded in 1779 by a 
" Board of Admiralty," consisting of three commissioners 
and two members of Congress, which was in power until 
1781. Finally, Robert Morris was appointed ' ' Agent of 
Marine," and he managed very efficiently what was left 



3 Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution, p. 182, ff. 



The First Fleet 



13 



of the American Navy. By this time, Congress realized 
that an administrative department, especially in time of 
war, must be under one head. 

The First American Fleet 

The first naval committee bought and fitted out two 
24-gun frigates, the Alfred and the Columbus, and two 
brigs, the Andrea Doria and the Cabot, and supplied 
them with powder and muskets borrowed from the 
Pennsylvania Committee of Safety. On December 22, 
1775, Congress organized the first "American fleet" by 
granting commissions to Esek Hopkins, commander-in- 
chief of the fleet; Dudley Saltonstall, captain of the 
Alfred; Abraham Whipple, captain of the Columbus; 
Nicholas Biddle, captain of the Andrea Doria; and John 
Burroughs Hopkins, captain of the Cabot. John Paul 
Jones headed a list of five first lieutenants commissioned 
at the same time. 

By the end of January, 1776, the committee had added 
to this fleet the sloops Providence and Hornet and 
the schooners Wasp and Fly. For these first eight 
vessels of the navy the committee had spent $134,333. 
With this tiny force, the commander-in-chief was ordered 
to proceed directly to Chesapeake Bay to attack the 
British fleet of Lord Dunmore; then, if successful, he 
was to proceed to the Carolinas and attack the British 
force there, and thence he was to sail to Rhode Island 
and ' ' attack, take, and destroy all the enemy 's naval force 
that you may find there. ' ' This was the gigantic task of 
a fleet of eight vessels carrying 110 guns, and manned by 
landsmen or, at least, men without naval discipline. To 
oppose this force, the British had in American waters, or 
on the way hither,, seventy-eight men-of-war mounting 
2078 guns. In Commodore Hopkins' fleet, only forty 



14 The United States Navy 



guns threw shot of nine pounds or more in weight, while 
the seventy-eight British ships on this coast had at least 
500 18-pounders and heavier guns. The orders of the 
Marine Committee to the commander-in-chief of the navy, 
Esek Hopkins, were therefore foredoomed to failure. 

Perhaps Commodore Hopkins himself foresaw the 
futility of trying to adhere too strictly to his orders, for, 
instead of going to Chesapeake Bay, he proceeded to 
Nassau in the Bahamas, which he captured. After taking 
a large quantity of shot and shell, besides some eight 
cannon, fifteen mortars, and other munitions of war, he 
sailed northward with the Governor and Lieutenant- 
Governor as prisoners. As he neared his destination, 
Rhode Island, he came upon his Majesty's ship Glasgow, 
of 20 guns, Captain Tyringham Howe, which single- 
handed, inflicted considerable damage on Hopkins' fleet, 
and made good its escape. The loss of the British was 
four men; that of the Americans, twenty-four, among 
the latter two lieutenants. 

This injury inflicted upon a fleet by a single vessel 
which escaped showed little tactical skill on the part of 
the officers of the American fleet. As Commodore Hopkins 
had, besides, disobeyed his orders, he was court-martialed 
and finally dismissed. 

Commodore Hopkins was the only man to hold the 
rank 1 ' commander-in-chief of the navy." This title was 
later merged in that of the President of the United States. 
During the rest of the Revolutionary War, the only com- 
missioned officers in the navy were captains and lieu- 
tenants ; but Congress, evidently providing for the future, 
fixed the relative ranks of army and navy officers as 
follows : admiral equivalent to general, vice-admiral equiv- 
alent to lieutenant-general, rear-admiral to major-general, 
commodore to brigadier-general, captain of a ship of forty 
guns and upwards to colonel, captain of a ship of twenty 



Arnold on Lake Champlain 



15 



to forty guns to lieutenant-colonel, captain of a ship of 
ten to twenty guns to major, and lieutenant in the navy 
to captain. This table, taken from the British regulations 
of those times, has, in the main, continued in force to our 
day. 

Important Naval Events During the Revolution 

From our standpoint it will hardly be profitable to 
follow all of the various actions fought by the little United 
States Navy during the Revolution. Paullin, in his Navy 
of the American Revolution, makes the total number of 
vessels under the Continental Congress forty-two. These 
were practically all annihilated before the end of the 
war; but the heroic struggles of this early navy were 
not without result. In considering them, we shall outline 
the work of Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain, of 
Wickes, Conyngham, and especially Jones, in British 
waters, and of Biddle, Barry, and others on the American 
seaboard; and we shall not omit some mention of the 
State navies and the privateers, as well as of the assist- 
ance rendered by France. 

The First Battle of Lake Champlain 

The possession of Lakes Champlain and George was 
felt early in the war to be of strategic importance. Not 
only did these lakes furnish an excellent waterway from 
Canada to the Colonies, but it was the design of the 
British that Carleton's army from Canada should rendez- 
vous about Albany and thereby cut off all communica- 
tions between the northern and southern Colonies. The 
American Army had invaded Canada in September, 1775, 
and during the following winter it had held Governor 
Guy Carleton shut up in Quebec. On the arrival of a 



16 



The United States Navy 




Lake Ciiamplain 



Arnold on Lake Champlain 



17 



British fleet with reinforcements, the Americans retreated 
to Crown Point, where they arrived on Jnly 3, 1776. 
Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, who, earlier in his 
career as a West India merchant, had at times commanded 
his own ships, started immediately to build a fleet on the 
lakes in competition with the British. Late in July, he 
was appointed by Gates to the command of the naval 
forces on the lakes. By October, he was able to muster 
one sloop, three schooners, eight gondolas, and four 
galleys. These vessels mounted altogether ninety-four 
cannon, from 2-pounders to 18-pounders, and they were 
manned by 700 officers and men, according to Arnold, ' ' a 
wretched motley crew; the marines the refuse of every 
regiment, and the seamen few of them ever wet with salt 
water." Arnold chose for his flagship one of the galleys, 
the Congress, a vessel of fifty-foot keel and of thirteen- 
foot beam, mounting one 18-pounder, one 12-pounder, 
and two 6-pounders. 

But the British, with their greater resources in skilled 
seamen and in manufactured articles, won this race in 
building a fleet. Captain Charles Douglas, who had 
charge of the construction work of the enemy, had ready 
in twenty-eight days a full-rigged ship, the Enterprise, 
carrying eighteen 12-pounders. She had been begun at 
Quebec, and had been brought from the St. Lawrence up 
the Richelieu. The Enterprise was of 180 tons burden, 
and greatly exceeded in size and armament any of 
Arnold's fleet. Early in October, General Sir Guy Carle- 
ton, thanks to Captain Douglas' energy in ship-building, 
had under his command one ship, two schooners, one 
radeau (raft), one large gondola, twenty gunboats and 
four armed tenders. The British fleet in the St. Lawrence 
furnished C'arleton with 700 experienced officers and 
seamen. The enemy also had a large detachment of sav- 
ages under Major Thomas Carleton. 
2 



18 



The United States Navy 



The first squadron battle to be fought by Americans, 
"a strife of pygmies for the prize of a continent," as 
Mahan styles it, was begun on October 11, 1776. Arnold 
was lying in wait for Carleton behind Valcour Island, not 
far from the site of a later battle of Lake Champlain 
(September 11, 1814), where the struggle was again for 
the control of this great waterway. 

As the British van, coming down under a fair north 
wind, with full press of sail, passed the Americans before 
discovering Arnold's fleet, Carleton 's heavier vessels had 
to beat back slowly to help his hard-pressed gunboats. 
The Americans fought desperately from eleven o'clock 
in the morning till five o'clock that afternoon. With the 
British attacking in front and the Indians occupying the 
shore in the rear, Arnold was indeed "between the devil 
and the deep sea." That night, however, under cover of 
the lake mist, he slipped through the British line toward 
Ticonderoga. The British gave chase, and on the two days 
following they continued the battle. Finally, Arnold 
beached his boats, and fought with desperate courage 
until his men had fired their gondolas and taken refuge 
in the woods. Most of Arnold's vessels were either capt- 
ured or destroyed. In this battle the enemy captured 
110 prisoners, among them being General Waterbury, the 
second in command. Arnold, with the rest of his men, 
made good his escape to Crown Point. 

Although Arnold had lost his fleet, the delay which he 
thus forced on Carleton was of the greatest advantage to 
the Americans. "Never had any force," says Mahan, 
"big or small, lived to better purpose, or died more glori- 
ously ; for it had saved the lake for that year. ' ' The delay 
compelled Carleton to give up his plan of joining Howe 
to the south. When, next year, Burgoyne, renewing the 
attempt, invaded New York, he had not the aid which 



Cruises of Wickes and Conyngham 19 

Carleton could have relied on in 1776. Hence Arnold's 
work on the lakes opened the way for the surrender of 
Burgoyne at Saratoga. 4 

Wickes and Conyngham in European Waters 

Nothing illustrates so completely the daring and enter- 
prise of the Americans, save possibly the boldness of 
certain privateersmen, as the harrying of the British coast 
by Wickes, Conyngham, and Jones. In the fall of 1776, 
Captain Lambert Wickes, of the 16-gun brig Reprisal, 
while carrying Benjamin Franklin to France, captured 
two prizes. The next spring, the Lexington joined the 
Reprisal, and these two vessels captured about fifteen 
prizes. With these the cruisers returned to France ; but, 
as the latter country was ostensibly at peace with England, 
the vessels were ordered to leave. After disposing of the 
prizes clandestinely to French merchants, the Lexing- 
ton quickly refitted and sailed from Morlaix on Sep- 
tember 18, 1777. She was captured shortly after by the 
Alert, and her officers and men were taken to Plymouth 
and thrown into Mill prison on a charge of high treason. 
Richard Dale, who later distinguished himself on the 
Bonhomme Richard under Jones, was one of these 
prisoners; but he made his escape a year later by boldly 
walking past the guards, dressed in a British uniform. 
On the insistence of the British, the Reprisal also left 
France; she foundered on her way home, off the Banks 
of Newfoundland, and, with the exception of one of the 
crew, all hands, including the brave Wickes, were lost. 

The reckless daring and success of Captain Conyng- 
ham in harrying British commerce, strained almost to the 
breaking point the relations between England and France. 



* Clowes, Royal Navy, iii, 368. 



20 



The United States Navy 



The American Commissioners at Paris, through an agent, 
had bought a cutter at Dover, and had then manned and 
equipped her at Dunkirk, naming her the Surprise. 
Congress, over the signature of John Hancock, as presi- 
dent, had issued blank commissions to the American Com- 
missioners in France; it was such a commission, dated 
March 1, 1777, that Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane, 
the commissioners, had filled out with the name of Gus- 
tavus Conyngham, authorizing him to sail in the Sur- 
prise as a captain of the American Navy. A great deal of 
difficulty was encountered in getting the Surprise out 
of Dunkirk. Captain Conyngham 'Hook his arms out of 
his ship and said he should load it with merchandise for 
one of the ports in Norway. As this declaration was sus- 
pected, security was demanded. Two persons, Hodge 
and Allen, became responsible for him. Conyngham 
actually left the port of Dunkirk without arms, but he 
caused sailors, cannon, and ammunition to be sent out 
to him in the night, while he was in the road, off Dunkirk ; 
and he shortly after took the English packet boat, Prince 
of Orange. As soon as this came to the knowledge of 
the French Government, Hodge, one of the securities, 
was arrested, and conducted to the Bastille. The packet 
boat was restored to the British Government without the 
form of process. After six weeks of confinement, Hodge 
was released. ' ' 5 

Shortly after this, Conyngham captured the Harwich 
packet and took it to a French port. This open violation 
of neutrality so enraged the British, that their ambassador 
threatened to leave France if Conyngham and his prize 
were not at once given up. The French Government 
imprisoned the captain and crew of the Surprise, and 



8 Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, i, 292, note (Franklin 
and Deane to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, May 25, 1777). 



Cruises of Wickes and Conyngham 21 



returned the vessel to her owners. But before England 
could enforce her demand for the delivery of Conyngham 
and his men to the sloops of war sent over for this pur- 
pose, the Americans, by some intrigue, had been released 
and sent to sea in another cutter, the Revenge, a vessel 
provided and equipped partly by the American Commis- 
sioners, and partly on private account. It seems prob- 
able that Hodge, a Philadelphia merchant, and perhaps 
some others, were pecuniarily interested, at least in the 
later cruises of this cutter. 

The Revenge captured many prizes, and on two 
occasions boldly sailed in disguise into British ports and 
refitted. As Deane wrote to Robert Morris in August, 
1777: " Conyngham 's cruise effectually alarmed Eng- 
land, prevented the great fair at Chester, occasioned 
insurance to rise, and even deterred the English merchants 
from shipping goods in English bottoms at any rate, so 
that in a few weeks forty sail of French ships were loading 
in the Thames on freight — an instance never known 
before. ... In a word, Conyngham, by his first and 
second bold expeditions, is become the terror of all the 
eastern coast of England and Scotland, and is more 
dreaded than Thurot 6 was in the late war. ' ' 7 

On a later cruise, Conyngham sent most of his prizes 
to Ferrol, Spain, and thus his depredations on British 
commerce embarrassed France and the American Com- 
missioners less than former expeditions had done. In 
1778, Captain Conyngham was captured, and while in 
prison he was treated with such severity, that Congress, 



6 A French corsair who did great damage in commerce-destroy- 
ing expeditions against British shipping during the Seven Years 
War. 

7 Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, ii, 379-380 (Deane to 
Morris, Aug. 23, 1777). 



The United States Navy 



in a resolution on July 17, of that year, protested against 
a treatment "contrary to all dictates of humanity and 
the practice of civilized nations." 

Naval Prisoners, Prizes, and Their Effects on 
Neutrality 

This matter of naval prisoners in England, combined 
with the violations of neutral rights committed by our 
vessels, was a great source of worry to the American Com- 
missioners. These officials, having merely the status 
of private citizens in France, were treated by the French 
court with all civility, but they could not yet be openly 
received or recognized. Hence their work required the 
utmost tact and delicacy. That naval prisoners in Eng- 
land were treated with extreme harshness is admitted even 
by British authorities. This cruelty was undoubtedly 
due partly to the low conditions of prison systems in 
England, as indeed in other parts of Europe in the 
eighteenth century. One of the reasons for the cruises 
of American vessels in British waters was to capture 
Englishmen in retaliation for the treatment of Americans 
in Forton prison at Portsmouth, Mill prison at Plymouth, 
and the prison ship Jersey at Brooklyn. 

"The British Government resisted the exchange of 
prisoners taken in European waters on three grounds: 
(1) This involved a recognition of belligerent rights in 
the insurgents. (2) The American prisoners could be 
kept out of harm's way in England; the same condition 
did not apply to British prisoners taken by American 
vessels, as long as France refused to permit such prisoners 
to be landed and imprisoned on her shores. (3) British 
seamen, being far more numerous than American, ex- 



Neutrality of France and Spain 



23 



change would tell more favorably for the latter than for 
the former. " 8 

To end their sufferings, some of these prisoners in 
England enlisted in the British Navy, or in whaling fleets, 
while others escaped from prison. Conyngham and sixty 
companions, in November, 1779, burrowed their way out 
of captivity, thus "committing treason through his 
Majesty's earth," as Conyngham remarked. It was long 
after the secret treaty between France and the United 
States was signed in February, 1778, before Franklin 
could persuade the English to take a more liberal view 
as regards exchanging prisoners. In fact, the first ex- 
change was not effected till March, 1779. The Americans, 
before the treaty with France, had to confine their captives 
taken in British waters on shipboard, or let them go. 
After the treaty and after the breaking out of war 
between Spain and England in 1779, these men were 
imprisoned in France and Spain. So, likewise, the ques- 
tion of the disposition of prizes captured in European 
waters was a difficult one before the treaty. Many prizes 
were taken to France, where they were secretly sold, 
in spite of official orders commanding the American 
captains to leave port with their prizes. Indeed, it is 
very probable that, if hostilities between France and 
England had not for other causes broken out in 1778, 
the countries would have gone to war because of the con- 
nivance of the French at these breaches of neutrality. 



8 Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, ii, 724, note (Franklin, 
Lee, and Adams to the President of Congress, Sept. 17, 1778). 



II 



THE REVOLUTION (CONTINUED)— THE 
CRUISES OF JOHN PAUL JONES 

Jones's Earlier Cruises 

Paul Jones's early career during the Revolution may 
be briefly told. On May 10, 1776, he received the 12- 
gun brig Providence as his first independent command. 
On this vessel he carried troops and convoyed merchant- 
men, and so skilful was he in eluding the numerous 
British cruisers, that Congress promoted him in August 
to the full rank of captain, with orders to cruise for 
prizes along the Atlantic coast. In September, 1776, by 
a bold maneuver, he escaped from the 28-gun frigate 
Solebay. He later eluded the British frigate Milford, 
captured sixteen prizes, and destroyed other vessels. 
Some time after this, while in command of the Alfred, 
Captain Jones took the British brig Mellish, laden with 
military supplies. On the way home, he was again 
chased by the Milford, and as he was accompanied by a 
convoy of prizes, he skilfully lured the Milford away 
from them, under cover of night, so that they got safely 
to an American port, and then Jones, by superior seaman- 
ship, escaped from his pursuer. 

Captain Jones, on June 14, 1777, was put in com- 
mand of the new 18-gun ship Ranger, built at Portsmouth, 
N. H., and was ordered to France. What the motives were 
for sending him to foreign waters is not quite clear. His 
knowledge of British shores and his success in American 
waters were doubtless contributing factors. He was, 

24 




From the painting- by Cecilia Beaux, copyrighted, 1906, Dy U. S. Naval Academy 

Paul Jones 



The Cruise of the Ranger 



25 



moreover, looked upon by some of his colleagues as luke- 
warm to America, because be was a native of Scotland 
and bad, from natural motives of generosity, been lenient 
to British prisoners. ■ 

It was true that he had been only about three years in 
America, and his ideas of liberty and the rights of man he 
had drawn from a brief association with the radicals of 
North Carolina and Virginia. But these radicals were 
no less than Willie Jones (son of the colonial agent of 
Lord Granville), Joseph Hewes, Patrick Henry, and 
Thomas Jefferson. What they taught certainly left a 
lasting impression. 

Furthermore, the jealousy of the inactive Commodore 
Hopkins, who looked with eyes askance at the strenuous 
successes of his young subordinate, may have had some 
effect in sending Jones to a difficult task far from home 
waters. This feeling against him seems also to have ex- 
isted in Congress, for on the reorganization of the Navy, 
October 10, 1776, thirteen men were promoted over his 
head. Some years later, in a letter to Robert Morris, Jones 
writes : " Rank, which opens the door to glory, is too near 
the heart of every man of true military feeling, to be given 
up in favor of any other man who has not, by the achieve- 
ment of some brilliant action, or by known and superior 
abilities, merited such preference. If this be so, how 
must I have felt, since, by the second table of captains in 
the navy, adopted by Congress on the 10th of October, 
1776, I was superseded in favor of thirteen persons, two 
of whom were my junior lieutenants at the beginning; 
the rest were only commissioned into the Continental 
Navy on that day; and if they had any superior ability, 
these were not then known, nor have since been proved. 
I am the eldest sea officer (except Captain Whipple) on 
the Journal, and under the commission of Congress, re- 
maining in the service. ' ' 



26 



The United States Navy 



Whatever the motives in sending him to Europe may 
have been, Jones started at once to prepare his ship for 
his long cruise. The selection of the commissioned and 
warrant officers of the Ranger was entrusted to a com- 
mittee of three men — William Whipple, the New Hamp- 
shire member of the Marine Committee, John Langdon, 
Continental agent at Portsmouth, and John Paul Jones, 
the new commander of the vessel. This illustrates one of 
the various ways by which selections of this kind were 
made — surely not a bad way, inasmuch as it gave the 
man who was to command the vessel a voice in the choos- 
ing of the men who were to serve under him. The 
Ranger is said to have been the first vessel to fly the 
Stars and Stripes, then recently adopted. 

Jones arrived at Nantes in December, 1777, and from 
there he sailed in February, 1778, for Quiberon Bay, to 
escort some American merchantmen. This was just 
about the time that the secret treaty was made between 
the United States and France. Jones, in his orders, had 
been warned to be very careful about the rights of the 
latter country as a neutral nation. Although Franklin 
was doing his utmost to have the United States recog- 
nized by France, thinking that this act would involve the 
French in trouble with the English, still any unwarranted 
breaches of neutrality might at the crucial moment spoil 
the plans of the American Commissioners at Paris. Cap- 
tain Jones writes very proudly of the fact that, at 
Quiberon Bay, on February 14, 1778, the Ranger was 
the first American vessel to exchange salutes with a 
foreign nation. Jones sent a boat back and forth to the 
French flagship in his effort to get the French admiral to 
return gun for gun, but at length the American com- 
mander reluctantly consented to a salute of two guns less 
than his own. This incident shows Jones's pride in his 
adopted county ; it also shows a willingness on the part 



The Ranger and the Drake 



27 



of France to do a generous and overt act towards recog- 
nition of the new nation. 

On April 10, 1778, Jones left Brest and sailed straight 
for the English coast. His first attempt was to set fire 
to the great quantity of shipping in the harbor of White- 
haven. Landing early on the morning of the 22d, he 
easily captured the forts. But, because of a hitch in his 
plans, the day was well advanced and the people were 
crowding to the shore in thousands before he reached the 
shipping. He had to content himself with setting fire to 
one ship, with the hope that the flames would spread to 
the 200 or more vessels in the harbor. The attempt was 
not successful, but its daring strongly impressed the 
British. 

Shortly after these events, Jones stood over to the 
Scotch shore, where, with one boat and a very small party, 
he made a landing at St. Mary's Isle. The American 
captain did this with the purpose of capturing the Earl 
of Selkirk as a hostage for the better treatment of our 
prisoners in England. As this nobleman was not at home, 
the sailors contented themselves with the taking of the 
silverware of the castle, which Jones himself bought from 
his men and returned to the Countess of Selkirk with a 
chivalrous letter full of apologies. 

The Ranger-Drake Battle 

On the morning of the 24th of April, 1778, Jones 
appeared off Carrickfergus on the northeast coast of 
Ireland opposite Whitehaven, and lured out the British 
sloop of war Drake, 20 guns, which came to investi- 
gate the "suspicious stranger." Hails were exchanged, 
whereupon, says Jones, "the Drake being astern of the 
Ranger, I ordered the helm up and gave the first broad- 
side. The action was warm, close, and obstinate. It lasted 



28 



The United States Navy 



an hour and four minutes, when the enemy called for 
quarter; her fore and main topsail yards being both cut 



> SHETLAND ISLANDS 




Cruises of the Ranger and the Bonhomme Richard 

away, and down on the cap ; the topgallant yard and 
mizzen-gaff both hanging up and down along the mast; 
the second ensign which they had hoisted shot away, and 



The War in Home Waters 



29 



hanging on the quarter-gallery in the water; the jib shot 
away, and hanging in the water; her sails and rigging 
entirely cut to pieces; her masts and yards all wounded, 
and her hull also very much galled. I lost only Lieutenant 
Wallingford and one seaman killed, and six wounded. 
The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was far 
greater, . . . forty-two men. The captain and the lieu- 
tenant were among the wounded. ' ' 

It is fair to state that the Drake, though nominally 
the equal of the Ranger, was almost as unprepared for 
battle as the ill-starred Chesapeake in her encounter 
with the Leopard. The Drake's crew were new; her 
only officers were the captain, and a lieutenant who had 
come on board at the last moment as a volunteer ; she had 
no gunner, no cartridges had been filled, and no prepara- 
tions had been made for handling the powder. 

BlDDLE AND BARRY IN AMERICAN WATERS 

While Jones was thus winning honors in British waters, 
the ships at home could accomplish little against the tre- 
mendous British Navy. But some of our captains, like 
Biddle and Barry, deserve mention for their heroic 
struggles in a losing game. On the 32-gun frigate 
Randolph, one of the thirteen frigates built by Con- 
.gress, Captain Nicholas Biddle fought in West Indian 
waters the British 64-gun ship-of-the-line Yarmouth. 
After an hour's hard fighting, a shot from the Yarmouth 
exploded the Randolph's magazine and blew her to frag- 
ments. Of the latter 's crew of 315 men only four were 
found alive. 

In the Lexington, Captain John Barry captured, in 
April, 1776, the British sloop Edward. Barry was 
later promoted to the Effingham, but this vessel was 
destroyed in the Delaware. In the Raleigh, 32, Captain 



30 



The United States Navy 



Barry then fell in with the 50-gun ship Experiment 
and the frigate Unicorn, in September, 1778. He kept 
up a running fight for two days, and, when the wind 
died out, he finally beached his ship on the coast of Maine 
and escaped with his men. Some time before this, Cap- 
tain Barry had, with twenty-seven men, boarded the 
British armed schooner Alert in the Delaware, capturing 
116 men and officers, and sinking the schooner and two 
transports. Barry was one of the bravest naval officers of 
the Revolution; but he was, if anything, too daring, for 
it was useless for the American frigates to fight the power- 
ful British ships-of-the-Kne. At the end of 1778, only 
four of the thirteen frigates were left. 



The Battle Between the Bonhomme Richard 

AND THE SeRAPIS 

Meanwhile France and England had gone to war, and 
in 1779 Spain leagued herself with America against Eng- 
land. The joint fleets of France and Spain thereupon 
entered the Channel and even threatened a descent on 
the English coast. 

Seemingly, France could now render effective aid to 
Paul Jones, yet he found great difficulty in persuading 
the French to give him a new command. The Minister 
of Marine, De Sartine, had promised him again and again 
specific ships, but the powerful aristocracy in the French 
Navy prevented De Sartine from fulfilling his promise 
to a foreigner, who was regarded by many as an advent- 
urer. The impetuous Jones chafed under these repeated 
disappointments, and wrote many letters to Franklin, 
De Sartine, and even to the King. When, after five 
months of waiting, Jones's patience was exhausted, he 
went in person to the court and received the old hulk 
Duras, of 40 guns. He had learned the wisdom of one 



Cruise of the Bonhomme Richard 



31 



of Franklin's adages in the latter's Poor Richard's 
A lmanac , "If you would have your business clone, go your- 
self ; if not, send." In gratitude to his friend Franklin, 
Jones rechristened the Duras the Bonhomme Richard. 

To this vessel were added four other ships: the 
Alliance, 36; the Pallas, 30; the Cerf, 18; and tha 
Vengeance, 12. The new Alliance, the only American 
ship in the squadron, Congress had put in command of 
Pierre Landais, a Frenchman, in compliment to France. 
The squadron was hastily got ready at L' Orient. Some 
American prisoners, about 100, recently exchanged by 
England, gave Jones the nucleus of an American crew 
on the Bonhomme Richard, but otherwise the officers 
and crews were a motley and cosmopolitan assemblage, 
except those of the Pallas and the Vengeance, which 
were French. Indeed, the fact that Landais' crew were 
largely British may add some extenuating circumstances 
to the strange conduct of this a half crazy" officer during 
the battle. On the other hand, Richard Dale, Jones's first 
lieutenant, had unusual ability and did excellent service. 

The relation of the American commodore to his 
squadron was peculiar. The representative of the French 
Minister of Marine, in giving Jones the squadron, had 
forced him to sign a paper, by which, instead of being 
the superior officer, he became only one of equal rank with 
his subordinates. This made the squadron a confederacy 
rather than a unit. 

After repeated delays, Captain Jones finally set sail 
from L'Orient on August 14, 1779. He proceeded up the 
west coast of Ireland with the purpose of circumnavi- 
gating the British Isles. On August 26, the Cerf and 
two French privateers which had attached themselves to 
the squadron a few days before were separated in a gale, 
and never rejoined the fleet. On the cruise Jones took 
some ships as prizes and destroyed others ; but he had con- 



32 The United States Navy 



siderable difficulty with his French captains, especially 
Landais, in regard to the disposal of prizes, and he could 
make no important move without much discussion with 
his colleagues. Indeed, Landais showed an insubordina- 
tion that boded ill for the success of any concerted 
movement. 

Having rounded the Orkneys, Jones intended to 
destroy the shipping at Leith, but was frustrated by 
the dilatory co-operation of the captains of the Pallas 
and the Vengeance. On September 23, at dawn, his 
lookout sighted a large ship rounding Flamborough Head. 
By noon it became apparent that a Baltic fleet of forty 
merchantmen, under convoy of two British men-of-war 
were heading northeast. The merchantmen, at the signal 
of danger, scattered in flight toward Scarborough. The 
warships, which were the Serapis, a new frigate of 50 
guns, and the Countess of Scarborough, 20, under the 
command of Captain Pearson, then took a position 
between the Baltic fleet inshore and their enemy. Jones 
now stood for the Serapis and ordered his captains to 
form the line of battle, an order to which Landais paid 
no attention. Instead of maintaining his place behind the 
Richard, Landais, availing himself of the better sail- 
ing qualities of the Alliance, forged ahead to ascertain 
the power of the enemy. Then he went out of gun- 
shot and remained there until the battle began. Lan- 
dais had already hailed Cottineau in the Pallas, say- 
ing that if the enemy had a ship of more than fifty 
guns their only course was to run away. This insub- 
ordinate and cowardly speech, uttered in the presence of 
the crews of both ships, shows what sort of officer Landais 
was. 1 



*Mahan, Jones in the Revolution (Scribner's Magaxine, xxiv, 
207.) 



The Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis 33 



At six p.m. the Serapis came about and steered 
westward with the Scarborough in her wake. Jones 
kept his vessel bows on toward the enemy to keep the 
British in the dark as to the number of his guns. His 
only hope was in a close encounter. Thus it was that, 
when at seven p.m. Jones came within range, the battle 



m SERAPIS 

O BOf HOMME RICHARD 




From Mahan's article in Scribner' s Magazine, XXIV, 210, by permission 

The Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis 



opened with both ships gradually running on parallel 
courses toward Flamborough Head. The wind at this 
time was southwest. 

Jones answered Pearson's hail evasively, and imme- 
diately followed this up with a shot. At the very first 
exchange of broadsides, two of the three 18-pounders on 
the starboard side of the Richard burst, killing and 
wounding most of their crews and blowing up the deck 
above. These guns had to be entirely abandoned, leaving 
only the 12- and 9-pounders. 

3 



34 



The United States Navy 



Of this stage of the battle Jones says in his report : 2 
" The battle, thus begun, was continued with unre- 
mitting fury. Every method was practised on both sides 
to gain an advantage, and rake each other; and I must 
confess that the enemy's ship, being much more manage- 
able than the Richard, gained thereby several times an 
advantageous situation, in spite of my best endeavors to 
prevent it. As I had to deal with an enemy of greatly 
superior force, I was under the necessity of closing with 
him, to prevent the advantage which he had over me in 
point of maneuver. It was my intention to lay the 
Richard athwart the enemy's bow, but as that operation 
required great dexterity in the management of both sails 
and helm and some of our braces being shot away, it 
did not exactly succeed to my wishes. The enemy's bow- 
sprit, however, came over the Bonhomme Richard's poop 
by the mizzenmast, and I made both ships fast together 
in that situation, which by the action of the wind on the 
enemy's sails, forced her stern close to the Richard's 
bow, so that the ships lay square alongside of each other, 
the yards being all entangled, and the cannon of each ship 
touching the opponent's side. When this position took 
place, it was eight o'clock, previous to which the Richard 
had received sundry 18-pound shots below the water, and 
leaked very much." 

Although Jones had lashed the vessels together, the 
Serapis' crew were on the alert for any attempt at 
boarding. Pearson evidently recognized his great advan- 
tage in maneuvering, and at the moment of fouling had 
let go an anchor, hoping thus, by means of the tide and 
the wind, to wrench the vessels apart. But the ships held 
fast. As up to this stage of the battle the Serapis 



'* Jones's report may be found in Stewart's John Paul Jones 
Commemoration, pp. 139, ff. 



The Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis 35 



had fought only her port guns, the starboard lower ports 
were closed. Since now the close contact of the vessels 
prevented the opening of these ports, Pearson fired 
through them. So near to each other were the gun 
crews, that, according to Dale, the men had to run the 
rammers into the opponent's ports to load their pieces, 
and Pearson tells us that the muzzles of the guns touched 
the sides of the enemy's ship. During this part of the 
fight, the damage done to the American vessel by the 
more powerful 18-pounders of the enemy was terrible. 
Says Jones: "The rudder was entirely cut off the stern 
frame, and the transoms were almost wholly cut away. 
The timbers of the lower deck especially, from the main- 
mast to the stern, being greatly decayed with age, were 
mangled beyond any power of description. " 

In the course of this terrible pounding, Jones's battery 
of 12-pounders was entirely silenced and abandoned. In 
his report he continues : 

"I had now only two pieces of cannon, 9-pounders, 
on the quarter-deck that were not silenced, and not one 
of the heavier cannon was fired during the rest of the 
action. The purser, Mr. Mease, who commanded the guns 
on the quarter-deck, being dangerously wounded in the 
head, I was obliged to fill his place, and with great diffi- 
culty rallied a few men, and shifted over one of the lee 
quarter-deck guns, so that we afterward played three 
pieces of 9-pounders upon the enemy. The tops alone 
seconded the fire of this little battery and held out bravely 
during the whole of the action; especially the main top, 
where Lieutenant Stack commanded. I directed the fire 
of one of the three cannon against the main-mast, with 
double-headed shot, while the other two were exceedingly 
well served with grape and canister shot to silence the 
enemy's musketry, and clear her decks, which was at last 
effected" 



36 



The United States Navy 



The condition of the Richard was becoming more 
and more desperate ; her hold was filling with water and 
she was on fire in several places. The master-at-arms, 
who had charge of the prisoners in the Richard's hold, 
either thinking the old vessel was doomed, or inspired by 
treachery, had released them. The prisoners would natu- 
rally have joined battle against the crew of the Richard, 
assisting their countrymen in the Serapis, had not Dale 
shrewdly put them to work at the pumps, telling them 
that the enemy's plight was worse, and that their own 
safety depended on keeping the Richard afloat. Just 
before this, the gunner, in a state of panic, had loudly 
clamored for quarter, and was in the act of striking the 
colors, when Jones hurled his pistol at the fellow, break- 
ing his skull. In the silence that followed, Pearson gave 
the order to board, but the men who attempted to carry 
out this command were quickly repelled. To Pearson's 
query whether the Americans had surrendered, Jones 
gave the answer that has since become one of the watch- 
words of the navy, ' ' I have not yet begun to fight ! ' ' 

Although the Richard was hopelessly inferior in 
her batteries, the force aloft, armed with muskets and 
grenades, finally turned the tide of victory. The British 
had been driven out of their own tops, and the Americans 
dexterously climbed along the interlaced rigging of the 
two ships, and thus kept the deck of the Serapis clear 
of defenders. Says Pearson in his report, "From the 
great quantity and variety of combustible material they 
threw upon our decks, chains, and in short into every 
part of the ship, we were on fire no less than ten or twelve 
times in different parts of the ship, and it was with the 
greatest difficulty and exertion at times that we were able 
to get it extinguished. ' ' 3 



3 Dodsley's Annual Register, xxii, 310. 



The Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis 37 

A veiy important part in this fight was played by a 
marine in the maintop of Jones's flagship who succeeded 
in dropping a hand-grenade into the open hatch of the 
Serapis. A terrific explosion followed, "the flames of 
which," says Pearson, "running from cartridge to car- 
tridge all the way aft, blew up the whole of the people 
and officers that were quartered abaft the mainmast ; from 
which unfortunate circumstance all those guns were 
rendered useless for the remainder of the action, and I 
fear the greatest part of the people will lose their lives.' ' 
Pearson was a brave fighter, but this catastrophe on his 
own ship must have had much to do with the final dis- 
organizing of his men. 

At this crisis the Alliance made her appearance. She 
had once before early in the action sailed around the 
combatants and fired her broadsides so recklessly at the 
entangled vessels that she did as much damage to the 
Richard as to the enemy. Of her second attack, Jones 
says: "Landais discharged a broadside full into the 
stern of the Richard. We called to him for God's sake 
to forbear firing into the Bonhomme Richard; yet he 
passed along the off side of the ship and continued 
firing. There was no possibility of his mistaking the 
enemy's ship for the Richard, there being the most essen- 
tial difference in their appearance and construction; 
besides, it was then full moonlight, and the sides of 
the Richard were all black, while the sides of the prizes 
were yellow. Yet, for the greater security, I showed 
the signal of our reconnoissance, by putting out three 
lanterns, one at the head, another at the stern, and the 
third in the middle, in a horizontal line. Every tongue 
cried that he was firing into the wrong ship, but nothing 
availed; he passed round, firing into the Richard's head, 
stern, and broadside, and by one of his volleys killed 
several of my best men, and mortally wounded a good 



38 



The United States Navy 



officer on the forecastle. My situation was really deplor- 
able. The RicJwrd received various shot under water 
from the Alliance; the leak gained on the pump, and the 
fire increased much on board both ships." 

However, Captain Pearson was even more discouraged 
by the reappearance of the Alliance than Jones. In fact, 
he ascribes his final defeat to Landais. But probably 
owing to his ignorance of the eccentricities of the French- 
man 's character, he did not realize the damage the latter 
was doing to Jones 's ship. Mahan thinks that it was the 
superiority above decks of the Bonhomme Richard which 
finally turned the scales. 4 At the moment of surrender, 
the mainmast of the Serapis, at which Jones had for 
some time been discharging one of his 9-pounders, went 
by the board. The loss in killed and wounded was excep- 
tionally heavy on both sides; that of the Richard being 
116 men, and of the Serapis 129. 5 

The Countess of Scarborough, the second of the two 
vessels under Captain Pearson, was captured after an 
hour's hard fighting by the Pallas. The latter seems to 
have been the only one of Jones's ships that rendered 
assistance. The Vengeance took no part in the action. 
The Baltic fleet was allowed to escape because, as Jones 
says, "I myself was in no condition to pursue, and none 
of the rest showed any inclination to do so." Unques- 
tionably, Landais was jealous of the American commodore, 
as was evident from numerous acts of his on the cruise. 

The honors in this battle were decidedly in favor of 
Jones, who, in an old vessel, transformed into a one-decker 
by the necessary abandonment early in the action of her 
useless 18-pounders, had fought to a finish a new frigate, 
which, though classed asa" forty-four, ' ' carried in reality 



* Mahan, Scribnei~'s Magazine, xxiv, 210. 

■ Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution, p. 297. 



Jones's Later Career 



39 



fifty guns. The Pallas had her match in the Countess 
of Scarborough; the Alliance did as much harm as good; 
and the remaining vessel under Jones took no part 
in the battle. Thus Pearson, instead of sacrificing his two 
vessels to save the Baltic fleet against a vastly superior 
force, had in reality matched his two better vessels against 
two of Jones's squadron, and the escape of the Baltic 
fleet was an accident so far as Pearson was concerned. 
There is not the slightest doubt that Pearson was a brave 
officer and fought as long as there was any hope of suc- 
cess, but he was matched against a man of indomitable 
courage. As Captain A. S. Mackenzie says, "The 
Richard was beaten more than once ; but the spirit of 
J ones could not be overcome. ' ' 6 

After the battle, Captain Jones tried hard to keep 
the Richard afloat. She was on fire in various parts, 
and at the same time the water was gaining in her hold 
in spite of three pumps that were kept constantly at 
work. The fire was extinguished, but on account of the 
increasing volume of water, she had to be abandoned, 
and on the morning of the 25th, with her flag still flying, 
the victorious old hulk sank beneath the waves. 

In the Serapis Jones now sailed for the Texel, where 
he arrived on October 3. British men-of-war were lying 
in wait to capture him ; but he bided his time and then, 
seizing a favorable opportunity, sailed boldly through the 
English Channel, in plain view of large British fleets at 
anchor, and reached Groix in February, 1780. 

For his brilliant victory, Jones was knighted by 
France, and presented a sword by the King. On his 
return to America in 1781, Congress gave him a vote of 
thanks, and appointed him to command the 74-gun ship 
America, then building at Portsmouth, N. H. As the 



'Mackenzie, Life of Paul Jones, i 3 205. 



40 



The United States Navy 



war was practically over, Jones 's services as a naval officer 
were no longer needed. In 1783 he was sent to Paris to 
conduct negotiations regarding prizes of the Bonhomme 
Richard. Jones later accepted a commission in the 
Russian Navy as vice-admiral, but his experience in 
Russia was not a happy one. He returned to Paris, where 
he spent most of the remaining years of his life, honored 
by the French, the intimate friend of such men as Morris 
and Lafayette. In this city Jones died July 18,, 1792. 
Of our greatest naval officer during the Revolution, Napo- 
leon is said to have remarked to Berthier in 1805, after 
the battle of Trafalgar, "Had Jones lived to this day, 
France might have had an admiral.' ' 

Conclusion of the War 

While the navy was winning honors in Europe, impor- 
tant events were happening in home waters. Captain 
Nicholson, in the U. S. S. Trumbull, saw some hard 
fighting, but in 1781 this ship was forced to surrender 
to the Iris and the General Monk. It is a strange 
irony of fate that the Iris, formerly the Hancock, and 
the first of the thirteen frigates of Congress to be captured, 
should thus have received the surrender of the TrumbulU 
the last of the unlucky thirteen. Captain Barry, in the 
Alliance, made a successful cruise and captured a number 
of prizes. In an encounter with an unknown vessel, 
probably the Sibylle, on March 10, 1783, he fought the 
last sea fight of the Revolution, in which he was unsuc- 
cessful, since the Alliance had to relinquish her prey on 
the appearance of two British frigates. 

There yet remain two classes of ships that deserve brief 
mention, privateers and State navies. From the beginning 
of the war there were swarms of American privateers that 
did great damage to British commerce, though it must 



Conclusion of the War 



41 



be admitted, also, that English privateers preyed exten- 
sively on American merchantmen. The effect upon the 
outcome of the war was negligible. The losses suffered 
were apparently equal, and from the American stand- 
point, the ill effects probably outweighed the good. Appeal- 
ing as privateering did to the enterprising and daring 
type of sailor, it diverted the very men who were most 
needed in the regular service. State navies were main- 
tained by all the States but two for the protection of 
their coasts. Their vessels were chiefly small, and of 
shallow draft, designed for river and harbor defense. One 
of them, the Tlyder All of the Pennsylvania Navy, 
mounting eighteen guns, and commanded by Lieutenant 
Barney, made in April, 1782, a brilliant capture of the 
English brig General Monk, mounting twenty guns. 

Meanwhile a strong French fleet under De Grasse had 
rendered aid of the greatest importance to the land forces, 
co-operating with Washington. When in 1781 the British 
power in America was confined to two centres, one at 
New York and the other in the Chesapeake, with the 
intervening country in the hands of the Americans, com- 
munications between the British forces depended wholly 
on the sea. 7 

Using one of his frigates as a dispatch boat, De Grasse 
arranged with Washington for a concerted attack on York- 
town. Early in September, 1781, the French fleet under 
De Grasse fought the British fleet under Graves, and, 
although the battle itself Was indecisive, De Grasse suc- 
ceeded in preventing Graves from entering Chesapeake 
Bay and effecting a junction with Cornwallis. Meanwhile, 
" a sudden march of Washington brought him to the 
front of the English troops . . . and the army of 
Cornwallis was driven by famine to a surrender as humili- 
ating as that of Saratoga. ' ' 8 



7 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p. 385. 

8 Green, Short History of the English People, p. 785. 



Ill 



THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW NAVY AND THE 
WAR WITH FRANCE 

The Beginnings of a New Navy 
In the chaos that followed the Revolutionary War, 
all that remained of the Continental Navy disappeared. 
The ship-of-the-line America, which had been completed 
shortly after the conclusion of peace, was presented by 
the United States to the King of France, in token of 
gratitude for the timely aid of France during the war. 
The three ships that survived the Revolution, the Deane, 
the Washington, and the Alliance, were sold; and after 
the disposal of the last of these in 1785, the United States 
had not a single armed vessel. 

With an empty treasury and an overwhelming public 
debt, the new-born nation was in no condition to maintain 
a navy ; but stronger than the reason of economy was the 
prevailing notion that an army and a navy were dangerous 
to the liberties of a republic. Years after the country had 
settled into its quiet and ordered career under the Con- 
stitution, when it was evident that a navy cost less than 
the annual tribute to pirates or extra insurance on ships 
and cargoes, the same cry of monarchism continued to be 
heard. 

Yet very soon after the close of the Revolutionary War 
the necessity of a navy began to be felt. A treaty of 
peace, in 1785, between Spain and Algiers, opened the 
Atlantic to the Algerian pirates, and in July of the same 
year led to the capture of the American schooner 
Maria. Five days later, the ship Dauphin of Phila- 
delphia was seized, and the crews of both vessels were 
42 



A 32-Pounder Carronade 
(Taken from H. M. S. Cyane, 1815) 




A 24-Pounder Long Gun 

(Taken from H. M. S. Confiance, 1814. This and the carronade shown above are 
now at the U. S. Naval Academy) 



Trouble with Algiers 



43 



taken into Algiers as slaves. At this time our consul- 
general at Paris, Thomas Barclay, was conducting a suc- 
cessful negotiation of a treaty of peace with the Emperor 
of Morocco. The costs of this treaty amounted to less 
than $10,000 in presents, with no annual tribute for the 
future; and it was hoped that some equally good treaty 
might be made with Algiers. 

The capture of the Maria and the Dauphin, how- 
ever, complicated the situation because, in addition 
to the cost of a treaty, the prisoners would have to be 
ransomed on whatever terms the Dey of Algiers chose. 
It was soon evident that he was in no hurry to conclude 
a treaty with America, for the prospect of preying on 
the shipping of a weak nation was highly attractive. The 
United States made three distinct efforts to treat with the 
Dey of Algiers and all were failures, the last being en- 
trusted to John Paul Jones, who died before the orders 
reached him. By the time a fourth envoy was dispatched, 
the Dey refused to give him audience, and at the same 
time a treaty of peace between Portugal and Algiers made 
still freer for the corsairs the highway into the Atlantic. 
This treaty, in 1793, was negotiated by the English 
consul-general, apparently with no authority from Portu- 
gal. At this time the British Government was frankly 
subsidizing the Barbary states to prey on the shipping of 
rival nations, especially America — a policy which was 
maintained until the United States made her own terms 
in the Mediterranean by force of arms. 

Taking instant advantage of the treaty with Portugal, 
Algerian corsairs swarmed into the Atlantic and, in 
the course of one month, captured eleven American 
vessels. By this time Algiers held thirteen American 
prizes, and their crews to the number of 119, seven of 
whom died in captivity. 

This disgraceful situation at last prompted Congress 



44 



The United States Navy 



to measures of force. On March 27, 1794, the President 
signed an act providing for six frigates, four of forty- 
four guns, and two of thirty-six, for the purpose of pro- 
tection against Algiers. The act, however, was careful 
to make clear that there was no intention of inaugurating 
a permanent navy, saying that "if a peace should take 
place between the United States and the regency of 
Algiers, no farther proceeding shall be had under this 
act. ' ' The fact remains, nevertheless, that this law marks 
the beginning of the permanent American Navy. 

Work on the frigates was promptly begun ; and, fortu- 
nately, the design of the new vessels was left to the 
finest ship-builder in the country, Joshua Humphreys. It 
is a significant compliment to his skill that toward the 
close of the War of 1812, England built frigates "exactly 
upon the plan of the large American frigates, ' ' 1 which 
had been constructed according to his designs. His idea 
was, " that the vessels should combine such qualities of 
strength, durability, swiftness of sailing, and force, as to 
render them superior to any frigate belonging to the 
European Powers. ' ' 2 His chief innovations were pro- 
visions for heavier batteries than had hitherto been 
attempted for frigates, much thicker scantlings, finer lines, 
and spars longer and stouter than those of any British 
frigate. The President, for example, had a thicker side 
by one inch than the British 74-gun ship-of-the-line Hero, 
and a mainmast a foot longer than that of a British 64- 
gun ship. 

Types of Ships and Guns 

It is worth noting what the term "frigate" meant at 
the close of the 18th century. The victories of Rodney and 
of Nelson were won with fleets of "ships-of-the-line. " 



1 London Times, March 17, 1814. 

2 p L epoit of Gen. Knox, Secretary of War, December 27, 1794. 



Types of Ships and Guns 45 




46 



The United States Navy 



These were heavy vessels of two or three gun decks, carry- 
ing from seventy-five to 125 guns. The " frigate " was, 
like the ' ' ship-of -the-line, ' ' ship-rigged, but distinguished 
by having only one gun deck below the spar deck. Being 
speedier than the heavy ship-of-the-line, the frigate was 
generally used for scout duty; she was the " cruiser " 
of this period. 

A third class was the " sloop of war." This, the 
smallest type, was distinguished by the fact that all her 
armament was mounted on the spar deck. These " sloops" 
were sometimes ship-rigged, sometimes brigs or schooners, 
and they varied widely in tonnage. The ship-rigged sloops 
were frequently spoken of as "corvettes." Between the 
ship-of-the-line and the frigate there was an intermediary 
class, the "razee," which was simply a ship-of-the-line 
that had been cut down one deck, but was still of greater 
size and heavier metal than the frigate. As a type it is 
unimportant; but the other three classes, "ship-of-the- 
line," "frigate," and "sloop," were standard types till 
the days of steam and steel. 

The naval guns of the period may be divided into 
two classes, long guns and short guns, or "carronades." 
Both were cast iron tubes, thicker at the breech than at 
the muzzle, and of smooth bore. The long gun was cast 
heavy and long, to bear a heavy charge and to strike a 
distant target; while the carronade was short and wide- 
muzzled, designed to throw a heavy shot, with a small 
charge of powder, at close quarters. The carronade 
(named from the village of Carron in Scotland where the 
type of gun was first cast) was high in favor in Nelson's 
day because of its tremendous smashing qualities in a 
yard-arm fight. The usual practice was to mount the 
carronades and lighter long guns on the spar deck of a 
frigate, and to equip the gun deck with the heavier long 
guns. These carronades and long guns were graded 



Types of Ships and Guns 



48 



The United States Navy 



according to the weight of shot they threw. At the end 
of the 18th century the long 42-pounder represented the 
most formidable naval ordnance of the day, but the long 
guns on a frigate usually varied from twelves to twenty- 
fours and the short ones from twenty-fours to forty-twos. 
All these guns were mounted on wooden carriages; the 
recoil threw the gun inboard as far as the breeching 
would allow, and when it was reloaded it was run out 
again by hand tackles. Indeed, all the labor connected 
with the loading, aiming and firing of a gun was done 
by hand. Elevating was done by means of a handspike 
under the breech where a wooden wedge, called a " quoin,' ' 
was inserted when the desired angle was reached. As a 
rule, there were no sights ; when the matter of sights was 
called to the attention of Nelson in 1801, he objected to 
them on the ground that ships should always be at such 
close quarters that missing would become impossible. This 
contempt of accurate aim sheds some light on the low 
state of British gunnery during our War of 1812. 

Firing was done on some ships by flint locks, but 
these missed so often that the priming quill was more 
popular. This was a split quill, full of powder, inserted 
in the touch-hole of the gun. The cartridge had already 
been punctured by a sharp wire thrust through the touch- 
hole, so that when a slow match in the hands of the 
captain of the gun touched off the powder in the quill, 
the discharge followed almost instantaneously. All the 
men were assigned to the guns of one broadside, a large 
crew to each gun, every man of whom had a definite duty 
to perform. In case a ship had to fight both broadsides 
at once, half the crew of each gun ran to the corresponding 
gun on the opposite side. 

The number of guns a ship carried gave her her rating 
within her own class. The ships-of-the-line ranged from 
"74V to "120V' frigates from "28's" to "44's," but 



Types of Ships and Guns 



49 




50 



The United States Navy 



the technical rating was always below the actual number 
of guns carried. The "44-gun" frigate Constitution, 
for example, carried fifty-four guns in her battle with the 
Java. 

In accordance with the act of March 27, 1794, six 
frigates were laid down as follows : 

Constitution, 44 guns, 1576 tons, costing $302,719, at 
Boston. 

President, 44 guns, 1576 tons, $220,910, at New York. 
United States, 44 guns, 1576 tons, $299,336, at Phila- 
delphia. 

Chesapeake, 36 guns, 1244 tons, $220,678, at Norfolk. 3 
Congress, 36 guns, 1268 tons, $197,246, at Portsmouth. 
Constellation, 36 guns, 1265 tons, $314,212, at Bal- 
timore. 

It is interesting to compare figures like these with 
those of one of our latest battleships, the North Dakota: 
ten 12-inch guns, 20,000 tons, costing approximately 
$8,000,000. 

On the fifth of June of the same year, six captains 
were selected in the following order: John Barry, Samuel 
Nicholson, Silas Talbot, Joshua Barney, Richard Dale, and 
Thomas Truxtun. All of these men had distinguished 
themselves in the struggle for independence. Captain 
Barney, however, feeling that he was unjustly rated with 
reference to the men above him, declined to serve, and 
James Sever was appointed sixth captain, ranking after 
Truxtun. The lieutenants were to be selected by the 
captains, the first lieutenant of Barry ranking the first 
lieutenant of Nicholson, etc. 

Meanwhile, efforts were continued to arrange a treaty 
with Algiers; and finally, toward the close of the year 
1795, a humiliating treaty was ratified by the Senate, 
requiring the United States to pay Algiers maritime stores 



8 The Chesapeake was intended originally to be a forty-four. 



Causes of the War with France 



51 



to the value of $21,600 annually. The cost of obtaining 
this treaty, including ransom of captives, amounted to 
nearly a million dollars. 

The law provided that nothing more was to be done 
on the frigates if peace was arranged, but three were so 
far constructed that Congress authorized their completion. 
The perishable material of the other three was ordered 
sold, and the rest kept in storage for future use. In 1797 
the three frigates completed were launched in the follow- 
ing order: the United States, July 10, at Philadelphia; 
the Constellation, September 7, at Baltimore; and the 
Constitution, September 20, at Boston. Captain Barry 
commanded the United States, Captain Nicholson, the 
Constitution, and, as it happened, Truxtun, the fifth 
on the list, who had been appointed to command the 36-gun 
Constellation, got to sea with his command, while his 
seniors, Captains Talbot and Dale, were forced into other 
occupations, because their frigates were not completed. 
This point, later, gave rise to a question of seniority 
between these two and Captain Truxtun, because at the 
time it was not clear whether Talbot and Dale had been 
retired or merely put on furlough. 

According to the terms of the above treaty, as we have 
seen, the difficulties with Algiers were settled by the 
payment of a large annual tribute and a cash payment at 
the time of nearly a million dollars. The last item alone 
would have been sufficient to build and equip three 44-gun 
frigates, which could have gone far toward protecting our 
shipping, and might even have blockaded Algiers and 
forced a peace on terms of honor. 

War with France 

Long before the first three frigates were launched, 
other enemies than Algiers had appeared. In the tremen- 
dous conflict between Napoleon and England, French and 



52 The United States Navy 



English cruisers and privateers alike plundered American 
merchantmen. A treaty of " amity, commerce, and navi- 
gation," in 1795, between Great Britain and the United 
States, temporarily relieved the burden of British oppres- 
sion, but only increased the hostility of the French. In 
1797, the Secretary of State reported that documents 
concerning the capture of thirty-two ships, brigs, and 
schooners lay in the department, while the newspapers had 
reported some 308 others, all by French cruisers. In many 
cases, these captures were attended with great inhumanity 
toward the unlucky crews. Finally, to bring their inso- 
lence to a climax, early in 1798, French privateers began 
to make captures in American harbors. 

This was too much even for the Congress of that day, 
and in April of the same year an act was passed authoriz- 
ing the building, purchase, or hire of " a number of vessels 
not exceeding twelve ... to be armed, fitted, and 
manned." On April 30, 1798, the office of the Secretary 
of the Navy was established, to which Benjamin Stoddert 
of Georgetown, D. C, was appointed. Several other acts 
followed in quick succession, authorizing the further exten- 
sion of the navy; more especially the building of the 
three frigates suspended in 1796, and the establishing of a 
marine corps. Further, all treaties with France were 
declared void, and rules were made governing the capture 
of prizes. The entire naval force authorized by these acts 
consisted of twelve ships of not less than 32 guns, twelve 
ships of not less than 20 nor exceeding 24 guns, and six 
not exceeding 18 guns, besides galleys and revenue cutters. 

Of this force, Captain Eichard Dale, in the Ganges, 
24 guns, was the first to get to sea, followed in a few days 
by Captain Truxtun in the frigate Constellation, 36 
guns, and Captain Stephen Decatur (senior), in the cor- 
vette Delaware, of 20 guns. These vessels were under 
orders to capture only such French ships as they found 
guilty of hostile acts, but it was only a matter of a few 



The Baltimore Affair 



53 



days before the Delaware took the Croyable, a French 
privateer of 14 guns, caught red-handed off the American 
coast. This vessel was taken into the service, under the 
name Retaliation, and put under the command of Lieu- 
tenant William Bainbridge. 

By the time the other ships were ready for sea, the 
administration had decided to carry on a vigorous offen- 
sive campaign in the West Indies instead of merely patrol- 
ling the Atlantic coast. Accordingly, during the winter 
of 1798-9, the fleet was divided into three squadrons, 
with definite cruising grounds assigned to each. The 
frigates President, Chesapeake, and Congress were as 
yet unfinished, and the greater number of the vessels in 
the squadrons were merchantmen hastily transformed 
into men-of-war. Nevertheless upon the mere sailing of 
these squadrons for the West Indies, the rates of insur- 
ance fell off, in some cases as much as fifty per cent ; for 
one of the important duties of these men-of-war was the 
safe conduct of fleets of American merchantmen. 

While thus convoying a fleet from Charleston to 
Havana, Captain Phillips, of the 20-gun sloop Balti- 
more, underwent an experience that cost him his epaulets 
and aroused in the nation a feeling of bitterness against 
Great Britain that did not subside till after the War of 
1812. Shortly before reaching Havana, November 16, 
1798, Captain Phillips ran into a British squadron. Sig- 
naling his convoy to scatter and make every effort to 
reach port, he himself bore up to meet the flagship, hoping 
to divert attention from the merchantmen. On being 
invited aboard the flagship, he was coolly informed that 
the British commodore, Loring, would impress all of the 
Baltimore's crew who did not have American "protec- 
tion papers." Phillips protested, but he was in a difficult 
situation. He had been provided with no commission to 
prove that the Baltimore was a public vessel, he had 
been strictly ordered to avoid all hostile acts toward 



54 



The United States Navy 



British men-of-war, "even if they were in the act of 
capturing American vessels," and, finally, he lay under 
the guns of an overwhelming force. At last he submitted. 
Fifty-five of the Baltimore's crew were taken off, but 
of these fifty were returned. As Loring refused to accept 
the surrender of the American corvette, Phillips continued 
to Havana. On his return to the United States, he made 
a detailed report of the affair to the Department, with 
the result that he was promptly dismissed from the 
service by Secretary Stoddert. 

Immediately after this incident, the Secretary issued 
orders to each of the commanders of the squadrons in the 
West Indies in the following vein : i ' Sir — It is the posi- 
tive command of the President that on no pretense what- 
ever you permit the public vessels of war under your 
command to be detained or searched, nor any of the 
officers belonging to her to be taken from her by the ships 
or vessels of any foreign nation, so long as you are in a 
capacity to repel such outrage on the honor of the Amer 
ican flag. If force should be exerted to compel your 
submission you are to resist that force to the utmost of 
your power, and when overpowered by superior force, you 
are to strike your flag and thus yield your vessel as well 
as your men, but never your men without your vessel." 

Four days after the Baltimore outrage, the Retaliation, 
Lieutenant William Bainbridge, was overhauled off 
Guadeloupe, by two French frigates, Insurgente and 
Volontier, and compelled to strike. It was due to Bain- 
bridge's quick wit, shortly after his surrender, that the 
other two American sloops, the Montezuma and the 
Norfolk, which happened to be in the neighborhood, were 
not taken also. The Insurgente was rapidly overhauling 
them, when the captain of the Volontier, turning to Bain- 
bridge, asked him the force of the American vessels. 

"The ship carries twenty-eight 12-pounders, and the 
brig twenty 9-pounders, ' ' he replied. 



The Constellation and the Insurgente 55 



Surprised at such force, the Frenchman instantly 
recalled the Insurgente and did not realize the decep- 
tion till her captain came aboard and reported the facts. 
In the meantime, the two sloops made good their escape. 

On the 9th of February, 1799, the Constellation 
sighted a large sail in the neighborhood of the island of 
Nevis. The stranger hoisted American colors as Captain 
Truxtun bore down on her, but was unable to answer the 




Scene of the Wab with France 



private signals which he displayed. She soon declared 
herself an enemy by raising the tricolor and firing a gun 
to windward. The following account is from Captain 
Truxtun 's report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on 
the 10th of February, the day after the battle: 

"I continued bearing down on her, and at a quarter 
past three p.m. she nailed me several times; and as soon 
as I got in a position for every shot to do execution, I 
answered by commencing a close and successful engage- 
ment, which lasted until about half-past four p.m., when 



56 



The United States Navy 



she struck her colors to the U. S. Ship Constellation, 
and I immediately took possession of her. She proved to 
be the celebrated French national frigate Insurgente, 
of 40 guns and 409 men, lately out from France, com- 
manded by Monsieur Barreaut, and is esteemed one of the 
fastest-sailing ships in the French Navy. I have been 
much shattered in my rigging and sails, and my foretop- 
mast rendered, from wounds, useless — you may depend the 
enemy is not less so. The high state of our discipline, with 
the gallant conduct of my officers and men, would have 
enabled me to have made a more formidable enemy yield, 
had the fortune of war thrown him in my way. As it is, 
I hope the President and my country will, for the present, 
be content with a very fine frigate being added to our 
navy. I must not omit in this hasty detail to do justice 
to M. Barreaut; for he defended his ship manfully, and 
from my raking him several times fore and aft, and being 
athwart his stern, ready with every gun to fire, when he 
struck his colors, we may impute the conflict not being 
more bloody on our side; for had not these advantages 
been taken, the engagement would not have ended so 
soon; for the Insurgente was completely officered and 
manned. " 

The total loss of the Constellation amounted to two 
badly wounded and one slightly wounded. Early in the 
action one man was shot by the third lieutenant for desert- 
ing his quarters. The loss of the Insurgente amounted 
to twenty-nine killed and forty-one wounded. Both 
frigates were rated at 36, but the American broadside was 
fully one-third heavier than the French. 

During the action with the Insurgente, Midship- 
man David Porter, who was stationed in the foretop of 
the Constellation, saved the wounded foretopmast from 
falling over by going aloft, under fire, cutting away 
the slings of the yards and letting them down. Porter 
had another and more trying proof of his coolness and 



The Constellation and the Vengeance 57 



gallantry after the action, when he and Lieutenant John 
Rodgers were sent with a prize crew of eleven men to 
take possession of the captured frigate. A gale which 
arose after the battle separated the two vessels before all 
the prisoners could be transferred to the Constellation, 
and the two young officers found themselves forced to 
navigate a ship whose decks were still strewn with dead 
and wounded, and whose spars, sails, and rigging were 
cut to pieces, some of which encumbered the decks — a 
situation made critical by the storm. But the worst 
danger lay in the fact that, before the surrender, the 
hatches had been thrown overboard, and the prize crew of 
two officers and eleven men had the task of guarding 
173 prisoners, as well as navigating a crippled ship in a 
gale. A heavily-armed sentinel was placed at each hatch- 
way, with orders to fire at the first prisoner that attempted 
to come on deck; and during the three nights and two 
days that passed before the ship reported to Truxtun at 
St. Kitts, neither Rodgers nor Porter could take a single 
minute of sleep or even rest. These two officers rose sub- 
sequently to distinction in positions of command, but they 
never afterward had to go through a more trying test of 
their courage and efficiency. 

During the year 1799, American operations in the 
West Indies were hampered by the fact that enlistments 
had been, by law, for only one year. Every ship, there- 
fore, had to leave her station during this year and go to 
the United States for fresh crews ; and the French priva- 
teers that made Guadeloupe their base were quick to take 
advantage of these enforced absences. On the whole, 
however, the French gained little beyond a brief respite. 

The second frigate action of the war also fell to 
Truxtun and the Constellation. On the morning of Feb- 
ruary 1, 1800, while about fifteen miles west of Basse 
Terre, the Constellation sighted a ship which soon proved 
to be a French frigate, the Vengeance. Captain Truxtun 



58 



The United States Navy 



immediately gave chase; but, owing to the light wind, it 
was not till eight o'clock on the evening of the 2d that 
he was able to close. The Frenchman, without waiting to 
hear the hail of the American, opened fire with his stern 
and quarter guns, which he directed at the Constellation's 
rigging. 

Captain Truxtun then gave orders, ' ' not to throw away 
a single charge of powder and shot, but to take good aim 
and fire directly into the hull of the enemy." A few 
minutes later, he gained a good position on the weather 
quarter of the Vengeance which enabled the American 
batteries to reply. A sharp action followed, lasting till 
about 1 a.m., when the Vengeance stopped firing and 
sheered off as if to escape. Just as Captain Truxtun was 
trimming his shattered rigging to come alongside and take 
possession, his mainmast fell over the side. As the Con- 
stellation was now unable to pursue the Vengeance, the 
latter made good her escape. 

In his report of this action, Captain Truxtun gave the 
American loss as fourteen killed and twenty-five wounded. 
The only officer killed was Midshipman Jarvis, who was 
stationed in the maintop and who, though warned of the 
dangerous condition of the mast, refused to leave his 
quarters without orders. The casualties of the Vengeance 
are put at fifty killed and 110 wounded. She was a beaten 
ship, and was saved from capture only by the fall of the 
Constellation's mainmast. Her first lieutenant stated 
some years afterward that the tricolor was struck two or 
three times; but, owing to the darkness and smoke, this 
fact evidently was not perceived by the officers of the 
Constellation. While it is impossible to state the precise 
armament of the French frigate during this action, owing 
to the disparity of the reports, 4 all the authorities are 

4 According to the lowest estimate, that of an American 
prisoner on the Vengeance, she carried fifty-four guns, firing 516 lbs. 
at a broadside. The Constellation fired a broadside of only 372 lbs. 



Conclusion of the War 



59 



agreed in a considerable superiority in weight of metal 
over that of the Constellation. 

The third encounter with a French man-of-war took 
place, October 12, 1800, between the frigate Boston of 
28 guns and the sloop Berceau of 24. The French ship 
was taken only after a long and stubborn running fight, 
in which the honors belong to the French captain, Senez. 

But the real work of the war lay in the capture of the 
privateers that swarmed out of the French ports of the 
West Indies, and there were many spirited combats 
between our smaller vessels and these privateers. One 
particularly gallant exploit was performed by Lieutenant 
Isaac Hull, who ran into Port Plate in broad daylight, 
spiked the guns of the fort, and surprised and carried 
away one of the best equipped and most successful of the 
French privateers. Mention also must be made of the 
famous cruise of the schooner Enterprise, under Lieu- 
tenant John Shaw, who, in eight months, captured six 
privateers and recaptured eleven American merchantmen. 
This is only the beginning of the fame of this little vessel ; 
for she came to be regarded, next to the Constitution, as 
the ' ' lucky' ' vessel of the navy. 

The foregoing naval operations against France covered 
in all about two years and a half ; at the end of that time, 
February 1, 1801, they were terminated by a treaty of 
peace, which had been under way for several months. By 
the terms of this treaty each side was to return to the other 
all government vessels that had been captured. This 
provision was greatly to the advantage of France, because 
none of our men-of-war had been taken save the Retalia- 
tion, which, as we have seen, had originally been a French 
privateer. On the other hand, the Insurgente, the Berceau, 
and a small cruiser, the Vengeance, had been taken by 
American ships. The Insurgente, dispatched to the West 
Indies early in the fall of 1800, was never heard from 
again. The other two were turned over to France, Of the 



60 



The United States Navy 



eighty-four vessels remaining in the hands of the United 
States at the close of hostilities, thirteen were released, 
and one was sunk, leaving seventy lawful prizes for the 
American Navy. 

The war, while never formally declared, and existing 
only in the West Indies, was of great benefit to the young 
American Navy. The large increase in exports due to 
the protection afforded by our cruisers, and their brilliant 
successes in battle, gave the navy a standing and popu- 
larity that it needed in the days when the maintenance of 
a man-of-war seemed, to many, a threat of monarchy. To 
the personnel of the navy, also, it gave a practical train- 
ing in warfare and self-confidence. The heroes of the 
war with Tripoli and the second war with Great Britain 
received their schooling as midshipmen or lieutenants in 
the West Indian campaigns. 

A point, also, which cannot be overlooked is the fact 
that during these campaigns, while American men-of-war 
were co-operating with the British in fighting the French, 
an "Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the 
United States" was passed by Congress, embodying a 
set of regulations taken almost word for word from the 
rules that governed the navy of Great Britain. In short, 
the discipline and traditions of the British service were 
then adopted as the standards of our own. Had the 
United States been allied with France against England 
at this time, and had the practice of the French Navy 
been accepted as our own, the results would have been 
unfortunate, since the discipline of the French men-of- 
war was at that time demoralized by the levelling ideas of 
the French Revolution. The point is aptly expressed in 
the remark of the Duke of Wellington, "I believe in free 
speech, but not on board a man-of-war." 



IV 



THE WAR WITH TRIPOLI 

An Insult by Algiers 

The treaties of peace bought from Morocco in 1786, 
Algiers in 1795, Tripoli in 1796, and Tunis in 1797, by no 
means settled the difficulties between American ships and 
Barbary corsairs. Indeed, the following incident, for 
which the Dey of Algiers was responsible, was character- 
istic of the attitude of all the Barbary rulers at that time. 

In 1800, when only twenty-six years old, William 
Bainbridge was promoted to the rank of captain, having 
served but two years in the navy. In these two years, 
however, he had come into public notice, especially on 
account of his experience in the dungeons of Guadeloupe 
during the war with France. He was assigned the George 
Washington, of 24 guns, one of the ships purchased for 
the navy at the outbreak of hostilities with France, with 
orders to carry the annual tribute to Algiers. Captain 
Bainbridge thus had the distinction of commanding the 
first American man-of-war to enter the Mediterranean, 
but the honor was over-shadowed by the humiliating 
nature of his mission. Bad as this was, the sequel was so 
much worse that it may fairly be described as the most 
mortifying incident in the record of the navy. 

When the Washington arrived in September, 1800, the 
Dey of Algiers was having difficulties with the Sultan of 
Turkey — the over-lord of the Barbary rulers — because the 
Algerians had made peace with Napoleon at a time when 
Turkey was fighting him. In order to conciliate his 
master, the Dey of Algiers wished to send presents to 
Constantinople, and for this purpose requested the loan 

61 



62 



The United States Navy 



of the American man-of-war. Naturally, the American 
consul and Captain Bainbridge protested ; but the George 
Washington was anchored under the batteries of Algiers, 
in a position where she could not escape, and the Dey 
threatened to declare war instantly if the request was 
refused. As there were at this time in the Mediterranean 
a large number of American merchantmen which would 
probably have been captured if the Dey had made good 
his threat of war, Bainbridge felt himself forced to yield 
and play errand boy for the Dey of Algiers. The latter 
aggravated the humiliation by compelling the American 
captain to hoist the Algerian flag at the main, an act that 
virtually put the George Washington out of commission 
and transferred her to the Algerian Navy. As soon as 
Bainbridge cleared the harbor, however, he hauled down 
the Algerian colors and hoisted his own. 

At Constantinople he had the satisfaction of being 
received with honor as the representative of a new nation, 
while the Algerian ambassador was given scant courtesy. 
During the visit, also, the Turkish admiral gave Captain 
Bainbridge a "firman," or passport, which insured him 
respectful treatment in all Turkish ports. On returning 
to Algiers, the American was careful to anchor out of 
range of the batteries and promptly refused the demand 
of the Dey that he make a second trip to Constantinople 
During an audience with the Dey, Bainbridge countered 
a fierce threat of instant war by displaying the Turkish 
"firman." This frightened the pirate into such respect 
that thereafter Captain Bainbridge and his ship were 
inviolate. When the Dey declared war with France, under 
the Sultan's orders, Bainbridge, by using the authority of 
his "firman," compelled him to allow the French subjects 
in his city forty-eight hours to leave the country. As it 
appeared that the unfortunate exiles had no other way 
of leaving Algiers and escaping slavery, Bainbridge took 



The Errand of the George Washington 63 




64 



The United States Navy 



them on board the George Washington, and conveyed them 
to Alicante, whence they made their way home. For this 
service he received the thanks of Napoleon. 

The First Year op the War with Tripoli 

Meanwhile, the Bey of Tripoli also was making trouble. 
Although he had concluded a treaty with the United 
States in 1796, realizing in two or three years that he had 
not made so good a bargain as his neighbors, Algiers and 
Tunis, he felt obliged to demand more than the treaty 
called for. Efforts to settle the matter on a reasonable 
basis failed, and the Bey became more and more insolent. 
At last, in February, 1801, he repudiated the former 
treaty, and, the following May, declared war. The nego- 
tiations had been dragging on for so long, however, that 
American merchantmen had had a fair warning, and the 
Tripolitan cruisers captured little or nothing. 

As soon as it became evident that diplomacy would 
fail, a squadron of " observation " was assembled at 
Hampton Roads, toward the end of May, with orders to 
visit the Barbary ports and open hostilities with any or all 
of the states that had declared war; or, at least, to help 
diplomatic relations by a show of armed force. This 
squadron consisted of the frigates President, 4:4: guns, 
flagship, Captain James Barron; Philadelphia, 36 guns, 
Captain Samuel Barron (brother of James Barron) ; 
Essex, 32 guns, Captain William Bainbridge; and the 
schooner Enterprise, 12 guns, Lieutenant Andrew Sterett. 
These vessels were placed under -the command of Commo- 
dore Richard Dale, famous as Paul Jones's first lieutenant 
in the battle between the Bonhomme Richard and the 
Serapis. 

The news of the declaration of war on the part of 
Tripoli did not reach the United States until after the 



The Declaration of War 



65 



squadron had sailed, but the ships fortunately arrived at 
Gibraltar just in time to intercept the passage of two 
Tripolitan corsairs that were in port, clearly bound for a 
raid in the Atlantic. Leaving the Philadelphia to block- 
ade them in Gibraltar, Commodore Dale dispatched the 
Essex to collect the American ships in neutral ports and 
convoy them to the Atlantic, while with the remainder of 
his squadron he cruised along the Barbary coast. The 
Bey 1 of Tripoli was somewhat disturbed by the appear- 
ance of the American ships and offered to treat for peace, 
but, though Dale remained eighteen days off the harbor, 
nothing was accomplished. At the end of that time, he 
was forced to put in for fresh water at Malta, where he 
arrived in the middle of August. 

Meanwhile, on the first of that month, a spirited action 
had taken place between the schooner Enterprise and the 
Tripoli. As the former carried twelve guns and ninety- 
four men, and the latter, fourteen guns and eighty men, 
the two vessels were very evenly matched. That the result 
was so one-sided, is chiefly due to the skill with which 
Lieutenant Sterett handled his vessel, never allowing 
himself to be boarded, and time and again raking his 
antagonist at close range. The following is his report to 
Commodore Dale: 

"I have the honor to inform you that on the first of 
August, I fell in with a Tripolitan ship-of-war, called the 
Tripoli, mounting fourteen guns, commanded by Reis 
Mahomet Sous. An action commenced immediately at 
pistol shot, which continued three hours with incessant 
firing. She then struck her colors. The carnage on board 
was dreadful, she having twenty men killed and thirty 
wounded; among the latter was the captain and the first 
lieutenant. Her mizzenmast went over the side. Agree- 

1 The title of this ruler is variously given as " Bey," " Bashaw," 
or " Pasha." 
5 



66 



The United States Navy 



able to your orders I dismantled her of everything but an 
old sail and spar. With heartfelt pleasure I add, that the 
officers and men throughout the vessel behaved in the 
most spirited and determined manner, obeying every 
command with promptitude and alertness. We had not a 
man wounded, and sustained no material damage in our 
hull or rigging." 

For this brilliant exploit, Sterett received the thanks 
of Congress and a sword, while an extra month's pay was 
awarded to his officers and men. The reason that the 
Tripoli was sent back to Tripoli dismantled instead of 
being destroyed, was that the commodore's orders from 
the President did not allow him to take prizes. Jefferson 
held that, under the Constitution, war had to be declared 
by Congress, that all he could direct the squadron to do, 
therefore, was to act on the defensive. This strict inter- 
pretation of the Constitution undoubtedly tied Dale's 
hands somewhat up to the time (February, 1802) when 
Congress passed an act that gave the President full war 
powers. Still one would expect from Paul Jones 's favorite 
lieutenant more than the barren results of the first year 
of the Tripolitan War. The blockade, which at first had 
been very annoying to the Bey of Tripoli, was gradually 
relaxed, and, after the departure of Commodore Dale for 
the United States in March, 1802, apparently amounted 
to nothing. This blockade duty fell chiefly on the Phila- 
delphia, Captain Samuel Barron, which, though in winter 
quarters at Syracuse, was under orders from Dale to make 
occasional excursions to Tripoli and Tunis during the 
spring. According to the report of William Eaton, our 
consul at Tunis, she appeared but once off Tripoli during 
the winter and spring, and that only for six hours. Cap- 
tain Barron made the excuse that the northerly winds were 
* ' very common and excessively heavy, ' ' and prevented his 
looking into Tripoli. 



The Second Year of the War 



67 



Consul Eaton, who criticised Barron's inefficiency, is 
an interesting figure in the story of our war with Tripoli. 
A veteran of the Revolution and a captain in the army at 
the time he was appointed our representative in Tunis 
(1797), he threw himself into the war with characteristic 
energy, and spoke his opinions without tact or reserve. 
His bitter criticism of Bainbridge for submitting the flag 
to the insult it received from the Dey of Algiers, and his 
equally scathing remarks about Captain Samuel Barron, 
awoke against him the hostility, not only of Bainbridge 
and the Barrons, but of all the naval officers on the station, 
for they felt that his strictures had involved the honor 
of the service. Perhaps it was on account of this hostility 
that, when he suggested attacking Tripoli in the rear by 
raising a force to the support of Hamet, the deposed 
brother of the reigning Bey, Yusuf, his plan was disap- 
proved by all the officers in the squadron. His idea was 
to collect an army of adventurers under the banner of the 
rightful ruler, Hamet, with which to attack Tripoli in 
the rear; and, by a joint assault on land and sea, drive 
Yusuf out of the city or, at least, bring him to terms. 



The Second Year of the War 

The custom of enlisting men for one year embarrassed 
the navy in the first year of the war with Tripoli as it 
had done in the war with France, for all of Dale's ships 
had to be sent home on account of the expiration of the 
terms of enlistment. The next enlistments, therefore, were 
made for two years instead of one. The command of the 
second squadron was given to Commodore Truxtun, the 
hero of the French War. Unfortunately, as there seems 
to have been a scarcity of captains at the time, no one 
was appointed to command his flagship, the Constellation. 
To act as captain for his own flagship, Truxtun felt to be 



68 



The United States Navy 



a descent in grade, and, therefore, declined the post. 
Since this amounted to a resignation, it cost the nation an 
officer of the type most needed to prosecute the war against 
Tripoli. The idea that departmental obstinacy was behind 
the action in Truxtun's case is suggested by the fact that 
Richard V. Morris, his successor, was given an acting 
captain for the flagship, without anything more being said 
about it. 

In the spring of 1802, the ships under Morris set sail 
for the Mediterranean, one after another, as soon as they 
were ready for sea. The squadron in the order of their 
sailing, consisted of the following: the Chesapeake, flag- 
ship, 36; the Adams, 28; the New York, 36; the John 
Adams, 28; the Constellation, 36; and the Enterprise, 12. 
There were still on the station, the Philadelphia, Boston, 
Essex, and George Washington; but the first and last of 
these soon left for the United States. 

The story of the operations that followed is a mass of 
confusing detail. Great things were looked for from this 
naval force, and the Bey of Tripoli was expected to submit 
at once. As a matter of fact, during this second year of 
the war the United States lost ground. The blockade was 
ineffectual except to irritate Tunis and Morocco. In 
May, 1803, the Americans made feeble overtures to buy 
peace ; but, meanwhile, an American vessel, the Franklin, 
had been seized, and her crew put in irons. These had to 
be ransomed through Algiers for $35,000. Consul Eaton, 
also, who was unable to get further in his plan on account 
of a quarrel with Commodore Morris, left for the United 
States. During the summer of 1803, however, two Tripoli- 
tan cruisers were destroyed by the squadron, and there 
were also some vigorous skirmishes against the enemy's 
gunboats, in which the younger officers won distinction. 
But the results were nothing. 

In September, Commodore Morris received a letter 



Arrival of Commodore Preble 69 



from the Secretary of the Navy, announcing that he was 
suspended from duty and ordered home. The following 
spring, a court of inquiry, composed unfortunately of 
officers junior to Morris, found him "censurable for his 
inactive and dilatory conduct of the squadron under his 
command. ' ' 2 Though for some reason no court-martial 
followed, Morris was summarily dismissed from the service 
by President Jefferson. 

Commodore Preble 

While the court of inquiry was sitting on the case of 
Captain Morris, a new squadron was being prepared, under 
the command of Captain Edward Preble. The task of 
fitting out the ships, especially the flagship Constitution, 
consumed so much of the summer of 1803, that it was 
August before the new commodore could set sail for the 
Mediterranean. He had the following vessels in his 
squadron, named in the order of sailing: Nautilus, 12, 
Lieutenant Richard Somers; Philadelphia, 36, Captain 
William Bainbridge ; Vixen, 12, Lieutenant John Smith ; 
Constitution, flagship, 44, Lieutenant Robinson, acting 
captain; Siren, 16, Lieutenant Charles Stewart; Argus, 
16, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, Jr. The Enterprise, 12, 
Lieutenant Isaac Hull, already on the station, was to be 
included; but Hull, being senior to Decatur, was to 
exchange commands with him, because the Argus was 
rated above the Enterprise. The small schooners and brigs 
of this squadron were built and fitted to cruise in the 
shoal waters about Tripoli, where the heavier frigates 
could not follow. 

The new commodore, like his predecessors, was a 



2 Captain Samuel Barron, who had himself been criticised by 
Eaton for " inactive and dilatory conduct " in his blockade of 
Tripoli, was president of this court. 



70 



The United States Navy 



veteran of the Revolutionary War. He came from New 
England, and was personally little known to the service, 
especially as all the other officers, with the exception of 
Hull, came from t v .e Southern or Middle States. His 
naturally violent temper was not improved by ill health, 
and he had iron ideas about discipline. He reciprocated 
the distrust which the younger officers felt toward their 
hot-tempered, "taut" commander, for he complained that 
they were only "school-boys." In fact, all the com- 
manders of his flotilla were under thirty and their lieu- 
tenants even younger. A year later, however, the mutual 
regard between Preble and his young officers amounted 
to warm affection. 

The situation that confronted Commodore Preble was 
not reassuring. During the two years and a half since 
war had been declared, the American Navy had gained no 
decided advantage ; on the contrary, the other Barbary 
powers, especially Morocco, were growing more and more 
restless and insolent, as is shown by the following incident : 
Shortly after Bainbridge arrived at Gibraltar in the 
Philadelphia, he learned that two Tripolitan cruisers were 
off Cape de Gat. "While in search of them he fell in with 
a vessel belonging to the Emperor of Morocco, which upon 
investigation, proved to be the American brig Gelia, with 
the captain and seven of the crew confined below decks. 
When Bainbridge threatened to hang the Moorish com- 
mander for piracy, the latter produced an order from the 
Governor of Tangiers, authorizing him to capture Amer- 
ican vessels. Bainbridge then returned to Gibraltar with 
his prize, and, upon the arrival of the Constitution, re- 
ported to Preble the case of the Celia. 

The commodore, realizing that Morocco must be dealt 
with promptly, dispatched the Vixen and the Philadelphia 
to blockade Tripoli while he, with the remainder of the 
squadron, joined with Commodore Rodgers and the home- 



Edward Preble 



The Loss of the Philadelphia 71 



bound frigates, New York, Boston, and John Adams, to 
make a demonstration at Tangiers. The display of this 
naval force had instant effect. The Emperor hastily 
shifted the responsibility for the capture of the Celia on 
the Governor of Tangiers — whom he publicly disgraced — 
and tried to placate the American officers by gifts. The 
negotiations concluded with a ratification of the old treaty 
of 1786, without any payment whatever on the part of 
the United States. 

Meanwhile the Vixen and the Philadelphia had taken 
up their station, blockading the port of Tripoli on October 
17. About a fortnight later Bainbridge received informa- 
tion of two Tripolitan war vessels cruising in the Medi- 
terranean. Judging that they were probably going west- 
ward toward the Straits, he dispatched the Vixen to look 
for them off Cape Bon, a station also which he thought 
much safer for the little schooner than the coast of Tripoli, 
at a time when the autumn gales had begun. 

Towards the end of October (1803) the Philadelphia 
was driven away by one of these storms. As she was 
returning to her station on the morning of the 31st, she 
sighted a Tripolitan vessel making for the harbor. The 
following account, adapted from Captain Bainbridge 's 
report to the Secretary of the Navy, describes the disaster 
that resulted : 

' ' Misfortune necessitates my making the most distress- 
ing communication of my life, and it is with deep regret 
that I inform you of the loss of the United States frigate 
Philadelphia, under my command, by being wrecked on 
rocks between four and five leagues to the eastward of 
the town of Tripoli. The circumstances relating to this 
unfortunate event are as follows : 

"At nine a.m., being about five leagues to the eastward 
of Tripoli, I saw a ship inshore of us, standing before 
the wind to the westward. I immediately gave chase, 



7% 



The United States Navy 



whereupon she hoisted Tripolitan colors and continued her 
course very near the shore. About eleven o'clock I had 
approached the shore to seven fathoms of water, and 
commenced firing at her, continuing our fire and running 
before the wind until half-past eleven. Being then in 
seven fathoms of water and finding our fire ineffectual to 
prevent her getting into Tripoli, I gave up the pursuit, 
and was bearing off the land, when we ran on the rocks, 
in twelve feet of water forward, and seventeen feet abaft. 
Immediately we lowered a boat from the stern, sounded, 
and found the greatest depth of water astern. Accord- 
ingly, I laid all sails aback ; loosed topgallant sails, and set 
a heavy press of sail canvas on the ship, with the wind 
blowing fresh, to back her off. I also cast three anchors 
away from the bows, started the water in the hold, hove 
overboard the guns, excepting some abaft to defend the 
ship against the gunboats which were then firing on us. 
But I found all this ineffectual. Then I made the last 
resort of lightening her forward by cutting away the fore- 
mast, which carried the main topgallant mast with it. ' ' 

In testifying before the court of inquiry held in June, 
1805, Lieutenant David Porter added a few more details 
to Captain Bainbridge's account at this point. After the 
resort of cutting away the foremast had failed to release 
the Philadelphia's bows, "orders were then given to the 
ship 's carpenter to go forward and bore holes through the 
ship's bottom, and the gunner to drown the magazine by 
turning the cock and securing the key. Orders were then 
given to destroy everything that could be rendered of 
any use to the enemy. ' ' 

"Striking on the rocks, " continues Captain Bain- 
bridge, "was an accident not possible for me to guard 
against by any intimation of charts as no such shoals were 
laid down on any on board. Every careful precaution 
(by keeping three leads heaving) was made use of, on 



The Loss of the Philadelphia 



73 



approaching the shore to effect the capture of the Tripoli- 
tan cruiser ; and, after the ship struck the rocks, all pos- 
sible measures were taken to get her off. I determined 
not to give her up as long as a hope remained, although 
all the while we were annoyed by gunboats, which took 
their position in such a manner that we could not bring 
our guns to bear on them, not even after cutting away a 
part of the stern to effect it. 

' 'We stood the fire of the gunboats for four hours. 
By the end of that time, as my officers and I had no hope 
of getting the frigate off the rocks, and we could see a 
reinforcement coming out from Tripoli — which there was 
not the smallest chance of our injuring by resistance — we 
decided, in order to save the lives of brave men, that 
there was no alternative but the distressing one of hauling 
our colors down and submitting to the enemy, whom 
chance had befriended. . . . 

"The gunboats, in attacking, fired principally at our 
masts. Had they directed their shot at the hull, they 
undoubtedly would have killed many. . . . The ship 
was taken possession of a little after sunset, and in the 
course of the evening I, and all the officers, with part of 
the crew were brought ashore and carried before the 
Pasha. . . . We had lost everything but what was on 
our backs, and even part of that was taken off." 

The attempts to scuttle the ship proved to be failures ; 
for, two days later, she was floated off the reef at high 
tide, her guns were raised and remounted by her captors, 
and she was towed into Tripoli practically as good as ever. 

The Kaliusa reef, on which the Philadelphia struck, 
was, as Bainbridge says, not located on the charts; and 
yet it is so extensive as to make the omission noteworthy, 
for it stretches several miles parallel to the coast, here and 
there broken by channels. It only intensifies the mis- 
fortune of Bainbridge to know that if he had kept on a 



74 



The United States Navy 



little farther before bearing up, he would have passed 
through one of these channels safely. If, also, he had held 
his course toward Tripoli, in the wake of the ketch, he 
would have escaped grounding. 

The imprisonment of the Philadelphia's people turned 
out to be a long one; but, for the officers, at least, not 
especially severe. They were allowed free intercourse, 
and, through the kind efforts of the Danish consul, Nissen, 
were able to buy back their books. By means of these 
books, Captain Bainbridge with his first lieutenant, David 
Porter, conducted for the midshipmen the first naval 
school in the history of the American service. Through 
Mr. Nissen, also, Captain Bainbridge was enabled to carry 
on a secret correspondence with Commodore Preble. 
Throughout their long captivity the officers wore away 
the heavy hours in laying futile plans for escape. The 
men, however, received none of the consideration shown 
to the officers. They were ill-fed, worse lodged, and 
worked and beaten like slaves ; but they seem to have stood 
their captivity surprisingly well. There were but six 
deaths and very little sickness during the whole nineteen 
months of captivity. 

Captain Bainbridge 's officers, realizing his distress of 
mind, were hardly in their prison quarters before they 
drew up a memorial to assure him of their sympathy and 
respect. ' ' Wishing to express our full approbation of your 
conduct, concerning the unfortunate affair of yesterday, ' ' 
it ran, "we do conceive . . . that every exertion was 
made and every expedient tried to get her off and to defend 
her, which either courage or abilities could have dictated. ' ' 
Commodore Preble, also, as soon as he heard the unwel- 
come news, wrote Bainbridge a comforting letter, with- 
out even a hint of criticism. 

But the latter had every reason to feel depressed. His 
career in the navy, though brief, had been singularly un- 



The Loss of the Philadelphia 75 



fortunate. During the French War he had been captured 
and imprisoned ; he was still smarting under the criticism 
of Eaton and others for the mortifying incident of the 
George Washington; and this final disaster strengthened 
the hands of the Bey of Tripoli to an extent hitherto not 
conceivable. 

If Commodore Preble had realized the seriousness of 
his task on taking command of the third squadron, he now 
felt the difficulties of his situation increased tenfold by 
the loss of the Philadelphia. The Tripolitans now pos- 
sessed in the Philadelphia a larger fighting ship than they 
had ever owned before, and at the same time the loss to 
the American squadron amounted to a large proportion of 
its force, for it left but a single frigate, the Constitution, 
besides the small brigs and schooners. In this way, Preble 's 
operations were crippled at the very outset ; and the mere 
holding for ransom of 300 American prisoners gave the 
Bey of Tripoli a further tremendous advantage, for he 
knew that the officers, especially, had influential friends 
who would bring pressure upon the Government to accept 
almost any terms of peace that he might dictate. 



V 



THE WAR WITH TRIPOLI (CONTINUED) 

The Destruction of the Philadelphia 

The news of the capture of the Philadelphia imme- 
diately suggested the idea of cutting her out or destroy- 
ing her. Bainbridge outlined a plan in one of his secret 
letters to Preble, and, even before this was received, Preble 
and Decatur had been discussing a similar course of action. 
As soon as the subject was mentioned by the commodore, 
Decatur eagerly volunteered to cut out the Philadel- 
phia with his ship, the Enterprise ; so when Lieutenant 
Stewart arrived in the Siren and offered to perform the 
same service, Preble informed him that Decatur was 
already promised the honor. The commodore, believing 
that it was impossible to save the frigate, decided not to 
try to cut her out but to destroy her at her moorings. The 
scheme was greatly helped by the capture of a Tripolitan 
ketch, the Mastico, whose Mediterranean rig would enable 
her to slip into the harbor without raising the suspicion 
that the Enterprise would have been sure to create. 

When Decatur assembled the officers and men of the 
Enterprise, told them of the intended expedition, and 
called for volunteers, every officer, man, and boy stepped 
forward. From this number, five officers — Lieutenants 
James Lawrence, Joseph Bainbridge, and Jonathan 
Thorn, Surgeon Lewis Hermann, Midshipman Thomas 
Macdonough — and sixty-two men were chosen. To these 
were added five officers from the Constitution — Midship- 
men Ralph Izard, John Rowe, Charles Morris, Alexander 
Laws, and John Davis — and a Sicilian pilot, Salvatore 
76 



The Burning of the Philadelphia 77 



Catalano, 1 who was familiar with the harbor of Tripoli. 
On February 15, the day before the destruction of the 
frigate, Lieutenant Stewart sent a boat to the Intrepid 
with Midshipman Thomas 0. Anderson and six men. 
The boat party remained on board the Intrepid, and 
shared in the attack on the Philadelphia. The following 
story of the expedition has been taken from the Auto- 
biography of Charles Morris, 2 one of the midshipmen 
detailed from the Constitution: 

"The brig Siren, Lieutenant Stewart, was to accom- 
pany us, to assist with her boats, and to receive the crew 
of the ketch (which had been named the Intrepid) in 
case of her destruction, which was considered probable. 
The officers were told to take only a single change of 
linen, and no time was allowed to prepare stores, as we 
embarked within an hour after receiving notice and sailed 
immediately, on the evening of the 3d of February, 1804. 
Combustibles had been previously prepared and placed in 
the vessel, with ship's provisions for two or three weeks' 
supply. A Maltese had also been obtained to accompany 
us as pilot into the harbor, with which he was well 
acquainted. We arrived in sight of Tripoli about the 
10th, but the wind was fresh from the westward, with 
strong indications of an approaching gale." . . . [Because 
of the heavy sea the entrance was decided to be unsafe.] 
"The attempt was abandoned for the time, and the vessels 
weighed again to get beyond the view of the town before 
daylight. This was not done without some difficulty, as 
the gale increased rapidly. It continued for four or five 
days with great violence, and drove us considerably to 

1 A native of Palermo, he apparently joined the squadron at 
Malta and is referred to by Preble, also, as a " Maltese." He was 
for many years afterwards a sailing master in our navy. 

2 Edited by Professor James S. Soley, U. S. N., and published 
for the first time in the Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. vi, 
(1880). Reprinted by permission. 



78 



The United States Navy 



the eastward, and at one time nearer the coast than was 
agreeable. 

"Our situation on board was far from comfortable. 
The commander, three lieutenants, and the surgeon occu- 
pied the very small cabin. Six midshipmen and the pilot 
had a platform laid on the water-casks, whose surface they 
covered when they lay down for sleep, and at so small 
a distance below the deck that their heads could reach it 
when seated on the platform. The marines had corre- 
sponding accommodations on the opposite side, and the 
sailors had only the surface of the casks in the hold. To 
these inconveniences were added the want of any room on 
the deck for exercise, and the attacks of innumerable 
vermin, which our predecessors, the slaves, had left behind 
them. The provisions proved to be decayed and 
offensive. . . . 

' 1 On the morning of the 16th, we again obtained sight 
of Tripoli, with light winds, pleasant weather, and a 
smooth sea, and stood in for the town. By arrangement, 
the Siren kept far without us during the day, and her 
appearance had been so changed as to lull all suspicion of 
her being a vessel of Avar. The lightness of the wind 
allowed us to keep up all appearance of an anxious desire 
to reach the harbor before night, without bringing us too 
near to require any other change than the use of drags, 
which could not be seen from the city. All the crew were 
also kept below, excepting six or eight persons at a time, 
that suspicion might not be awakened by unusual num- 
bers ; and such as were visible were dressed as Maltese. 

"As the evening advanced, our drags were taken in, 
so that we were within two miles of the eastern entrance 
at dark, the Siren being some three miles without us. 
The concerted arrangements were for the ketch to wait for 
the boats of the Siren to join us after dark, that they might 
accompany us to the attack ; but as the sun descended, the 



80 



The United States Navy 



wind grew fainter, and there was good reason to appre- 
hend that any delay in waiting for the boats might render 
it very difficult for the ketch to reach the ship. Decatur, 
therefore, determined to proceed without waiting, and 
accompanied his decision with the remark, 'the fewer the 
number, the greater the honor. ' One boat from the Siren, 
with six men, had joined us a few days before, and was 
still with us. 

"The final arrangements were now made, and the 
respective duties of the several officers, which had been 
previously allotted, were again specified and explained. 
The presumed number of our enemy was stated, and the 
necessity for our utmost exertions enjoined upon us. The 
watchword 'Philadelphia' was issued to be used as a 
means of recognition ; and as we advanced into the harbor, 
strict silence was enjoined and observed. The injunction, 
however, appeared to be unnecessary. No one appeared to 
be disposed to enter into conversation, but [each] to be 
absorbed by his own reflections. My own thoughts were 
busy, now reverting to friends at home, now to the perils 
we were about to meet. Should I be able to justify the 
expectations of the former by meeting properly the 
dangers of the latter? . . . The officers and crew were 
directed to conceal themselves as much as possible, except- 
ing some six or eight. Most of the officers could be dis- 
tinguished by their dress, and they required concealment 
more than the sailors. Fortunately, owing to the loss of 
some articles, which had been replaced by loan from the 
crew, my own dress corresponded to theirs, which 
enabled me to keep near Decatur, who I supposed would 
naturally be among the first to leave the ketch. The wind 
wafted us slowly into the harbor, the water was smooth, 
and the young moon gave light enough to distinguish 
prominent objects. One battery was passed, and the 
Philadelphia was in view near several smaller vessels, and 



The Burning of the Philadelphia 81 



the white walls of the city and its batteries were before us. 
We steered directly for the frigate, and at last the anxious 
silence was broken by a hail from her, demanding our 
character and object. Then might be seen the eager move- 
ment of the heads of the officers and crew who were 
stretched on the deck, ready to leap forward at the word 
of their commander, but still resting in silence. The 
conversation was kept up between the frigate and the 
ketch through our pilot, acting under the dictation of 
Decatur. We alleged the loss of our anchors during the 
last gale, which was true, as a reason for wishing to make 
fast to the frigate till morning, and permission was 
obtained ; but just as the ketch was about coming in con- 
tact with the frigate, the wind shifted, blowing lightly 
directly from the frigate, and it left us at rest abeam and 
about twenty yards from her. This was a moment of 
great anxiety. We were directly under her guns, motion- 
less and powerless, except by exertion which might betray 
our character. The Siren's boat was, however, in tow, 
and was leisurely manned and took a rope to make fast 
to the ship. She was met by a boat with another rope, 
when both were united, and each boat returned to its 
vessel. This rope was passed along the deck and hauled 
upon by the crew as they lay stretched upon it, and the 
vessels brought gradually nearer each other. When 
nearly in contact, the suspicions of the enemy appeared 
to be aroused, and the cry of i Americanos ! ' resounded 
through the ship. In a moment, we were near enough, 
and the order 6 Board ! ' was given ; and with this cry 
our men were soon on the decks of the frigate. The 
surprise had been complete; there was no time for any 
preparation, and the enemy made scarcely a show of 
resistance. A few were killed, one was made prisoner, 
and the remainder leaped overboard and probably reached 
their cruisers which were anchored near the ship. . . . 
6 



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The United States Navy 



" The plan of attack, prescribed by our commander, 
was for united action to obtain possession of the 
ship, with the exception of a boat to intercept com- 
munication with the shore, and for the surgeon and a 
few men to secure the ketch to the ship. When posses- 
sion was secured, each lieutenant, with a midshipman and 
specified men, was to receive a portion of the prepared 
combustibles, and distribute them in designated parts of 
the berth deck, and in the forward store rooms, and a 
smaller party under a midshipman to do the same in the 
cockpit, and there await orders to set fire, that all might 
be done at the same time, and give all a chance for safe 
retreat. The party for the cockpit was assigned to my 
charge. My object in keeping near Lieutenant Decatur 
when we were approaching the ship was that, by watching 
his actions, I could be governed by these rather than by 
his orders when the boarding should take place. It was 
well that this course was taken, for Decatur had leaped 
to the main chain plates of the frigate, before the order 
to board was given. I had leaped with him, and, probably, 
more favored by circumstances, was able to reach the 
deck by the time he had gained the rail. The enemy were 
already leaping over the opposite side, and made no resist- 
ance ; but Decatur, under the supposition that he was the 
first on board, was about to strike me, when I accidentally 
turned and stayed his uplifted arm by the watchword 
and mutual recognition. On my way to my station, after 
examining the cabin, and when passing forward, we met 
again under similar circumstances. Passing through the 
wardroom, which I found deserted, I awaited in the cock- 
pit the men who had gone for the combustibles. These 
were so delayed that we had none when the order was 
given to set fire; but as they came a moment after, they 
were distributed, and fire communicated before we left 
our station. In the meantime, the fire on the deck above 



The Burning of the Philadelphia 83 

us had communicated so rapidly that it was with no small 
difficulty and danger that our party reached the spar 
deck by the forward hatchways. All the others had 
already joined the ketch, except Decatur, who remained 
on the rail till all others were on board; and the bow of 
the ketch had already swung off from the ship when he 
joined us by leaping into the rigging of the ketch. . . . 
In less than twenty minutes the ship had been carried, the 
combustibles distributed and set on fire, and all our party 
were again on board the ketch. By great exertions the 
two vessels were separated before the fire, which was 
pouring from the ports of the ship, enveloped the ketch 
also. 

"Up to this time, the ships and batteries of the enemy 
had remained silent, but they were now prepared to act; 
and when the crew of the ketch gave three cheers, in 
exultation of their success, they received the return of a 
general discharge from the enemy. The confusion of the 
moment probably prevented much care in their direc- 
tion, and though under the fire of nearly a hundred 
pieces for half an hour, the only shot which struck the 
ketch was one through the topgallant sail. We were in 
greater danger from the ship, whose broadside commanded 
the passage by which we were retreating, and whose guns 
were loaded and were discharged as they became heated. 
We escaped these also, and while urging the ketch onward 
with sweeps, the crew were commenting upon the beauty 
of the spray thrown up by the shot between us and the 
brilliant light of the ship, rather than calculating any 
danger that might be apprehended from the contact. The 
appearance of the ship was indeed magnificent. . . . 
Favored by a light breeze our exertions soon carried us 
beyond the range of their shot, and at the entrance of 
the harbor we met the boats of the Siren, which had been 
intended to co-operate with us, whose crews rejoiced at 



84 



The United States Navy 



our success, while they grieved at not having been able 
to participate in it. . . . The success of this enterprise 
added much to the reputation of the navy both at home 
and abroad." 

In confirmation of this final remark of Morris, it may 
be added that Nelson, who was then blockading Toulon, 
generously described the exploit as "the most bold and 
daring act of the age." 

The Bombardment op Tripoli 

During the winter and spring of 1804, Commodore 
Preble maintained as strict a blockade on Tripoli as the 
weather would allow, and kept two or three of his vessels 
cruising the Mediterranean in search of any Tripolitan 
that might have taken advantage of a gale to escape. 
Meanwhile, he arranged with the King of Sicily for the 
use of six small, flat-bottomed gunboats and two bomb 
vessels, together with some extra guns and ninety-six 
Neapolitan seamen. As soon as these vessels were ready, 
he proceeded to bombard Tripoli with his entire force. 
Aside from the gunboats, which carried one long 24- 
pounder apiece, and the bomb-ketches, each of which 
mounted a 13-inch mortar, the American attacking force 
consisted of the frigate Constitution, the brigs Siren, 
Argus, and Scourge, and the schooners Vixen, Nautilus, 
and Enterprise. The schooners and brigs, however, 
mounted nothing but carronades, and the only guns fit 
for the purpose of bombardment were the long guns of 
the Constitution and of the unwieldy gunboats. Against 
this force was a walled city, strongly fortified, having 
115 guns, most of them heavy. Besides these, the Tripoli- 
tans had a navy of a brig, two schooners, two large 
galleys, and nineteen gunboats. The complement of men 



The Bombardment of Tripoli 85 



on these vessels alone amounted to more than all under 
Preble's command. 

It was not till August 3 that the weather permitted 
an attack. Under cover of the bombs and the fire from 
the heavier vessels, the six gunboats, in two divisions, 
advanced to attack the two divisions of Tripolitan gun- 
boats which had advanced beyond the line of rocks that 
sheltered the harbor. The rest of the enemy's shipping 
and the batteries opened at once in reply. Of the two 
divisions of American gunboats, Lieutenant Richard 
Somers commanded the first division, Nos. 1-3 ; and Lieu- 
tenant Stephen Decatur the second, Nos. 4-6. 

The following from Preble's report to the Depart- 
ment describes the attack: 

"In an instant the enemy's shipping and batteries 
opened a tremendous fire, which was promptly returned 
by the whole squadron at grape shot distance; at the 
same time, the second division of three boats, led by the 
gallant Captain 3 Decatur, was advancing with sails and 
oars to board the eastern division of the enemy, consisting 
of nine gunboats. Our boats gave the enemy showers of 
grape and musket balls as they advanced ; the Tripolitans, 
however, soon closed, and the pistol, sabre, pike, and 
tomahawk were made use of by our brave tars. 

" Captain 3 Somers, being in a dull sailer, made the 
best use of his sweeps, but was not able to fetch far 
enough to windward to engage the same division of the 
enemy's boats which Captain Decatur fell in with; he, 
however, gallantly bore down with his single boat on five 
of the enemy 's western division, and engaged within pistol 
shot, defeated and drove them within the rocks in a shat- 
tered condition and with the loss of a great number of 
men. 



" Captain " by courtesy, as he was in command of a division. 



86 



The United States Navy 



" Lieutenant [James] Decatur, in No. 2, was closely 
engaged with one of the enemy's largest boats of the 
eastern division, which struck to him, after having lost a 
large proportion of men ; and at the same instant that that 
brave officer was boarding her to take possession, he was 
treacherously shot through the head by the captain of 
the boat that had surrendered ; which base conduct enabled 
the poltroon (with the assistance received from other 
boats) to escape. . . . Captain Decatur, in No. 4, after 
having with distinguished bravery boarded and carried 
one of the enemy of superior force, took his prize in tow 
and gallantly bore down to engage a second, 4 which, after 
a severe and bloody conflict, he also took possession of. 
. . . Lieutenant Trippe, of the Vixen, in No. 6, ran 
alongside one of the enemy 's large boats, which he boarded 
with only Midshipman Henley and nine men — his boat 
falling off before any more could get on board ; thus was 
he left to conquer or to perish, with the odds of thirty-six 
to eleven. The Turks, however, could not withstand the 
ardor of this brave officer and his assistants — in a few 
minutes the decks were cleared and her colors hauled 
down. . . . Lieutenant Trippe received eleven sabre 
wounds, some of which were very severe; he speaks in 
the highest terms of Mr. Henley, and those who followed 
him. . . . 

" Lieutenant Decatur was the only officer killed, but 



4 Decatur believed that this second vessel was the one that 
had struck to his brother a few moments before, and that in killing 
her commander he had avenged his brother's death. Morris, 
however, agreeing with Preble, says in his memoks that the 
treacherous pirate escaped. At all events, Stephen Decatur very 
nearly lost his own life in his hand to hand grapple with the 
Tripolitan commander. One of his seamen, Daniel Frazier, already 
wounded, interposed his own head to catch the blow of the scimitar, 
aimed for Decatur. 



The Bombardment of Tripoli 



87 



in him the service has lost a valuable officer. . . . The 
enemy must have suffered very much in killed and 
wounded, both among their shipping and on shore. Three 
of their gunboats were sunk in the harbor, several of 
them had their decks nearly cleared of men by our shot, 
and a number of shells burst in the town and batteries, 
which must have done great execution. " 

On the 7th of August, four days later, the squadron 
again bombarded Tripoli, but on this occasion none of the 
enemy's vessels advanced to attack at close quarters. 
During this attack, gunboat No. 9 5 blew up, killing and 
wounding eighteen of her crew. Among the killed were 
Lieutenant Caldwell and Midshipman Dorsey. 

The same day brought the frigate John Adams with 
the new commissions of the officers connected with the 
destruction of the Philadelphia, and with the unwelcome 
news that Preble would be superseded in command by 
Captain Samuel Barron. This was apparently unavoid- 
able, as the Secretary of the Navy was careful to point 
out to Commodore Preble, because Barron was senior 
to him ; but the fact hurt Preble, and aroused the indigna- 
tion of every officer under him. The outcome more than 
justified their feeling. 

Meanwhile, Preble pushed his operations with all vigor. 
Under a hundred difficulties such as lack of water, lack 
of men, insufficient or worthless stores, and scurvy, Preble 
maintained his blockade, and three times again bombarded 
the city with all his guns. This policy so greatly disturbed 
the Bey, that he began to moderate very decidedly his 
terms of ransom and peace. 



5 The three Tripolitan gunboats that had been captured (see 
page 86) were rerigged and taken into service as Nos. 7, 8, 9. 



88 



The United States Navy 



The Intrepid Disaster 

The summer campaign of 1804, however, closed with 
a melancholy episode. "Desirous of annoying the enemy 
by all the means in my power, ' ' wrote Commodore Preble 
to the Department in his report, ' ' I directed to be put in 
execution a long contemplated plan of sending a fire 
ship, or infernal, into the harbor of Tripoli in the night for 
the purpose of endeavoring to destroy the enemy's ship- 
ping and shatter the Pasha's castle and town. Captain 
Somers, of the Nautilus, having volunteered his services, 
had, for several days before this period, been directing 
the preparation of the ketch Intrepid, assisted by Lieu- 
tenants Wadsworth and Israel. About 100 barrels of 
powder and 150 fixed shells were apparently judiciously 
disposed on board her. The fuses, leading to the maga- 
zine where all the powder was deposited, were calculated 
to burn a quarter of an hour. 

"September 4, the Intrepid being prepared for the 
intended service, Captain Somers and Lieutenant Wads- 
worth made choice of two of the fastest rowing boats in 
the squadron for bringing them out after reaching their 
destination and firing the combustible materials which 
were to communicate with the fuses. Captain Somers' 
boat was manned with four seamen from the Nautilus, 
and Lieutenant Wadsworth 's with six from the Constitu- 
tion. Lieutenant Israel accompanied them. At eight in 
the evening, the Intrepid was under sail and standing 
for the port with a leading breeze from the eastward. 
The Argus, Vixen, and Nautilus convoyed her as far as 
the rock. On her entering the harbor, several shots were 
fired at her from the batteries. In a few minutes, when 
she had apparently nearly gained the intended place of 
destination, she suddenly exploded, without her people's 
having previously fired the room filled with splinters 
and other combustibles. These were intended to create a 



The Intrepid Disaster 



89 



blaze in order to deter the enemy from boarding while 
the fire was communicating to the fuses which led to the 
magazine. The effect of the explosion stunned their 
batteries into profound silence — not a gun was afterward 
fired for the night. The shrieks of the inhabitants in- 
formed us that the town was thrown into the greatest 
terror and consternation by the explosion of the maga- 
zine and the bursting and falling of shells in all direc- 
tions. The whole squadron awaited with the utmost 
anxiety to learn the fate of the adventurers from a signal 
previously agreed on in case of success— but waited in 
vain; no signs of their safety were to be observed. The 
Argus, Vixen, and Nautilus hovered around the entrance 
of the port till sunrise, when they had a fair view of the 
whole harbor — not a vestige of the ketch or boats was to 
be seen. One of the enemy 's largest gunboats was missing 
and three others were seen very much shattered and 
damaged, which the enemy were hauling on shore. 

1 1 From these circumstances, I am led to believe that 
those boats were detached from the enemy's flotilla to 
intercept the ketch without suspecting her to be a fire 
ship. The boat afterwards missing suddenly boarded her. 
The gallant Somers and the heroes of his party, observing 
the other three boats surrounding them, and no prospect 
of escape from them, . . . put a match to the train 
leading directly to the magazine, which at once blew the 
whole into the air, and terminated their existence. My 
conjectures respecting this affair are founded on a reso- 
lution which Captain Somers arid Lieutenants Wads worth 
and Israel had formed, neither to be taken by the enemy 
nor suffer him to get possession of the powder on board 
the Intrepid. They expected to enter the harbor without 
discovery, but had declared that if they should be dis- 
appointed and the enemy should board them before they 
reached the point of destination in such force as to leave 
them no hopes of safe retreat, that they would put a match 



90 



The United States Navy 



to the magazine and blow themselves and the enemy up 
together — determined as there was no exchanging of 
prisoners, that their country should never pay ransom 
for them, nor the enemy receive a supply of powder 
through their means." 

Captain Bainbridge was permitted to see the bodies 
when they came ashore the next day, but all were so 
mangled as to make recognition out of the question. 
According to him, no damage whatever was done the 
Tripolitans ; so Preble was probably mistaken in his idea 
regarding the injury sustained by the enemy's gunboats. 

The loss of the Intrepid' s crew was felt deeply 
throughout the squadron. Somers, especially, seemed to 
have a brilliant future in store for him, having many fine 
qualities in common with Decatur, whose dearest friend 
he had been from boyhood. After the war, the officers 
of the squadron subscribed to the erection of the monu- 
ment, now in the United States Naval Academy grounds, 
honoring the memory of the six comrades who fell before 
Tripoli: Somers, Caldwell, James Decatur, Wadsworth, 
Israel, and Dorsey. 

The Final Year of the War 

Shortly after the Intrepid disaster, Commodore 
Barron arrived with the frigates President and Constella- 
tion, bringing as passenger Tobias Lear, former consul- 
general to Algiers, who had full powers to negotiate with 
the Bey of Tripoli ; and in December Commodore Preble 
sailed for New York on the John Adams. The new com- 
modore had under his flag about twice the force that 
Preble had commanded, but the glory of the war ended 
with Preble's departure from the Mediterranean. Com- 
modore Barron was, at the time, in wretched health and 
soon became incapable of command. When, finally, he 
was compelled to give up his duties, in the spring of 1805, 
he was succeeded by Commodore Rodgers. The latter then 



Eaton s Expedition 



91 



had under his pennant five frigates and seven schooners 
and brigs, the largest of all the American squadrons 
assembled before Tripoli. 

Meanwhile, the energetic Eaton had managed to inter- 
est the authorities of Washington in his scheme of backing 
the deposed Hamet in an effort to regain his throne by 
means of a land attack against Tripoli. Eaton was author- 
ized to go to Egypt and do what he could, relying on such 
assistance as the fleet could afford. Starting at Cairo, 
he collected a motley array of Arabs and freebooters, 
including Hamet and some of Hamet 's officials. This 
horde he drove by sheer force of will through the desert 
to the frontiers of the province of Tripoli, and captured 
the city of Derne. 6 The attack on the city was led in 
person by Eaton, who was shot through the wrist in the 
final charge. The fall of Derne thoroughly frightened 
the Bey, and Eaton was looking forward to a triumphant 
march on Tripoli when he was met by the humiliating 
news that he must abandon Derne, because peace had 
already been concluded on the 10th of June, 1805. Consul 
Lear, who disliked Eaton and had opposed his plans, had 
during Eaton's operation hastily agreed to a treaty of 
peace with the Bey of Tripoli, involving the payment of a 
ransom of $60,000 for the captives from the Philadelphia. 
Apparently, neither Rodgers nor Bainbridge made any 
objection to the terms; but that any money should have 
been paid when a large fleet lay off the batteries of Tripoli 
and Eaton with an army threatened a revolution in the 
province itself, seems inexcusable. 7 



6 In this attack Eaton was supported by the fire of the sloop 
Hornet, the brig Argus, and the schooner Nautilus. 

1 Commodore Preble wrote to Eaton that he was sure "the 
Senate feel that just sense of indignation which they ought at the 
sacrifice of national honor which has been made by an ignominious 
negotiation." Preble Papers, quoted by Allen, Our Navy and the 
Barbary Corsairs, p. 254. 



92 



The United States Navy 



The treaty was satisfactory, however, in that it did 
away with all annual tribute for the future. Hamet, who 
was left in the lurch at Derne, became thereafter a pen- 
sioner of the United States. Eaton was honored by the 
State of Massachusetts with a grant of 10,000 acres of 
land ; but he was embittered by the outcome of his efforts 
to secure an honorable peace, and up to his death in 1811, 
he was engaged in disputes over that brilliant but luckless 
expedition. 

The war with Tripoli was the beginning of the move- 
ment of the civilized world to shake off the yoke of the 
Barbary pirates. The operations of our little fleet, under 
Preble, brought honor to the nation and to the service in 
the eyes of Europe, and at the same time they gave a 
practical schooling in warfare to the officers of all grades, 
but especially to the younger men, who later won fame 
in the War of 1812. 

In the popular mind, the hero of the Tripolitan War 
was Stephen Decatur, and there is no question as to his 
distinction in the brilliant personal qualities of courage 
and dash. But the officer who deserved first honors was 
Commodore Preble. Where others failed with large squad- 
rons, he succeeded with the smallest. He introduced 
iron discipline into the service at a time when it was most 
needed, and yet became the idol of his officers and men, 
because he was as jealous of their success and reputation 
as of his own. The difficulties that had proved insur- 
mountable to others he overcame. And he inspired his 
subordinates with ideals of obedience, courage, and effi- 
ciency that have ever since been the standards of the 
American Navy. 



VI 



THE WAR OF 1812 — CAUSES AND EARLY 
EVENTS 

Impressment 

The causes of the War of 1812 were mainly the 
impressment of American seamen, the restrictions npon 
our commerce by the British Orders in Council and the 
Napoleonic Decrees, and the Indian troubles in the 
Northwest — the responsibility for all of which was 
charged, at least by many, against England. 

Great Britain at the close of the eighteenth century 
entered upon a struggle with Napoleon that was so desper- 
ate as to require well-nigh all her resources, both of men 
and of food and war materials. For her gigantic navy 
she was constantly experiencing difficulty in finding a 
sufficient number of seamen. The duty required of them 
was hard and irksome. Further, many who might other- 
wise be available were drifting into the rapidly growing 
American merchant marine. The Yankee ships offered 
more comfort and very much higher wages. Some sea- 
men of British birth sailing in our ships had become 
naturalized American citizens; others were deserters 
from the Royal Navy. It made little difference. Eng- 
land claimed the right of seizing them wherever found 
and impressing them into her navy. For at this time and 
for many years to follow she held to the principle, "Once 
a subject, always a subject." Thus her warships fre- 
quently stopped an American merchantman on the high 
seas and took off deserters. This was bad enough, but 
when mistakes were made and American-born seamen 
were removed, there was sharp resentment. The case in 
which the United States frigate Chesapeake was thus 

93 



94 



The United States Navy 



treated by His Majesty's ship Leopard caused a sense 
of national humiliation and an indignation that lasted 
for years. 

The Chesapeake-Leopard Incident 

The British had been blockading some of our ports 
to enforce their orders, and several of the vessels on this 
duty had been very bold in impressing sailors even within 
a league of our shores. One of these blockaders in Chesa- 
peake Bay had even chased an American revenue cutter 
with the Vice-President of the United States on board. 
On the other hand, from the Melampus, a British block- 
ader in the Chesapeake, five of the crew deserted, one 
night in February, 1807, and three of them later enlisted 
on the United States frigate Chesapeake. A demand was 
made for their return by the British minister at Wash- 
ington, and while the correspondence was going on, five 
more men deserted from the Halifax, and also took service 
on the Chesapeake. The authorities at Washington made 
an investigation, but having been convinced that the 
deserters were Americans, refused to give them up. This 
refusal was reported to Vice-Admiral Berkeley at Halifax, 
who at once sent an order to the commanders of all British 
vessels on the North Atlantic station, requiring them 
to watch for the Chesapeake at sea, and search her 
for deserters. 

On June 22, 1807, as the Chesapeake set sail from 
Hampton Roads to relieve the Constitution in the Medi- 
terranean, His Majesty's ship Leopard, which had been 
lying at Lynnhaven, followed her, and when well outside 
of the jurisdiction of the United States, the British vessel 
spoke the American. Captain James Barron of the Chesa- 
peake, supposing the message to be of a peaceful char- 
acter, hove to, and received an officer from the Leopard 



Chesapeake-Leopard Affair 95 



who came aboard with Admiral Berkeley's order. Barron 
refused to give up the men, whereupon the British frigate 
at once opened fire. The American vessel had just under- 
gone repairs; her powder horns were empty, rammers 
could not be found, matches had been mislaid, and but few 
of her guns were mounted. After a number of broadsides 
had been fired at close range by the Leopard, First Lieu- 
tenant Allen managed to discharge one gun in return by 
means of a live coal from the galley. Meanwhile, twenty- 
one shot had struck the Chesapeake's hull, her foremast 
and mainmast had been carried away, the rigging had been 
badly cut, and three men had been killed and eighteen 
wounded. Barron thereupon hauled down his flag. The 
British boarding party found only one man of the 
Halifax's crew, for the rest had deserted before the 
Chesapeake sailed, but they took off three other men, all 
Americans. Barron attempted to throw his ship on the 
British captain as a prize, but the latter, refusing to 
accept it, left the American vessel to find her way back 
to port as best she might. 1 

The Chesapeake affair angered the nation as had 
nothing of its kind since the battle of Lexington. But 
Jefferson sought to avert war. In the negotiations which 
followed, England was ready to make reparation, but the 
President thought he could secure with it an abandon- 
ment of impressments and demanded also the latter. 
Since this was refused, many months of uncertainty 
passed, and it was not until 1811 that Great Britain made 
a formal disavowal of the wrong by restoring to the United 
States three of the four men who had been seized — the 
fourth had been hanged at the yardarm as a deserter. 

1 Captain Barron was court-martialed and found guilty of 
neglecting, on the probability of an engagement, to clear his 
ship for action. He was suspended for five years without pay. 



96 The United States Navy 

Restrictions Upon Commerce 

The French Revolution, beginning in 1789 and fol- 
lowed soon by wars in which most of Europe including 
Great Britain was involved, so engrossed the people of 
the several countries that more and more of the commerce 
and carrying trade fell to America. For two decades 
profits were enormous and shipping grew by leaps and 
bounds. Thus in 1790 the total exports of the country 
amounted to $19,000,000 ; five years later $26,000,000 
worth of merchandise was brought from French, Spanish, 
and Dutch possessions to the United States, and thence 
re-exported. In 1806 the value of the re-exports had 
grown to $60,000,000. The magnitude of the foreign 
trade can be seen further by a comparison with later 
times. In 1810 when the population was about one-tenth 
that of 1900, and the total national wealth was one-fortieth 
or one-fiftieth that of the later year, American ships in 
foreign trade were carrying actually a greater volume 
of trade. 2 

The conditions that obtained during this period are 
closely parallel to those of a century and some odd years 
later in the first years of the World War, when again 
America was the neutral power and profited from the 
great demands for ships and cargoes. 

It is not strange that England became alarmed over 
the future of her maritime supremacy, and being goaded 
on also by the economic phase of her war with Napoleon, 
passed many restrictive measures. 

The British courts having felt the pressure of public 
opinion handed down a decision on the "Essex case." 
By a previous act, the a Rule of 1756," neutral ships could 
not in time of war engage in a trade forbidden them in 

2 For a fuller discussion of the growth of the American mer- 
chant marine see Krafft and Norris, Sea Power in American 
History, chap. iv. 



Restrictions Upon Commerce 97 



time of peace ; e.g., trade between a country and its colon- 
ies. American merchants, however, had got around this 
by bringing the goods from a French or a Spanish colony 
first to an American port, and, after landing them and 
paying the duty, reshipping them to France or Spain (or 
vice versa) ; the drawback of the duty which was granted 
made this highly profitable. In the Essex case a cargo 
was thus taken from Barcelona to Havana via Salem. 
But the highest legal authority in England ruled that 
since the cargo was never intended for the American 
market, the broken voyage did not make the trade lawful. 
As a result of this decision, "about 120 vessels were seized, 
several condemned, all taken from their course, detained, 
or otherwise subjected to heavy losses and damages." 3 

Great Britain, as the next step, now ordered a general 
blockade against France from the Elbe to Brest, and a 
close blockade from the Seine to Ostend (Order in Coun- 
cil of May 16, 1806). Napoleon retaliated with his 
famous Berlin Decree (November 21, 1806), proclaim- 
ing "that the British Islands were thenceforward in a 
state of blockade ; that all correspondence and commerce 
with them was prohibited ; that trade in English merchan- 
dise was prohibited ; and that all merchandise belonging 
to England or (even if neutral property) proceeding from 
its manufactories or colonies, is lawful prize." 4 

England now countered with a second Order in Coun- 
cil, more drastic than the first, and Napoleon answered 
with a Decree that was scarcely less than confiscation. 
American commerce was in consequence ground between 
the "upper and nether millstones." President Jefferson's 
remedy for all these wrongs was "peaceable coercion." 
In 1807 he declared an embargo on all foreign shipping, 

3 Monroe to Fox, American State Papers, Foreign Eelations, 
III, 114. 

4 Mahan, War of 1812, I, 142. 



98 



The United States Navy 



which lasted fifteen months. This cost the New England 
merchants alone $8,000,000 ; it was extremely unpopular 
at home and injured America much more than it 
did Europe. 

Orders in Council and Decrees now followed fast, 
one after another, in this economic warfare, in which 
America also took part as she issued her Embargo and 
Non-Intercourse Acts. Napoleon was by far the worst 
offender, but he played his game so skilfully that popular 
feeling in America turned chiefly against England. 

Several British statesmen tried hard to avert war with 
the United States. The lack of bread in England, the 
distress of her manufacturing towns, and her already 
great burden in the European War made them hesitate 
before entering upon further hostilities. The Prince 
Regent also did his utmost. Thus the Orders in Council 
restricting American trade were revoked about the middle 
of 1812, but the action came too late. 

Indian Troubles 

While the negotiations between Washington and 
London and Paris had been proceeding, settlers had been 
pushing on in the Northwest. Already there was the 
desire for more space, and land speculators were pressing 
the Indians for further cessions. Against them Tecumseh 
attempted to organize the Indians that they might unite 
in refusing to cede more lands and oppose the settlers' 
progress. 

The Indians had obtained their guns and ammunition 
from British traders in Canada. Making much of this, 
the land speculators argued through their spokesmen in 
Congress that the only way to bring peace to the North- 
west was to remove the British from Canada. The West, 
largely represented by young men in Congress, had as 
their leader Henry Clay from Kentucky, and they were 



The President-Little Belt Affair 



99 



becoming a strong faction. Clay in a speech declared: 
a The conquest of Canada is in your power. ... Is it noth- 
ing to extinguish the torch that lights up savage warfare ? 
Is it nothing to acquire the entire fur-trade connected 
with that country ?" Clay, who had been elected Speaker 
of the House, was with his followers so insistent on 
aggressive measures that they were dubbed the "War 
Hawks." Their opponents charged that they had as their 
real motive territorial conquest. 

The President and the Little Belt 
Meanwhile another unpleasant affair occurred at sea. 
On May 1, 1811, the British frigate Guerriere, off New 
York harbor, had boarded the American brig Spitfire and 
impressed a passenger, a native of the United States. 
Immediately, Captain John Rodgers in the President was 
ordered to seek the Guerriere. Rodgers had already been 
put in command of a squadron of frigates and sloops, 
with orders to defend on the open sea all vessels of the 
United States from molestation by foreign armed ships. 

While searching for the Guerriere , on May 16, 1811, 
fifty miles off Cape Henry, he sighted a strange vessel. 
At eight o'clock that evening, though within hailing dis- 
tance, he could not make out in the darkness the stranger's 
identity. The latter, after two hails from the President, 
replied with a shot, which struck the American vessel's 
mainmast. Captain Rodgers at once returned the com- 
pliment. After a battle that lasted fifteen minutes, the 
foreign corvette, which turned out to be the sloop of war 
Little Belt, gave up the unequal contest. She had been 
badly cut up, and had lost nine killed and twenty-three 
wounded. Captain Rodgers stood by during the night, 
and next day offered assistance ; but the English captain 
refused the proffered aid, and continued his voyage. 
This incident embittered the feeling between the two 
countries still more. 



100 



The United States Navy 



The Declaration of War 

President Madison had called the Congress together 
on November 4, 1811, and this body had at once voted 
an army of 35,000 regulars and 50,000 volunteers. To 
the navy, the President had devoted in his message only 
three lines. Congress appointed a committee to consider 
the feasibility of building war vessels, and this committee 
suggested that twelve ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates 
should be built to protect our coasts. But Congress, still 
dominated by a Jeffersonian opposition to naval arma- 
ments as expensive and subversive of political freedom, 
rejected the report by a vote of sixty-two to fifty-nine. 
Politicians could not see that privateers and the loss of 
trade were far more expensive than ships-of-war, nor did 
they yet realize that a well-managed navy would promote 
patriotism and bring back national self-respect. Congress 
contented itself in making an appropriation of $600,000 
for timber for future warships and while in secret 
session it passed another embargo, April, 1812, intended 
to prevent the sapping of our seamen and supplies to aid 
England in her Peninsular War. Like the other embar- 
goes, the Non-Intercourse Act, and similar legislation, 
this law also failed in its object. On June 1, 1812, the 
President sent a message to Congress urging that war be 
declared against Great Britain, for the reasons that the 
latter country had ruined America's trade by her Orders 
in Council, had practically blockaded American ports, 
and had impressed American seamen into the service of 
her navy. Congress passed the necessary act, and on June 
19, 1812, war was declared. 

We thus see that the causes which led to war were: 
(1) impressment of American seamen, and (2) restric- 
tions upon American commerce resulting from the British 
Orders in Council, the Decrees of Napoleon, and the 



Comparison of Naval Strength 



101 



retaliatory Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts. With 
these there was a third cause, Indian trouble in the 
Northwest (justifying, as some maintained the taking of 
Canada). The last, though not proclaimed by the Presi- 
dent, had undoubted weight with the section of the country 
that clamored for war. 

The Navies of t&a United States and Great Britain 

At the outbreak of the war there were sixteen service- 
able war vessels in our navy ; among them there was not 
a single ship-of-the-line, but they included the three 
splendid 44-gun frigates, United States, Constitution, and 
President, which were superior to any frigate in the 
British Navy. The personnel of the navy also was at a 
high pitch of efficiency, for nearly all the officers and 
many of the seamen had seen active service in the French 
"War and in the war with Tripoli. 

Besides these sixteen men-of-war, there were 257 gun- 
boats which had been built in the years immediately pre- 
ceding the war; for Jefferson, who strongly opposed a 
navy, placed great faith in these gunboats, which were 
intended for coast defence. These, however, proved to 
be utterly worthless, and need not be considered as any 
part of our naval force. 

On the other hand, Britain's navy in 1812 "stood at 
a height never reached before or since by that of any 
other nation. ' ' 5 According to the London Times of that 
year, England "had from Halifax to the West Indies 
seven times the armament of the whole American Navy. ' ' 
Two years later, by the abdication of Napoleon, she had 
her entire navy free to use against the United States, a 
huge fleet of 219 ships-of-the-line and 296 frigates, besides 
a larger number of corvettes. 



6 Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, p. 22. 



102 



The United States Navy 



The Chase of the Belvidera 

Shortly after the declaration of war, Commodore 
Rodgers, with his squadron (the only vessels ready for 
immediate service) consisting of his flagship, the Presi- 
dent, 44; the United States, 44, Captain Decatur; the 
Congress, 36, Captain Smith ; the Hornet, 18, Master-Com- 
mandant Lawrence; and the Argus, 16, Lieutenant Sin- 
clair, left New York on June 21, with the intention of capt- 
uring the homeward-bound plate fleet from Jamaica. On 
June 23, Rodgers' squadron sighted the British frigate 
Belvidera, 36, Captain Byron. The President was over- 
hauling the enemy, and when she came within gunshot, the 
American vessel, by means of her bow guns, killed and 
wounded nine men. At this juncture a main-deck gun on 
the President burst, and in the ensuing confusion, Captain 
Byron escaped. The President had lost much ground by 
yawing and firing harmless broadsides. By this chase, 
Commodore Rodgers was taken far out of the course of the 
plate fleet. He now proceeded to Newfoundland and 
thence across the Atlantic and back to Boston, where he 
arrived on August 31, with seven prizes, all merchantmen. 

Hull's Escape from Broke 's Squadron 

The Belvidera, after her escape, carried the news of 
war to Halifax, and acting on this information Vice- 
Admiral Sawyer, on July 5, 1812, sent a squadron under 
Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke to cruise against the 
United States. This squadron consisted of the flagship 
Shannon, 38 ; the Belvidera, 36, Captain Byron ; the 
Africa, 64, Captain Bastard; the Aeolus, 32, Captain 
Townsend; and the Guerriere, 38, Captain Dacres. On 
the 16th, the British vessels captured the United States 
brig Nautilus, of 14 guns. On the same afternoon, off 



Chase of the Constitution 



103 



Barnegat, they made out a strange sail standing to the 
northeast. This was the Constitution, Captain Hull. 
When on the following morning they discovered that she 
was an American frigate, they began a chase, remarkable 
for its duration, and for the skill with which the Constitu- 
tion was handled. 

Commodore Charles Morris, at this time first lieu- 
tenant on the Constitution, gives in his autobiography an 
interesting account of this chase : 

"The ship [the Constitution] had been ordered to 
New York to meet and join other vessels under the com- 
mand of Commodore Rodgers, and our course was directed 
accordingly. We had proceeded beyond the Delaware, 
but out of sight of land, when, on the afternoon of the 
16th [July, 1812], we discovered four vessels at a great 
distance to the northwest, and a single ship to the north- 
east, from which quarter a light wind was then blowing. 
The wind changed to the southward about sunset which 
brought us to windward, and we stood for the ship, the 
wind being very light. The chase was evidently a frigate, 
and the first impression was that she might be a part of 
Commodore Rodgers' squadron. By eleven p.m. we were 
within signal distance, and it was soon apparent that she 
was not an American man-of-war. There being no appre- 
hension that a British frigate would make any attempt 
to avoid an engagement, Captain Hull felt justified in 
delaying any nearer approach till daylight of the 17th, 
when our newly-collected and imperfectly disciplined 
men would be less likely to be thrown into confusion. 
The ship was accordingly brought to the wind with her 
head to the southward and westward, under easy sail, 
with a light wind from the northwest. The other ship did 
the same at about two miles' distance. The watch not 
on duty were allowed to sleep at their quarters, and the 
officers slept in the same manner. 



104 



The United States Navy 



"As the following morning opened upon us, it dis- 
closed our companion of the night to be a large frigate, 
just within gunshot, on the lee quarter, and a ship-of-the- 
line and three other frigates, a brig, and a schooner, about 
two miles nearly astern, with all sails set, standing for 
us, with English colors flying. All our sails were soon 
set, and the nearest frigate, fortunately for us, but with- 
out any apparent reason, tacked and immediately wore 
round again in chase, a maneuver that occupied some 
ten minutes, and allowed us to gain a distance, which, 
though short, proved of utmost importance to our safety. 
By sunrise our ship was entirely becalmed and unman- 
ageable, while the ships astern retained a light breeze till 
it brought three of the frigates so near, that their shot 
passed beyond us. The distance, however, was too great 
for accuracy, and their shot did not strike our ship. 

' 1 Our boats were soon hoisted out, and the ship 's head 
kept from the enemy, and exertions were made to increase 
our distance from them by towing. This, and occasional 
catspaws, or slight puffs of wind, enabled us to prevent 
their closing, but as their means were equal to ours, we 
could gain nothing. A few guns were fired from our 
sternports, but so much rake 6 had been given to the stern, 
that the guns could not be used with safety and their 
further use was relinquished. All means were adopted 
that seemed to promise any increase of speed. The ham- 
mocks were removed from the nettings, and the cloths 
rolled up to prevent their unfavorable action ; several 
thousand gallons of water were started and pumped over- 
board, and all the sails kept thoroughly wet to close the 
texture of the canvas. 

"While making all these exertions, our chances for 
escape were considered hopeless. For many years the 
ship had proved a very dull sailer, especially during the 



6 Slant or inclination. 



Chase of the Constitution 105 



late cruise, and it was supposed that the first steady 
breeze would bring up such a force as would render 
resistance of no avail, and our situation seemed hopeless. 
At about eight a.m., one of the frigates called all the 
boats of the squadron to her, and, having arranged them 
for towing, furled all sails. This brought her toward us 
steadily, and seemed to decide our fate. Fortunately for 
us, a light breeze filled our sails and sent us forward a 
few hundred yards, before her sails could be set to profit 
by it. 

"With our minds excited to the utmost to devise 
means for escape, I happened to recollect that, when 
obliged by the timidity of my old commander, Cox, to 
warp the President in and out of harbors where others 
depended on sails, our practice had enabled us to give her 
a speed of nearly three miles an hour. We had been on 
soundings the day before, and, on trying, we found 
twenty-six fathoms. This depth was unfavorably great, 
but it gave me confidence to suggest to Captain Hull the 
expediency of attempting to warp the ship ahead. He 
acceded at once, and in a short time (about seven a.m.) 
the launch and the first cutter were sent ahead with the 
kedge and all the hawsers and rigging, from five inches 
and upward, that could be found, making nearly a mile 
of length. When the kedge was thrown, the men hauled 
on the connecting hawser, slowly and carefully at first, 
till the ship was in motion, and gradually increasing until 
a sufficient velocity was given to continue till the anchor 
could be taken ahead again, when the same process was 
repeated. In this way the ship was soon placed out of 
the range of the enemy's guns and by continued exertions 
when the wind failed, and giving every possible advantage 
to the sails when we had air enough to fill them, we pre- 
vented them from again closing very near us. 

' ' The ship which we had first chased gained a position 
abeam of us about nine a.m., and fired several broadsides. 



106 



The United States Navy 



but the shot fell just short of us, and only served to 
enliven our men and excite their jocular comments. The 
exertions of neither party were relaxed during this day 
or the following night. There was frequent alternation 
of calms and very light winds from the southeast, which 
we received with our head to the southwestward. When 
the wind would give us more speed than with warping and 
towing, the boats were run up to their places, or sus- 
pended to the spars in the chains by temporary tackles, 
with their crews in them, ready to act again at a moment 's 
notice. 

"At daylight of the second day, on the 18th, it was 
found that one frigate had gained a position on our lee 
bow, two nearly abeam, one on the lee quarter about two 
miles from us, and the ship-of-the-line, brig, and schooner, 
three miles from us in the same direction. The wind had 
now become tolerably steady, though still light. The 
frigate on the lee bow tacked about four a.m., and would 
evidently reach within gunshot if we continued our course. 
This we were anxious to avoid, as a single shot might 
cripple some spar, and impede our progress. If we tacked, 
we might be exposed to the fire of the other frigate on 
the lee quarter; but as she was a smaller vessel, the risk 
appeared to be less, and we also tacked soon. 

"In passing the lee frigate at five, we expected a 
broadside or more, as we should evidently pass within 
gunshot; but, from some unexplained cause, Lord James 
Townsend, in the Aeolus, of 32 guns, suffered us to pass 
quietly, and tacked in our wake, while the others soon 
took the same direction. We had now all our pursuers 
astern and on the lee quarter, and as the wind was grad- 
ually increasing, our escape must depend on our superi- 
ority of sailing, which we had no reason to hope or expect. 
Exertions, however, were not relaxed. The launch and 
first cutter, which we dared not lose, were hoisted on 
board at six a.m., under the directions of Captain Hull, 



Chase of the Constitution 107 



with so little loss of time or change of sails, that our 
watching enemies could not conceive what disposition was 
made of them. This we afterward learned from Lieu- 
tenant Crane, who was a prisoner in their squadron. The 
sails were kept saturated with water, a set of skysails 
was made and set, and all other sails set and trimmed to 
the greatest advantage, close by the wind. The ship 
directly astern gained slowly, but gradually, till noon; 
though, as the wind increased, our good ship was going at 
that time at the unexpected rate of ten knots an hour. 
At noon we had the wind abeam, and as it gradually 
freshened, we began to leave our fleet pursuer. Our ship 
had reached a speed of twelve and a half knots by 
two p.m. Our hopes began to overcome apprehension, and 
cheerfulness was more apparent among us. 

' 'Though encouraged, we were by no means assured, 
as all the ships were still near and ready to avail them- 
selves of any advantage that might offer. About six p.m., 
a squall of wind and rain passed over us, which induced 
us to take in our light sails before the rain covered us 
from the view of the enemy ; but most of them were soon 
replaced as the wind moderated. 7 When the rain had 
passed, we had evidently gained a mile or more during its 



7 This was a skilful ruse on the part of Hull to deceive the 
enemy. " He immediately let everything go by the run, apparently 
in the utmost confusion, as if unable to show a yard of canvas — 
his sails were hauled up by the brails and clewlines. The enemy, 
perceiving this, hastened to get everything snug, before the gust 
should reach them; but no sooner had they got their sails furled, 
than Captain Hull had his courses and topsails set, and the 
Constitution darted forward with great rapidity. So coolly, 
however, did he proceed, that he, . . . though pressed by a 
pursuing enemy, attended personally to hoisting his launch and 
other boats, while the ship was going at ten knots through the 
water. . . . The British squadron cut adrift all their boats, and, 
after they abandoned the chase, spent two or three whole days in 
cruising to pick them up." 'Naval Monument, pp. 8-9. 



108 



The United States Navy 



continuance. Still the pursuit was continued, and our 
own ship pressed forward to her utmost speed. The 
officers and men again passed the night at quarters. At 
daylight, on the morning of the 19th, our enemies had 
been left so far astern that danger from them was consid- 
ered at an end, and at eight a.m. they at last relinquished 
the chase and hauled their wind. 8 Our officers and crew 
could now indulge in some rest, of which the former had 
taken little for more than sixty hours. 

' ' Captain Hull deservedly gained much reputation for 
this difficult retreat from a greatly superior- force, when 
superior numbers and other circumstances gave the enemy 
great advantages. ... If they had concentrated their 
efforts at an earlier period to bringing up some one of 
their ships within fair range, or had adopted our plan of 
warping at any time during the early part of the chase, 
they could hardly have failed to inflict such damage as 
would have prevented our escape, after our dependence 
was reduced to our sails. The result may be remembered 
as an evidence of the advantages to be expected from 
perseverance under the most discouraging circumstances, 
so long as any chance of success may remain. ' ' 9 

Captain Isaac Hull, by reason of his coolness, great 
perseverance, good seamanship, and readiness to take 
suggestions of his subordinates, had completely out- 
maneuvered five British captains. This feat in eluding 
Broke 's squadron, and his fight shortly afterwards with 
the Guerriere, according to Roosevelt, " place him above 
any single-ship captain of the war." 

8 That is, came up into the wind. 

9 The Autobiography of Commodore Morris, pp. 51-55. 



VII 



THE CAPTURES OF THE GUERRIERE AND 
THE MACEDONIAN 

The Constitution and the Guerriere 

The Constitution, having been prevented by Broke 's 
squadron from entering 1 New York, proceeded to Boston, 
where she arrived July 27, 1812. Captain Hull at once 
dispatched letters to New York and Washington, renewed 
supplies, and prepared for active service. When he had 
delayed just long enough to learn that there were no 
orders from Commodore Rodgers awaiting him in New 
York, Hull put to sea on August 2. His haste, Morris 
says, was due to his "apprehension of being blockaded 
by the enemy's squadron"; but probably he was also 
influenced by his eagerness to try issues with the British, 
and by the likelihood that his ship would soon be given to 
a captain higher on the list. As it turned out, he had a 
narrow escape in getting to sea; for, on the day following 
his departure, orders came from Washington which would 
have held him in port for weeks and perhaps months. It 
was well for Hull, thus sailing without orders, that he 
could give a good account of himself upon his return. 

After an uneventful cruise to Halifax, he took his 
station off Cape Race, where he might intercept ships 
bound to or from Quebec or Halifax. Here he seized two 
British brigs, saved an American prize from being recapt- 
ured, and retook an American brig that had been seized 
by the British. At this point he heard that Broke 's 
squadron was on the western edge of the Grand Banks. 
He therefore took a course southward, intending to pass 
near the Bermudas. On the evening of August 18, he 

109 



110 



The United States Navy 



saw a sail, and giving chase overhauled it in two hours. 
It proved to be an American privateer, the Decatur, 
which, in attempting to escape its supposed foe, had 
thrown twelve of its fourteen guns overboard. From the 
Decatur Hull learned that a British ship of war had 
been seen the day previous standing to the southward. 
He immediately resolved to give chase. 

At one p.m., August 19, when the Constitution was in 
latitude 41° 42' N., longitude 55° 48' W. 1 (about 750 
miles east of Boston), the lookout at the masthead made 
out a sail somewhat south of east. Two hours later the 
sail could be seen to be a large ship on the starboard tack 
under easy canvas, close hauled to the wind, which was 
blowing fresh from the northwest. Hull was eager to 
engage a British frigate, and, being to windward, he came 
rapidly down until he was within three miles, when he 
ordered the light sails taken in, the courses hauled up, and 
the ship cleared for action. The stranger, which proved 
to be the Guerriere, had, in the meantime, shown her 
willingness to engage by backing her main topsail and 
waiting for her enemy to approach. The American 
responded smartly, intending to come to close quarters at 
once. 

If the Constitution held to her course, Captain Dacres 
of the Guerriere saw that his enemy might pass under 
his stern and rake. To prevent this, Dacres fired a broad- 
side when his antagonist was barely within range and 
then wore, firing the other broadside as he came about. 
The Constitution, which had displayed an ensign and a 
jack at each masthead, also fired occasionally, and yawed 
to prevent being raked. Thus the frigates maneuvered for 
three-quarters of an hour, each giving the other no advan- 



1 Letter of Captain Hull, August 30, 1812, to the Secretary of 
the Navy. 



The Constitution and the Guerriere 



111 



tage, but inflicting no injury. The Guerriere then gave 
the Constitution an opportunity to come into close action 



ft 



5.55P.M. 



v \ 
10 / 



<3( 

c constitution uMt 

a GUERRIERE (shaded) VT^v/^w 
synchronous r ^-^cg" 



7&> CONSTITUTION and GUERRIERE 
AUGUST 19, 16 IE 



Plan of the Battle between the Constitution and the Guerriere 
August 19, 1812 

by bearing up and sailing slowly under topsails and jib 
with the wind on her quarter. Hull, seeing Dacres' will- 
ingness, ordered the man at the wheel to steer directly 



112 



The United States Navy 



for the British ship, and had the main topgallant sail set 
that he might close at once; further, he instructed his 
gunners to cease firing. 

As the Constitution approached, the Guerriere opened 
vigorously with her stern chasers, to which the Constitu- 
tion could give no effective reply without yawing, a 
maneuver which would prevent the American from coming 
at once into close action. In obedience to Hull's orders, 
his gunners endured this fire in silence, but made every 
preparation to strike a telling blow when the word should 
be given, and double-shotted their guns with round and 
grape. 

It was at 5.55, according to Captain Hull's report, 
that he came alongside the Guerriere within half pistol 
shot. At the signal a heavy fire burst from his starboard 
battery as each gun bore on the Guerriere. Hull had 
struck his first blow, and the enemy fairly staggered 
from the shock. Just before the battle, as the American 
ensign was unfurled, the crew of the Constitution had 
given three cheers, " requesting to be laid close alongside 
the enemy." And now when their desire was promptly 
granted, they responded nobly to the supreme test and 
maintained a cool and well-directed fire in the face of a 
furious cannonade from the Guerriere. It was only six 
to eight weeks since Hull had shipped his crew, many of 
whom were raw hands. But the weeks had been filled with 
constant practice, and early in this battle the practice 
began to tell. The main yard of the Guerriere was shot 
away in the slings, and fifteen minutes after she had been 
engaged at close quarters her mizzenmast was struck by 
a 24-pound shot, and went by the board, knocking a hole 
in her starboard counter. On seeing this, Hull is said to 
have exclaimed, ' ' Huzza, my boys ! We have made a brig 
of her!" 

The mast, falling on the starboard side, acted 



The Constitution and the Guerriere 113 

as a drag, and, though the helm was put hard over, 
brought the ship's head up. As the Constitution 
then drew ahead, Hull luffed short round the Guerriere' s 
bows. The loss of braces, with spanker and mizzen top- 
sails disabled, prevented his coming to as quickly as he 
desired, 2 but he poured in two raking broadsides, swept 
her decks with grape, and put several holes in her hull 
between wind and water. He then attempted to wear that 
he might retain the advantage of position and perhaps 
rake again, but as he brought the ship before the wind 
the bowsprit of the Guerriere fouled the port mizzen 
rigging of the Constitution. 

Each side now thought of boarding. With the British 
it was indeed a last desperate chance to retrieve the day. 
But as they were assembling on the forecastle of the 
Guerriere, the American sailors were being drawn up on 
the quarter-deck of the Constitution. Captain Dacres, 
seeing what preparation had been made to receive his 
men, and considering how slow and difficult it would be 
to cross over because of the rough sea, gave up the 
attempt. 

So near were the two forces to each other, that an 
American sailor who had discharged his boarding pistol, 
enraged that he had missed his man, threw the pistol and 
struck him in the chest. Marksmen in the tops, mean- 
while, inflicted severe losses on each side; in fact, nearly 
all the losses that the Constitution suffered during the 
engagement occurred at this time. Lieutenant Bush of 
the American marines, who in organizing the boarding- 
party had exposed himself on the Constitution's quarter- 
deck, was killed; Lieutenant Morris, while attempting to 
pass some turns of the mainbrace over the Guerriere's 
bowsprit to hold the two ships together, was severely 



2 Autobiography of Commodore Morris, p. 56. 
8 



114 



The United States Navy 



wounded; Mr. Alwyn, the master, also sustained a slight 
injury ; and Captain Hull escaped only because a devoted 
sailor who saw him mounting an arm-chest forcibly drew 
him back and begged he would not get up there unless 
he took off "those swabs," pointing to his epaulets. Nor 
did the British suffer less; among the wounded were 
Captain Dacres (shot through the back), Mr. Scott, the 
master, and Mr. Kent, the master's mate. 

The ships soon drew apart, but the bowsprit of the 
Guerriere, striking the taffrail of the Constitution, slacked 
the British ship 's f orestay ; and as the f oreshrouds on the 
port side had been mostly shot away, the foremast fell 
over on the starboard side, crossing the mainstay. The 
jerk suddenly given to the mainmast — not very sound — 
caused that to fall; and thirty minutes after fighting at 
close quarters had begun, according to Hull's statement, 
the Guerriere was left without a spar except the bowsprit. 
The Constitution sailed ahead of the Guerriere and again 
took a position to rake, but the British, seeing the useless- 
ness of further fighting, fired a gun to leeward as signal 
of submission. 

The Constitution then set fore and mainsails, and 
hauled a short distance to the east to repair damages. 
All her braces and much of her standing and running 
rigging had been injured, and some spars had been shot 
away. A slight fire, caught in the cabin from the wadding 
of the enemy 's guns, had to be extinguished. A half hour 
sufficed for reeving new braces and making temporary 
repairs, whereupon the Constitution wore and returned 
to the Guerriere. 

The British had during the interim employed all hands 
in clearing away the wreckage. They had rigged up a 
spritsail, but when the Constitution again bore down, the 
spritsail yard carried away, and the ship fell into the 
trough of the sea, with her main-deck guns rolling under. 



The Constitution and the Guerriere 115 

It was hard for the British to acknowledge defeat on 
their own element, the sea, but there was no alternative. 
The small boat sent by the Constitution returned with 
Captain Dacres, and the formal surrender took place. 

A few more broadsides would have sent the Guerriere 
to the bottom. As it was, the lieutenant placed in charge 
of the prize hailed next morning at daylight to say that 
there was four feet of water in the hold. The possibility 
of taking her into port was so slight that Hull decided 
on her destruction ; and having removed the prisoners, he 
set fire to her and blew her up on the afternoon of the 
20th. As he had completed the repairs of the Constitution 
about the same time, he set sail for Boston. 

The New England States had been opposed to the war 
at the outset, and more than once during the dreary con- 
flict their discontented citizens threatened secession. How- 
ever, on Hull's arrival there was no lack of enthusiasm. 
A splendid entertainment was given by the citizens of all 
parties in Boston to the victorious captain and his officers ; 
other cities and the officers' respective States honored 
them with similar spirit, and Congress, besides giving a 
vote of thanks, appropriated $50,000 as prize money. 
The encouragement gained from capturing a British 
frigate was certainly needed after the disgraceful sur- 
render of Detroit, which occurred within the same week. 

The victory also had an important influence on the 
naval policy of the nation. In the years following the 
war with Tripoli many prominent statesmen were strongly 
in favor of doing entirely away with the navy as had 
been done after the Revolution. And on the outbreak of 
the second war with England, the administration, having 
no confidence in its ships when opposed to the over- 
whelming forces of England, was inclining to the course 
of preventing their capture by holding them locked in 
the fortified harbors. The victory of the Constitution 



116 



The United States Navy 



made permanent the establishment of the navy, and 
induced the Government to give the ships their share in 
the fighting. 

Exultation in America and depression in England 
were both marked with extravagance. Strangely enough, 
when the British officers had seen the Constitution in the 
West Indies and the Mediterranean, they had spoken 
slightingly of her, as of the other "Yankee" frigates. 3 
The low estimation put on their power is indicated by 
Dacres' entry on the register of the American brig John 
Adams, as he fell in with her two or three days before 
meeting the Constitution: "Captain Dacres, commander 
of His Britannic Majesty's frigate Guerriere, of 44 guns, 
presents his compliments to Commodore Rodgers, of the 
United States frigate President, and will be very happy 
to meet him, or any other American frigate of equal force 
to the President, off Sandy Hook, for the purpose of 
having a few minutes' tete-a-tete." Thus, in meeting a 
sister ship of the President, Dacres got precisely what he 
sought. 

The opinions of the British on the inferior qualities 
of the American frigates were now quickly reversed. Cap- 
tain Dacres, before the court-martial which tried him for 
the loss of his ship, testified to the American's "superior 
sailing" which "enabled him to choose his distance." 
And an officer of the Guerriere wrote home shortly after 
the fight: "No one that has not seen the Constitution 
would believe there could be such a ship for a frigate; 



3 The English people as a whole underrated the power of their 
enemy. The Morning Post, the organ of the Government, had 
observed shortly before the loss of the Guerriere : " A war of a 
very few months, without creating to England the expense of a 
single additional ship, would be sufficient to convince America of 
her folly by a necessary chastisement of her insolence and 
audacity." Quoted by Coutts, Famous Duels of the Fleet, p. 244. 



The United States and the Macedonian 117 



the nearest ship in the British Navy, as to her dimensions 
and tonnage, is the Orion, of 74 guns." 

A comparison of the two forces will show at a glance 
that, courage and skill being at all equal, there really 
could be no excuse for the Americans ' not winning : 



Constitution 
Guerriere . . 



Guns Broadside- Crew 
weight 

55 736 4 468 

49 570 263 



Killed Wounded Total 

7 7 14 

15 63 78 



Yet the British had fought with the French and Spanish 
against odds fully as great, and had won. They had come 
to think British courage and discipline much more than 
an offset for a few additional guns. Now, as they sud- 
denly apprehended, they were dealing with quite a differ- 
ent foe. They had also to face the fact that the disparity 
in force, w T hich, according to Koosevelt's estimate, was 
about as three to two, was very much less than the dis- 
parity in losses, so that the advantage was very decidedly 
with this new foe. 

The United States and the Macedonian 

In the first frigate action of the war there is some 
weight to be given to the explanation that the Guerriere 
was not an English-built ship (she had been captured 
from the French six years before), and that at the end 
of a long cruise she was very much in need of overhauling. 
In the second action this was not at all the situation. 
The British frigate, the Macedonian, 38 guns, just out of 
drydock, and built only two years before, was supposed 

4 American shot regularly was lighter than British of the 
same size. To bring the two to a like standard, subtract from 
the figures given for American guns one-eighteenth, following the 
suggestion of James (Naval Occurrences, p. 10) ; Roosevelt would 
make a reduction slightly larger than James, or seven per cent. 



118 



The United States Navy 



to be one of the finest ships of her class in the Royal Navy. 
Her captain, J ohn Surman Carden, gave the closest atten- 
tion to the personnel as well as to the discipline of his 
crew. To such men as he found below the standard he 
gave opportunity to desert ; those whom he found efficient 
he held under strictest rule ; and with his able lieutenant, 
David Hope, drilled them daily in seamanship and 
gunnery. 

The ship that was to engage in duel with the Mace- 
donian was the United States, 44 guns, commanded by 
Captain Stephen Decatur. She had left Boston, October 
8, 1812, in Commodore Rodgers' squadron. The other 
ships of the squadron, the President, Congress, and Argus, 
returned after a three months' cruise, having accom- 
plished little. Decatur had parted company after three 
days out, and it was on October 25, 1812, off the Canary 
Islands (lat. 29° N., long. 29° 30' W.) that he encountered 
the Macedonian. 5 

Carden, who was less than a month out from Ports- 
mouth, had heard at Madeira that the American frigate 
Essex was in, the vicinity, and as the lookout at the mast- 
head early on the morning of the 25th reported a sail 
twelve miles distant on the lee beam, Carden made haste 
and stood over in its direction. Instead of the Essex, 
inferior to his ship in power, he was about to meet the 
United States, which was decidedly superior. Yet had he 
known who the stranger was, it is probable he would have 
been scarcely less eager for an engagement. The utmost 
confidence prevailed on board the Macedonian, and neither 
Carden nor his lieutenant, Hope, was the kind of English- 
man that is careful in considering the odds against him. 
Carden had not yet learned of the fate of the Guerriere. 



6 Letter of Captain Decatur, October 30, 1812, to the Secretary 
of the Navy. 



Stephen Decatur, J: 



The United States and the Macedonian 119 



In the crew of the Macedonian were seven Americans 
impressed into the British Navy. They had heard only 
rumors of the existence of war between the two countries ; 
but when they saw the preparations for battle and an 
American frigate approaching, one of their number, Jack 
Cand, known among his shipmates for his bravery, 
addressed the captain, requesting that they might be 
regarded as prisoners of war and be excused from fighting 
against their own flag. Captain Dacres, although short 
of men, had in precisely the same situation allowed the 
Americans to go below. Captain Carden, never too gentle 
with his crew, roughly ordered the man to his quarters, 
threatening to shoot him if he made the request again. 
It was a hard fate for Cand, whichever course he took, and 
he was killed during the battle by a 24-pound shot. 

The Macedonian, on first sighting the United States, 
was sailing northwest by west, and in closing had the 
advantage of the weather-gage. 6 The wind was blowing 
fresh from the south-southeast. 

Decatur, wishing to secure a better position, just before 
coming into range wore round on the port tack and 
hauled short up. The Macedonian, by continuing on the 
course she was then sailing, would have crossed the 
United States' bow at short range and would have entered 
at once into close action. 7 This was what Lieutenant 
Hope advised. But in so doing the Macedonian must have 
relinquished the weather-gage. Rather than do this 
Carden hauled close to the wind, still keeping his distance. 
Had he been fighting the Essex, as he still supposed, 

8 Weather-gage : the term applied to the position of a ship to 
windward of another; in the days of sailing vessels this was 
regarded as a decided advantage, for it gave the ship possessing 
it in battle, everything else being equal, the greater speed and 
facility in maneuvering. 

7 Court-martial of Captain Carden. 



120 



The United States Navy 



V UNITED STATES 
M MACEDONIAN (Shaded) 

a. b. c, etc., synchronous / 
positions y 



M / 



t 



8.30 



WIND \ 




PLAN of the ENGAGEMENT between 
The UNITED STATES and 
The MACEDONIAN, Oct 25. 1812 

From Mahan's War of 1812, by permission 

Plan of the Engagement Between the United States &nb 
the Macedonian. Oct. 25, 1812 



The United States and the Macedonian 121 



Carden's decision would have been wise, for that ship, 
though well equipped with carronades, was weak in long 
guns. As it was, he gave his enemy a decided advantage, 
for the United States excelled in long guns of unusual 
weight. 

When the ships passed on opposite tacks, the United 
States fired, but the distance was too great to inflict 
injury. The Macedonian, which had already shown her- 
self much the faster sailer, then wore in pursuit and 
caught up with her enemy, reaching a position, at long 
range, off the American's port quarter. An exchange of 
broadsides cost the United States her mizzen topgallant 
mast, and the Macedonian her gaff-halyards and mizzen 
topmast, the latter falling into her maintop. This loss 
deprived the Macedonian of her superiority in sailing. As 
long as the two ships sailed on parallel courses or yawed 
to fire a full broadside, the advantage was not of position 
but of long guns, and the latter was decidedly with the 
United States. To overcome this superiority, and to bring 
his ship near enough to use her carronades, Carden 
changed from a parallel to a converging course. Decatur 
yawed and fired a broadside; and then, running ahead a 
little to prevent the Macedonian from closing, he repeated 
the maneuver. On came the Macedonian, exposing her 
starboard bow to the United States; whereupon the latter, 
by a severe diagonal fire, dismounted all the carronades 
on the starboard side of the Macedonian's quarter-deck 
and forecastle and at the same time damaged her hull and 
disabled many of the crew. 

If in time of peace there had been considerable sullen- 
ness among the crew of the Macedonian because of the 
stern rigidity of the discipline and the cruel use of the 
lash, as is reported, the men certainly showed admirable 
spirit in fighting. ' ' Our men kept cheering with all their 



122 



The United States Navy 



might," wrote Samuel Leech, 8 a boy serving one of the 
guns. ' 'I cheered with them, though I confess I scarcely 
knew for what. Certainly there was nothing very inspirit- 
ing in the aspect of things where I was stationed. So 
terrible had been the work of destruction round us, it 
was termed the slaughter-house." After many gruesome 
details he continues, "Our men fought like tigers. Some 
of them pulled off their jackets, others, their jackets and 
vests; while some, still more determined, had taken off 
their shirts, and, with nothing but a handkerchief tied 
around the waistband of their trousers, fought like 
heroes. ' ' Mr. Hope, the first lieutenant, was wounded by 
an iron ring torn from a hammock by a shot. ' ' He went 
below, shouting to the men to fight on. Having had his 
wound dressed, he came up again, shouting to us at the 
top of his voice, and bidding us fight with all our might." 
This lieutenant had been brutal in enforcing discipline 
and in administering extreme penalties for slight offenses ; 
and the gunner's boy pauses in his narrative to observe 
that there was not a man in the ship who would not have 
rejoiced if something much larger had struck the petty 
tyrant. 

At 10.15, when the United States had been pouring in 
an effective fire for half or three-quarters of an hour, 
Decatur laid his maintopsail to the mast and allowed the 
Macedonian to come into close action. But it was too 
late to be of any benefit to the Englishman, who had only 
his main-deck guns remaining, and the maneuver but 
increased the disparity of forces. A few minutes after 
eleven the Macedonian had her mizzenmast shot away; 
her fore and maintopmasts were also shot away at the 
caps, her lower masts were wounded, and she had received 
more than 100 shot in her hull. No longer steadied by 
her sail, she was rolling her main-deck guns under, while 



8 In his Thirty Years from Home, p. 132, ff. 



The United States and the Macedonian 123 



the United States, having no sail she could not set but 
her mizzen topgallant, was perfectly steady. 

There was just one wild, desperate chance remaining 
for the British, and putting their helm hard aport they 
prepared to board the American frigate. Lieutenant 
Hope wrote afterwards, ' ' At that moment every man was 
on deck, several who had lost an arm, and the universal 
cheer was, ' Let us conquer or die. ' ' ' Just then, however, 
the forebrace was shot away, and the yard, swinging 
round, threw the ship up into the wind. The United 
States, seeing her opponent's helpless state, then with- 
drew a short distance for repairs; at which the irre- 
pressible "Macedonians," deluded into thinking that 
their enemy had spied an English man-of-war coming to 
the rescue, gave a final cheer. 

Returning at noon, the United States took a position 
off her opponent's stern. There had already been a 
council of war on the quarter-deck of the Macedonian. 
Lieutenant Hope, though wounded again, this time some- 
what seriously in the head, had still much fight in him, 
and advised "not to strike but to sink alongside." The 
counsel of those who put a higher valuation on life, how- 
ever, prevailed. 

It must have been a surprise for Garden when he 
learned on surrender, that he was to meet his old acquaint- 
ance, Decatur. As he offered his sword, Decatur gener- 
ously declined it, saying, ' ' Sir, I cannot receive the sword 
of a man who has so bravely defended his ship. ' ' With 
a like chivalry and kindness Decatur gave orders that all 
the personal effects of the English officers should be 
respected as still theirs, even including a large stock of 
wine which they had laid in at Madeira, giving them as 
equivalent $800. Further, everything was done by the 
Americans to give their late enemies, while on the United 
States, the comforts and cheer due to honored guests. 



124 



The United States Navy 



Decatur's good fortune did not end with the capture. 
Having determined to take his prize in, he spent two 
weeks after the fight in making repairs. With the many 
squadrons that the English had scattered about the 
Atlantic and along the American coast, the long voyage 
home involved great risk of recapture. However, without 
having so much as sighted a British sail, the two ships 
arrived at New London and then proceeded to New York. 
The Macedonian was repaired and fitted out anew, and 
had a long and honorable career in the American Navy. 

The following shows the comparative force of the two 
ships : 



In speed the Macedonian had the decided advantage 
(the nickname of the United States, ''Old Wagoner," 
suggests her lumbering gait, which seems later to have 
been somewhat remedied) . In every other particular the 
advantage was with the American frigate. She was the 
larger ship, had thicker scantlings, was higher out of the 
water (of importance in the rough sea), had heavier guns 
and more of them, and finally was superior in her crew. 
Further, Decatur showed better seamanship than Carden. 
An instructive comparison is to be gained by considering 
the coming into close action by Captain Carden on the 
Macedonian and by Captain Hull on the Constitution. 
Each at the beginning of the engagement had the advan- 
tage of the weather-gage ; Hull yawed when his opponent 
wore, giving him no opportunity to rake; Hull pursued 
a zig-zag course, and coming up in the British ship's 
wake, was within pistol shot before the enemy could do 
any harm. Carden obstinately held to the weather-gage ; 
and when he closed he did so without maneuvering, and 
exposed his ship to such a disastrous diagonal fire that 



United States 
Macedonian . 



Guns Broadside 
55 786 
49 547 



Crew 
478 
292 



Killed Wounded Total 
5 7 12 

36 68 104 



The United States and the Macedonian l%5 



he was virtually defeated before he had reached close 
quarters. 

Strangely enough, the comparative effectiveness of 
24- and 18-pounders, as well as the superiority of their 
respective ships, had been the subject of a friendly argu- 
ment between Garden and Decatur a few months previous 
to the war, when, as the two ships were together in Chesa- 
peake Bay, the commanders were discussing the merits of 
each. 

The inequality in force was approximately the same 
as that between the Constitution and the Guerriere, three 
to two, but the disparity in losses was almost nine to one. 
Yet David Hope wrote some years later to his old com- 
mander, "In no ship in the British service could there 
have been more attention paid to the practical part of 
gunnery than was done by you to the crew of the Mace- 
donian." If this is true, the results of the action are 
evidence of the very superior quality of the crew under 
Decatur. Perhaps, also, they illustrate the principle 
uttered by Farragut at Port Hudson, "The best protec- 
tion against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from 
our own guns." It is plain, on reading the extravagant 
speeches and newspaper articles that dealt with the capt- 
ure, that our country was young and unaccustomed to 
victory. Yet without magnifying the size and armament 
of the Macedonian or reducing that of the United States, 
this victory, like that of the Constitution, was a notable 
achievement in the history of the navy and of the nation. 
The leading naval power of the world had lost a frigate of 
which an officer of the United States, while admitting the 
Macedonian's inferiority in force, goes on to observe, "But 
she is just such a ship as the English have achieved all 
their single-ship victories in; . . . she is, in tonnage, 
men, and guns, such a ship as the English prefer to all 
others, and have, till the Guerriere 's losy always thought 
a match for any single-decked ship afloat." 



VIII 



A VICTORY AND A DEFEAT 

The Constitution and the Java 

The third squadron sent to cruise against British 
commerce during the War of 1812 was placed under the 
command of Captain William Bainbridge, and consisted 
of three ships, the Constitution, 4:4: guns, flagship ; the 
Essex, 32 guns, Captain David Porter; and the sloop 
Hornet, 18 guns, Master-Commandant James Lawrence. 
The Hornet and the Constitution left Boston together on 
October 26, 1812, but the Essex, which was fitting in the 
Delaware, was unable to get to sea till the 28th. 

The orders for this little squadron were, to sail first 
for the Cape Verde Islands, where fresh water could 
be procured; thence, by November 27, to Fernando 
Noronha, an island about 200 miles off the coast of Brazil ; 
and thence along the coast to Rio de Janeiro. From this 
port the course was to be laid directly across the South 
Atlantic for the neighborhood of St. Helena, where the 
home-coming English East Indiamen frequently touched. 
These plans were never carried out. 

In the first place, the Essex, which Porter charac- 
terized as the " worst frigate in the service," was unable 
to catch up with the other two ; and when Porter arrived 
at Fernando he found that the Constitution and the 
Hornet had already gone to Bahia, but that Bainbridge 
had left orders for him to proceed to Rio. There, finding 
no sign of his commodore, Porter struck out on his own 
authority and began his famous roving cruise in the 
Pacific. Meanwhile the actions between the Constitution 

126 



The Constitution and the Java 127 



and the Java, and between the Hornet and the Peacock, 
compelled the Constitution and the Hornet to give up the 
intended cruise, and repair to the United States. 

On the 13th of December, the Constitution and the 
Hornet arrived at Bahia, where they found a British 
sloop, the Bonne Citoyenne, with a large amount of specie 
aboard. The American vessels kept her blockaded for 
some time, during which Lawrence challenged the British 
commander to come out to single combat, Bainbridge 
pledging his honor not to interfere. The Englishman, 
however, declined, excusing himself on the ground that 
he did not believe the American commodore would keep 
his hands off. Finally on the 26th of the month, Bain- 
bridge made sail for open sea, hoping thereby to tempt 
the Bonne Citoyenne to come out and meet the Hornet. 

At nine o'clock, on the morning of the 29th, Bain- 
bridge discovered two sails to the northeast, which proved 
to be a British frigate, the Java, 1 and an American prize. 
On sighting the American frigate, the Englishman directed 
his prize to make for Bahia, while he himself made all 
sail to come up with the Constitution. Captain Bain- 
bridge responded by tacking and heading southeast, in 
order to draw the other to a safe distance beyond neutral 
waters. The Java came on at a ten-knot gait, and rapidly 
overhauled the Constitution till about 1.30, when Bain- 
bridge put his ship about, shortened sail, and headed for 
the enemy. The Java now held off, trying for an oppor- 
tunity to rake, which the Constitution prevented by 
wearing and resuming her course to the southeast. A 
half hour later, with the Java in a windward position 
and a half mile distant, Bainbridge fired ahead of the 
enemy to make her display her colors. The response was 



1 Like the Guerriere, the Java was a French prize, originally 
named the Renommee, and captured only the year before. 



128 The United States Navij 



an instant hoisting of the ensign to the gaff, followed by 
a broadside, and the contest was on. 

The earlier part of the battle consisted of maneuvering 
on the part of the Java to get a raking position, and the 
simultaneous wearing of the Constitution to avoid it, 



^ S December 29, 1812 



\ 

\ 



CONSTITUTION - JAVA V ~-C^> > 

O CONSTITUTION ^ 

JAVA \ / 



Plan of Engagement Between Constitution and Java 

accompanied by heavy firing on both sides. The Java was 
a better sailer than the Constitution, and Brinbridge had 
his hands full to match her movements, particularly as 
at 2.30 a round shot from the Java smashed the Constitu- 
tion's wheel, and the ship had to be steered thereafter by 
relieving tackles, handled two decks below. Earlier in 
the action, Commodore Bainbridge had received a musket 
ball in his hip, and the shot that smashed the wheel also 



The Constitution and the Java 129 

drove a copper bolt deep into his thigh. In spite of these 
painful wounds, he kept the deck throughout the battle. 

Shortly after the disaster to his wheel, he determined 
to close with his adversary even at the risk of being raked, 
and luffed up. For some reason, however, the Java 
missed the opportunity to rake as she passed under the 
Constitution's stern (see diagram, 1), for she fired only 
one 9-pounder. She then luffed up and crossed the wake 
of the Constitution again, delivering a semi-raking fire 
which was not effective on account of the distance (2). 
Bainbridge then set the courses and luffed up again 
in order to close with his nimble adversary. At this point 
the Java had the end of her bowsprit with the jib and 
jib-boom shot away, and with this sudden loss of her head 
sails she pointed up into the wind, where she lay for a 
few moments helpless (3). The Constitution instantly 
wore and, passing under the Java's stern, raked with 
great effect. The American wore again, and the English 
ship attempted to save the day by laying alongside and 
boarding; but she lost her foremast at the outset of the 
maneuver and succeeded only in running the stump of her 
bowsprit into the mizzen shrouds of the Constitution (4). 

From this moment on, though the Java maintained a 
heroic defense, she was a beaten ship. The Constitution 
sailed round her, pouring in an accurate fire at close 
quarters that shot away every spar but the mainmast, and 
that went by the board a few minutes before the surrender. 

Meanwhile, the American gunners had been also 
sweeping the Java's decks with a diagonal fire, seconded 
by a deadly sharp -shooting of the marines in the tops. 
It was a musket bullet from the maintop that gave Cap- 
tain Lambert his mortal wound, shortly after the two 
vessels came in contact. The command then devolved 
upon his first lieutenant, Chads, who continued the hope- 
less fight with great spirit. 

9 



130 



The United States Navy 



At five minutes after four, 2 the fire from the Java had 
been completely silenced, and she rolled on the seas a 
dismasted hulk, her decks lumbered with the fallen spars, 
sails, and rigging. As she displayed no colors, Captain 
Bainbridge took it for granted that she had struck; and, 
hauling down his courses, he shot ahead to repair his 
badly cut rigging. On his return, at about 5.30, he found 
that the enemy had his colors flying again; but, as the 
Constitution drew across the Java's bow, ready to rake, 
they were instantly struck. 

The Constitution had about the same superiority in 
metal over the Java as she had had over the Guerriere; 
but, as in the action with the latter frigate, the relative 
damage inflicted was wholly disproportionate to the 
respective armaments. It must be remembered also that 
the Java had one considerable advantage in her superior 
speed. The British frigate 3 was so thoroughly shot to 
pieces that Bainbridge had no alternative but to blow her 
up, while the Constitution was in condition to make a 
long voyage back to the United States without refitting. 
The American loss in this engagement amounted to nine 
killed and twenty-five wounded, three mortally. Chads 's 
official report of the British casualties gave twenty-two 
killed and 102 wounded. 4 

In 1804 Captain Lambert distinguished himself, in a 

2 According to the British account, 4.35. There is such a 
wide discrepancy in the matter of time between the two reports 
that an English writer suggests that " perhaps someone's watch or 
clock was adrift." (Famous Duels of the Fleet, p. 261.) 

3 A relic of the Java that for a long time remained on the 
Constitution's quarter-deck was her wheel, which replaced the one 
shot away early in the action. 

4 Captain Bainbridge, inclosing as evidence a letter written 
by one of the British officers and accidentally left on board the 
Constitution, gives the figures of that officer, which are sixty 
killed and 170 wounded. 



The Constitution and the Java 



131 



heavy action at close quarters, by beating off a French 
ship with a broadside of 240 pounds opposed to his own 
total of 99 pounds. But the crew he then commanded 
had just been under a captain known as a "crank" in 
gunnery, and Lambert got the benefit of his predecessor's 
work. During the six weeks he was in command of the 
Java, he had held gun drill only once, and then with 
blank cartridges. In seamanship he was probably unsur- 
passed, for the Java was expertly handled; but, like so 
many of his brother-officers, he had small interest in 
gunnery. The Java's firing grew wilder as the battle 
progressed, while that of the Constitution steadily 
improved. 

Among the American wounded was Lieutenant Alwyn, 
who had been shot through the shoulder in the engage- 
ment with the Guerriere. When the Java's bowsprit 
fouled the mizzen rigging of the Constitution, and board- 
ers were called away, he leaped upon the hammock net- 
tings to lead the party, and was shot through the very 
shoulder that had been wounded before. Despite the 
painful character of the wound, he kept at his station 
till the enemy had struck, but died on the voyage home. 

While at Bahia, where the Constitution put in after 
the battle, Commodore Bainbridge, himself suffering 
severely, was brought before the dying Lambert; and, 
with the stately courtesy of the time, returned to him his 
sword with the expression of an earnest hope for his 
recovery. There are also letters from General Hyslop, 
a passenger on the Java, to Commodore Bainbridge, 
which bear grateful testimony to the chivalrous bearing 
of the victorious commander. Later, General Hyslop 
presented Bainbridge with a gold-mounted sword in token 
of appreciation. 

Of the engagement with the Java, Admiral Mahan 
says : ' ' This battle was not merely an artillery duel, like 



132 



The United States Navy 



those of the Constitution and the Guerriere, the Wasp 
and the Frolic, nor yet one in which a principal maneuver, 
by its decisive effect upon the use of artillery, played the 
determining part, as was the case with the United States 
and the Macedonian. Here it was a combination of the 
two factors, a succession of evolutions resembling the 
changes of position, the retreats and advances, of a fencing 
or a boxing match, in which the opponents work round 
the ring; accompanied by a continual play of the guns, 
answering to the thrusts and blows of individual en- 
counter. ' ' 

This victory can hardly be passed without some men- 
tion of its personal significance to Commodore Bainbridge. 
Up to this time, though he was admittedly an excellent 
officer, his professional career had been marked by the most 
trying misfortunes that can befall a commander. In the 
French War he had been taken by a superior force and 
imprisoned, with the mortifying knowledge that his was 
the only American man-of-war to strike to the tricolor. 
Scarcely was he again on the quarter-deck, when he was 
forced by the Dey of Algiers to submit to the worst 
humiliation ever suffered by an American naval officer. 
During the war with Tripoli, the greatest disaster to the 
American cause was the loss of his ship, the Philadelphia, 
and, while his brother officers were winning distinction 
and applause, he was compelled to remain a prisoner. He 
had been sharply criticised on more than one occasion, 
and,, even his own crew, the men who under Hull had 
worked the ship free from Broke r s squadron and recently 
beaten the Guerriere, apparently felt little confidence in 
their new commander, as is shown by the long list of 
punishments for infractions of discipline. To all this 
criticism and distrust, Bainbridge 's conduct in the battle 
with the Java was a sufficient answer. 



The Chesapeake and the Shannon 133 



The Chesapeake and the Shannon 

In spite of the fact that Commodore Bainbridge left 
the Hornet alone to blockade the Bonne Citoyenne, Cap- 
tain Greene of the British sloop still refused Lawrence's 
challenge. This was taken by Lawrence as cowardice, 
and he did not avoid saying what he thought. His crit- 
icism of Greene on this occasion put him on his mettle, 
when, six months later, the situation was exactly reversed 
and Captain Broke, with the Shannon, blockaded alone the 
young American commander in the ill-fated Chesapeake. 

Lawrence's relations with the Bonne Citoyenne were 
suddenly cut short by the arrival of a ship-of-the-line 
that chased him into port. By immediately standing 
out to sea, under cover of the night, he escaped the new 
enemy, and headed north. During this cruise he made 
his famous capture of the sloop Peacock. On the 24th of 
March, 1813, he reached New York and discharged his 
prisoners, after a cruise of 145 days, during which he 
had captured one ship, two brigs, one schooner, and one 
man-of-war, a record that none of his brother officers 
could equal. 

Lawrence, already the most popular officer in the 
service, became at once the toast of the nation. By this 
time, his rank 5 would not permit his retaining command 
of the sloop Hornet, though he requested to be allowed to 
do so ; and the Department appointed him to command a 
frigate, the Chesapeake, then refitting at the Boston Navy 
Yard. Lawrence would have preferred the Constitution, 
but, as his orders were not changed, he took command of 
the Chesapeake on May 20, 1813. 

Lawrence was under orders to put to sea at the earliest 



B Lawrence had been promoted in March from Master-Com- 
mandant to Captain. 



134 



The United States Navy 



opportunity, and to head north to strike at the British 
fisheries on the Banks. On this cruise he was to meet, at 
Cape Breton, Master-Commandant Biddle, commanding 
the Hornet, and the two vessels were to act together in a 
commerce-destroying cruise. Although in the early 
months of the war the Admiralty had left the coast of 
New England alone, in order to encourage the hostile 
attitude of that section toward the war, by the spring of 
1813 it had abandoned this policy and instituted a block- 
ade from New York to Nova Scotia. Early in April the 
Shannon and the Tenedos appeared off Boston Light and 
maintained as close a blockade as the weather conditions 
would permit. Shortly before Lawrence arrived, the 
frigates President and Congress ran the blockade in a 
fog, leaving the Constitution, which was undergoing 
repairs, and the Chesapeake, which was nearly ready for 
sea. 

On taking command, Lawrence notified the Depart- 
ment that he found the Chesapeake ' ' ready for sea," 
lacking only a small number of men and a few supplies. 
On May 30, ten days later, he cast loose from Long 
Wharf and dropped down to the Roads, "with the inten- 
tion of lying there a few days and shaking down before 
going to sea. ' ' 6 The following afternoon, while dining 
with a friend in Boston, he received news that only one 
English frigate was in sight off the port, and he imme- 
diately returned to his ship to prepare for action. Between 
eight and nine o'clock the next morning, June 1, 1813, 
the British frigate was again sighted, and Lawrence made 
instant preparations for going out to meet her. The 

6 Gleaves, Life of James Lawrence, p. 172. 

7 Although the Chesapeake was rated as a " 36," she carried 
two more carronades than the " 38-gun " Shannon, and fifty more 
men in her crew. 



The Chesapeake and the Shannon 135 

stranger was the 38-gun 7 frigate Shannon; and it hap- 
pened that while Lawrence was making ready to slip his 
moorings, her commander, Captain Philip B. V. Broke, 
was writing a lengthy but courteous challenge to Law- 
rence, inviting him to single-ship combat, " wherever it 
is most convenient to you." This challenge was sent 
ashore by a discharged prisoner, but by the time it reached 
Boston, the beaten Chesapeake was already on her way 
to Halifax. 

The American commander was under orders to strike 
a blow at a definite area of the enemy's commerce, but, 
with the memory of the Bonne Citoyenne fresh in his 
mind, Lawrence was not the man to hesitate an hour in 
the face of an opportunity for single-ship combat. That 
one ship should attempt to maintain the blockade was 
enough to call him out as soon as he could trip his anchor 
and swing his yards. The Chesapeake was not, however, 
in the best condition to meet a seasoned enemy. Her 
first lieutenant, Octavius Page, was lying ill with pneu- 
monia in the hospital ashore, where he died a few days 
after the battle. Two other officers were on leave, so 
that Lieutenant Ludlow, then only twenty-one, became 
first lieutenant, and two midshipmen, Cox and Ballard, 
were promoted to the position of acting lieutenants. 
These officers were new to their duties and to the men, and 
the crew, for their part, were as yet unorganized and 
undisciplined. 

On the other hand, their antagonist, the Shannon, 
was manned by a veteran crew, some of them men who 
had fought under Rodney and Nelson, and who had been 
drilled together aboard the same ship, and under the same 
captain, for about seven years. Her commander, though 
only five years older than Lawrence, had seen active 
service since his midshipman days. He had been a lieu- 



136 



The United States Navy 



tenant in the great victory off St. Vincent, and had 
become post captain 8 at the age of twenty-five. 

In 1806 he was given the Shannon, and it was not long 
before he made her famous as a "crack" ship. At a 
time when most of the British officers echoed Nelson's 
contemptuous remark on gun-sights, Broke fitted out at 
his own expense dispart sights and quadrants for every 
gun on his ship. Behind each gun he cut out arcs of 
circles on the deck, with degrees notched in, and filled 
with putty, so that all the fire of a broadside could be con- 
centrated accurately upon a target. Nor were the devices 
idle. Twice a day, except Saturdays and Sundays, the 
watch below were exercised at the guns, not merely in 
practice with the side-tackles, but in actual firing at a 
barrel floating three or four hundred yards away. 

When hostilities broke out, Broke was the senior 
British officer on the American station. Early in the 
war, he had endured the chagrin of seeing the Constitution 
slip away from his squadron when he was so sure of 
her that he had told off a prize crew from his Shannon 
to bring her into Halifax. Then followed the mortifying 
captures of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, the Frolic, the 
Java, and the Peacock, without a single British naval 
success to offset them. Confident of his own ship and 
her crew, he dismissed the Tenedos from the blockade of 
Boston in order that he might meet the Chesapeake alone, 
and restore the prestige of the British Navy by a victory. 

His opponent, James Lawrence, was now in his thirty- 



8 Post captain : " A designation formerly applied ... to 
a naval officer holding a commission as captain, to distinguish him 
from an officer of inferior rank, to whom the courtesy title of 
captain was often given, either as being an acting captain, or as 
being master and commander of a vessel not rated to be commanded 
by a full-grade captain, and so not said to ' give post.' " New 
English Dictionary. 



The Chesapeake and the Shannon 137 

second year. Like most of the naval heroes of the War 
of 1812, he had entered the navy as a midshipman in 
1798, at the outbreak of the war with France, and he 
had received his early training under Captain Tingey 
on the Ganges. He had won distinction in the war with 
Tripoli, notably as Decatur's lieutenant in the burning of 
the Philadelphia, and had reached the height of his fame 
by his recent brilliant capture of the Peacock. Hand- 
some, impetuous, and winning, he was perhaps, next to 
Decatur, the most romantic figure in the navy. 

Before unmooring ship to meet the Shannon, Law- 
rence mustered his crew aft, and made the customary 
patriotic speech before an action. At the end two mem- 
bers stepped forward, requesting the prize money which 
had long been due them. Lawrence sent them below to 
the purser to get checks for the amount due, and then 
retired to his cabin to write last letters to his wife and 
the Secretary of the Navy. 

By noon, the Chesapeake was heading for the Shannon, 
and Broke, seeing that Lawrence intended to fight, led 
the way some distance to sea, and then hove to, awaiting 
his approach. The Englishman made no effort to 
maneuver, allowing Lawrence to choose his own method 
of attack. For his part, the American commander 
refused the opportunity of securing a raking position 
under the Shannon's quarter, but rounded-to to run 
alongside and fight ' 'yard-arm to yard-arm." 

At 5.50, as the Chesapeake's bows doubled on the 
Shannon's starboard quarter, the British gunners struck 
the first blow. As soon as each gun of the Shannon bore 
on the Chesapeake, it was fired, rapidly reloaded, and 
fired again. The effect was terrible at such close quarters, 
but the American gunners responded smartly, and for 
five or six minutes the two frigates sailed on parallel 
courses, pounding each other at a range of about fifty 
yards. 



138 



The United States Navy 



Lawrence, however, had made the mistake of coming 
up with too much headway, and he saw that his ship 
would soon forge too far ahead. Accordingly, he tried to 
luff her, but as her sails blanketed those of her enemy, 
her headway carried her still farther till she lay on 
the Shannon's weather bow. At this critical point the 
two upon whom the safety of the vessel most depended 




The Chesapeake and the Shannon 



were disabled, Lawrence was wounded, and his sailing- 
master killed. Disasters then crowded each other in rapid 
succession. The cutting of the fore-topsail tye by the 
enemy's fire let fall the yard, so that the foresail became 
useless; at the same time the wheel was disabled and the 
brails of the spanker and the jib-sheet were shot away. 
The combined result was that, as the ship had no head 
sails left, and her wheel was useless, she pointed up into 
the wind, and lay helpless in the most desperate position 
imaginable; that is, with her quarters exposed to her 



The Chesapeake and the Shannon 139 



enemy's broadside only about seventy yards distant. 
The Shannon took instant advantage of the opportunity 
by a terrible diagonal fire that swept the Chesapeake. To 
add to the confusion, about this time a grenade tossed 
from the Shannon's mainyard exploded an arms chest on 
her enemy's deck. 

Seeing that the Chesapeake was now gaining stern- 
board, and would soon foul the Shannon, Lawrence called 
the boarders away. But the negro bugler, whose duty it 
was to sound the call, had hidden himself in terror, and 
the word was passed with difficulty by word of mouth. 
Just before the two ships touched, Lawrence received his 
second and mortal wound, and was carried below. Like 
Lambert of the Java, he had been picked off by one of 
his enemy's marines. 

As the Chesapeake's stern fouled the main chains of 
the Shannon, the two ships were lashed together by the 
British, who made instant preparation to carry the Amer- 
ican frigate by boarding. Meanwhile, at Lawrence's call 
for boarders, the Chesapeake's men had responded 
promptly, but they found no leaders. Lawrence was being 
carried below; and, of the officers on the spar deck, first 
lieutenant, sailing-master, captain of marines, and boat- 
swain had already received their death wounds, leaving 
none but a few midshipmen. 

The second lieutenant was at the forward end of the 
gun deck with no idea of what was happening on the 
quarter-deck; the fourth lieutenant had been mortally 
wounded at the first fire; and the third lieutenant, on 
hearing the call for boarders, led his men on deck, but 
stopped to help his beloved commander down to the 
steerage ladder ; and when he attempted to get back again, 
found the hatch battened down by the enemy 's boarders. 

Left wholly without officers, the crew, already demor- 
alized by a raking fire at close quarters, made an ineffect- 



140 



The United States Navy 



ual attempt to resist the British boarding party, and 
then a large number actually broke and ran below into 
the hold. The marines, however, under their sergeant, 
made a gallant defense ; out of a total of forty-four they 
lost twelve killed and twenty wounded. 

Shortly after Captain Broke and his men boarded the 
quarter-deck of the Chesapeake, the American frigate fell 
off sufficiently to catch the wind. The lashings parted 
and the Chesapeake broke away with the enemy's boarders 
on her deck. Here was a chance for the Americans to 
save the day, but there were no officers to rally the panic- 
stricken crew. Second Lieutenant Budd, who had gained 
the forecastle, and begun a desperate resistance, was twice 
severely wounded, and thrown to the deck below. In a 
few minutes the last effort at defense was abandoned. 

In this hand-to-hand struggle on the forecastle, Cap- 
tain Broke himself received a sabre cut on the head that 
very nearly proved mortal, and incapacitated him for 
the rest of his life. Meanwhile, his first lieutenant, 
Watts, lost his life by a blunder; soon after boarding 
the Chesapeake he had lowered the colors, and bent on an 
English ensign, but in his excitement he stopped the 
English colors under, instead of over, the American. At 
this, the " Shannons," thinking that the Americans must 
have regained the quarter-deck, fired one of the main 
deck guns, killing Watts and four or five of his men. 

It was only fifteen minutes from the first shot of the 
battle to the final rout of the American crew, just the 
time it took Lawrence to destroy the Peacock a few 
months before. Unfortunately, the brutality of the young 
English lieutenants and their men on taking possession 
bears no such parallel with the magnanimity of Lawrence 
on a similar occasion, and it is the most discreditable 
feature of the Shannon's victory. No blame, however, 
can be attached to the gallant Broke, whose wound had 
already rendered him unconscious. 



The Chesapeake and the Shannon 141 

For four days, Lawrence lingered in great agony, 
repeating in his delirium, the words that have since become 
the motto of the navy, "Don't give up the ship!" His 
kindness to the men of the Peacock had won him friendly 
regard among all Englishmen, and no honor was spared 
him in the subsequent funeral ceremonies at Halifax. 

Naturally, the victory of the Shannon caused the 
greatest exultation in England, and corresponding gloom 
in the United States. The fact that the Shannon had 
captured the Chesapeake in fifteen minutes with an 
unprecedented slaughter of officers and men was morti- 
fying, and it was not long before a "patriotic" legend 
twined around the ugly fact. This legend reports, in 
brief, that the Chesapeake's crew was made up of land- 
lubbers and foreigners, and those were either dead drunk 
during the battle, or mutinous and cowardly. The muster 
roll, however, proves that there was not one "landsman" 
on board, and gives only fifteen foreign names out of a 
total of 340. Just two men were reported drunk, and 
the idea of a mutinous spirit is based wholly on the request 
for prize money made just before going out. This request 
was reasonable enough. The money was long overdue, 
and the men wanted it to their credit on the eve of battle. 
The purser expressly testified before the court of inquiry, 
that there was nothing disorderly or mutinous in the 
conduct of the crew as they came to him for the prize 
checks. Lawrence, in writing to the Secretary of the 
Navy after this incident, says, "My crew appear to be 
in fine spirits, and I trust will do their duty." 

While it is true that many of the crew became panic- 
stricken at the end when they had no leaders, yet of their 
own accord they gave three hearty cheers when the 
Chesapeake swung alongside the enemy; and they stood 
splendidly by their guns in that terrible first broadside 
from the Shannon. In fact, during those six minutes, 



142 The United States Navy 



when the two vessels were running on parallel courses, 
the slaughter on board the Shannon was apparently as 
bad as that on board the Chesapeake. During those min- 
utes, the Chesapeake killed and wounded more on the 
Shannon than the Constitution — a much heavier frigate — 
did in thirty minutes' pounding of the Guerriere. It was 
when the Chesapeake hung in irons, unable to reply to a 
diagonal fire, that the American loss grew to such a 
terrible disproportion. 

In his official report of the action, Lieutenant Budd 
gave a loss of forty-eight killed and ninety-seven 
wounded, and of the latter fourteen died after the battle. 
The British loss was given at forty-three killed (including 
those who died shortly after the engagement) and twenty- 
nine wounded. 9 In this brief action the victor suffered 
more than the vanquished Guerriere or Macedonian. 
1 'The total loss of both ships [Chesapeake and Shannon] 
was only forty-five less than the combined losses of the 
French and English fleets at Cape St. Vincent where 
forty-two ships were engaged. " 10 

The defeat was partly due to the fact that "the Chesa- 
peake was a ship much inferior to the Shannon, as a regi- 
ment newly enlisted is to one that has seen service, and 
the moment things went wrong seriously, she could not 
retrieve herself." 11 But, equally it can be attributed to 
what may be called "the fortune of war," in the unprece- 
dented slaughter of the Chesapeake f s officers at the outset 
of the battle, with a simultaneous destruction of her wheel 
and head sails. The fact may be accepted, however, that 
it was a fair fight and fairly won. 

It was fortunate for Lawrence that he died a hero, 
for the defeat was a severe blow to our national pride. 

9 Figures from Gleaves's Life of James Lawrence, p. 209. 

10 Ibid., p. 210. 

"Mahan, War of 1812, ii, 145. 



The Chesapeake and the Shannon 143 

As it was, Midshipman Cox — acting third lieutenant — 
who made the mistake of assisting his commander to the 
deck below, was expelled from the service with the burden 
of the defeat laid on his shoulders; and this, despite 
the fact that it was he who trained and discharged the 
last gun fired in defense of the flag. 

Much has been written concerning Captain Lawrence 's 
judgment in going out to fight the Shannon, and the 
opinion is widely accepted that he acted rashly and impul- 
sively; with great gallantry, but with inexcusable lack 
of judgment. And yet, it is hard to see how a brave 
officer could have done otherwise. For months the harbor 
had been blockaded by two frigates; and, as far as Law- 
rence knew, at any moment the blockade of two or even 
three frigates, would be renewed. The fact that the 
Shannon alone stood on blockade meant an opportunity 
to get to sea, and win honor besides. It is clear, from 
his letter to the Secretary of the Navy, that he regarded 
his ship as ready for sea, and he knew that if he delayed 
a week, or even a day or two, simply to get his ship's 
organization into better shape, he ran the risk of never 
having another chance to leave port. As it turned out, 
the Constitution, which was then undergoing repairs 
after her battle with the Java, was blockaded until late 
in 1814, when the war was practically over. Had the 
Chesapeake also remained, she would have shared the 
same fate. It must be added to Lawrence's credit, that 
when he did offer battle, he chose the style of fighting that 
was best adapted to an unpracticed crew, namely, close 
quarters. At all events, he did not strike his colors; and 
the harshest critic must be gentle in the face of his heroic 
death. 



IX 

THE SLOOP ACTIONS OF THE WAR 

In the single-ship engagements between frigates in this 
war, the United States was three times victorious and once 
defeated. All these actions occurred during the first 
twelve months of the war, for after the several reverses 
the British Admiralty had grown wary and had instructed 
their captains to refuse battle when English 18-pounders 
were opposed to American 24 's, and to obtain added 
security for their frigates by cruising in couples. The 
activity of American frigates was further checked, as 
the British, on increasing their naval force on our shores, 
extended the blockade so as to include New England. 
Whenever it was known that an American frigate was in 
a harbor, an English squadron would hover about, making 
it impossible for a large ship to get to sea. Thus the 
Congress was shut up in Portsmouth on her return in 
1813 ; the Constellation, which was undergoing repairs 
in the Chesapeake at the outbreak of hostilities, was pre- 
vented from sailing till their close ; and the United States, 
after defeating the Macedonian, was permitted to sail 
with her former prize only from New York to New 
London, where both frigates were closely held till the 
end of the war. 

The sloops of war, drawing less water and being much 
more nimble than the frigates, easily eluded the blockade, 
and their activity continued unabated throughout the 
war. Besides inflicting great damage on the enemy's 
commerce, they engaged in battle British craft of their 
own kind, fighting in all eight single-ship actions ; in just 
one, the third encounter, the British were successful; in 
the other seven, our sloops were victorious. 

144 



The Frigate and the Sloop Actions 145 




1. Wasp-Frolic 5. Peacock-Epervier 

2. Hornet-Peacock 6. Wasp-Reindeer 

3. Argus-Pelican 7. Wasp-Avon 

4. Enterprise-Boxer 8. Hornet-Penguin 



I I I I I 

60 60 40 20 



The Frigate and the Sloop Actions op the War of 1812 



10 



146 The United States Navy 



The Wasp and the Frolic 

On the 18th of October, 1812, the American sloop of 
war Wasp, 18 guns, Master-Commandant Jacob Jones, 
engaged the British brig Frolic, 22 guns, Captain Thomas 
Whinyates. The Wasp had sailed from the Delaware on 
October 13 ; two days later she had encountered a violent 
storm that carried away her jib-boom with two men. On 
the 17th, a half hour before midnight, when about 500 
miles east of Chesapeake Bay (lat. 37° N., long. 65° W.) 
Jones made out a convoy; but, as there appeared to be 
at least two large ships, he cautiously stood off till day- 
light should disclose their force. The convoy consisted of 
six vessels returning from Honduras in the charge of the 
Frolic. The gale which had so severely handled the 
Wasp had been no kinder to the English brig, for the 
Frolic had lost her main yard as well as her topsails and 
had sprung her maintopmast. 

When, as day broke, Jones had determined the char- 
acter of the enemy, he bore down to attack. 1 Whinyates, 
seeing his intention, ordered the convoy to run before 
the wind, while he dropped astern and hoisted Spanish 
colors, hoping by this ruse to deceive and delay his enemy. 

The action did not begin until the two were within 
fifty yards of each other, and as they sailed along parallel 
courses, there was little maneuvering. In very few naval 
battles has the equality of force been so marked. For 
though the Wasp had an advantage in the number of men, 
135 to her opponent's 110, the Frolic, to offset this, had 
a heavier broadside, 274 pounds to the American's 250; 
both alike had suffered from the gale. 

There was a heavy sea running, which frequently 
threw spray over the decks or even rolled the muzzles of 

1 Jones's official report may be found in Niles's Register, iii, 
217; Whinyates', in the Naval Chronicle, xxix, 76. 



The Wasp and the Frolic 



147 



the guns under, yet the gunnery was unusually good. 
The Wasp suffered many wounds in her spars and rig- 
ging; within four or five minutes her maintopmast was 
shot away, and, falling with the maintopsail yard across 
the port fore and foretopsail braces rendered the head 
yards unmanageable ; four minutes later, the gaff and 
mizzen topgallant mast fell; and after twenty minutes 
of fighting every brace and most of the rigging had been 
shot away. Meanwhile, the distance between the two 
ships had gradually lessened and the Wasp, drawing 
ahead of her opponent, secured an advantageous position 
off the Frolic's bow. Captain Whinyates in his official 
report of the battle wrote: 

"The superior fire of our guns gave every reason to 
expect its speedy termination in our favor; but the gaff 
head-braces being shot away, and there being no sail on 
the mainmast, the brig became unmanageable, and the 
enemy succeeded in taking a position to rake her, while 
she was unable to bring a gun to bear." 

The Frolic now fouled the Wasp, running her bow- 
sprit between the main and mizzen rigging of the Wasp. 
This was not disadvantageous for Jones; for, with his 
rigging so badly cut up, he was apprehensive that his 
masts might fall, and he had already decided to take the 
enemy by boarding. First, however, he seized the oppor- 
tunity to rake, and was intending further to hammer 
away, when the eagerness of his crew for still closer action 
could scarcely be restrained. Jack Lang, once impressed 
into the British service, leaped on his gun, cutlass in 
hand, and thence to the Frolic. Lieutenant Biddle was 
for calling him back, but, seeing the enthusiasm of the 
crew, quickly changed his mind, and led them on. His 
feet, however, got tangled in the rigging, and, as a mid- 
shipman caught hold of his coat to help himself up, the 
lieutenant fell back upon the deck of the Wasp. Quickly 



148 



The United States Navy 



jumping up again, Biddle passed Lang and a seaman 
who had gained the bowsprit of the Frolic, and was the 
first to go aft. There to his astonishment, he found only 
four men on deck alive, Captain Whinyates with two other 
officers and a seaman who held to his station at the wheel. 
On Biddle 's approach the officers, all wounded, threw 
down their swords in token of submission, and as there 
was no one to haul down the colors Biddle himself 
climbed the rigging and did so. 

A few minutes after the Wasp had freed herself from 
the Frolic, both masts of the latter fell, the mainmast 
close to the deck, the foremast twelve or fifteen feet above 
the deck. The action had lasted forty-three minutes. 
The most surprising feature of the engagement is that 
with the unusual equality of force there should have been 
such a great difference in losses. On the American side 
there were five killed and five wounded, a total of ten ; on 
the British, not twenty men escaped injury, and the total 
loss was about ninety. In explanation of this it was 
reported that, in the heavy sea running, the Frolic fired 
when rising on the crest of the waves, so that nearly all 
her shot which struck injured the spars and rigging of 
her enemy ; and that the Wasp fired while going down so 
that her shot swept the decks or pierced the hull of her 
opponent. When Whinyates spoke of the ' * superior fire" 
of the British guns, he probably meant the more rapid 
fire (three to two, according to Cooper) for, as Vice- 
Admiral Jurien de la Graviere of the French Navy 
observes, the accuracy of the American fire, in spite of 
the unfavorable conditions prevailing, was indeed aston- 
ishing. 

The determined and obstinate resistance of the Frolic 
illustrates the value of holding out to the last, even 
when things are going wrong. Whinyates subjected 
his ship and crew to awful losses, yet not with- 



The Hornet and the Peacock 



149 



out result; for soon after the Frolic had surrendered, 
another sail appeared on the horizon. Jones supposed it 
to be one of the convoy of the Frolic, several of which 
were heavily armed, and he loaded his guns and cleared 
for action. But the stranger proved to be the British 
74-gun ship-of-the-line Poictiers, Captain Beresford; and 
as the Wasp could not flee, Beresford took the Wasp and 
recaptured the Frolic, and sailed with them to Bermuda. 

The Hornet and the Peacock 

It has been told in the previous chapter how James 
Lawrence, when captain of the Hornet, vainly sought an 
engagement on equal terms with the Bonne Citoyenne off 
the coast of Brazil. At length, compelled by the British 
ship-of-the-line Montague, 74 guns, to choose a new 
station, he followed the coast to British Guiana, a 
favorite cruising ground of American privateers, and on 
his way captured the British brig Resolution, 10 guns, 
with $23,000 in specie on board. 

On February 24, 1813, when off the mouth of the 
Demerara River, British Guiana, Lawrence discovered 
on his weather quarter, a brig which showed a willingness 
to engage. It was the Peacock, sl sister ship of the Frolic, 
and thus of about the same size as the Hornet, but with 
only two-thirds as heavy a broadside ; for her 32-pound 
carronades, because of her light scantling, had all been 
replaced by 24 's. 

As the ships neared each other, Lawrence kept close 
to the wind, and secured the weather-gage. At 5.25 the 
ships, passing on opposite tacks, exchanged broadsides at 
half pistol-shot range. Then Lawrence, seeing that the 
Peacock was about to wear, bore up and, receiving her 
starboard broadside, ran close on her starboard quarter, 
where, by a heavy and well-directed fire, he cut the brig 



150 



The United States Navy 



to pieces. By this fire the British commander, Captain 
William Peake, was killed, and soon the Peace ck was in 
a desperate condition. Less than fifteen minutes after 
ihe action had begun, the Peacock surrendered, hoisting 
an ensign, union down, as a signal of distress. The ship 
was sinking fast, already having six feet of water in her 
hold. 

Lieutenant Conner, who, with a small force of Amer- 
ican seamen, had been sent aboard, made every effort to 
keep the Peacock afloat until the prisoners could be re- 
moved; they threw guns overboard, plugged some of the 
holes, and resorted to pumping and baling. But she 
continued to settle, and went to the bottom so suddenly 
as to carry down nine of her crew and three Americans. 

The loss on the Peacock was five killed, including her 
commander, and thirty-three wounded; on the Hornet, 
one killed and four wounded (two by the bursting of a 
cartridge) 2 ; the rigging of the Hornet was cut, but the 
hull had received no damage. While it must be admitted 
that the advantage favored the Americans in number of 
crew and weight of gun metal, still this does not explain 
the astonishing difference in the effects of the fire of the 
two ships. As some writer has observed, "Had the guns 
of the Peacock been of the largest size they could not 
have changed the result, as the weight of shot that do not 
hit is of no great moment. ' ' 

Another British brig, the Espiegle, of approximately 
the same strength as the Peacock, lay at anchor six miles 
distant throughout the engagement. At its termination, 
Lawrence quickly patched his rigging and prepared for 
a second fight which he supposed would be soon forced 
upon him. But as the Espiegle remained unconcernedly 
at her anchorage in the harbor, he sailed away. 



2 Official report of Captain Lawrence, March 19, 1813. 



The Argus and the Pelican 151 



The Argus and the Pelican 

On June 18, 1813, the American brig-of-war Argus, 
Master-Commandant William H. Allen, sailed for 
L 'Orient, with Mr. Crawford, the newly appointed min- 
ister to France. On the voyage over of twenty- three days, 
Allen made just one prize, but, later, in thirty-one days 
of cruising in the chops of the English Channel, he cap- 
tured and destroyed nineteen British merchantmen. The 
explanation of the difference is that on the regular thor- 
oughfares ships were not allowed to sail except in convoy, 
while nearer home, in the vicinity of England and Ireland, 
ships followed a hundred courses, as in time of peace, 
and there were no ships-of-war stationed near to protect 
them. The career oi* the Argus was soon to be cut short, 
but she had shown the advantage of preying on unpro- 
tected parts of the enemy's coast. 

Early in the morning, August 14, 1813, the Argus, 
after capturing a prize between Wales and southern 
Ireland and setting fire to her, fell in with the British 
brig-of-war Pelican, Captain Maples, which had been 
sent out from Cork, expressly to meet her. The wind was 
from the south and the Pelican had the weather-gage. 
Allen attempted to pass to windward, but finding he could 
not, he shortened sail and allowed the Pelican to close. 
The action began at six a.m., when the Argus wore round 
and fired her port broadside within grape distance, the 
Pelican promptly responding with her starboard battery. 
Although early in the action, Allen was severely wounded 
in the leg by a round shot, he held to his post, until he 
fainted from loss of blood — bravery that cost him his 
life. A few minutes later, the first lieutenant, W. H. 
Watson, was struck in the head and stunned by a grape 
shot, whereupon the command devolved on the second 
lieutenant, W. H. Allen, Jr. 



152 The United States Navy 



A large part of the rigging of the Argus had now 
been disabled, yet as the enemy edged off to pass under 
her stern, Second Lieutenant Allen skilfully prevented 
this by luffing with the maintopsail aback, at the same 
time firing a raking broadside. The wheel ropes of the 
Argus, as well as the running rigging, were soon shot 
away and she became unmanageable. Her enemy, only 
slightly damaged, could then choose his position at will. 

When, at 6.30, Lieutenant Watson, on recovering con- 
sciousness, again came up on deck, he found the enemy 
raking from under the stern of the Argus. The Amer- 
icans were plainly beaten, unless they could bring their 
ship up and board; and this maneuver, since all their 
braces were cut, proved impossible. The action continued 
a few minutes longer, the Argus exposed to a cross or 
raking fire to which she was able to respond with little 
more than musketry. Finally, at 6.47, when the action 
had been in progress about three-quarters of an hour, 
the Argus surrendered. 

The American loss was six killed and seventeen 
wounded, five so severely that they died within a few 
days. The British had two killed and five wounded. 
The British brig was twenty per cent larger, and her 
broadside seventeen per cent heavier. Yet this does not 
explain why the American fire at short range caused so 
little injury. Even when the Argus had a raking position 
she could not use it to advantage. Her gunnery was 
decidedly poor. Lieutenant Watson observes in his 
official report that the crew had been under a long strain 
because of the ' ' very rapid succession of captures. ' ' 

The Enterprise and the Boxer 

On September 5, 1813, the American brig Enterprise, 
of 14 guns, commanded by Lieutenant William Burrows, 
while near Monhegan Island, Maine, fell in with the 



The Peacock and the Epervier 



153 



British brig Boxer, of 14 guns, Captain Samuel Blyth, 
and decisively defeated her in an action lasting forty 
minutes. 

Both vessels were dull sailers. The Enterprise had a 
slight superiority in guns, and also a larger complement; 
but while the Enterprise had just got to sea, the Boxer 
had been cruising for six months, certainly an enviable 
opportunity for drilling. 

The loss of the Americans was fourteen killed and 
wounded; that of the British was not reported, but was 
evidently larger. The Enterprise had inflicted consid- 
erable damage in the hull of her enemy, while receiving 
little in return ; both had suffered in spars and rigging. 
The Enterprise seems to have been more skilfully maneu- 
vered, and, to quote the findings of the British court- 
martial, she had ' 1 a greater degree of skill in the direction 
of her fire." Almost at the first broadside, Captain 
Blyth of the Boxer was killed, and, at about the same 
time, Lieutenant Burrows of the Enterprise was struck 
down by a musket ball. Lieutenant Edward R. McCall, 
who then assumed command of the Enterprise, and carried 
the fight to a successful conclusion, had never so much as 
seen a battle before. 

The Peacock and the Epervier 

The Government, though so slow in building new 
frigates that none took part in the war, had in the latter 
part of 1813 three new sloops approaching completion, 
the Peacock, the Frolic, and the Wasp, names given in 
honor of Lawrence's and Jones's splendid victories. On 
April 29, 1814, the Peacock, 18 guns, Master-Commandant 
Lewis Warrington, while off the southeast coast of Flor- 
ida, engaged the British brig Epervier, 18 guns, Captain 
Wales. The American ship, nominally equal in strength 
to her antagonist, was slightly superior in every partic- 



1.54 



The United States Navy 



ular. Still when the Epervier surrendered, after an action 
lasting forty-five minutes, the difference in losses showed, 
even more decidedly than in previous engagements, that 
it was something more than heavier guns which brought 
victory. 

The Peacock had not a man killed, and but two slightly 
wounded; the Epervier, eight killed and fifteen wounded. 
Not a round shot had touched the hull of the Peacock, 
and her masts and spars were as sound as ever, while her 
enemy had masts badly cut up and forty-five shots in the 
hull which had admitted five feet of water in the hold. 

After making some repairs, Warrington decided to 
take his prize into Savannah. The sloops were chased by 
two British frigates, but escaped by clever maneuvering, 
and succeeded in reaching port in safety. 

The Wasp and the Reindeer 

An important share in the credit for the Enterprise's 
splendid victory over the Boxer was due to Master- 
Commandant Johnston Blakely. It was he who had fitted 
out the brig and drilled the raw crew, and thus made it 
possible for the young and inexperienced Lieutenants 
Burrows and McCall, immediately on getting to sea, to 
give such good account of the Enterprise. He himself 
did not sail, for he had just received a better command, 
the new sloop of war Wasp, now nearly ready for sea. 
The story of this, the second Wasp, is that of a swift and 
daring cruiser which met with signal success. 

Leaving Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on May 1, 1814, 
Blakely slipped through the blockading line, and, accord- 
ing to his instructions, took up a station in the approaches 
to the English Channel, almost exactly where Allen, in 
the Argus, had, a year before, captured so many mer- 
chantmen. Blakely had a sloop that probably was not 
surpassed in all European waters; his crew of 173 was 



The Wasp and the Reindeer 155 

made up almost entirely of New Englanders, and, though 
they averaged only twenty-three years in age, many with- 
out previous sea training, they were spirited and ambi- 
tious, the kind that an efficient commander like Blakely 
could quickly mould into the best of crews. 

Not until he had been thirty-two days at sea did he 
make a capture ; he was then probably near his station 
in the Channel, for, in the next thirty-five days he took 
seven more prizes. Not every sail he saw was legitimate 
prey; as he observes in a letter of July 8, 1814, "After 
arriving on soundings, the number of neutrals which were 
passing kept us almost constantly in pursuit." It was a 
daring game he was playing, for he adds, "I found it 
impossible to maintain anything like a station, and was 
led in chase farther up the Channel than was intended. " 

Early on the morning of June 28, 1814, Blakely, 
having discovered two sails on his lee beam, started in 
chase; but as soon afterwards he made out a single sail 
on his weather beam, he altered his course, and stood for 
this. The stranger, which was the brig Reindeer, Captain 
William Manners, might easily have escaped, and as the 
superior character of American sloops was now pretty 
well known, Manners must have been aware that he was 
about to engage a stronger antagonist; but William 
Manners had a crew said to be the pride of Plymouth, 
and was himself a commander that, for courage and 
ability, had scarcely a superior. Instead of avoiding 
battle, Manners came about with the wind nearly aft, and 
stood for his opponent. 

The breezes were so light that the ships moved on 
almost an even keel; and it was quarter after one before 
Blakely had the drummer call the men to their quarters. 
Two hours more elapsed before the fight began, Blakely 
having tacked and attempted to pass to windward of his 
enemy ; Manners, much too clever to surrender any advan- 



156 



The United States Navy 



tage needlessly, had tacked at the same time, and standing 
from the American, had foiled him. Blakely, seeing that 
his enemy would weather him, changed to the other tack, 
and, furling most of his sail, allowed the Reindeer to 
approach. 

The English brig came up on the weather quarter of 
the Wasp, about sixty yards distant, and opened with a 
12-pound carronade loaded with round and grape shot, a 
fire that must have severely tested the discipline of the 
crew of the Wasp, for, as the Reindeer did not draw 
abeam, the guns of the Wasp would not bear. Blakely 
got out of this awkward position, however, by suddenly 
putting his helm alee ; and beginning with the after 
carronade he fired, in succession, all the guns of his 
broadside as they bore. 

The Reindeer, somewhat disabled by this fire, now 
ran aboard of the Wasp, her port bow against the Wasp's 
quarter, in which position the Wasp raked with telling 
effect. Meanwhile the American marines and riflemen, 
with the skill for which they were famed, picked off many 
of the exposed officers and crew of the brig. Captain 
Manners, though wounded, kept the deck and urged on 
the fight. A second wound caused by a shot that went 
through both thighs, brought him to his knees ; but he was 
up again quickly, and would give no heed to his wounds, 
which were bleeding profusely. Finally, perceiving the 
execution of the musketry from the tops of the Wasp, he 
called out, ' ' Follow me, my boys, we must board. ' ' With 
the words, he climbed the rigging to lead them on, but 
two balls from the Wasp's maintop, passing through his 
skull, killed him instantly. 

The Americans, in turn, now prepared to board. The 
English, badly crippled by the death or disability of nearly 
all their officers, as well as of half their men, could make 
but little resistance, and soon surrendered. 



The Wasp and the Avon 



157 



The action occupied nineteen minutes. 3 The Wasp 
received six round shot in her hull, and a 24-pound shot 
that passed through the centre of her foremast, and had 
her sails and rigging injured. The Reindeer, wrote 
Blakely, ' 'was literally cut to pieces in a line with her 
ports." The Wasp had five killed and twenty-one 
wounded, the Reindeer, twenty-five killed and forty-two 
wounded. Almost equal honor was due the two forces for 
the brave fight. When, as in this case, it is a picked 
American crew against a picked English crew, both splen- 
didly disciplined, and directed by the finest of captains, 
victory depends on something else than determination and 
courage; and here it is fair to conclude that it was due 
to superiority in power. The Wasp had twenty 32- 
pounder carronades and two long guns against the Rein- 
deer's sixteen 24-pounders and two long guns, and as 
the complement of the Wasp was in a like degree larger, 
she surpassed the English brig in at least the ratio of 
three to two. 

The Wasp and the Avon 

That he might secure the best care for his wounded 
and as well make needed repairs on the Wasp, Blakely 
sailed for L 'Orient, where he remained till the 27th of 
August. Then putting to sea, in less than a month, he 
made six more valuable captures. How free and fearless 
were his movements may be seen from the capture of the 
British brig Mary, loaded with cannon and other mili- 
tary stores, and convoyed with nine other ships by a bomb- 
ship, and the ship-of-the-line Armada, 74 guns. The Wasp 
not only succeeded in cutting out the Mary, but having 
burned it within sight of the convoy attempted to make 
another capture; she was prevented, however, by the 
Armada, which chased her away. 

3 For Blakely's report, see Niles's Register, vii, 114. 



158 



The United States Navy 



On the evening of the same day, September 1, 1814, 
the lookout sighted four sails, two on the starboard and 
two on the port bow. Blakely immediately set sail in 
chase of the ship on the starboard bow farthest to wind- 
ward. The chase was the brig Avon, Captain James 
Arbuthnot. After an engagement of three-quarters of an 
hour she surrendered, with a loss of nine killed and 
thirty-three wounded. The Wasp had two killed and one 
wounded, about an eighth or ninth of her loss in the fight 
with the Reindeer; since the Avon was superior to the 
Reindeer by having 32-pounders where the Reindeer had 
24 's, this shows something of the quality of Manners 
and his crew. 

When Blakely was about to take possession of the 
prize, he discovered a second brig, the Castilian, of 18 
guns, standing towards him and he received a broadside 
from her as she ran up under his stern. Since two other 
sails were also approaching, Blakely left his prize and 
standing off to reeve new braces, attempted to decoy the 
second brig from her supports. But the Avon was firing 
guns of distress, and the Castilian went to her rescue; 
scarcely had the last man been removed from the Avon 
before she went down. 

Sailing now to the south, Blakely captured off the 
Madeiras the brig Atlanta, which, being of exceptional 
value, he sent with official despatches to Savannah. Three 
weeks later, the Wasp was spoken 900 miles farther south 
and this is the last ever heard of the brilliant captain 
and his gallant crew. Their end is entirely shrouded in 
mystery. 

The Hornet and the Penguin 

On January 20, 1815, the Hornet, Master-Comman- 
dant James Biddle, slipped through the British blockading 
squadron off New York and set sail for the South Atlantic, 



The Hornet and the Penguin 159 



where, with several other ships that were to rendezvous 
at the lonely island of Tristan da Cunha, 1500 miles west 
of the Cape of Good Hope, it was planned she should 
cruise against British commerce. 

On her arrival, March 23, 1815, as she was about to 
anchor, the lookout sighted a sail to the southeast, passing 
behind the island. The Hornet immediately got under 
way, and after a little maneuvering, at 1.40 that after- 
noon, entered into an artillery duel with the British sloop 
of war Penguin, Captain Dickinson. The two were run- 
ning on parallel courses, the Hornet to leeward. In 
armament, the Penguin had sixteen 32-pounder carron- 
ades, two long 12 's, and one 12-pounder carronade; 
opposed to this, the Hornet had eighteen 32-pounder 
carronades and two long 12 's. Thus it will be seen that 
the Hornet had only very little superiority in gun metal. 

The story of the fight is like that of many other actions. 
The Penguin kept drifting nearer, and as she was being 
decidedly worsted in the artillery duel, Dickinson sud- 
denly put his helm hard up and fouled the Hornet with 
the intention of boarding. But the American crew was 
ready and kept the British off while the small-arms 
men poured in a murderous fire. The Penguin wrenched 
loose with the loss of her bowsprit and foremast, and then 
surrendered. The action lasted twenty-two minutes. The 
British guns were active, yet the fact that the Hornet 
did not receive a single round shot in her hull or any 
material injury in her spars shows the inaccuracy of their 
fire. Her loss was one killed and eleven wounded, to be 
contrasted with fourteen killed on the Penguin, including 
the captain, and twenty-eight wounded. This was the 
last naval action of the war; in fact, it occurred several 
weeks after the terms of peace had been approved by the 
President and ratified by the Senate. 



160 



The United States Navy 



The Importance of the Sloop Actions 

Although the loss of seven sloops from such a navy 
as Great Britain's could have little direct effect upon 
the war, yet the service of our small cruisers was far- 
reaching in its influence. The daring enterprise of our 
sloops, their ability to move almost at will in the face of 
a heavy blockade, the skill with which they were handled, 
in short, their almost uninterrupted success in coping 
with the first navy of the world, fostered in our country 
the much needed spirit of self-respect, earlier stimulated 
by the frigate actions, and awoke in Europe a general 
feeling of admiration. 

Of no trifling importance, further, was the service of 
our sloops in their attack upon England's commerce. The 
Argus, Peacock (2d), and Wasp (2d) were extremely 
daring, and the number of prizes they took can be com- 
pared favorably with the work of even the most celebrated 
of the privateers. The sloops had found a vulnerable spot 
in the great sea power. Their attack was similar in strat- 
egy, though not in magnitude, with that of the German 
U-boats a century later. Such communications as the 
following, sent to the British Admiralty by the Eoyal 
Exchange and London Assurance Corporations in August, 
1814, were weighty arguments for concluding hostilities: 

"Should the depredations on our commerce continue, 
the merchants and traders will not be able to get any 
insurance effected, except at enormous premiums on 
vessels trading between Ireland and England, either by 
the chartered companies or individual underwriters; and 
as a proof of this assertion, for the risks which are usually 
written fifteen shillings nine pence per cent the sum 
of five guineas is now demanded. ' ' 4 



4 Niles's Register, vii, 174. 



X 

THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE 

Strategic Importance of the Great Lakes 

Although the United States did not rouse itself tu 
maintain a navy on the Great Lakes until after hostilities 
had begun, long before the beginning of the war Great 
Britain had appreciated their strategic importance. 
Indeed the British had, ever since the days of the French 
occupation in Canada, realized the advantage of these 
inland oceans on the borderland as rapid means of con- 
veying troops, supplies, and communications. The nation 
in power on these waterways had also the lucrative fur 
trade, and with it the Indian interests in that section. 
The woods on both Canadian and American sides were 
all but impassable. Since Britain's salt water navy 
could reach with its mighty arm as far as Montreal, 
control of the lakes would easily give her the upper hand 
in all the territory bordering on these waterways as far 
as Mackinac. Kingston, Detroit, and Mackinac were the 
important links in the chain of communication from the 
Atlantic to the Northwest. Besides, the fact that two of 
these places, Detroit and Mackinac, were on narrow bodies 
of water, furnished an additional element of defense. 

It should have been the policy of our Government to 
take the offensive on the northern border, while it sought 
to maintain a defensive attitude on the seaboard. Prepa- 
rations for a control of the lakes should have been made 
ten years previous to the war, but a parsimonious govern- 
ment, naturally opposed to navies, did not foresee the 
need of warships at sea, much less on the lakes. It was 
a similar shortsighted policy that prompted Hull and 

11 161 



162 



The United States Navy 




Chamwey and Elliott 163 



Dearborn to concentrate their efforts in the Northwest, 
rather than at Lake Champlain and against Montreal, the 
true objective in an offensive war for control of the 
Northwest. Hull's disastrous campaign in Michigan, and 
the fall of Detroit and Mackinac in the summer of 1812, 
spurred our people to efforts which culminated in a par- 
tial control of Lake Ontario, and in Perry's victory on 
Lake Erie. Detroit and Mackinac would never have fallen 
if we had had control of the Great Lakes. Indeed, shortly 
after Perry's capture of the British flotilla on Lake 
Erie, Detroit and the territory of Michigan came back 
into our possession. 

Chauncey and Elliott Sent to the Lakes 

On September 3, 1812, Captain Isaac Chauncey was 
ordered by the Navy Department to take command of 
Lakes Erie and Ontario with the purpose of building 
fleets on these waters and wresting the naval supremacy 
on them from the British. Chauncey took, charge of the 
work on Ontario himself, and on September 7 he dis- 
patched Lieutenant Jesse D. Elliott to Lake Erie to estab- 
lish a naval base. The latter arrived at Buffalo on Sep- 
tember 14, and was busily engaged in equipping at Black 
Rock, his temporary navy yard, some schooners which he 
had recently bought, when, on October 8, he was informed 
that two British armed brigs had come to anchor off Fort 
Erie. These were the Detroit, formerly the U. S. S. 
Adams, and the Caledonia. 

With the aid of ninety seamen, who had arrived that 
very day from New York, and with about fifty soldiers, 
Elliott determined to cut out these brigs. He succeeded 
in bringing the Caledonia to Black Rock, but the Detroit 
ran aground off Squaw Island, and, under the fire of both 
the British and American forts, had to be burned. The 



164 



The United States Navy 



Caledonia had a cargo of furs valued at $200,000, and the 
Detroit had a quantity of ordnance; four of the latter 's 
12-pounders and a quantity of shot were later recovered 
at night by a party of American seamen. 

Lieutenant Elliott had quickly seen his opportunity 
and grasped it ; he had realized that with these two vessels 
added to his squadron he might wrest the control of the 
Upper Lakes (i.e., the lakes west of Lake Erie) from 
Great Britain. But as the Detroit had to be destroyed, 
the British still possessed a naval force too great for 
Elliott to encounter. General Brock, commanding the 
British forces, however, felt the loss of these brigs very 
much. In a letter to the Governor-General of Canada, he 
wrote : ' ' This event is particularly unfortunate and may 
reduce us to incalculable distress. The enemy is making 
every exertion to gain a naval superiority on both lakes; 
which if they accomplish, I do not see how we can retain 
the country. More vessels are fitting for war on the other 
side of Squaw Island, which I should have attempted to 
destroy but for your Excellency's repeated instructions 
to forbear. Now such a force is collected for their pro- 
tection as will render every operation against them very 
hazardous. ' ' 1 Elliott kept hard at work until the winter 
closed the lake to navigation, and his labors laid the 
foundations for Perry's success the following year. 

<* 

Perry in Command on Lake Erie 

On March 27, 1813, Master-Commandant Oliver 
Hazard Perry took charge of the work on Lake Erie, 
and removed the flotilla from Black Rock to Presqu'isle 
(Erie), where he established his base. A race in ship- 
building now took place between Perry on the American 



1 Quoted in Mahan's War of 1812, i, 356. 




Oliver H. Perry 



Perry and Barclay on Lake Erie 165 

side and the British naval commander, Barclay, on the 
Canadian side. Both were young and full of energy. 
Both had to work under great difficulties. The Canadians 
gave Barclay little help ; the severer winter and less 
developed country on the north shores made his task 
harder. Although the salt water navy of Great Britain 
could reach as far as Montreal to bring men and arms, 
still the Government was in great straits for sailors for 
the European war. Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, the 
able young British officer on Lake Ontario, could spare his 
subordinate on Erie but few men, as he needed them too 
much himself in his struggle for supremacy against 
Chauncey. On the other hand, Perry had in New York 
a better developed country to operate in. But he likewise 
found it difficult to persuade his superior, Chauncey, to 
spare him men and supplies; and he had to bring his 
mechanics and seamen for the most part from New York 
City, a distance of 500 miles. The American commander 
had to depend largely on militia and negroes to defend 
his shipbuilding operations, as his British rival depended 
on Canadians and Indians. As many of the Canadians 
had originally come from New England and New York, 
they had been from the beginning as much opposed to 
the war as the people in our northern States, and were 
not to be relied upon. Eoosevelt is of the opinion that 
the Canadians, being naturally lake sailors, fought better 
at the battle of Lake Erie than British tars did a year 
later at the battle of Lake Champlain. Barclay, however, 
lamented greatly his lack of British officers and seamen. 

Taking advantage of a temporary naval control on 
Lake Ontario, Chauncey, in conjunction with General 
Dearborn, captured York, now Toronto, in April, 1813. 
A month later Chauncey assisted in the capture of Fort 
George, on the Niagara River, an event which compelled 
the British to abandon their hold on this river. This 



166 



The United States Navy 



made it possible for Perry to tow up the river to Presqu '- 
isle the brig Caledonia, the purchased schooners Somers, 
Tigress, and Ohio, and the sloop Trippe. The warping 
of these vessels up against the powerful current was an 
arduous task. The rest of Perry's squadron, the two 
20-gun brigs Lawrence and Niagara, and three more 
schooners, the Ariel, Scorpion, and Porcupine, were being 
hastily constructed at the navy yard at Presqu 'isle. 

Barclay, too, was very busy in building and equipping 
his flotilla, which consisted of the ships Detroit (a new 
vessel named after the former Detroit) and Queen Char- 
lotte, the brig Hunter, the schooners Lady Prevost and 
Chippewa, and the sloop Little Belt. As soon as most of 
his vessels were ready, Barclay put to sea and at once 
blockaded Perry at Presqu 'isle. The American com- 
mander was now in difficult straits, because he could not 
get his brigs, with their guns mounted, across the bar 
at the mouth of Erie harbor ; and to try to get them over 
Avith guns unmounted, while Barclay's flotilla was hover- 
ing about, would be foolhardy. The British commander 
maintained a close blockade until August 2, when, for no 
apparent reason, he disappeared to the westward. Perry 
now hurried matters, and on the 4th he towed the Law- 
rence to the deepest part of the bar, hastily took out her 
guns, and that night got the brig across the bar. The 
method used by Perry in getting the Lawrence over is 
thus described by Cooper: "Two large scows, prepared 
for the purpose, were hauled alongside, and the work of 
lifting the brig proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of 
massive timber had been run through the forward and 
after ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's 
edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked up, supported 
by these floating foundations. The plugs were now put in 
the scows, and the water was pumped out of them. By 
this process the brig was lifted quite two feet, though 



Perry and Barclay on Lake Erie 



167 



when she was got on the bar it was found that she still 
drew too much water. It became necessary, in conse- 
quence, to cover up everything, sink the scows anew, 
and block up the timbers afresh. This duty occupied the 
whole night. ' ' 2 

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 5th, just as 
the Lawrence had been safely got across, Barclay reap- 
peared. But he was too late, and after the exchange of a 
few shots with the American schooners, Barclay went back 
to his base at Maiden (Amherstburg) to await the com- 
pletion of his most powerful ship, the Detroit. Shortly 
after, Perry brought the Niagara across the bar without 
trouble. After sailing westward towards Maiden, Perry 
returned to Erie to lay in provisions, and on August 10 
took on 102 seamen whom Lieutenant Elliott had just 
brought as a much-needed reinforcement. Elliott, as 
second in command, took charge of the Niagara. Perry 
could now range the lake at will. He made his head- 
quarters at Put-in-Bay, a good harbor thirty miles south- 
west of Maiden, where he could watch the movements of 
Barclay and prevent him from getting to the British 
source of supplies at Long Point. As the roads were 
impassable, and as blockade-running was impracticable, 
Captain Barclay was soon forced to come out for supplies. 
In his report to Sir J ames Yeo after the battle, he wrote : 
"So perfectly destitute of provisions was the port 
[Maiden], that there was not a day's flour in store, and 
the crews of the squadron under my command were on 
half allowance of many things, and when that was done 
there was no more." The Indians had been wantonly 
killing cattle in this region, and these warriors and their 
families, in all 14,000, whom the British had to provide 
for, were becoming restive because of the lack of food. 

2 J. Fenimore Cooper, The History of the Navy of the United 
States of America, ii, 389. 



168 



The United States Navy 



The Battle of Lake Erie 

At sunrise on September 10, 1813, the lookout at the 
masthead of the Lawrence saw the British flotilla coming 
out from Maiden. The wind was at first southwest, which 
gave Barclay the weather-gage. But after Perry had 
got under way, the wind shifted to the southeast and thus 
was in his favor. Barclay, in his report of the battle, 
says: "The weather-gage gave the enemy a prodigious 
advantage, as it enabled them not only to choose their 
position, but their distance also, which they did in such a 
manner, as to prevent the carronades of the Queen Char- 
lotte and Lady Prevost from having much effect; while 
their long guns did great execution, particularly against 
the Queen Charlotte.'' 

Both commanders formed their vessels in columns, 
with the most powerful ships in the centre — a formation 
which gave the whole line a strong cohesive force. Perry 
had intended to have each of his stronger vessels keep its 
position parallel to a correspondingly powerful opponent. 
This is proved by the fact that after he noticed the forma- 
tion of Barclay's centre to be constituted in the following 
order: Detroit, Hunter, and Queen Charlotte, he rear- 
ranged his own centre thus : Lawrence, Caledonia, and 
Niagara. His first plan had been to have the Niagara 
ahead of the Lawrence, thinking that the British centre 
would be led by the Queen Charlotte. This change in 
formation should be noted carefully, as it has an impor- 
tant bearing on the Perry-Elliott controversy which arose 
after the battle, and which caused our people to take sides 
with the two American commanders. 

The battle began at 11.45 and continued until three 
o'clock. Shortly after the British opened fire, Perry 
determined to abandon his first formation parallel to the 
enemy's column. He found that the Lawrence with her 



The Battle of Lake Erie 169 



carronades was not within effective range. Accordingly, 
with the schooners Ariel and Scorpion, and the flagship 
Lawrence in the van, he tried to reform his flotilla in 
column ahead obliquely, that is, in echelon, or bow and 
quarter line. At the same time he sent word to the rear 
ships, which by reason of the lightness of the wind were 
straggling behind, to close up. For some reason Elliott 
did not follow his commander's lead; instead, he kept his 
position behind the slow-sailing Caledonia, and as four- 



f 
se 
of 

H f 

1 of 

1 



SO 



Oc 



ni L C- 
Si 



L LAWRENCE 
C CALEDONtA 
N NIAGARA 



y,y / 
m& j 

3 



D DETROIT 
ff HUNTER 
Q QtfEEN CHARLOTTE 



S SCHOONERS 



From Mahan's War of 1812, by permission 

The Battle of Lake Erie 



fifths of the Niagara's guns were carronades, Elliott's 
vessel fell behind, out of range. Meanwhile, her intended 
antagonist, the Queen Charlotte, finding that the long 
guns of the Caledonia were doing great damage, sailed 
ahead to take part in the terrific fire that was already 
being concentrated on the Lawrence. By reason of 
Elliott's misunderstanding of orders, or his poor judg- 
ment, there was now a considerable gap between the 
Caledonia and the vessels in the van. 

The Lawrence was thus compelled to bear the brunt 
of the battle from twelve o'clock until half-past two. Both 



170 



The United States Navy 



the British and the American larger ships in the van 
were suffering terribly. At the end of the first stage of 
the battle, at two-thirty, the Lawrence was a wreck. Four- 
fifths of her crew were either dead or wounded. Finally, 
Perry had to call on the surgeons and even on the wounded 
to lend a hand, and he himself, assisted by the purser 
and chaplain, fired the last effective gun. But the Detroit 
was also ' ' a perfect wreck, ' ' according to Barclay 's report. 
The Queen Charlotte had lost her able captain, Finnis, 
early in the action, and was now being badly handled by 
an inexperienced Canadian officer. 

It was at this crucial moment, that Perry, while his 
ship was drifting helplessly astern out of action, made his 
famous passage in a boat from the flagship to the Niagara, 
which was still perfectly fresh. He at once sent Elliott 
to hurry up the American vessels astern, and he himself 
in the Niagara stood down for the badly shattered British 
flagship. On passing, Perry fired his port guns into the 
smaller vessels of the enemy, and his starboard into the 
Detroit, the Queen Charlotte, and the Hunter. The 
Detroit and the Queen Charlotte were at this moment 
trying to wear, to bring fresh broadsides into action ; but 
as every brace and almost every bowline on both had been 
shot away, the two vessels fouled each other, and thus 
gave the Niagara an excellent opportunity to rake within 
half pistol-shot. The terrific fire of the Niagara, sup- 
ported by the Caledonia and the schooners now coming 
up, quickly brought the battle to a close. 

Perry then transferred his broad pennant back to the 
Lawrence, so that he might receive the surrender of the 
British commanders on the deck of his old flagship. In 
the smoke and confusion, the Chippewa and the Little 
Belt had crowded on all sail to escape, but they were soon 
overhauled by the Trippe and the Scorpion, and were 
forced to send their officers to the Lawrence to give up 



The Battle of Lake Erie 171 



their swords. Immediately after the formalities of sur- 
render, Perry sent to General William Henry Harrison, 
who had succeeded Hull in the command of the American 
Army in the Northwest, his famous message, "We have 
met the enemy and they are ours — two ships, two brigs, 
one schooner, and one sloop." 

The forces opposed in the battle were very unequal. 
The Americans had nine vessels 3 with a total broadside 
of 896 pounds against Barclay's six vessels and total 
broadside of 459 pounds. Perry's superiority in long gun 
metal was as three is to two, and in carronade metal as 
two is to one. Barclay's gunnery was excellent in spite 
of the fact that, having no locks, he had to fire his guns 
by flashing pistols at the touch-holes. The total American 
crew numbered 532, of whom only 416 were fit for duty; 
the British crew amounted to 440. In all this comparison, 
however, it must be borne in mind that the Americans 
were not able to take advantage of their superiority in 
ships and equipment until nearly the end of the action, 
when Elliott finally brought up the Niagara. 

Elliott's conduct in the battle is difficult to explain. 
He seems to have misunderstood his commanding officer's 
orders. Perry had sent back word by trumpet early in 
the engagement to close up the line. Whether Elliott ever 
received this order we cannot now determine, as the 
charges and counter-charges were never carefully sifted. 
Lieutenant Elliott had rendered excellent service in his 
earlier work on Lake Erie, but in this battle he seems to 
have displayed bad judgment and lack of initiative in not 
following Perry's lead in getting into close action, and 
in not engaging the Queen Charlotte according to the 
original plan. Elliott's pleas were that he understood he 



3 The Ohio was not present at the battle ; she had some time 
preyiously been sent down the lake. 



172 



The United States Navy 



was to maintain his position in the line behind the Cale- 
donia, and that the wind was too light to keep up with 
the faster sailing Queen Charlotte. 

Hitherto American naval officers had had little or no 
practice in fleet operations, for the sea fights of the early 
days had been all single-ship actions. The traditions of 
the middle of the 18th century required that the line 
must be maintained at all hazards, with the opposing fleets 
sailing in parallel courses. In the famous Battle of the 
Saints, fought with De Grasse in the West Indies, April 
12, 1782, Rodney, at the suggestion of his fleet captain 
Douglas, introduced a new maneuver, that of breaking 
the enemy's line. By this means he concentrated the fire 
of many of his ships upon an inferior number of the 
enemy, and determinedly clung to them until after a 
desperate resistance they were worn out and compelled to 
surrender. These also were Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar, 
and the remarkable results still more positively demon- 
strated the soundness of this style of fighting. The prin- 
ciple of concentration, although carried out in a different 
way, holds as good now as in the time of Rodney 
and JSTelson. 

Perry's method of attack seems at first to have fol- 
lowed the older tradition of ships sailing in column 
abreast the enemy, and Elliott's reluctance to leave his 
station astern of the Caledonia indicates that this was 
the style of battle which he, at least, expected. This 
unwillingness of his to leave his position in column, and 
the maneuver of the Queen Charlotte in sailing ahead to 
join in the attack on the Lawrence, the Ariel, and the 
Scorpion, very nearly enabled Barclay to accomplish the 
feat of destroying in detail a superior enemy. From the 
moment Perry boarded the Niagara, however, he aban- 
doned all line formation, and, by breaking through his 
enemy 's flotilla, turned defeat into victory. 

Captain Barclay, who was thirty-two years of age, had 



The Battle of Lake Erie 



173 



an excellent record, and had been in the battle of Trafal- 
gar under Nelson. In the action on Lake Erie he was 
twice wounded. He refused to leave the deck the 
first time he was hurt, but the second time he was wounded 
so terribly that his condition later brought tears to the 
eyes of the officers who sat on his court-martial. Barclay 
behaved with splendid courage during the battle; his 
great mistake was in giving up the blockade of Presqu'- 
isle and thus letting Perry get to sea. In his report, 
the British commander states the number of killed as 
forty-one, and wounded ninety-four; Perry gives his 
losses as twenty-seven killed and ninety-six wounded. 

Although the forces were unequal, this very inequality 
redounds to the glory of Perry, whose energy created so 
quickly a superior flotilla. Roosevelt remarks that Perry 
by reason of his victory over an inferior force does not 
deserve the high place above such men as Hull and 
Macdonough that is generally accorded him in American 
histories. But he goes on to say : "It was greatly to our 
credit that we had been enterprising enough to fit out 
such an effective little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this 
Perry deserves the highest praise." 4 Further, when 
we contrast the determined work on Lake Erie with the 
lack of results on Lake Ontario, we must admit that 
Perry accomplished wonders. His intense energy got 
together a fleet which within a few months gave the 
United States control of Lake Erie, the Upper Lakes, 
and the adjacent territory. On the other hand, on Lake 
Ontario, the shipbuilding race between Yeo and Chauncey 
kept on without result, and ended only with the war. 
The extravagant praise of Perry in American histories, 
criticised by Roosevelt, is due to the melodramatic features 
of the battle, which appealed to the popular imagination : 



4 Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, p. 278. 



174 



The United States Navy 



the heroic resistance of the Lawrence, the passage of 
Perry in an open boat to the Niagara, and the sudden 
turning of the tide of victory. His fame should rest, 
rather, upon the hopeless days when the timbers of his 
future ships were still growing in the forest. In a word. 
Perry's work on Lake Erie attests the fact that what counts 
in an officer's career is not the spectacular event which 
appeals to the public, but the quiet, yet tireless energy, 
the sound judgment, and the farsightedness that always 
precede, and sometimes follow, a successful battle. 

•Results 

The results of the battle of Lake Erie were far-reach- 
ing. Detroit and Michigan fell back into our possession. 
Then followed the victory of the Thames, in which 
Tecumseh, the great Indian leader, was slain. Thereupon 
the Indians, leaving the British, ceased to be a terror 
to the American settlements in the Northwest. The 
scheme which the British had fostered of creating in 
this section an independent Indian state, carved out of 
United States territory — a state which should be under 
the protection of Great Britain, constituting a bulfer 
against the United States — was ended once and for all. 



XI 



THE CRUISE OF THE ESSEX 

In Chapter VIII it was said that the 32-gun frigate 
Essex, after missing the Constitution and the Hornet, set 
sail on a roving cruise in southern waters. There were 
several reasons for this independent action on the part 
of Captain Porter. In the first place, after waiting in 
vain two weeks off Cape Frio (near Rio de Janeiro) to 
meet Bainbridge, Porter found his ship running short of 
supplies. He, therefore, hurried on to the next rendezvous 
agreed upon, the Island of St. Catharine's, which was 
also on the Brazilian coast. There he failed to find either 
the Constitution or the Hornet, but heard of the capture 
of the Java, with rumors to the effect that the Hornet had 
been taken by the ship-of-the-line Montague, and learned 
that several heavy British ships were soon expected in 
those waters. Fearing that he should be blockaded, or 
attacked in port by an overwhelming force, Captain Porter 
immediately put to sea. 

1 ' It was then necessary, " 1 he wrote in his journal, 
"to decide promptly on my proceedings, as our pro- 
visions were getting short. I called on the purser for a 
report and found that we had about three months' bread 
at half allowance. There was no port on this coast where 
we could procure a supply, without a certainty of capture, 
or blockade (which I considered as bad) ; to attempt to 
return to the United States at a season of the year when 
our coast would be swarming with the enemy's cruisers, 
would be running too much risk, and would be going 

1 Porter's Journal, i, 56, ff. 

175 



176 



The United States Navy 



diametrically opposite to my instructions. I was per- 
fectly at loss now where to find the commodore, as, in 
remaining before Bahia, he had departed from his original 
intentions, and had already disappointed me at three 
rendezvous. The state of my provisions would not admit 
of going off St. Helena's to intercept the returning India- 
men, nor would my force justify the proceeding. . . . 
I, therefore, determined to pursue that course which 
seemed to be best calculated to injure the enemy and 
would enable me to prolong my cruise. This could only 
be done by going into a friendly port, where I could 
increase my supplies without the danger of blockade, and 
the first place that presented itself to my mind was the 
port of Concepcion on the coast of Chile. The season was, 
to be sure, far advanced for doubling Cape Horn; our 
stock of provisions was short, and the ship in other 
respects not well supplied with stores for so long a cruise • 
but there appeared no other choice left to me except 
capture, starvation or blockade." 

Accordingly he put all hands on half rations and 
steered for the Cape. After a rough three weeks spent 
in beating against the storms for which Cape Horn is 
famous, the Essex turned northward again, the first 
American man-of-war to weather the Horn or to enter the 
Pacific. It happened by an odd coincidence that this 
little vessel had been also the first American man-of-war 
to round the Cape of Good Hope. 2 

On March 13, 1813, Captain Porter dropped his anchor 
in the harbor of Valparaiso, 3 and proceeded at once to 
replenish his exhausted stores. The Chilean Government 
treated him with courtesy, for, being at that time already 

2 In 1800, under Captain Edward Preble. 

3 Porter was prevented from carrying out his original intention 
of entering Concepcion by a gale that drove him so far north of 
that port that he made for Valparaiso instead. 



The Cruise of the Essex 



177 



in revolt against Spain, it did not profess an alliance 
with England, as did the still loyal colonies of Spain and 
Portugal. Peru, for example, was so zealous in England 's 
cause that she had already commissioned several privateers 
to prey on the returning American whalers. 

While lying at Valparaiso, Captain Porter learned 
from an American whaler that there were likely to be many 
English whalers in the vicinity of Galapagos Islands, a 
noted whaling rendezvous about five hundred miles west 
of Ecuador, and that the presence of the Essex in that 
neighborhood would serve also to give warning and pro- 
tection to home-bound American vessels, whose masters 
were still ignorant of the fact that war had broken out. 
Acting on this information, as soon as he had finished 
storing ship (March 20), Captain Porter left Valparaiso 
for the Galapagos, skirting, en route, the coast line of 
Chile and Peru, looking for a Peruvian privateer which 
he heard had captured two American whalers. In a few 
days he succeeded in finding and capturing the privateer, 
whose captain, on demand, furnished a list and descrip- 
tion of all the British whalers he knew in those waters. 
Two days later, he recaptured the Barclay, one of the 
two American ships taken by the privateer. After this, 
he sailed direct for the Galapagos Islands, arriving there 
on the 17th of April. 

While cruising in this neighborhood, the Essex capt- 
ured six ships, carrying in all eighty guns and 340 men. 
Finding himself burdened with prisoners and prizes, which 
were too far from any American port to send home, Porter 
took his squadron to the coast to land his prisoners and 
dispose of some of his prizes. He touched first at Tumbez, 
a town at the mouth of the Tumbez River, in the Gulf of 
Guayaquil, Ecuador. There he put the largest of the 
prizes, the Atlantic, mounting twenty light guns, under the 
command of the first lieutenant, Master- Commandant 
12 



178 



The United States Navy 



Downes, and renamed her the Essex Junior. To another 
prize, the Greenwich, he transferred all the supplies he 
had taken from his captures and made her thereafter the 
store ship of his squadron. 

Having completed these arrangements, Porter returned 
to the Galapagos in the Essex, accompanied by the Green- 
wich, and a prize ship of 16 guns, the Georgiana. The 
remaining prizes he sent to Valparaiso under the escort 
of the Essex Junior. By this time he had captured so 
many vessels that he was compelled to draw on the mid- 
shipmen for prize masters, and in the trip from Tumbez 
to Valparaiso, he put the ship Barclay, with her ex-captain 
retained on board to help navigate her, under the com- 
mand of Midshipman Farragut, then not quite twelve 
years old. At the very outset, the lad was compelled to 
settle the question of command with the big whaler, who 
swore that he would take the Barclay to New Zealand 
instead of Valparaiso, and went below to get his pistols. 
The other vessels of the squadron were by this time too 
far away to communicate with, but Farragut, after telling 
his right-hand man of the prize crew what the situation 
was, shouted down the cabin ladder that if the whaler 
came up with his pistols he did so at the risk of going 
overboard. Finding that the crew were ready to stand 
by their young commander, the ex-captain had to give in. 
From that moment Farragut was master of the situa- 
tion, and navigated the Barclay without miqhap to 
Valparaiso. 

Captain Porter continued to make valuable captures in 
the neighborhood of the Galapagos, and by the end of 
September, when he was rejoined by the Essex Junior, 
he had captured nearly every English ship on the southern 
coast. Master-Commandant Downes, on his arrival, 
brought the news from Valparaiso that the 36-gun frigate 
Phoebe and the sloops Cherub and Raccoon were on their 



The Cruise of the Essex 



179 



way round the Horn. Porter lojked forward to an oppor- 
tunity of trying the Essex against the Phoebe, but his ship 
was in great need of overhauling. Accordingly, he set 
sail with his squadron for the Marquesas Islands, where 
he could dismantle his ship without fear of being dis- 
turbed by a British man-of-war. 

While the squadron lay at Nukahiva, one of the 
Marquesas Islands, the work of refitting was interrupted 
by a lively campaign on shore in defense of the coast 
tribe, which had received them with hospitality, against 
hostile tribes of the interior. On the 12th of December, 
1813, the overhauling of the Essex was completed. Cap- 
tain Porter left Lieutenant Gamble 4 of the marines with 
three midshipmen and twenty-six men in charge of a 
small battery, under which the four prizes were moored; 
and made sail for Valparaiso, accompanied by the Essex 
Junior. He hoped now to meet an English man-of-war 
of equal force, and conclude his commerce-destroying 
cruise with the capture of a frigate. 

The results of this famous cruise, Captain Porter 
summarized in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, 
as follows : 5 

" I had completely broken up the British navigation 
in the Pacific ; the vessels which had not been captured 
by me were laid up and dared not venture out. I had 
afforded the most ample protection to our own vessels, 
which were, on my arrival, very numerous and unpro- 
tected. The valuable whale fishery there [of the British] 
is entirely destroyed, and the actual injury we have done 



4 A mutiny broke out shortly afterwards. Lieutenant Gamble 
escaped with his life and eventually made his way to one of the 
Sandwich Islands, and was captured afterwards by the Cherub. 
The mutineers were British deserters in the crew of the Essex 
aided by six prisoners. 

8 Porter's Journal, ii, 161. 



180 



The United States Navy 



them may be estimated at two and a half million dollars, 
independent of the expenses of vessels sent in search of 
me. They have supplied me amply with sails, cordage, 
cables, anchors, provisions, medicines, and stores of every 
description — and the slops on board them have furnished 
clothing for the seamen. We have, in fact, lived on the 
enemy since I have been in that sea; every prize having 
proved a well-found store ship for me. I have not yet 
been under the necessity of drawing bills on the Depart- 
ment for any object, and have been enabled to make con- 
siderable advances to my officers and crew on account of 
pay. For the unexampled time we have kept at sea, my 
crew have continued remarkably healthy. ' ' 

On the way to the mainland, Captain Porter kept his 
men exercised daily at gun and sword drills in anticipa- 
tion of meeting the Phoebe. On February 3, 1814, the 
Essex and the Essex Junior reached Valparaiso. Five 
days later, the Phoebe and the Cherub came in together. 
The Raccoon had previously parted company from her 
consorts and headed north. What happened between the 
two forces is graphically told by Farragut in his journal. 6 

"In January, 1814, we arrived off the coast of Chile. 
After looking into Concepcion, we ran down to Valparaiso, 
where we lay until the arrival of the British frigate 
Phcebe and sloop of war Cherub. This occurred early in 
February. The frigate mounted thirty long 18-pounders, 
sixteen 32-pounder carronades, one howitzer, and six 
3-pounders in the tops, with a crew of 320 men. The 
Cherub had eighteen 32-pounder carronades, eight 24- 
pounders, two long nines, and a crew of 180 men. 

" When they made their appearance off the port, our 
whole watch, being a third of our crew, were on shore on 
liberty. The mate of an English merchantman, which 



6 Loyall Farragut, Life of David Glasgow Farragut, p. 32, ff. 



The Arrival of the British Ships 



181 



was lying in port at the time, went immediately on board 
the Phoebe, and stated to Captain Hilly ar that one-half of 
our men were on shore and that the Essex would fall an 
easy prey. The two ships then hauled into the harbor 
on a wind. The Phoebe made our larboard quarter, but 
the Cherub fell to leeward about half a mile. On gaining 




The Cruise of the Essex, Oct. 28, 1812 — Mar. 28, 1814 



our quarter, the Phoebe put her helm down, and luffed up 
on our starboard bow, coming within ten or fifteen feet of 
the Essex. 

"I should say here, that as soon as the enemy hove in 
sight, we fired a gun and hoisted a cornet for all boats and 
men to return, and in fifteen minutes every man was at 
his quarters, and but one was under the influence of liquor, 
he a mere boy. When the Phoebe, as before mentioned, 
was close alongside, and all hands were at quarters, the 



182 



The United States Navy 



powder-boys stationed with slow matches ready to dis- 
charge the guns, the boarders, cutlass in hand, standing 
by to board in the smoke, as was our custom at close 
quarters, the intoxicated youth saw, or imagined that he 
saw, through the port, some one on the Phoebe grinning at 
him. 'My fine fellow, I'll stop your making faces,' he 
exclaimed, and was just about to fire his gun, when Lieu- 
tenant McKnight saw the movement and with a blow 
sprawled him on the deck. Had that gun been fired, I 
am convinced that the Phoebe would have been ours. But 
it was destined to be otherwise. We were all at quarters 
and cleared for action, waiting with breathless anxiety for 
the command from Captain Porter to board, when the 
English captain (Hillyar) appeared, standing on the after 
gun in a pea-jacket, and in plain hearing said : 

" 'Captain Hillyar 's compliments to Captain Porter, 
and hopes he is well.' 

"Porter replied, 'Very well, I thank you; but I hope 
you will not come too near, for fear some accident might 
take place which would be disagreeable to you, ' and with 
a wave of his trumpet the kedge anchors went up to our 
yard-arms, ready to grapple the enemy. 

' ' Captain Hillyar braced back his yards and remarked 
to Porter that if he did fall aboard him, he begged to 
assure the captain that it would be entirely accidental. 

" 'Well,' said Porter, 'you have no business where 
you are. // you touch a rope-yarn of this ship, I shall 
board instantly/ He then hailed the Essex Junior, and 
told Captain Downes to be prepared to repel the enemy. 

"But our desire for a fight was not yet to be gratified. 
The Phoebe backed down, her yards passed over ours, not 
touching a rope, and she anchored about half a mile astern. 
We thus lost an opportunity of taking her, though we had 
observed the strict neutrality of the port under very 
aggravating circumstances. 



The Arrival of the British Ships 183 

"We remained together in the harbor for some days, 
when the British vessels, having completed their pro- 
visioning and watering, went to sea and commenced a 
regular blockade of our ships. One night we manned all 
our boats for the purpose of boarding the enemy outside. 
The captain in his boat, with muffled oars, pulled so close 
up to the Phoebe that he could hear the conversation of 
the men on her forecastle, and thereby learned that they 
were lying at their quarters prepared for us; so the 
attempt was given up, and we returned on board. 

' ' It was understood in our ship, one day, that Captain 
Porter had sent word to Captain Hillyar that, if he would 
send the Cherub to the leeward point of the harbor, he 
would go out and fight him. We all believed the terms 
would be accepted, and everything was kept in readiness 
to get under way. Soon after, the Phoebe was seen stand- 
ing in with her motto flag flying, on which was God and 
our Country! British Sailors' Best Rights! This was in 
answer to Porter's flag, Free Trade and Sailors' Rights! 
She fired a gun to windward, and the Cherub was seen 
running to leeward. In five minutes our anchor was up, 
and under topsails and jib we cleared for action — in fact, 
we were always ready for that. When within two miles 
of our position, the Phoebe bore up and set her studding- 
sails. This I considered a second breach of faith on the 
part of Hillyar; for, by his maneuvers in both instances, 
it was evident that he was either wanting in courage or 
lacked the good faith of a high-toned chivalrous spirit to 
carry out his original intention. However, as Captain 
Hillyar subsequently proved himself a brave man, in 
more than one instance, I shall not deny him that common 
characteristic of a naval officer, and have attributed his 
action on these two occasions to a want of good faith. He 
was dealing with a far inferior force and it w T as ignoble 



184 



The United States Navy 



in the extreme, on his part, not to meet his foe, when he 
had the ghost of an excuse for doing so, ship to ship. 

"On the 28th of March, 1814, it came on to blow from 
the south, and we parted our larboard cable, dragging the 
starboard anchor leeward ; we immediately got under way 
and made sail on the ship. The enemy's vessels were close 
in with the weathermost point of the bay; but Captain 
Porter thought we could weather them, so we hauled up 
for that purpose, and took in our topgallant sails, which 
had been set over close reefed topsails. But scarcely had 
the topgallant sails been clewed down, when a squall struck 
the ship and, though the topsail halyards were let go, the 
yards jammed, and would not come down. When the ship 
was nearly gunwale under, the maintopmast went by the 
board, carrying the men who were on the maintopgallant 
yard into the sea, and they were drowned. We imme- 
diately wore ship and attempted to regain the harbor; 
but, owing to the disaster, were unable to do so ; therefore 
we anchored in a small bay, about a quarter of a mile 
off shore and three-quarters of a mile from the small 
battery. 

"But it was evident, from the preparations being 
made by the enemy, that he intended to attack us ; so we 
made arrangements to receive him as well as we possibly 
could. Springs 7 were got on our cables, and the ship was 
perfectly prepared for action. 

"I well remember the feelings of awe produced in me 
by the approach of the hostile ships; even to my young 
mind it was perceptible in the faces of those around me, 

7 A spring is a rope taken from the stern of a ship to an 
anchor off the bow. By hauling on it the crew can turn or wind " 
the ship in the desired direction without having to depend on sail 
power. In this action the springs were bent to the anchor cable 
instead of to the ring of the anchor itself, an unfortunate arrange- 
ment which exposed them to the enemy's fire. 



The Action with the Phoebe and Cherub 185 



as clearly as possible, that our case was hopeless. It was 
equally apparent that all were ready to die at their guns 
rather than surrender; and such I believe to have been 
the determination of the crew almost to a man. There 
had been so much bantering of each other among the men 
of the ships, through the medium of letters and songs, 
with an invariable fight between the boats' crews when 
they met on shore, that a very hostile sentiment was 
engendered. Our flags were flying from every mast, and 
the enemy's vessels displayed their ensigns, jacks, and 
motto flags, as they bore down grandly to the attack. 

"At 3.54 p.m. they commenced firing; the Phoebe 
under our stern, and the Cherub on our starboard bow. 
But the latter, finding out pretty soon that we had too 
many guns bearing on her, likewise ran under our stern. 
We succeeded in getting three long guns out of the stern 
ports, and kept up as well directed a fire as possible in 
such an unequal contest. 

"In half an hour they were both compelled to haul 
off to repair damages. During this period of the fight, 
we had succeeded three times in getting springs on our 
cables, but in each instance they were shot away as soon 
as they were hauled taut. Notwithstanding the incessant 
firing from both of the enemy's ships, we had, so far, 
suffered less than might have been expected, considering 
that we could bring but three guns to oppose two broad- 
sides. Y7e had many men killed in the first five or ten 
minutes of their fire, before we could bring our stern guns 
to bear. 

"The enemy soon repaired damages, and renewed the 
attack, both ships taking position on our larboard quarter, 
out of reach of our carronades, and where the stern guns 
could not be brought to bear. They then kept up a most 
galling fire, which we were powerless to return. At this 
juncture the captain ordered the cable to be cut, and, 



186 



The United States Navy 



after ineffectual attempts, we succeeded in getting sail 
on the ship, having found that the flying jib-halyards 
were in a condition to hoist that sail. It was the only 
serviceable rope that had not been shot away. By this 
means we were able to close with the enemy, and the 
firing now became fearful on both sides. The Cherub was 
compelled to haul out, and never came into close action 
again, though she lay off and used her long guns greatly 
to our discomfort, making a perfect target of us. The 
Phoebe also, was enabled, by the better condition of her 
sails, to choose her own distance, suitable for her long 
guns, and kept up a most destructive fire on our helpless 
ship. 

' ' ' Finding, ' as Captain Porter says, ' the impossibility 
of closing with the Phoebe,' he determined to run his ship 
ashore and destroy her. We accordingly stood for the 
land, but when we were within half a mile of the bluffs 
the wind suddenly shifted, took us flat aback, and paid 
our head off shore*. We were thus again exposed to a 
galling fire from the Phoebe. At this moment Captain 
Downes of the Essex Junior came on board to receive his 
orders, being under the impression that our ship would 
soon be captured, as the enemy at that time were raking 
us, while we could not bring a gun to bear, and his vessel 
was in no condition to be of service to us. 

"Captain Porter now ordered a hawser to be bent on 
to the sheet anchor and let go. This brought our ship's 
head around, and we were in hopes that the Phoebe would 
drift out of gun shot, as the sea was nearly calm ; but the 
hawser broke, and we were again at the mercy of the 
enemy. The ship was now reported to be on fire, and the 
men came rushing up from below, many with their clothes 
burning, which were torn from them as quickly as pos- 
sible, and those from whom this could not be done were 
told to jump overboard and quench the flames. Many of 



The Action with the Phoebe and Cherub 187 

the crew, and even some of the officers, hearing the order 
to jump overboard, took it for granted that the fire had 
reached the magazine, and that the ship was about to blow 
up ; so they leaped into the water and attempted to reach 
the shore, about three-quarters of a mile distant, in which 
effort a number were drowned. 

"The captain sent for the commissioned officers, to 
consult with them the propriety of further resistance ; but 
first went below to ascertain the quantity of powder in 
the magazine. On his return to the deck, he met Lieu- 
tenant McKnight, 8 the only commissioned officer left on 
duty, all the others having been killed or wounded. As it 
was pretty evident that the ship was in a sinking condi- 
tion, it was determined to surrender, in order to save the 
wounded, and at 6.30 p.m. the painful order was given to 
haul down the colors.' ' 

In this action, the Essex lost fifty-eight killed, sixty- 
six wounded, and thirty-one missing. Most of the last 
were probably drowned in the attempt to swim ashore. 
If the number of the missing is included, this is the 
heaviest loss sustained by any American vessel during the 
war. The British reported four killed and seven wounded 
on the Phoebe; and one killed and three wounded on the 
Cherub. Among the killed on the Phoebe was Captain 
Hillyar's first lieutenant, Ingram, who, it is said, begged 
his captain to close with the Essex, saying that if was 

8 The loss of the Essex is linked with the tragedy of the 
Wasp. After the battle in Valparaiso, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur 
McKnight and Midshipman James Lyman were exchanged against 
a number of Englishmen in one of the Essex's prizes that remained 
in port, and these officers consented to go in the Phoebe to Rio to 
testify before the prize court in behalf of the Phoebe's prize claims. 
Afterwards they embarked in a Swedish brig sailing for England. 
On October 9, 1814, the brig fell in with the Wasp, in mid ocean. 
The two officers were transferred to her, and she was never heard 
from again. 



188 The United States Navy 

deliberate murder to lie off at long range and fire into 
the Americans like a target, when they were unable to 
return the fire. Hillyar, however, naturally preferred to 
make the capture at least cost to himself. 

The result was conclusive as to the folly of arming a 
frigate's main deck with carronades. Porter himself had 
protested, on taking command, and begged to be allowed 
to substitute long guns, but the Department refused. It 
may fairly be said that the country owes the loss of the 
Essex to this refusal. 9 

Though the British captain showed Captain Porter 
and the survivors of the American crew every considera- 
tion, as Porter freely admits, the latter could not but feel 
a bitter resentment over Hillyar 's attacking him in neutral 
waters. This was particularly hard to endure after 
Porter's forbearance when the Phoebe came into the 
harbor with the evident intention of taking the Essex by 
surprise. Captain Hillyar 's conduct, however, wajs in 
keeping with the policy of those days, common to Napoleon 
and to the British Government alike, which recognized 
neutral rights only when it was convenient. 

Like another famous commerce-destroyer, the Con- 
federate cruiser Alabama, the Essex was not taken till 
after she had struck her blow. By destroying British 
commerce in the Pacific she did far more to hurt the 
enemy than she could have done by the capture of a 
frigate ; for in 1814 England had frigates to spare, but 
her merchantmen were her very means* of existence. 



9 The armament of the Essex in her action with the British 
ships consisted of forty 32-lb. carronades and six long 12's. 



XII 



BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE WAR 

Operations on Lake Ontario 

On Lake Ontario the shipbuilding contest between 
Sir James Lucas Yeo and Captain Isaac Chauncey, re- 
ferred to in a previous chapter, continued. At the begin- 
ning of the summer of 1814, each had four ships and 
four brigs. This contest in building went on with the 
nicety of a mathematical problem. When one commander 
had a slight superiority, the second hid in port until he 
could build enough to outstrip the other. Then the second 
sallied forth, and the first took his turn in port. Both 
were overcautious. 

During the previous spring, Yeo had managed to get 
to sea some time before Chauncey, and at once made a 
successful attack (May 5) on Oswego, destroying the 
barracks and sailing away with the Growler, together with 
heavy ordnance and supplies. The British, however, did 
not pursue their advantage, but, instead, now blockaded 
the American commodore at Sackett's Harbor, where he 
was doing his best in hurrying forward the heavy guns 
for his new ships. On June 5, Yeo raised the blockade ; 
and Chauncey, on July 31, took the lake, only to find 
that the British commander had shut himself up at 
Kingston to await the completion of a ship-of-the-line 
then building. 

When Major-General Brown asked the co-operation of 
Chauncey in the offensive campaign against Canada, the 
latter, who had rendered valuable assistance the year 

189 



190 



The United States Navy 



before in the attacks on Forts George and York, objected 
on the plea that he had his hands full in attempting the 
"capture and destruction" of the enemy's fleet." This 
was, of course, his immediate duty ; and if he had accom- 
plished it, General Brown 's mission on the Niagara penin- 
sula would have received the kind of co-operation it most 
needed. But Chauncey's cautious and dilatory tactics 
gained nothing for himself, or for the American cause 
anywhere. It was the opinion of Winfield Scott that if 
the British had not had free access to the lake, Lundy's 
Lane, instead of being a drawn battle, might have been 
a victory so decisive as to have turned the scales of war. 
The Americans soon found themselves, instead of taking 
the offensive against Canada, forced to prepare for a 
threatened invasion through Lake Champlain. 1 

Battle of Lake Champlain 

Although the condition of affairs on the Great Lakes 
remained unchanged during the year 1814, events of the 
greatest importance were taking place on Lake Champlain. 
This lake had not hitherto played a part in the war at all 
commensurate with its important position. With Lake 
George and the Hudson River it formed a series of water 
connections from the source of American supplies at New 
York to what should have been the true objective of an 
offensive war on the Canadian border, Montreal. The 
British, naturally on the defensive in Canada, had paid 
no heed to this waterway during the early years of the 
war, and the Americans, in their efforts, under Hull and 
Dearborn, to concentrate their attention on the Northwest, 
had neglected their opportunity. Hence we find little or 
no mention of Lake Champlain until June, 1813. As 
three of the armed sloops here were American, against one 

^ahan, War of 1812, ii, 306-311. 



Thomas Macdonough 



Rivalry for Control 



191 



British, the former could sail where they pleased, while 
the British remained at their base in the lower narrows, at 
Isle aux Noix. On June 2, 1813, two of the American 
sloops, the Eagle and the Growler, while approaching 
too near the British garrison at the narrows, were raked 
from the shore and captured. The British now followed 
up their advantage. Captain Everard, of the British 
sloop Wasp, lying at Quebec, volunteered w T ith some of 
his men to make a raid on the lake. He destroyed the 
public building at Plattsburg and the barracks at Saranac, 
and captured some small vessels, while Macdonough, the 
American commander on the lake, taken utterly by sur- 
prise, and helpless because of the loss of his two vessels, 
had to sit by and look on. Everard hurried back, and 
with Captain Pring stirred up the authorities to building 
ships at once on Lake Champlain. 

Now began a contest in shipbuilding like the rivalry 
on the Great Lakes, and it continued until the fall of 
1814. Macdonough had already established his base at 
Plattsburg, and had all his vessels, except the Eagle, 
ready by the latter part of May. He could then range 
the lake at will and bring stores from Burlington, while 
the British were awaiting the completion of their most 
powerful ship, the Confiance, which was not launched 
until August 25. Captain Downie took command of 
the British flotilla on September 2, and in response to the 
goading of the Governor-General of Canada, hurried the 
equipment of his vessels to the utmost in order to 
co-operate with Prevost's invading army. By this time, 
the American flotilla consisted of the ship Saratoga, 26 ; 
the brig Eagle, 20; the schooner Ticonderoga, 17; the 
sloop Preble, 7 ; and about ten row-galleys or gunboats : 
in all fourteen vessels, with 882 men, eighty-six guns, 
and total broadside of 1194 pounds, 714 from short and 
480 from long guns. 



192 



The United States Navy 



On the other hand, the British had the Confiance 
(rated after her capture in our navy as a frigate), mount- 
ing twenty-seven long 24-pounders, of which one was a 
pivot gun and thus available for both broadsides, and 
ten carronades; they had, besides, the brig Linnet, 16; 
the Chub, 11 ; the Finch, 11 ; and about twelve gunboats : 
in all, sixteen vessels, with 937 men, ninety-two guns, and 
total broadside of 1192 pounds, 532 from short and 660 
from long guns. Thus the superiority was on the British 
side. The Confiance had an approximate tonnage of 1200, 
as against the Saratoga's 734 tons. "The two largest 
British vessels, Confiance and Linnet, were slightly 
inferior to the American Saratoga and Eagle in aggregate 
weight of broadside ; but, like the General Pike on Ontario 
in 1813, the superiority of the Confiance in long guns, and 
under one captain, would on the open lake have made her 
practically equal to cope with the whole American squad- 
ron, and still more with the Saratoga alone, assuming that 
the Linnet gave the Eagle some occupation. ' ' 2 

A British army of 11,000 men, part of four brigades 
recently sent from Wellington's Peninsular veterans to 
Canada, was slowly marching, under the command of 
Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, up the 
western side of Lake Champlain. The American general, 
Izard, had been ordered to proceed with most of the 
troops at Plattsburg to Sackett's Harbor, leaving General 
Macomb with scarcely 2000 men to meet the invaders. 
Prevost kept urging Downie to set sail, so as to co-operate 
with him in the attack on Plattsburg. The Governor- 
General drove Macomb across the Saranac, which divides 
Plattsburg, and then he sat down and waited for Downie. 
The latter thus had to offer battle prematurely to Mac- 
donough; but although the British flotilla was somewhat 



2 Mahan, War of 1812, ii, 371. 



Rivalry for Control 



193 



handicapped by this haste, the American vessels were 
likewise not yet fully prepared. The crews of both 
flotillas had had little time for that training necessary to 
organized effort. The locks of some of the guns of the 
Confiance were useless, and similar difficulties presented 
themselves on the American vessels. But in these disad- 
vantages, the opposing fleets were equally handicapped. 

Macdonough, though only thirty years old, had made 
preparations for battle worthy of a much older head. 
The mouth of Plattsburg Bay, where the engagement took 
place, extends from Cumberland Head southwestward to 
the shoals of Crab Island. When Downie's fleet, early on 
the morning of September 11, was known to have set sail 
under a northeast wind, Macdonough anchored his ships 
in a line across the entrance of Plattsburg Bay, the larger 
vessels off Cumberland Head, in the following order: 
Eagle, Saratoga, Ticonderoga, and Preble; the gunboats 
he drew up in a line forty yards behind. Thus the heavier 
vessels at Cumberland Head, and the shoals at Crab 
Island, would check any attempt at turning Macdonough 's 
flanks. The enemy, in a channel too narrow to beat, would 
have to approach bows on, close to the wind, while the 
Americans had the weather-gage for easy maneuvering. 
Besides, in case of failure of wind, or for presenting a 
new broadside quickly at the same berth, Macdonough had 
provided his vessels with springs. 

The British naval commander, who could plainly see 
across the narrow Cumberland Head Macdonough 's for- 
mation, planned his own line accordingly. The Confiance 
was to round the point, fire a broadside at the Eagle at 
the upper end of the line, and then come to anchor across 
the bows of the Saratoga. The Chub and the Linnet were 
then to anchor off the Eagle's bow and stern, and the 
Finch, assisted by the British gunboats, was to oppose 
the Ticonderoga and the Preble. 
13 



194 



The United States Navy 



As Downie rounded Cumberland Head, he was sur- 
prised to find no co-operation from Prevost, but he never- 
theless bravely adhered to his part of the attack. The 
Con fiance laboriously made for the upper end of the 




The Battle of Lake Champlain, Sept. 11, 1814 



American line, but under the concentrated fire from 
Macdonough's vessels and the shifting winds, she was 
compelled to abandon her first plan of going to the head 
of the line, and she came to anchor some 500 yards to the 
east of the Saratoga. Both port bow-anchors of the 



Battle of Lake Champlain 195 



British flagship had meanwhile been shot away, and a 
ball from one of the Saratoga's long 24-pounders, fired 
by Macdonough himself, struck the Confiance near the 
hawse-hole, killing and wounding several men in its course 
along the length of the deck. Downie, who coolly made 
fast his ship before he fired a gun, now, at about nine 
o'clock, fired a deadly broadside which is said to have 
killed or wounded one-fifth of the Saratoga's crew. 

Meanwhile the Linnet and the Chub had engaged the 
Eagle. The Chub, before she could anchor, received con- 
siderable damage to her sails and rigging; and, with her 
commander wounded, she drifted helplessly through Mac- 
donough 's line, where an American midshipman took 
charge of her. The Linnet, having anchored to windward 
of the Eagle, kept pouring a diagonal fire into the Amer- 
ican vessel. After standing the broadsides of the Linnet 
and part of the fire of the Confiance, the Eagle at 10.30 
cut her cables and slipped down to a position between the 
Saratoga and the Ticonderoga. In this way she brought 
her fresh broadside into play against the Confiance with- 
out exposure to shots from either the Confiance or the 
Linnet. The Eagle's change of berth gave the Linnet an 
opportunity, after some slight skirmishing with the Amer- 
ican gunboats, to shift her anchorage to a raking position 
off the Saratoga's bows. 

At the southern end of the American line, the 
Finch and some of the British gunboats were attack- 
ing the Ticonderoga and the Preble. As the Finch 
did not keep near enough to the wind, she failed to 
reach the position assigned to her abreast the Ticon- 
deroga, nor could she gain it later when the wind died 
down. Silenced by a few broadsides from the Amer- 
ican schooner, she drifted on the shoals at Crab Island, 
where a 6-pounder mounted on shore forced her finally 
to surrender. Although some of the British gunboats kept 



196 The United States Navy 



at a safe distance from their enemy's long guns and later 
ingloriously fled, four pressed forward to attack with des- 
perate courage. The little Preble was obliged to cut her 
cable and take refuge under the American shore batteries 
at Plattsburg. As the American gunboats were too light 
to be of much assistance, the Ticonderoga was left prac- 
tically unsupported, but her commander, Lieutenant 
Cassin, handled his schooner with marked ability. Heed- 
less of the great danger from musketry and grape, he 
directed the fight from the taffrail, and gave the close- 
approaching gunboats loads of canister that finally drove 
them off, though not till some of them had got within a 
boat's length of their foe. 

At the head of the line, where the main fighting took 
place, the contest dwindled down to one between the 
Swatoga and Eagle on the American side, and the Con- 
fiance and Linnet on the British. The vessels were firing 
at stationary targets, at point-blank range, and in smooth 
water, and under such conditions even inexperienced 
crews could inflict terrible damage. Downie was killed 
early in the action, and his death was a great loss to the 
British side. Gradually, owing to the inexperience and 
lack of longer training of the crews, confusion became 
apparent in both flotillas. The American sailors, when 
their officers were killed or wounded, overloaded the car- 
ronades, and thus destroyed the effectiveness of these 
guns. On the Confiance the quoins were gradually 
loosened by the heavy firing, and as this error was- not 
rectified, her guns kept shooting higher and higher. Such 
confusion reigned at times on the British flagship, that 
the gunners rammed home shot without any powder, or 
cartridges without any shot. The first broadside of the 
Confiance, before Captain Downie was killed, had been 
directed with deadly precision, but the later confusion 



Battle of Lake Champlain 



197 



showed the need of that organization and co-operation 
which are necessary to make crew and officers a unit in 
action. 

The damage aboard the Saratoga was also great, 
nearly her whole starboard battery having been rendered 
useless; but it was at this crisis that Macdonough's fore- 
sight and preparation were able to bring into play the 
unused guns of his vessel. By means of the springs pre- 
viously prepared for just such a contingency, he now 
winded his ship, and thus brought to bear her fresh broad- 
side. The British tried to do the same, and as the Con- 
fiance's stern anchor had been shot away, Lieutenant 
Robertson tried to wind her by a spring from the 
bow. The attempt was not successful, and the flagship 
hung with her bow to the wind, affording the Saratoga 
an excellent opportunity to rake. With the British vessel 's 
hold partly full of water, and a crew that refused to work 
the guns any longer, Robertson, in his exposed position, 
was compelled to strike his colors. This was at about 
eleven o'clock. Macdonough at once, by means of his 
springs, again turned his ship so that her broadside would 
bear on the Linnet, and after fifteen minutes forced Cap- 
tain Pring also to strike. At just this time the Ticon- 
deroga was ending her fight with the gunboats. 

The battle had been fought with the greatest obstinacy 
on both sides. The Saratoga had been hulled by round 
shot fifty-five times, and the Cpnfiance 105 times. The 
Eagle and the Linnet also were badly shattered. The 
number of killed and wounded on the American side was 
approximately 200 ; that of the British, 300. The greatest 
praise is due to Macdonough for this signal victory; in 
the careful choice of his position and in the thorough 
preparations for battle, he had shown unusual skill and 
judgment. In addition to these qualities, Macdonough 



198 



The United States Navy 



possessed indomitable courage. "Down to the time of the 
Civil War he is the greatest figure in our naval history. ' ' 3 
The results of the battle of Lake Champlain were of 
the highest importance. Prevost's army at once fled in 
confusion back to Canada, thus abandoning the policy of 
the British Government for an offensive war. It had also 
a decisive effect on the pending peace negotiations in 
forcing England to relinquish her claim to American 
territory. 

Concluding Events of the War 

The battle of Lake Champlain practically ended the 
war. The Treaty of Ghent was signed on December 24, 
1814, but, owing to the slowness of means of communica- 
tion in those days, it was not ratified by our Government 
until February 17, 1815. Since it had been expressly stip- 
ulated that hostilities were not to cease until ratification, 
and since it was difficult to get news of peace to vessels 
cruising in distant waters, several important battles took 
place after the signing and even after the ratification of 
the treaty. These included one land battle, New Orleans ; 
and several naval engagements, the capture of the Presi- 
dent by the British blockading squadron off New York, 
the battle between the Constitution and the Cyane and 
Levant, and the sloop action between the Hornet and the 
Penguin. 

The part of the navy in the battle of New Orleans 
was small; yet the aid of the Carolina in attacking the 
invaders on December 23, 1814, and the assistance ren- 
dered by the crew of the Louisiana, with its naval battery 
mounted ashore so as to enfilade the troops of the enemy, 
on January 1, 1815, showed of what excellent use even a 
trifling naval force can be. 



Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, p. 399. 



Capture of the President 



199 



Loss of the President 

The frigate President, lying in New York harbor, 
had, in May, 1814, been transferred to Captain Stephen 
Decatur, who had brought with him the crew from his 
former command, the United States, then hopelessly 
blockaded at New London. As a formidable force under 
Admiral Cochrane and General Ross was now threatening 
our coast, the citizens of New York and Philadelphia were 
anxious that Decatur should remain in the vicinity. 

This, and the fact that a vigilant blockading fleet was 
outside, kept the President shut up in New York until 
the night of January 14, 1815, when, in a bad northwester, 
she slipped out of the harbor, but unfortunately went 
aground in the channel. After considerable effort, the 
President cleared the bar, damaged so badly that her 
former speediness was gone. To add to her misfortune, 
she ran at five o'clock next morning into the blockading 
fleet, under Captain Hayes, consisting of the razee Majes- 
tic, 56, and the 38-gun frigates Endymion, Pomone, and 
Tenedos. In the fierce gale, the British vessels were 
scattered, and Captain Hayes had not yet succeeded in 
getting his ships together. 

While Captain Hayes was directing his attention to 
a suspicious sail to the south, which turned out to be his 
own frigate, the Tenedos, the Endymion started a chase 
of the President which lasted until nearly midnight of the 
fifteenth. Decatur steered his course eastward, parallel 
to the shore of Long Island. The Endymion, by con- 
stantly yawing, was able to bring her broadsides to bear 
without losing distance. Decatur endured this fire for 
a half hour, and then suddenly putting his helm to port 
headed south, with intent to cross the Endymion' s bows. 
But the latter imitated the maneuver, and the two ships, 
on parallel courses, exchanged broadsides until Decatur 



200 



The United States Navy 



had accomplished his purpose, which was to strip his 
pursuer's sails from the spars and thus prevent further 
pursuit. The President now, with even studding-sails 
set, continued her course, but although the Endymion 
was badly crippled, Decatur's maneuver had given the 
Pomone and the Tenedos a chance to overtake him. At 
eleven p.m., the American commander surrendered with- 
out firing another broadside. 

Capture of the Cyane and Levant 

The Constitution, Captain Stewart, after a long block- 
ade in Boston harbor, managed, in December, 1814, to 
get to sea. Some 200 miles northeast of Madeira, on 
February 20, 1815, she sighted two vessels, which later 
were found to be the frigate Cyane, 32, and the sloop of 
war Levant, of 20 guns. When first seen, the British 
ships were ten miles apart, but in spite of the light easterly 
wind, they gradually joined each other, and were only 
100 yards apart when they attacked the Constitution. 
At 6.05 p.m. the American vessel, being to windward, at 
300 yards ' distance, opened with her guns. The wind was 
so light that in the enveloping smoke the antagonists had 
to cease firing at times to see where they were. Stewart, 
with remarkable nimbleness, not only avoided being raked 
himself, but managed to wear the Constitution so adroitly 
that he raked both British vessels several times. The 
Cyane struck at 6.50. Stewart now set out in pursuit 
of the Levant, which had withdrawn while a prize crew 
was taking possession of the Cyane; but at 8.50 p.m. the 
plucky little Levant wore, and on opposite tacks the vessels 
exchanged broadsides. Stewart, by another quick turn, 
raked the Levant from the stern. The British vessel now 
sought safety in flight, but at ten p.m. the Constitution 
overtook and captured her. The divided force of the 



Results of the War 



201 



enemy in this engagement was in the Constitution's favor, 
but it was especially the quick and skilful maneuvering 
of Captain Stewart that won the battle. The Constitution 
and the Cyane later escaped from a British squadron and 
safely reached the United States, but the Levant was 
recaptured. 

Privateering 

At least a passing consideration should be given to 
the very important service of the American privateers, 
although, strictly speaking, they had no place in our navy. 
Privateering, especially towards the end of the war, was 
a favorite way of harrying British trade. By diverting 
large numbers of seamen, it weakened the regular navy; 
and as the results were far less than might have been 
secured by men-of-war, it seems from our point of view 
to have been of doubtful advantage. Yet our country, 
when it awoke to the fact that it had entered upon hos- 
tilities wretchedly prepared, welcomed assistance from 
private enterprise. Privateering was profitable business 
to those who succeeded, and it must be admitted com- 
mercial instinct quite as often as patriotism was the 
impelling motive. There were about 500 of these vessels, 
and they captured or destroyed 1350 British ships. 

Results of the War 

The treaty signed at Ghent on December 24, 1814, was 
silent regarding the two great issues of the war, impress- 
ment and illegal seizures under the Orders in Council. 
The orders had been repealed before war was declared 
by the United States, and though Great Britain stoutly 
maintained her prescriptive right to impressment, she did 
not later continue her practice in this regard. On the 
other hand, the British made concessions in the treaty that 



202 The United States Navy 



were hard for them to yield. On the strength of their 
possession, in 1814, of Forts Mackinac and Niagara, and 
of the country east of the Penobscot, England had at 
first laid claim to the surrender of some of our territory. 
The British also had sought to make military barriers of 
the Great Lakes, which thenceforth should be controlled 
by Great Britain and used by Americans only for com- 
mercial purposes. Further, they had laid claim to some 
of our territory in the Northwest for an independent 
Indian state. In the face of a possible European war, 
however, and more particularly by reason of Prevost's 
precipitous retreat to Canada, the British gave up these 
territorial demands, and the American position, no grant 
of territory whatever, was incorporated in the treaty. 
Moreover, to avoid future complications, the treaty pro- 
vided for the adjustment of the boundary as far as the 
Lake of the Woods in Minnesota. Both parties also 
pledged themselves to use every effort to stamp out the 
slave trade. 

The war had an excellent effect in firing anew the 
spirit of patriotism in the young nation, and in promoting 
respect abroad. The narrow selfishness of many of the 
merchant classes and the hostile attitude of New England 
to the war, had given way to a stronger national unity 
and a broader patriotism. The navj r had contributed in 
no small degree to bringing about this result. While 
battles were being lost on land, the brilliant feats of the 
navy kept up the courage of our people. Although Great 
Britain with her thousand vessels might little miss the 
loss of a few frigates, still the ship-duels of this war 
brought the navy, and consequently the country, a world- 
wide respect. 



XIII 



MINOR OPERATIONS 

The War with Algiers 

The war with Tripoli had put an end to all paying 
of tribute by the United States to that principality, but 
ever since the treaty of 1795 we had been sending annual 
tribute to the Dey of Algiers. The return of the Hornet 
to the United States, in 1807, left the Mediterranean 
without a single American man-of-war; and after the 
Leopard incident in 1807 the American Navy was con- 
fined so closely to home waters, on account of impending 
war with Great Britain, that one year succeeded another 
without the appearance of an American cruiser before 
Algiers. Encouraged by this situation, the Dey seized 
three American merchantmen, late in 1807, on the excuse 
that his tribute of naval stores was overdue. The crew of 
one of these ships, the Mary Ann, managed to kill their 
Algerian prize crew and retake their vessel, but the other 
two were brought into port. Scarcely had the matter 
been settled by cash payment for arrears, when the Dey 
demanded $18,000 for the nine Algerians who had been 
the prize crew of the Mary Ann. Consul Lear had to pay 
this, also, in order to avoid instant declaration of war. 

In 1808, this Dey was assassinated, as was his succes- 
sor the year following. Early in 1812, the reigning Dey 
received a special envoy from the British Government, 
presenting a friendly letter from the Prince Regent him- 
self. Feeling now that he had the support of Great 
Britain, the Dey decided that he could safely assume a 
hostile attitude towards the United States. When the 
Alleghany arrived in July with the tribute of naval stores, 

203 



204 The United States Navy 



he instantly found fault with them. There was some 
tribute money — less than $16,000 — still in arrears, but 
he demanded $27,000, on the ground that, by the Mahom- 
medan way of reckoning (354 days to a year) seventeen 
years and a half had elapsed since the treaty of 1795, 
instead of seventeen. He gave Consul Lear five days in 
which to make the payment, with the alternative of going 
into slavery, together with all other American residents 
and the crew of the Alleghany. The consul finally bor- 
rowed the money at twenty-five per cent interest from a 
Jew in Algiers, and, with three other American residents, 
left the country on the Alleghany. 

Fortunately the expectation of war with England had 
kept American merchantmen out of the Mediterranean, 
so that when the Dey sent out his cruisers they took only 
one brig, the Edwin. Her crew of ten were sold into 
slavery. During the war with England, efforts were 
made to ransom them, but without success. 

The conclusion of peace with Great Britain left the 
United States free to deal with Algiers, and Congress 
acted promptly. On March 2, 1815, war was declared 
against Algiers and two squadrons ,were ordered to the 
Mediterranean. One, which was to assemble at Boston, 
was placed under the command of Commodore Bain- 
bridge, and the other, at New York, under Commodore 
Decatur. The latter squadron got to sea first, on May 20. 
It consisted of the frigates Guerriere, 1 44, flagship ; Con- 
stellation, 36 ; Macedonian, 38 ; the sloops Epervier, 18, 
and Ontario, 16 ; and the brigs Firefly, Spark, and Flam- 
beau, each 14 guns. Of these the Firefly was so badly 
damaged by a gale that she had to put back to New York. 

Before entering the Mediterranean, Decatur made 
inquiries of the American consuls at Cadiz and Tangiers 



l A new frigate named after the one destroyed by the Consti- 
tution. 



Operations under Decatur 205 



as to the whereabouts of Algerian cruisers, and learned 
that a squadron had just entered the straits under the 
command of the Algerian admiral, Rais Hammida. 
Decatur touched at Gibraltar only long enough to com- 
municate with the American consul, and then set off in 
pursuit, hoping to take the Algerians by surprise. 

On June 17, the Constellation sighted a large frigate 
off Cape de Gat and signaled an enemy. Decatur imme- 
diately ordered English colors hoisted to deceive the 
Algerian, but the mistake of a quartermaster on the Con- 
stellation in sending up American colors gave the corsair 
warning and she made all sail to escape. The Constellation 
then opened fire, and the Algerian, apparently giving up 
the idea of making the port of Algiers, suddenly wore 
ship to reach the neutral waters of Spain. This maneuver 
brought her close to the Guerriere, and Decatur, laying 
aboard, delivered two broadsides. This fire did such exe- 
cution that it drove below decks all the survivors of the 
crew but the musketeers in the tops, and killed Rais 
Hammida himself. Seeing that the Algerian frigate 
was making no resistance, Decatur ceased firing and drew 
a short distance away. The little Epervier, however, 
under Captain John Downes, came up on the starboard 
quarter of the enemy, who was trying to escape, and, by 
skilful maneuvering, held this position, delivering nine 
broadsides. This forced the frigate to come up into the 
wind and surrender. She proved to be the Mashuda, 44 
guns, the flagship of the Algerian fleet. 

Two days later the squadron drove an Algerian brig 
ashore, and on the 28th arrived at Algiers. Decatur 
immediately sent to the Dey the terms of a treaty which 
he insisted should be ratified at once, threatening, in case 
of delay, to capture every Algerian ship that tried to enter 
the port. The loss of the Mashuda, together with the 
death of Hammida, had its effect on the Dey. On the 



206 



The United States Navy 



appearance of an Algerian cruiser, whose capture by 
Decatur was only a matter of minutes, he sent out a boat 
in great haste to give word of his assent. 

Thus, by Decatur's dashing methods, peace was con- 
cluded with Algiers in less than six weeks from the time 
the squadron left New York. The treaty provided for no 
tribute in the future, the instant release of American 
captives, the restoration of American property seized by 
the Dey, the payment of $10,000 for the brig Edwin, the 
emancipation of every Christian slave who should escape 
to an American man-of-war, and the treatment of cap- 
tives, in case of a future war, not as slaves, but as pris- 
oners of war, exempt from labor. 

After settling with Algiers in this masterful style, 
Decatur proceeded to Tunis and Tripoli, having learned 
meanwhile that these states had permitted British men- 
of-war to recapture American prizes in their waters. 
From Tunis he exacted $46,000 — the estimated value of 
the prizes taken there — and from Tripoli $25,000 with the 
added condition that ten Christian slaves should be lib- 
erated. Two of these were Danes, selected by Decatur out 
of gratitude to the Danish consul, Nissen, who had shown 
so much kindness to the captives from the Philadelphia. 

Meanwhile, Commodore Bainbridge had sailed with his 
squadron from Boston, July 3. With characteristic bad 
luck, he arrived at Gibraltar only in time to discover that 
his junior, Decatur, had done all that needed to be done, 
and had carried off all the glory. Nevertheless, he took 
his squadron to the Barbary ports to reinforce the impres- 
sions left by Decatur. As it was no longer of any advan- 
tage to Great Britain to subsidize Algiers, she dispatched, 
the following year, a large fleet under Lord Exmouth to 
bombard the city. That blow ended the pretensions 
of the Barbary states to special privileges in piracy and 
Christian slavery. 



Piracy in the West Indies 



207 



Suppression op Piracy in the West Indies 

We have already seen the extent to which French 
privateers, in the closing years of the 18th century, preyed 
on American ships in the West Indies and even in our 
own waters, eventually bringing on our war with France. 
These privateers were, to all purposes, pirate craft, which 
used the French colony of Guadeloupe as their base of 
operations. During the West Indian campaigns against 
France, the pirates were checked by British and American 
men-of-war, but by no means exterminated. The capture 
of Guadeloupe by the British in 1810 drove them from 
their refuge; but they found other rendezvous in the 
Gulf coast, where some resorted to smuggling and others 
continued their piracy. 

The bayous of Louisiana were especially adapted to 
their profession, and here the celebrated brothers Lafitte 
made their headquarters for preying on the commerce of 
the coast. The war with Great Britain saved them from 
interruption by American authorities till September, 
1814, when Master- Commandant Patterson, with six gun- 
boats and a schooner towing several barges of troops, 
attacked and destroyed ten of the pirate vessels. The 
Lafittes, with some of their followers, escaped to New 
Orleans, where, oddly enough, they offered their services 
to General Jackson and fought under him in the famous 
defense of that city in January, 1815. One of the brothers 
went afterwards to Texas, where he resumed his profes- 
sion. As late as 1822, his name was the terror of every 
skipper on the Gulf. 

The Lafittes were not the only pirates in this region 
in the decade after the war. There were French and 
Spanish privateersmen, and — it must be admitted — some 
American as well, to whom the business of robbing mer- 
chantmen was too agreeable to give over on conclusion of 



208 The United States Navy 



peace. Nearly all of these obtained letters of marque 
from some Spanish colony in revolt, as Venezuela, for 
example, and used them for protection against capture by 
a man-of-war. This abuse grew to such proportions that 
scarcely a ship passed through the Gulf or the Caribbean 
without at least one desperate adventure with these 
so-called privateers. 

In 1819, the United States took action by sending a 
squadron to the Gulf under the command of Commodore 
Oliver H. Perry, the hero of Lake Erie. He went directly 
to Angostura, Venezuela, to open negotiations concerning 
the matter of Venezuelan letters of marque. But there he 
was suddenly taken ill with yellow fever, and died on the 
way to Trinidad. His death ended the expedition without 
result. 

Further efforts in the year 1821-22, by a squadron 
under Commodore James Biddle, made a good beginning. 
One small gunboat, the Shark, distinguished herself by 
capturing five pirate craft and aiding in the capture of 
a sixth. Her commander was Matthew C. Perry, a 
younger brother of Oliver Hazard Perry, and famous 
later for his mission to Japan. To continue the work, 
the Government dispatched another squadron the follow- 
ing year, February, 1823, commanded by Commodore 
David Porter. He was accompanied, as in the Essex 
days, by his adopted son, David G. Farragut. 

This service in the "West Indies was beset with difficul- 
ties. In order to destroy the pirates it was necessary to 
make land attacks upon their strongholds. Frequently 
the ground was almost impassable, and the Americans 
advanced in constant danger of ambush. Further, the 
yellow fever, which had recently been brought to the 
West Indies by the slaves, proved a far more dangerous 
enemy than the pirates themselves. In the midst of his 
campaign, Commodore Porter was forced for a time to 



The Fajardo Affair 



209 



withdraw his entire squadron to Key West on account 
of the epidemic. It cost him one of his best officers, Lieu- 
tenant Watson; indeed, he himself lay for some days at 
the point of death. Perhaps the greatest obstacle, how- 
ever, was the fact that many, if not most, of the Spanish 
officials were secretly hand in glove with the pirates, as 
they were then and later with the slavers. 

An instance of this duplicity was the famous "Fajardo 
case." In October, 1824, Lieutenant Piatt, commanding 
the schooner Beagle, was informed that $5000 worth of 
goods had been stolen from the American consul at St. 
Thomas. As the robbers were reported to have taken a 
boat for Fajardo, Porto Rico, Lieutenant Piatt sailed for 
that place. On going ashore to explain his errand, he was 
insulted by the officials of Fajardo and thrown into 
prison. 2 After a long deliberation, enabling the stolen 
goods to be put safely out of the way, the "alcalde" 
allowed Lieutenant Piatt to return to his ship. As soon 
as the commodore heard of the affair, he proceeded to 
Fajardo with a large force. The Spaniards, who had 
prepared a defense, deserted their guns and ran at the 
approach of the American seamen and marines. Porter 
spiked the battery that had been thrown across the road, 
and proceeded to the outskirts of the town. Under a flag 
of truce, he sent a demand for the officials of the town 
to appear and make instant and public apology to Lieu- 
tenant Piatt. This they hastened to do, with the humblest 
promise of good behavior in the future toward all Amer- 
ican officers. Thereupon Porter retired to his ship, having 
settled the whole affair in less than three hours. 

Although Spain had made no protest whatever, this 

2 They pretended to believe that Piatt was not an American 
officer because he had come ashore in civilian clothes, and when he 
showed his commission they declared that it was a forgery. 
14 



210 



The United States Navy 



impulsive conduct offended the Secretary of the Navy, 
as being an offense against neutral rights, and Captain 
Porter was ordered home in December, 1824, to explain 
his action. By this time, however, he had so thoroughly 
done the difficult work intrusted to him that the year 
1824 may be said to be the last in which the black flag 
was seen in the West Indies. 

On reaching the United States, Porter found that he 
had to face a court-martial on account of his conduct 
at Fajardo. Unfortunately, there were some members of 
the court who were reputed to be personally hostile to 
the commodore, notably the president, James Barron. At 
least, Porter believed that the latter bore a grudge against 
him because he had been a member of the court that sus- 
pended Barron for the affair of the Chesapeake and the 
Leopard. At all events, the court found Commodore 
Porter guilty of "disobedience of orders and conduct 
unbecoming an officer," and suspended him from the 
service for six months. The court added, however, that 
the "censurable conduct" of the accused was due to an 
"anxious disposition on his part to advance the interest 
of the nation and the service. ' ' 

Strictly speaking, there is no question but that the 
landing of an armed force on Spanish soil, except in 
pursuit of actual pirates, was an act of hostility and 
unauthorized by the United States Government; but to 
many who were acquainted with the ways of West Indian 
officials the circumstances were an ample justification. 
Porter naturally felt that the sentence was unjust, and 
resigned. Shortly after, he accepted the command of the 
naval forces of Mexico, but after three years of this 
service he left in disgust and returned to the United 
States. President Jackson then appointed him consul- 
general to Algiers and later minister-resident to Turkey, 
in which office he died in 1843. 



The Slave Trade 



211 



Commodore Porter's name is associated chiefly with 
his celebrated cruise in the Essex, but it should be remem- 
bered that by abolishing in one year the long-established 
piracy of the Gulf and Caribbean, he performed a task 
far more difficult and hazardous. 

The Slave Trade 

Although the Constitution forbade the prohibition of 
the slave trade to the United States prior to the year 
1808, Congress, as early as 1794, passed an act prohibiting 
the export trade and providing for the humane treatment, 
during their passage, of slaves imported into the United 
States. In 1800 it was made a crime, punishable by two 
years' imprisonment and a fine of $2000, for any Amer- 
ican citizen to engage in the slave trade. In 1808, the 
trade was prohibited entirely, and in 1820 it was declared 
piracy and punishable by death. Our men-of-war were 
ordered to take slavers wherever found. A bounty of 
twenty-five dollars a head was offered to the captor for 
every slave on board. 

In spite of these severe measures, the slave trade 
increased enormously for two principal reasons; first, the 
great profits in the business, and second, the carelessness 
of United States authorities. As an example of the first, 
in 1835 the Baltimore schooner Napoleon, of ninety tons, 
delivered in one voyage 350 slaves. These cost $16 a 
head on the African coast and sold at $360 each in Cuba. 
As for the second, although the slave trade was declared 
piracy, scarcely a week passed in the decade before the 
Civil War when a slaver did not leave New York harbor ; 
and the first American slave trader hanged as a pirate 
went to his death in November, 1861, after the Civil War 
had begun. 

The efforts of our navy to suppress the traffic were 



212 



The United States Navy 



weakened by several conditions. For a number of years 
the courts in England and America would convict a slaver 
only when the negroes were actually on board. The result 
of this ruling is exemplified in the case of the slaver 
Brilliante. On one of her trips, in 1831, her captain found 
himself becalmed and surrounded by four British cruisers. 
Anticipating being boarded if the wind did not rise, he 
stretched on deck his entire chain cable, suspended it 
clear of everything, and shackled it to his anchor, which 
hung on the bow ready to drop. To this chain he lashed 
his 600 slaves. He waited for a breeze till he heard the 
oars of the British boats close at hand, when he cut away 
the anchor. As it fell, it dragged overboard the entire 
cable with its human freight; and, though the British 
heard the screams of the victims and found their manacles 
still lying on the deck, because there were no slaves left on 
board the officers had to leave the vessel amid the jeers 
of her captain and crew. 1 

It was not long after this incident when the prepos- 
terous ruling was set aside in favor of common sense. A 
more serious obstacle to the suppression of the trade arose 
from the unwillingness of the United States to co-operate 
heartily with Great Britain. In 1824 the English Parlia- 
ment declared the slave trade piracy, though the founda- 
tions of Liverpool's commercial greatness had been only 
recently laid by the profits of her slavers. England soon 
went still further by asking and gaining the co-operation 
of several of the European powers in suppressing the 
slave traffic to their colonies. But when she made an 
appeal for a mutual right of search to be exercised by 
United States and British cruisers upon the merchantmen 
of England and America in the "Middle Passage" she 
met with an indignant refusal. Those who were financially 



1 Spears, The American Slave Trade, p. 145. 



The Slave Trade 



213 



interested in the trade raised the cry of ' ' sailors ' rights, ' ' 
and appealed to the principles of the War of 1812. 

This patriotic clap-trap succeeded; and as the Ameri- 
can ships were the only ones safe from British search, 
almost the entire slave trade passed under the protection 
of the American flag. Although in 1842 the United 
States, in a treaty with England, agreed to maintain a 
squadron of not less than eighty guns off the African coast, 
the Secretary of the Navy in his instructions to the com- 
modore laid more emphasis on the necessity of preventing 
any attempted search of American ships by English 
cruisers than on capturing slavers. Accordingly, the 
commander of this squadron, Commodore Matthew C. 
Perry, cruised about without finding a single slaver. 
Meanwhile, every English officer who boarded a slaver was 
obliged to leave with an apology if the captain could show 
American papers, real or forged. 

Early in the fifties Lieutenant-Commander Andrew H. 
Foote captured two slavers off the coast of Africa. On 
his return he wrote a book, Africa and the American 
Flag; and this book, by describing the hideous condi- 
tions of the traffic and the protection it received from 
the American ensign, did more to stop the abuse than all 
the American squadrons put together. It opened the 
eyes of the Americans to the fact that their flag had 
become the symbol of the slave trade. 

During President Buchanan's administration the Gov- 
ernment was secretly anxious to bring about the annexa- 
tion of Cuba. In order to create a sentiment of some 
sort on which to base an appeal to the nation, especially 
to the anti-slavery sections, the Secretary of the Navy 
ordered American naval vessels to cruise in Cuban waters 
and capture slavers there. In spite of Spain's formal 
renouncement of the slave trade, made under pressure 
from England, it was common knowledge that Cuba was 



214 The United States Navy 

the most profitable slave market in the world, for the 
black-mailing charges of the Cuban officials were so low 
as not to interfere seriously with the great profits of the 
business. In the year 1860 alone, twelve Cuban slavers 
were captured by our men-of-war, although that was 
insignificant compared with the actual number of slavers 
that were landing negroes at various points along the 
coast. One great difficulty was the fact that the slavers, 
usually American-built "clipper" ships, or sometimes 
converted yachts, could easily outsail a man-of-war. At 
all events the trade was never so flourishing as in the five 
years preceding the Civil War. 

During that time the pro-slavery men were making 
active efforts to repeal all existing legislation against the 
slave trade, most of which was admittedly dead-letter. 
But the change of administration and the outbreak of 
war altered the situation. The limited right of search 
asked by England was readily granted in 1862, enlarged 
in 1863, and in 1870 extended still further. From the 
moment the United States showed a sincere desire to allow 
her navy to co-operate with the British, the slave trade 
was doomed. 

The Mutiny on the Somers 

In the fall of 1842, the brig Somers, 10 guns, was 
ordered to the African coast with dispatches for Com- 
modore Perry's squadron. On her return trip to New 
York, November 26, the purser's steward got word to 
the captain, Commander Alexander Slidell MacKenzie, 
that Acting-Midshipman Philip Spencer had tried to 
induce him to join a conspiracy to seize the ship, murder 
all the officers, together with such of the crew as would 
not be wanted, and turn pirate. 

At first, Commander MacKenzie laughed at the story 



The Mutiny on the Somers 215 



as a boy's joke, but since the bearing of the crew had been 
insubordinate from the time they left Madeira, the other 
officers were inclined to regard the i matter as serious. 
Accordingly, Spencer was put in irons and his effects 
were searched, with the result that a paper with Greek 
characters was discovered. It happened that there was one 
person on board besides Spencer who understood the Greek 
alphabet — Midshipman Rogers. He interpreted the words 
as a list of the crew, marked "certain," or "doubtful," 
with a few observations as to the policy to be pursued 
with the rest of the crew. 

From the time of Spencer's arrest the conduct of the 
crew became more and more sullen and insubordinate. 
That afternoon there was a sudden and mysterious falling 
of the maintopmast and unnecessary confusion in clearing 
it away. The men gathered in whispering groups, and 
Spencer was observed making signals to them from the 
quarter-deck where he sat in irons. 

From the evidence of the purser's steward, a boat- 
swain's mate named Cromwell, and a seaman named 
Small also were arrested as ring-leaders and put in irons. 
As it was evident from the temper of the crew that the 
situation was extremely grave, Commander MacKenzie 
convened all his officers in a court of inquiry, while he, 
with a midshipman, took charge of the vessel. After 
deliberating about a day and a half, the officers returned 
a report that the prisoners were guilty of a "determined 
intention to commit a mutiny on board this vessel of a 
most atrocious nature," and in view of the "uncertainty 
as to what extent they are leagued with others still at 
large, the impossibility of guarding against the contingen- 
cies which a day or an hour may bring forth, we are con- 
vinced that it would be impossible to carry them to the 
United States, and that the safety of the public property, 
the lives of ourselves, and of those committed to our 



216 



The United States Navy 



charge, require that . . . they should be put to 
death." 2 

Commander MacKenzie concurred in this opinion, and 
on December 1, he caused the three conspirators to be 
hanged from the yard-arm. Upon receiving sentence, 
Spencer and Small admitted their guilt; Cromwell pro- 
tested his innocence to the end. The execution had a 
salutary effect on the crew, who immediately returned to 
their duties with an alacrity that was in striking contrast 
with their previous conduct. 

On the arrival of the Somers at New York, the report 
of this execution aroused the greatest excitement, par- 
ticularly as Spencer was the son of the Secretary of War. 
MacKenzie immediately called for a court of inquiry ; but 
before its findings were reported, he was hurried to a 
court-martial. Though both courts rendered an hon- 
orable acquittal, for a long time thereafter the father of 
Spencer made unsuccessful efforts to have MacKenzie 
indicted in the civil courts for murder. The newspapers 
naturally made a great deal of the matter, to the dis- 
paragement of the navy as well as of MacKenzie, and even 
so distinguished a writer as Fenimore Cooper published a 
pamphlet reviewing the evidence of the court-martial 
with a severe criticism of Commander MacKenzie 's con- 
duct. Indeed, the feeling was so strong that it became 
a point of etiquette among naval officers never to discuss 
the mutiny on the Somers. 

Theoretically, the death sentence, then as now, could 
not be inflicted without the approval of the President. 
But a commander's first duty is to save his ship, and 
the lives of the officers and men under him. To appre- 
ciate the circumstances, one must realize that the Somers 



2 Proceedings of the Naval Court -Martial in the Case of Alex- 
ander Slidell MacKenzie, p. 35. 



The Mutiny on the Somers 217 

was about the size of a pleasure yacht of to-day. There 
were only small scuttles leading from the officers ' quarters 
to the deck, and it would have been a simple matter for the 
mutineers to seize the deck and kill the officers one by one 
as they came up. In fact, if there had been a leader ready, 
after the three were put in irons, a single concerted rush 
by the crew would have overpowered the officers instantly. 
Further, on account of the cramped quarters, the pris- 
oners had to be kept in irons on the quarter-deck where 
they were in sight of the crew and offering a constant 
temptation to rescue, if the men were so disposed. As 
the Somers was at this time more than 500 miles from 
St. Thomas, there was no knowing when she would be 
able to reach New York; and the mutiny might have 
broken out at any moment. Finally the dying confession 
of Spencer showed that a plot for a mutiny of the most 
diabolical type was actually afoot, so that the apprehen- 
sions of Commander MacKenzie and his officers were not 
due to sudden panic. At the time this affair occurred, 
Commander MacKenzie had as fine a professional reputa- 
tion as any other officer in the service, and though he had 
a difficult decision to make, it is safe to concur with the 
opinion of his brother officers that he followed the only 
proper course. 

This incident had a wider significance than was realized 
at the time. It suddenly focused the attention of the 
naval officers and the public upon the evils of a practice 
that had become prevalent, that of throwing upon the 
navy such young scapegraces as proved on shore hard 
to keep out of jail. Philip Spencer was probably the 
worst example of this type, and his case, like most of the 
others, was aggravated by the fact that he was backed 
by strong political influence. He came to the receiving 
ship North Carolina with a bad college record, and made 
mischief at once. When the first lieutenant Craney, 



218 



The United States Navy 



tried to have him punished, the father set in motion all 
his political influence to persecute the unfortunate officer, 
who finally escaped only by resigning his commission. 
After Spencer had made a brief cruise on the Brazilian 
station in the John Adams, he was forced to resign on 
account of his "disgraceful and scandalous conduct"; 
but, apparently he was reappointed to the Somers, through 
his father's influence. In fact, Spencer admitted to Com- 
mander MacKenzie just before the execution that he had 
cherished the plan of mutiny and piracy ever since he 
entered the navy. 



The Founding of the Naval Academy 

Hitherto the idea of a naval school corresponding to 
the Military Academy had often been urged, but without 
success. Congress did not wish to spend any more money 
on the navy, and the officers, especially the older men, 
laughed at the idea of "teaching sailors on shore." The 
Spencer incident, however, showed clearly enough the 
demoralizing influence of taking undisciplined young 
rascals into the service without any training or qualifica- 
tions whatever. Furthermore, the use of steam for men- 
of-war had by this time passed the experimental stage 
and become recognized as necessary. It began to be evi- 
dent that steam engineering could not be picked up, like 
seamanship, simply by going to sea. Accordingly, when 
the historian, George Bancroft, accepted the post of 
Secretary of the Navy, in March, 1845, he did so with 
the determination of founding a Naval Academy. Know- 
ing the obstacles he had to overcome, he went about the 
work with consummate tact. He managed it so that the 
suggestion for a school appeared to come directly from 
the officers themselves. He first asked an examining board, 
consisting of older officers, to make a report on the best 




George Bancroft 



The Founding of the Naval Academy 219 



location for the school, and by submitting the same ques- 
tion to another board, composed of the younger element, 
won their approval as well. The recommendation of the 
first board that Fort Severn, Annapolis, was a suitable 
place was formally seconded by the second board, and 
thus the entire navy was committed to the idea. 

Bancroft then overcame the unwillingness of Congress 
to make an appropriation; first, by getting a transfer 
of Fort Severn from the War to the Navy Department; 
and secondly, by putting all but a selected few of the 
navy ' ' schoolmasters ' ' on the waiting list, using the money 
appropriated to their salaries for the necessary expenses 
of the new academy. 

By these means, he managed in a few months from 
the time he accepted his post, to have the Naval Academy 
in actual operation. From the point of view of its effect 
on the personnel of the navy, the founding of this school 
may be regarded as the most important event between 
the War of 1812 and the Civil War. 

The Naval Academy was formally opened October 10, 
1845, with fifty midshipmen and seven instructors. Com- 
mander Franklin Buchanan, IT. S. Navy, was the first 
superintendent. For fifteen years the institution strug- 
gled along, handicapped by inadequate equipment and 
insufficient funds. In the Civil War period it first justi- 
fied its existence. Practically all midshipmen, with the 
exception of the fourth class, were at once transferred to 
the fleet, where the need of officers was acute. The notable 
work of these young officers in a time of national emer- 
gency awakened new interest in the Naval Academy, and 
at the end of the war it was Vice-Admiral Porter, next to 
the ranking officer in the navy, who was detailed as its 
superintendent. The Spanish-American War was the 
first to be conducted by its graduates, and firmly estab- 
lished the Academy as a national institution. 



XIV 



THE MEXICAN WAR 
PERRY'S EXPEDITION TO JAPAN 

The Mexican War 

While President Polk, early in his administration 
(1845-1849), was framing a treaty with Great Britain 
that should establish our claim to Oregon — the name 
applied to the vast territory in the extreme northwest — 
he was also attempting to secure the Pacific slope to the 
south ; for he had already recognized the immense future 
value of California with its harbor of San Francisco. 
This territory, owned by Mexico and as yet undeveloped, 
President Polk wished to purchase at a fair price; but 
Mexico, ill disposed because of the annexation of Texas 
to the United States and torn by civil dissension, would 
not consent. Her refusal, however, did not discourage 
the determined President. 

On the 13th of May, 1846, when troubles relating to 
Texas had become acute, Congress by a joint resolution 
recognized a state of war as existing between Mexico and 
the United States. Nearly a year previous, Commodore 
Sloat in command of the American squadron on the Pacific 
coast had been given confidential instructions as to his 
course of action should Mexico show herself " resolutely 
bent on hostilities. ' ' 1 When he heard that war had begun, 
Commodore Sloat sailed north, and, on July 7, 1846, took 
possession of Monterey. Two days later, by his orders, 
Captain Montgomery took possession of San Francisco, 
and when Commodore Stockton, who had relieved Sloat, 



1 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1846, p. 378. 
220 



The War with Mexico 221 

entered Los Angeles the month following, our flag was 
flying over every commanding position in California. 

A campaign in the extreme west had also been planned 
by the army. Brigadier-General Kearny had begun a 
march to the Pacific early in July, stopping long enough 
before Santa Fe to scatter an army of Mexicans, three 
times his force, and to occupy the city. When he arrived 
at the eastern border of California and heard that the navy 
had largely anticipated him, he sent most of his troops 
back. But just about this time the Mexicans recaptured 
Los Angeles. Kearny had now only 110 dragoons and 
mounted riflemen; but, co-operating with Stockton, who 
furnished a large force of sailors and marines, he marched 
from San Diego to 7jos Angeles and after a two days' 
battle made permanent the authority of the United States 
in California. 2 The rest of the war was on the east, or 
Gulf, side of Mexico. 

The general situation at the beginning of the war 
corresponded in many respects with the situation a half 
century later, when the United States was fighting, not 
Mexico, but Mexico's mother country, Spain. Commo- 
dores Sloat and Stockton in the far west, like Admiral 
Dewey in the far east, acted with decision, and, falling 
upon a detached portion of the enemy that were ill pre- 
pared, at once took possession of a vast territory. In 
consequence, the plans of the Navy Department in both 
wars were chiefly concerned with the slower and more 
extensive operations nearer home. 

The chief work for the navy was, therefore, to block- 
ade and seize the Mexican ports on the Gulf; these were 
from north to south, Tampico, Tuxpan, Vera Cruz, Alva- 
rado, and Frontera. Later, the co-operation of the navy 
was required for the army, when the plan of military 



2 Bancroft, H. H., History of California, vol. v. 



222 The United States Navy 

campaign changed a long march from the Rio Grande 
through the interior by General Taylor, to a short advance 
from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico by General Scott. 
The navy was to assist in the transportation of troops to 
Vera Cruz and in the attack on that city. 

The "Home Squadron," upon which this duty fell, 
was at the beginning of the war under the command of 
Commodore David Conner. Its early work was lacking in 
results because of two reasons : First, it was handicapped 
by having no gunboats of shallow draft to cross the bars 
at the mouths of rivers. Second, the commander of the 
squadron, though possessing many excellent qualities, was 
ill adapted to the service required. Captain W. H. Parker 
says of him: "I knew Commodore Conner well; I was 
his aid for some time. He had served with distinction in 
the War of 1812, and was in the Hornet w T hen she captured 
the Penguin, where he was badly wounded. He was an 
educated man and a brave officer; but during the war 
he always seemed to be too much afraid of risking his 
men; he lacked moral courage, and would not take the 
responsibility his position imposed upon him. Conse- 
quently he failed. ' ' 3 

The naval operations before Vera Cruz were naturally 
of much greater magnitude than at any other point. 
Here the ships covered the landing of the army, and by a 
very nice piece of organization disembarked 10,000 in one 
day. Later, a naval battery with guns and men from the 
ships did excellent service in the attack upon Vera Cruz. 

Among the officers who had a minor part in the opera- 
tions on the Gulf were Farragut and Porter, who were 
later to win renown, but were as yet unknown. At the 
outbreak of hostilities both had applied to the Depart- 
ment for active duty ; but although they possessed unusual 



3 Parker, Recollections of a Is aval Officer, p. 53. 



Operations at Vera Cruz 



223 



qualifications for service about Vera Cruz, they were kept 
waiting for several months. 

Farragut knew Vera Cruz, for he had served five 
years in the Gulf, and had been present on the U. S. S. 
Erie when, nearly twenty years earlier, the French had 
taken the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa, the chief defense 
of the city. And it was because he was confident in his 
knowledge that he wrote to the Department, urging that 
the fleet early in the war should bombard the castle or 
attack by escalade 4 at night. Knowing the character of 
the Mexicans, he believed either method of attack would 
be successful, and he wanted to win honors for the navy. 
In referring to what he had learned from the operations 
of the French, he later remarked, "I . . . had taken 
great pains to inform myself as to the local advantages in 
attacking the place, measured the depth of water all 
around the fort, and marked the penetration of every 
shell from the French ships ; ... in so doing I had not 
at the time looked forward to a war with Mexico, but I 
had made it a rule of my life to note these things ivith a 
view to the possible future."* It was just this thorough- 
ness of Farragut that eventually was to enable him to 
fly the admiral 's flag, but in the Mexican War the oppor- 
tunity for making it tell was denied him. When at length 
he was given a ship, he was ordered to blockade Tuxpan. 
There for five months and a half, where nothing ever 
happened, he remained ; and the only enemy he had to deal 
with was yellow fever, which very nearly proved fatal. 

Porter also knew Vera Cruz, for when he was a boy 
of fourteen his father was commander-in-chief of the 
Mexican Navy, and with his father he lived for a while 



4 Escalade: surmounting the walls or ramparts of a fortifica- 
tion by means of ladders or scaling. 

B Loyall Farragut, The Life of David Glasgow Farragut, p. 157. 



224 The United States Navy 



in this very Castle of San Juan. It was, however, not 
until nearly ten months after the beginning of hostilities 
that his request for active service was granted. He had, 
in the meantime, submitted to the Department a plan in 
many respects resembling Farragut's. It provided for the 
exploding of several cases of gunpowder placed under the 
bastions of the castle by Captain Taylor, the submarine 
engineer. Porter had volunteered to rush in through the 
breach made by the explosion with fifty picked men, and 
seize the top of the castle. 6 The scheme was novel and 
suggested many difficulties in its operation, but Porter had 
nerve and knew how effective were surprise and deeds of 
daring in fighting Mexicans. Porter's plan, like Farra- 
gut's, failed to gain serious consideration. 

To Porter's great satisfaction, however, he was sent 
to Vera Cruz in time to take part in the attack. His 
duty was that of first lieutenant on the Spitfire, Captain 
Josiah Tattnall, of the " Mosquito Fleet." When the 
army had been landed, Commodore M. C. Perry, who 
had relieved Conner, wished to learn the position of the 
enemy's guns, and directed the Mosquito Fleet to draw 
their fire. The night previous Porter spent in a row boat, 
moving daringly about under the enemy's guns in order 
to take soundings. In the morning he acted as a pilot 
and guided in the Spitfire and the Vixen, each with two 
gunboats in tow. They advanced to a position between 
the Castles of San Juan and Santiago and opened fire on 
the fortifications. In reply, the heavy guns of the forts 
began a furious cannonade, which if it had been well 
directed would have quickly sunk the little vessels. Shot 
and shell splashed around them, but, incredible as it may 
seem, did practically no harm. The army and the navy 
looked on breathless and amazed. Commodore Perry 



6 Soley, Admiral Porter, p. 59. 



Perry's Expedition to Japan 225 



anxiously signalled a retreat; but Tattnall, following the 
famous example of Nelson at Copenhagen, told his quar- 
termaster not to look at the flagship and continued the 
bombardment. At length, Perry sent his fleet captain, 
Mayo, to the Spitfire with peremptory orders fo retire, 
and was reluctantly obeyed. 

The war ended on February 2, 1848, when according to 
the treaty the United States came into possession of an im- 
mense area which included, not only Texas, but the present 
States of California, New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, 
and parts of Wyoming and Colorado. In return Mexico 
was given $15,000,000 and released from the payment of 
claims, amounting to $3,000,000, held against her by 
American citizens. 7 

Although our naval officers and seamen for several 
months continued to exhibit courage, resource, and daring, 
yet the Mexican War cannot be regarded as of great • 
importance in the history of the navy. As the enemy had 
no force to meet our ships on their element, the army 
bore a far more conspicuous part. At the same time the 
navy, through its spirited co-operation, made possible 
several victories of the army, the most important of which 
was Vera Cruz ; and for this service gained recognition. 

Perry's Expedition to Japan 

The acquisition of California opened the way for trade 
with the Orient. American merchants had already made 
a beginning, and for some years our whalers had been 
carrying on extensive operations in the Japanese Sea. 
The United States earnestly desired friendly relations 
with Japan for three reasons : 1. To protect our shipping ; 
in stress of weather foreign vessels could not take refuge 



7 Cambridge Modem History, vii, 397. 
15 



226 The United States Navy 



in Japanese ports, and when wrecked on the Japanese 
coast the crews were thrown into prison. 2. To facilitate 
trade with Asia ; Japan had rich industries, she lay on 
the route to China, and she had deposits of coal of the 
greatest value to steamers making the long voyages. 
3. To succeed where England, France, Portugal, and 
Russia had failed, for they had long been seeking trade 
relations in vain. 

There were several steps that led up to the opening 
of Japan. The first was the success that Commodore 
Lawrence Kearny achieved in China. We had had no 
legitimate commerce with that country, but when in 1842 
Commodore Kearny with the Constellation and the 
Boston arrived at Macao, he heard of the favorable treaty 
that England had just obtained from China and decided 
to act at once. Addressing a direct and friendly communi- 
cation to Viceroy Ke, minor guardian of the heir apparent 
and governor of two provinces, he asked that the citizens 
of the United States should "be placed upon the same 
footing as the merchants of the nation most favored." 
This he followed up by fearlessly sailing to Canton for 
an answer. The reply was favorable, and he strengthened 
the good feeling that had been created, with the assurance 
that the United States would not protect her merchants 
caught smuggling opium. Thus it was Commodore Kearny 
who was largely responsible for a proclamation issued a 
few months later giving to the United States and other 
nations the same commercial privileges that had been 
granted to Great Britain. 

Four years later Commodore Biddle with the Colum- 
bus and the Vincennes entered Yedo Bay. Nine years 
earlier the Morrison, an unarmed ship that attempted to 
land shipwrecked Japanese sailors, had been fired upon 
by the forts. Biddle was treated with more respect. 
The Japanese, with a show of great generosity, brought 



Perry's Expedition to Japan 227 



him supplies, but they would allow no one to land; and 
to the offer of friendly intercourse, they replied, "Go 
away and do not come back any more." In 1849 Com- 
mander Glynn with the Preble visited Nagasaki and com- 
pelled the release of some American sailors who had been 
shipwrecked the year before and imprisoned. During 
this transaction he discovered that the Japanese knew all 
about our recent victory over Mexico and had been con- 
siderably impressed. Returning home he reported that 
the time was unusually favorable for the United States to 
try the moral effect of an armed demonstration. A large 
expedition was accordingly authorized, and to Commodore 
Matthew Calbraith Perry, on March 24, 1852, was given 
the command. 

In organizing his squadron Perry encountered many 
vexatious delays. Had he waited for the twelve ships 
assured him, he might never have seen Japan. However, 
the months of waiting were not given entirely to idleness. 
Charts of Japanese waters were secured from Holland 
at a cost of $30,000. And, through book collectors in New 
York and London, Perry gathered all the important litera- 
ture relating to the Japanese. By these and other means 
he carefully acquainted himself with Japanese history, 
customs, and manners. 

Commodore Perry sailed from Norfolk, November 24, 
1852. On arriving in China, he continued his study and 
preparation. Finally, when all was ready, he directed his 
course toward the very heart of Japan. On July 8, 1853, 
with the steam frigates Susquehanna and Mississippi, 
towing the sloops of war Saratoga and Plymouth, he 
moved slowly up the bay of Yedo and dropped anchor off 
Uraga, a city twenty-seven miles from the capital, Yedo 
(Tokio). This was the first appearance of a steamer in 
Yedo Bay ; and great was the astonishment of the natives 
to see the huge ships approaching directly against the 



228 



The United States Navy 



wind. A cordon of small boats soon surrounded the 
vessels, and the curious natives caught at the chains and 
attempted to clamber on board. This and many other 
liberties had been permitted by foreign ships in the past, 
but now the Japanese were forcibly given to understand 







( 


/ 






f/Y \ZHAKODADI 




o \ 

\ 

^9 4 


J 


%T MRAGA J^pVKOJfAMA 








JAPAN 





Japan 



that they must keep off. Perry, in coming to the exclusive 
nation, had decided fairly to outdo them in exclusiveness, 
and had given orders forbidding communication with the 
natives except from the flagship. Even when the Vice- 
Governor of Uraga appeared in a small boat and an inter- 
preter declared his rank, he was kept waiting until he 
had explained why he, and not the Governor, had come. 



Perry's Expedition to Japan 229 



And when the gangway was lowered and the dignitary 
came on board, he was by no means permitted to see Com- 
modore Perry. Perry, because of his rank as the great 
ambassador of the President, would meet no one less than 
a " counsellor of the Empire" (cabinet minister). How- 
ever, Lieutenant Contee, acting as Perry's representative, 
informed the Vice-Governor of the friendly mission on 
which the Americans had come, and of the letter written 
by the President to the Emperor, which Commodore Perry 
would deliver with appropriate formalities. The Vice- 
Governor's immediate answer was that " Nagasaki was 
the only place, according to the laws of Japan, for nego- 
tiating foreign business, and it would be necessary for 
the squadron to go there." To this "he was told that 
the commodore had come purposely to Uraga because it 
was near to Yedo, and that he should not go to Nagasaki; 
that he expected the letter to be duly and properly 
received where he then was; that his intentions were per- 
fectly friendly, but that he would allow of no indignity. ' ' 8 

Perry had resolved to use force only as a last resort; 
yet that he might be prepared for emergency he had 
already cleared the decks and begun drilling the crews as 
in war. It was indeed a time of uncertainty. Though on 
the ships all was very quiet that evening, on the shores the 
blazing of beacon fires from every hill top and the tolling 
of a great alarm bell gave indication of the tremendous 
excitement that was rapidly spreading among the people. 

At seven o 'clock the next morning two large boats that 
came alongside the Susquehanna brought the Governor 
of Uraga. Again the exclusive commodore would not 
deign to treat with an official beneath his rank, but dele- 

8 This and the following quotations relating to the opening of 
Japan are from Hawks's Narrative of the Expedition to Japan. 
This is the official account, compiled from Perry's notes under his 
immediate supervision. 



230 The United States Navy 



gated Captains Buchanan and Adams to confer with him. 
The first suggestion from the new conferee was " Naga- 
saki ' ' ; and again this met with an emphatic refusal. The 
captains said that the commodore "would persist in deliv- 
ering the letter where he was; and, moreover, that if the 
Japanese Government did not see fit to appoint a suitable 
person to receive the documents in his possession addressed 
to the Emperor, that he, the commodore, whose duty it 
was to deliver them, would go on shore with a sufficient 
force and deliver them in person, be the consequences what 
they might. ' ' The Governor now requested an opportun- 
ity to send to Yedo for further instructions. This he said 
would require four days ; he was informed the commodore 
would wait only three. Before departing the Governor 
asked what the ships' boats, busily engaged since daylight 
in surveying the bay and harbor,- were doing. And when 
he was told, he strongly protested, urging that it was 
against the Japanese law to permit such examinations. 
The quick reply was "that the American laws command 
them, and that Americans were as much bound to obey 
the American as he was to obey the Japanese laws. ' ' 

Perry was well aware "that the more exclusive he 
should make himself, and the more unyielding he might 
be in adhering to his declared intentions, the more respect 
these people of forms and ceremonies would be disposed 
to award him." And thus it happened that on the day 
following the Governor's visit, Sunday, Perry, who from 
his boyhood up had been careful in Sabbath observance, 
refused to admit on board his ship several mandarins 
who had come to make an unofficial visit. If the J apanese 
had been familiar with the language of their visitors they 
would have been further edified by one of Isaac Watts 's 
lrymns sung in the morning service: "Before Jehovah's 
awful throne, Ye nations bow with solemn joy." 

As can be easily imagined, the communications taken 



Perry 's Expedition to Japan 231 



to Yedo by the Governor of Uraga had the effect of an 
earthquake. For even if the Japanese were not to be 
shaken out of their prejudice against foreigners by 
Perry's friendly purpose, they were tremendously dis- 
turbed by his individual firmness and power. They were 
shrewd enough to recognize that if they forcibly resisted 
him, he might land, and by dwelling in it defile the Holy 
Country. They especially dreaded this, because the gov- 
ernment was already in an unstable condition and the 
dynasty in power was threatened with rebellion. 

Of this internal disorder Perry had no knowledge. 
But he was rejoiced by the Governor's returning, on the 
day appointed, with the answer that the President 's letter 
would be received by an official of superior rank with 
fitting ceremonies. Almost immediately the Governor 
proceeded to arrange with Captains Buchanan and Adams, 
the time, place, and even the minutest details for the 
formal delivery and acceptance of the letter. 

Two days later (July 14), shortly before eight o'clock, 
the Susquehanna and the Mississippi moved down the 
bay, and inshore, towards a large and highly decorated 
reception hall which the Japanese had quickly erected. 
At a signal from the Susquehanna, 300 officers, sailors, 
and marines filled fifteen launches and cutters, and with 
stately procession moved toward the shore. When they 
had gone half way, a salute of thirteen guns from the 
Susquehanna began to boom and re-echo among the hills ; 
this was to announce that the great commodore, the 
august ambassador of the President, upon whom no 
Japanese eye had yet been privileged to gaze, was embark- 
ing in his barge. 

' ' On the arrival of the commodore, his suite of officers 
formed a double line along the landing place, and as he 
passed up between, they fell into order behind him. The 
procession was then formed and took up its march toward 



232 



The United States Navy 



the house of reception, the route to which was pointed out 
by Kayama Yezaiman [the Governor of Uraga] and his 
interpreter, who preceded the party. The marines led 
the way, and the sailors following, the commodore was 
duly escorted up the beach. The United States flag and 
the broad pennant were borne by two athletic seamen, 
who had been selected from the crews of the squadron on 
account of their stalwart proportions. Two boys, dressed 
for the ceremony, preceded the commodore, bearing in an 
envelope of scarlet cloth the boxes which contained his 
credentials and the President's letter. These documents, 
of folio size, were beautifully writter on vellum, and not 
folded, but bou^d in blue silk velvet. Each seal, attached 
by cord of interwoven gold and silk with pendent gold 
tassels, was encased in a circular box six inches in diam- 
eter and three in depth, wrought of pure gold. Each of 
the documents, together with its seal, was placed in a box 
of rosewood about a foot long, with lock, hinges, and 
mountings all of gold. On either side of the commodore 
marched a tall, well-formed negro, who, armed to the 
teeth, acted as his personal guard." These negroes, the 
pick of the squadron, were giants in stature and attracted 
great attention from the Japanese, who had never seen 
blacks before. This pomp and parade, carefully planned 
for effect, seems to have been highly successful. 

As Perry and his suite entered the reception hall, 
magnificent in its hangings of violet-colored silk and fine 
cotton, two princes, who were seated on the left, rose, 
bowed, and then resumed their seats. They had been 
appointed by their government to receive the documents, 
and their dignity was appalling ; during the entire inter- 
view they sat with statuesque formality uttering not a 
word nor making a gesture. 

The complete ceremonies occupied not more than a 
half hour. For some minutes after the commodore had 



Perry's Expedition to Japan 233 



taken his seat there was absolute silence, broken finally by 
the Japanese interpreter asking the American interpreter 
if the letters were ready for delivery and stating that the 
princes were ready to receive them. "The commodore, 
upon this being communicated to him, beckoned to the 
boys who stood in the lower hall to advance, when they 
immediately obeyed his summons and came forward, bear- 
ing the handsome boxes which contained the President's 
letter and other documents. The two stalwart negroes 
followed immediately in rear of the boys, and marching 
up to the scarlet receptacle [prepared by the Japanese 
for the letters] , received the boxes from the hands of the 
bearers, opened them, took out the letters, and, displaying 
the writings and seals, laid them upon the lid of the 
Japanese box — all in perfect silence." 

The commodore then directed his interpreter to inform 
the Japanese that he should leave in two or three days, 
but would return the following spring for an answer. 
When they inquired if he should return with all four 
vessels, he gave the prompt assurance, "All of them and 
probably more, as these are only a portion of the squad- 
ron." After a further impressive silence, and a repetition 
of the formal bowing with which the conference had 
begun, Perry took his departure. 

Before leaving the bay of Yedo the Susquehanna had 
another visit from Yezaiman, Governor of Uraga, who, 
after being shown over the ship, was urged to remain and 
see the engine in motion. The interest of the Japanese 
was keenly aroused and there could be no doubt of the 
favorable impression produced by this striking example 
of American inventive genius. Perry advanced farther 
up the western shore of the bay within ten miles of Yedo, 
all the while taking soundings, and again he caused the 
Japanese evident uneasiness. Then he retraced his course 
and sailed for China, 



234 



The United States Navy 



While the American ships were wintering in Hong 
Kong, Commodore Perry had his suspicions aroused by 
the unusual movements of some French and Russian 
ships in the vicinity, and he feared lest they were secretly 
planning a visit to the bay of Yedo, with the purpose of 
snatching the advantages he had gained. He resolved not 
to be anticipated ; and although navigation in those waters 
was supposed to be extremely dangerous in winter, he 
sailed for Japan on the 14th of J anuary, 1854. Entering 
Yedo Bay with three steam frigates and four sloops of 
war he steamed twelve miles beyond Uraga, and on Feb- 
ruary 13 came to anchor twenty miles from Yedo. 

Shortly after Perry's first visit, the Japanese Emperor 
had died. The Japanese officials had sent the Americans 
news of this while the squadron was at Hong Kong, and 
had requested that they defer their return as it might 
create confusion. Perry suspected the genuineness of 
the report ; at least he could see no reason why he should 
not be near to comfort his new friends in their bereave- 
ment. On arrival he was well received, but the Japanese 
dignitaries who conferred with his captains — for Perry 
was still playing his role of exclusiveness — at once re- 
quested that the ships put back to Uraga, where they said 
preparations had been made to treat with the Americans 
and to give an answer to the President's letter. Perry, 
feeling that it would be dangerous to yield in a single 
instance, replied, through his captains, that Uraga was 
unsafe and inconvenient for the ships, and further that 
it was the custom of civilized nations to treat at the 
metropolis. When the dignitaries continued to insist on 
Uraga and the captains to refuse, and several days had 
been spent in useless conferences, Perry settled the diffi- 
culty in a characteristic way. Without warning, he moved 
the squadron forward until within sight of Yedo. This 
induced the Japanese promptly to adopt a conciliatory 



Framing the Treaty 



235 



tone ; they then proposed for the treaty ground Yokohama, 
almost opposite where the ships were anchored, and this 
was at once accepted. 

On the eighth of March, the day that had been set for 
beginning the negotiations, the commodore with 500 men 
and three bands of music, went ashore to the "Treaty 
House," erected for this especial occasion. At an early 
stage in the negotiations, the Japanese expressed a willing- 
ness to enter into friendly intercourse with the United 
States, but were seemingly determined to grant nothing. 
Three weeks of conference followed, and as the commodore 
continued to show the firmness and dignity that had 
already won prestige for him and as he kept his men 
strictly under discipline, the Japanese came to regard 
their persistent visitors with increasing tolerance. 

In the middle of the negotiations Perry delivered to 
the Japanese the presents that the storeship had lately 
brought from America, designed especially for this people, 
and he sent ashore officers and workmen to prepare the 
gifts for exhibition. Among them were agricultural 
implements, clocks, two telegraph instruments, three 
Francis life-boats, and a Lilliputian railway. The last 
had a locomotive, tender, car, and rails, but was so small 
that it could scarcely carry a child of six. ' ' The Japanese, 
however, were not to be cheated out of a ride, and, as 
they were unable to reduce themselves to the capacity of 
the inside of a carriage, they betook themselves to the 
roof. It was a spectacle not a little ludicrous to behold a 
dignified mandarin whirling around the circular road at 
the rate of twenty miles an hour, with his loose robes 
flying in the wind, . . . [clinging] with a desperate 
hold to the edge of the roof, [and] grinning with intense 
interest." In return the Japanese brought generous 
presents of lacquered work, pongee, umbrellas, dolls, and 
various other things, together with the substantial remem- 



236 



The United States Navy 



brances of 200 sacks of rice and 300 chickens. Then, 
after this evidence of friendliness, they entertained their 
guests with wrestling matches between their champions, 
enormously fat and muscular. Later the Americans 
received seventy of the Japanese on board the Powhatan 
and the cook fairly outdid himself in setting forth a 
dinner which, as the Japanese did not pay much attention 
to order in eating the various dishes of food loading the 
tables, is described as the most "confused commingling 
of fish, flesh, and fowl, soups and syrups, fruits and 
fricassees, roast and boiled, pickles and preserves"; all 
of which the Japanese consumed in large quantities, and 
became fairly "uproarious under the influence of over- 
flowing supplies of champagne, Madeira, and punch, which 
they seemed greatly to relish." 

On Friday, March 31, 1854, Commodore Perry and 
four Japanese commissioners signed a treaty written in 
the English, Dutch, and Chinese languages. This guar- 
anteed succor and protection to shipwrecked Americans; 
permission for a ship in distress, or overtaken by storm, 
to enter any Japanese port; the opening of the ports 
Simoda and Hakodadi, where Americans could secure 
water, wood, coal, and provisions, and enjoy, with some 
restrictions, trade relations. 9 

Larger privileges were later granted by the treaties of 
1857 and 1858. England, quick to follow the advantage 
gained by the United States, six months after Perry 



8 An interesting souvenir of Perry's expedition is preserved at 
the U. S. Naval Academy. It is an ancient bronze bell, said to 
have been cast in 1168, which was presented to Perry by the 
Regent of Napha, one of the Lew Chew Islands, a dependency of 
Japan. Among the many flowery sentences inscribed on the outside, 
one gave the assurance that if the people would bear in mind to 
act rightly and truly, and the lords and ministers would do justice 
in a body, the barbarians would never invade their country. 



The Treaty with Korea 



237 



(September, 1854), also secured commercial rights, and 
Russia and Holland were only a few months later. Thus 
if Perry's expedition had been planned solely for our 
own commercial profit, there might have been disappoint- 
ment. But the prestige gained by the American commo- 
dore, who had shown himself such an able diplomat, and 
the honor that came to our nation in having drawn J apan 
from her isolation, proved an ample recompense. 

A similar achievement by an American naval officer, 
requiring not less skill and patience, was that of Com- 
modore Robert W. Shufeldt in opening up Korea. A 
previous attempt by Rear-Admiral John Rodgers had 
resulted in a battle in which 350 Koreans were killed or 
wounded, but the Korean government would not enter 
into any negotiations. For four years Shufeldt strove, 
first through the Japanese, and then through the more 
friendly Chinese, to reach the Korean King. Finally 
the high dignitaries in Peking were convinced of the 
advantages that would result to them if Korea would 
establish treaty relations with the western powers, and 
they lent their influence. As a result the long-sought-for 
treaty was secured and signed with elaborate ceremony 
(1882). It was more comprehensive than t;he initial 
treaty with either China or Japan. Great Britain, Ger- 
many, and other nations were watching, and soon they 
pressed forward to obtain like treaties. In each case they 
accepted the American draft as their model. 



XV 



THE CIVIL WAR: THE FIRST YEAR 

In the great struggle with Secession certain conditions 
that had existed in our wars with England were reversed. 
The odds were as decidedly in favor of the United States 
Navy as earlier they had been against it. Yet the varied 
duty that fell to the navy was full of hazard and difficulty, 
and often involved extreme tests of endurance. 

It was not merely that the South showed daring and 
brilliancy in the few single-ship actions, and, by develop- 
ing the idea of the ironclad, threatened destruction to 
whole squadrons of wooden vessels; the National Navy 
had also to fight against powerful forts guarding the 
harbors and the rivers ; it had to blockade a coast over 
3000 miles in length ; and with the army it was assigned 
the task of opening the vast system of waterways com- 
prised in the Mississippi and its tributaries. 

The Navy Unprepared 

Here were difficulties for any navy, and they were 
more formidable because of the wretched condition of the 
National Navy at the outbreak of the war. On March 4, 
1861, when President Lincoln took his oath of office, there 
were in commission, including supply ships and tenders, 
forty- two vessels, of which there were only twenty- three 
propelled by steam that might be called efficient. On 
that day but four of the twelve ships constituting the 
home squadron were in Northern ports, available for 
service 1 ; the other squadrons were in the Mediterranean, 



1 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1861, p. 10. 
238 



The Navy Unprepared 239 



Pacific, and off Brazil, the East Indies, and Africa. With 
the time necessary for the transmission of orders and for 
the return voyage, it was several months before these 
squadrons could be utilized. Threats of war had been 
heard long before fighting began; why then, when the 
crisis came, was the navy so utterly unprepared? 

First, President Buchanan (1857-1861) was the victim 
of his environment; three of his Cabinet advisers were, 
to say the least, lukewarm in their allegiance to the 
Union; and a fourth, Mr. Toucey, the Secretary of the 
Navy, although from Connecticut, was so strong in his 
Southern sympathies, that he had earlier failed of re-elec- 
tion to the Senate. Secondly, Congress had by its indiffer- 
ence and blindness disorganized the navy quite as much 
as had the administration. Because of the wide-spread 
financial disaster, beginning in 1857, the national revenue 
had fallen off, and Congress, in attempting to economize, 
had severely crippled the navy. 

Opposition to building or even repairing ships came 
from Northern as well as Southern sources. Congress- 
men from Ohio and Illinois led in the attack on the navy 
and the naval appropriation bill. Congress as a whole 
was apathetic. Strange as it may seem now, even a few 
months before hostilities began, the Northern members had 
no real apprehension of the titanic struggle at hand. 
Outside of Congress such a clear-sighted observer as 
James Russell Lowell, writing on the eve of Lincoln's 
election, made light of the threats of secession. 

When Lincoln was elected and secession had been 
accomplished, President Buchanan still remained inac- 
tive; thus no preparation was made to meet the great- 
emergency. Admiral Chadwick ably remarks on the state 
of affairs at the time : ' ' The whole Government was in a 
state of sad flabbiness. There was but a nucleus of an 
army ; the navy was moribund ; there was a captain afloat 



240 



The United States Navy 



in command nearly seventy years of age ; the commandant 
of the Norfolk Navy Yard was sixty-eight; the com- 
mandant at Pensacola, sixty-seven. The general-in-chief 
of the army was seventy-four. There was no settled belief 
or opinion. The New York Tribune, which held the posi- 
tion of leadership among Republican journals, and which 
was a power throughout the North, was proclaiming that 
'if the Cotton States shall become satisfied that they can 
do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting 
them go in peace' ; and, again, that 'five millions of people, 
more than half of them of the dominant race, of whom at 
least half a million are able and willing to shoulder 
muskets, can never be subdued while fighting around and 
over their own hearthstones' — expressions which had a 
powerful effect for ill throughout the South. ' ' 2 The 
opinion that the South could never be subdued was freely 
uttered in the North, and universally believed in Europe. 



The Early Plans for Operations 

With the firing on Fort Sumter, April 12, 1861, war 
began, and the new and efficient Secretary of the Navy, 
Gideon Welles, took vigorous hold of affairs. He had 
an invaluable helper in the Assistant Secretary, Gustavus 
V. Fox. Mr. Fox had had eighteen years' experience in 
the navy, resigning to enter business in 1856, the year he 
was commissioned lieutenant. His training and rare 
ability made him just the man for the position. The 
assistant secretaryship was a new office felt to be neces- 
sary in order to introduce harmony in the various bureaus 
of the Department. Fox was the professional adviser, and 
was given the greatest responsibility in planning opera- 
tions, choosing leaders, and removing superannuated and 



3 Causes of the Civil War, p. 164. 



Early Plans for Operations 241 

inefficient officers. The last was the weakest point of the 
navy at the beginning of the war. One of Lincoln's 
Cabinet characterized Fox as ' ' the able man of the admin- 
istration. ' ' 

The Department early made plans for an immense 
naval armament. The annual appropriation made by the 
previous Congress for the navy of about $13,000,000 was 
increased to $43,500,000. As Mr. Welles outlined in his 
report of December, 1861, three lines of operation had 
been determined on: 1. The naval occupation of the 
Potomac, and the blockade of all Southern ports. 2. The 
organization of combined naval and military expeditions 
against various points on the Southern coast and along 
the Mississippi. 3. The active pursuit of Confederate 
cruisers and privateers. 

The Northern navy yards, in which work had been 
almost entirely suspended during the years preceding, 
became scenes of great animation. Within a few months 
after the firing on Sumter, the North had 11,000 men 
engaged in fitting out the old ships that had been dis- 
mantled, in overhauling those returned from foreign, 
waters, and in building new ships especially adapted to 
the service for which they were required. At the same 
time the Navy Department, drawing from every source, 
was purchasing and making over ships from the merchant 
service. 

The added ships required crews to man them, and 
before the year was ended the number of seamen had 
grown from 7600 to 22,000. Meanwhile, one-fifth of all 
the officers in the old navy (322, if all grades and corps 
are included) had joined fortunes with the seceded States. 3 
To meet the emergency, the upper classes at the Naval 
Academy were given active duty; and promotion was so 



■ Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers, p. 8. 
16 



242 



The United States Navy 



rapid that many midshipmen became lieutenants before 
they had reached the age of nineteen. Volunteer officers 
were also called for, and 7500 of them received appoint- 
ments during the war. 

President Lincoln, by official proclamation on April 
19 and 27, declared his intention to blockade all the 
Southern coast. But according to international law, as 
formulated in the Declaration of Paris, 1856, ' ' a blockade 
in order to be binding must be effectual, that is to say, 
maintained by a force, sufficient in reality to prevent 
access to the coast of the enemy." For the Union Navy 
at once to blockade the coast from Alexandria, Virginia, 
to the Rio Grande, 3549 statute miles, with 189 harbor or 
river openings, was discovered to be an impossible task. 
It could not be accomplished in a month nor in several 
months; but the beginning was made at Hampton Roads 
shortly after the proclamation, and as ship after ship, 
purchased or built, was fitted out, it was assigned its place 
in the long line. 

The Potomac Flotilla 

Washington, both because of its being the national 
capital and because of its proximity to the Confederate 
lines, became an important centre of operations. And 
when at the outbreak of the war the loyalty of Maryland, 
the nearest State, seemed to be wavering, it caused the 
greatest concern. The people of Baltimore attempted to 
prevent the Northern troops from passing through the city, 
though it was known that those troops were indispensable 
to the protection of the national capital. Thus, for various 
reasons, it was highly important that the Union forces 
should control the Potomac and maintain Washington's 
communications by water. 

For this service Commander J. H. Ward organized a 
small flotilla in May, 1861. Already the buoys had been 



The Expedition to Hatter as Inlet 243 



largely removed from the Potomac by the Confederates, 
and men and supplies were being constantly ferried across 
from Maryland into Virginia. Then, too, the Confederates 
had begun to fortify the heights near Aquia Creek. Ward 
bombarded them without much result on May 31 and 
June 1. This was the first naval engagement of the war. 

The flotilla was active and efficient, but its duties, as 
the year advanced, became increasingly difficult. Buoys 
that had been replaced were again removed; light-house 
keepers were intimidated into extinguishing their lights; 
and so many were the convenient points for crossing the 
river that it was impossible to stop more than a part of 
the men and supplies entering Virginia. Finally, the 
Confederates, having come into possession of large guns 
by the capture of the Norfolk Navy Yard, made fortifica- 
tions along the river of such strength that they were 
more than a match for the ill-protected paddle-wheel 
steamers of the flotilla. On October 15, Commander T. T. 
Craven had to report that in spite of the utmost efforts 
of the flotilla the navigation of the river was practically 
closed. In the following spring, however, the operations 
of the Army of the Potomac against Richmond compelled 
the Confederates to contract their lines and abandon 
the fortifications on the Potomac. 



Capture of Batteries at Hatteras Inlet 

Naval stations and harbors convenient for refuge from 
the heavy storms common to the South Atlantic coast 
were, as the Department saw, indispensable for carrying 
on hostilities and maintaining a blockade. Accordingly, 
a board was appointed, consisting of Captain Samuel F. 
DuPont and Commander Charles H. Davis of the navy, 
and Major John G. Barnard of the Coast Survey, to make 
" a thorough investigation of the coast and harbors, their 



244 The United States Navy 



access and defenses, ' ' and recommend a plan of immediate 
action. As a result, two combined naval and military 
expeditions were organized in the late summer and fall 
of 1861. 

The first was directed against Hatteras Inlet. This 
position was important as the key to Pamlico Sound, and 
here the Confederates had erected two defenses, Forts 
Clark and Hatteras. On August 26, an expedition of four- 
teen vessels under Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham, accom- 
panied by Major-General Benjamin F. Butler with 860 
troops, sailed from Hampton Roads. The resistance made 
by the forts was rather weak, and after a two days' bom- 
bardment the Confederates surrendered; the captured 
numbered 615 officers and men, including Samuel Barron, 
flag-officer of the Confederate Navy, who for nearly fifty 
years previous had served in the National Navy. Not a 
man in the Union Navy was killed during the engagement, 
an immunity due in part to Stringham 's clever maneuver- 
ing of his ships when near the forts; he passed and 
repassed the forts, varying his course so as to prevent 
their securing the range. 



The Capture of Port Royal 

For the second point of attack, the Department decided 
on Port Royal, S. C, and made Captain Samuel F. 
DuPont, lately appointed flag-officer of the South Atlantic 
blockading squadron, leader of the expedition. Port Royal 
was by inland routes thirty miles from Savannah and 
fifty from Charleston. Though somewhat neglected, it 
was the finest natural harbor on the Southern coast. 

On October 29, the fleet of fifty vessels (including 
army-transports carrying nearly 13,000 troops under 
Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sherman) left Hampton 
Roads. Great pains had been taken to conceal their 



The Capture of Port Royal 



245 



destination, but without success. The Confederates heard 
of the plans even earlier than most of the officers of the 
fleet. 4 

The weather, which had promised well as they started, 
changed to a gale off Hatteras, and for a while its violence 
approached that of a hurricane. The fleet was utterly 
dispersed and on November 2 but one sail was to be seen 
from the deck of the Wabash. Some of the ships that had 
been purchased or chartered because of the great need 
were quite unfit to encounter such a wind and sea. Thus 
two were lost — the men being saved with great difficulty — 
and a third had to throw her battery overboard to keep 
from foundering. However, as the severity of the gale 
abated, prospects brightened and on the morning of the 
4th, DuPont, with twenty-five of his vessels, anchored 
off the bar of Port Royal, while others were appearing on 
the horizon. 

The buoys that marked the channel across the long 
bar before Port Royal had been removed. But they were 
replaced by Commander Davis, the fleet-captain, and Mr. 
Boutelle, of the Coast Survey, so that the gunboats and 
lighter transports could enter the roadstead that evening. 
DuPont had grave fears in crossing the bar with his flag- 
ship, the Wabash, for with her deep draft there would be 
but a foot or two to spare. But on making the attempt 
next morning, he succeeded, and was soon followed by the 
frigate Susquehanna and the large transports. 

The entrance to Port Royal was guarded by two 
strongly built fortifications, two and five-eighths miles 



4 Although the ships were sailing under sealed orders, the 
following telegram was sent, on November 1, from Richmond, to 
Governor Pickens and Generals Drayton and Ripley of South Caro- 
lina : " I have just received information, which I consider entirely 
reliable, that the enemy's expedition is intended for Port Royal. 
J. P. Benjamin, Acting Secretary of War." 



\ 



246 



The United States Navy 



apart, Fort Beauregard, mounting twenty guns on Bay- 
Point, the northern side, and Fort Walker, mounting 
twenty-three guns on Hilton Head, the southern side. To 
reduce these forts with wooden ships was what Flag-Officer 




Battle of Port Royal 



DuPont had decided on. The 13,000 troops accompanying 
the expedition had no part in the attack on the forts. 
This change in plans was due to the fact that the greater 
part of the means for disembarkation had been lost in the 
storm, and that the only convenient place for the troops 



The Capture of Port Royal 247 



to land was five or six miles from the anchorage of the 
transports. It was therefore decided to reduce the forts 
by the naval force alone. 

Calling his captains on board the Wabash, DuPont 
explained the strength and the weakness of the enemy's 
position, and then carefully outlined his plan of attack 
and order of battle. The fleet was to divide, "a main 
squadron ranged in a line ahead, and a flanking squadron 
which was to be thrown off on the northern section of the 
harbor to engage the enemy's flotilla, and prevent their 
raking the rear ships of the main line when it turned to 
the southward, or cutting off a disabled vessel. ' ' 5 The 
main squadron, consisting of nine of the heaviest frigates, 
sloops, and gunboats, was led by DuPont 's flagship, the 
Wabash; and the flanking squadron of five gunboats was 
led by the Bienville. 

"The plan of attack was to pass up midway between 
Forts Walker and Beauregard, receiving and returning 
the fire of both, to a certain distance about two and a 
half miles north of the latter. At that point the line 
was to turn to the south, round by the west, and close in 
with Fort Walker, encountering it on its weakest flank, 
and at the same time enfilading, in nearly a direct line, 
its two water faces. . . . When abreast of the fort the 
engine was to be slowed and the movement reduced to 
only as much as would be just sufficient to overcome the 
tide, to preserve the order of battle by passing the batteries 
in slow succession, and to avoid becoming a fixed mark 
for the enemy 's fire. On reaching the extremity of Hilton 
Head . . . the line was to turn to the north and east, 
and, passing to the northward, to engage Fort Walker 
with the port battery nearer than when first on the same 
course. These evolutions were to be repeated." 

Captain DuPont had worked out an unsually skilful 



5 Naval War Records, xii, 262. 



248 



The United States Navy 



plan, which was executed with faultless precision. At 
eight a.m., November 7, the commander made signal to 
get under way. A half hour later the two columns were 
headed in for the forts, the flanking squadron to the 
right; and soon the ships, decreasing the intervals, came 
into close order. At 9.26 there was a flash and a roar from 
Fort Walker, and another immediately followed from Fort 
Beauregard. The challenge was taken up by the Wabash, 
and the other ships followed with their fire as their guns 
bore. At ten o'clock the head of the main squadron had 
reached the point two and a half miles above the forts; 
then as the ships turned, they changed the course so that 
when abreast of Fort Walker they should be only 800 
yards distant; and in this closer formation they steamed 
with great deliberation southward. 

From a reconnoissance DuPont had learned of the 
weakness of the northern flank of Fort Walker, and on 
this point each ship opened with her forward pivot as 
soon as she came in range. The Confederates, unprepared 
for an attack on this quarter, suffered from the enfilading 
fire, which dismounted a few of the guns and greatly 
annoyed the defenders. And their confusion increased 
when in addition to the enfilading fire, still kept up by 
the rear of the Union line, full broadsides swept the 
parapets from the leading ships, now abreast of the fort. 

Meanwhile, a small Confederate squadron of four gun- 
boats under Commodore Tattnall came down the river and 
endeavored to make its presence known. Tattnall was a 
cool and daring officer who had served long in the old 
navy, and when the Union columns had first moved against 
the forts he had advanced as if to give battle to the entire 
fleet. Taking a raking position he fired several ineffectual 
broadsides at the Wabash. But as that ship came within 
range, he wisely retreated in haste up Skull Creek ; there 
he was out of the fight, yet still showed his spirit by 



The Capture of Port Royal 



249 



dipping his blue flag- three times, ' 1 regretting his inability 
to return the high-flown compliments of Flag-Officer 
DuPont in a more satisfactory manner." 6 The flanking 
squadron, by remaining at the northern end of the loop, 
prevented Tattnall's emerging from Skull Creek, and 
also kept up the enfilading fire on Walker. 

The main squadron reached its starting place at 11 
a.m. and then proceeded to execute another ellipse; but 
this time the ships as they turned to southward moved 
still nearer to Fort Walker, taking a course less than 600 
yards distant. 

The forts were considered strong and well equipped, 
yet the defense crumbled under the fire of the fleet. The 
commanding officers gave various explanations in their 
reports to Richmond: only a part of the guns could be 
used against the ships, many of the shells would not fit 
the guns and were useless, ammunition was insufficient, 
and gun crews became exhausted — all of which indicated 
lack of preparation and discipline. Yet, had the forts 
been fully manned and equipped, the slight losses sus- 
tained by the fleet give reason for believing that it might 
still have been successful. More troops and ammunition 
would not have made up for the defects in the construc- 
tion of the forts. The batteries were arranged to command 
the sea-front ; but against an attack from inside the sound 
they had no defense. The guns were nearly all mounted 
en barbette, that is, above a parapet, thus affording the 
advantage of wide range, but with the disadvantage of 
little protection to the gunners. Consequently, although 
it was estimated at this time that one gun on shore was 
equal to four on ship, the superiority of the land batteries 
was lost almost the moment the ships took the enfilading 
position. For though the fire of the fleet did not do great 

6 Savannah Republican, November 12, 1861, quoted in the 
Naval War Records, xii, 295. 



250 



The United States Navy 



damage to the guns themselves, it drove the gunners to 
shelter. 

Major Huger, C. S. A., one of the defenders of Fort 
Walker, recognized its weakness, as in his official report 
he said: " Three of them [the Union ships] took position 
to enfilade our batteries from our northwest flank, while 
others which had not yet got into action assumed direc- 
tion opposite our southeast front, and their largest ship 
[the Wabash] . . . returned down our front, delivering 
a beautifully accurate fire at short range, supported at 
rather longer range by the fire of two other large ships 
of war. So soon as these positions had become established, 
the fort was fought simply as a point of honor, for, from 
that moment, we were defeated, except perhaps by provi- 
dential interference. ' ' 7 

When the main squadron had reached the northern 
end of the ellipse for the third time and was about to 
begin another bombardment on the southern course, the 
Ottawa signaled that the works at Hilton Head had been 
abandoned. Commander John Rodgers was sent ashore 
with a flag of truce, and, finding that the fort was indeed 
deserted, at 2.20 p.m. raised the flag of the Union. The 
transports now came up, and before night troops had 
landed and occupied the works. At sunset it was dis- 
covered that Fort Beauregard was no longer flying the 
Confederate flag, and early next morning that defense 
also was occupied by Union troops. 

The victory was extremely important. It created 
alarm in South Carolina, and caused troops about to leave 
for Virginia to be retained for the protection of their own 
State. It gave the Union an excellent harbor, of the great- 
est advantage for fitting out expeditions against the strong- 
holds along the coast, and for protecting the blockade. 2 
Incidentally, the engagement demonstrated the value of 
steam power, and showed that ships could be used even 



7 Naval War Records, xii, 308. 



The Trent A flair 



251 



in attacking strongly armed forts. Finally, the victory, 
coming in the latter part of 1861, when a gloom was over- 
hanging the North from the many disasters on land, 
brought cheer and encouragement. A stronghold had 
been seized in South Carolina, the State that had been 
first to secede. 

The Trent Affair 

On the same day the Union flag was raised over Fort 
Beauregard there occurred elsewhere an event which at 
first was hailed as a great achievement on the part of the 
navy, but which soon proved a grave menace, for it 
involved the United States almost in a European war. 
It was the " Trent affair." 

The Confederacy had early sought recognition from 
the leading European states, but although their repre- 
sentatives were given a friendly reception in England 
and elsewhere, they were received merely as private citi- 
zens. President Davis then resolved to send commissioners 
of the highest ability to England and France, hoping 
that they might succeed where the others had failed; he 
accordingly selected James M. Mason of Virginia and 
John Slidell of Louisiana, with J. E. Macfarland and 
George Eustis as their secretaries; both Mr. Mason and 
Mr. Slidell were United States senators when their States 
seceded, and both had earlier held important posts in the 
diplomatic service. Eluding the blockade, they sailed 
from Charleston to Nassau and then to Cardenas, Cuba; 
on November 7 they took passage on the British mail- 
steamer Trent, Havana to St. Thomas, on their way to 
England. It was the seizing of these commissioners on the 
Trent by an armed United States ship that so violently 
aroused all Europe and America. 

Captain Charles Wilkes, commanding the San Jacinto 
in West Indian waters, who had earlier distinguished 



252 



The United States Navy 



himself in Antarctic exploration, resolved to intercept 
the Confederate commissioners. As they made no effort 
to maintain secrecy after arriving in Cuba, Captain 
Wilkes learned of their intended departure on the Trent, 
and took up his station in the Old Bahama Channel. At 
11.40 a.m., November 8, the smoke of a steamer was 
reported, which was rightly guessed to be the Trent. 
What followed Captain Wilkes states in his official report. 8 

"We were all prepared for her, beat to quarters, and 
orders were given to Lieutenant D. M. Fairfax to have two 
boats manned and armed to board her and make Messrs. 
Slidell, Mason, Eustis, and Macfarland prisoners, and send 
them immediately on board. ... 

"The steamer approached and hoisted English colors. 
Our ensign was hoisted, and a shot was fired across her 
bow; she maintained her speed, and showed no disposi- 
tion to heave to ; then a shell was fired across her bow, 
which brought her to. I hailed that I intended to send a 
boat on board, and Lieutenant Fairfax, with the second 
cutter of this ship, was dispatched. He met with some 
difficulty, and remaining on board the steamer with a 
part of the boat 's crew, sent the boat back for more assist- 
ance. The captain of the steamer having declined to 
show his papers and passenger list, a force became neces- 
sary to search her. Lieutenant James A. Greer was at 
once dispatched in the third cutter, also manned and 
armed. 

"Messrs. Slidell, Mason, Eustis, and Macfarland were 
recognized and told they were required to go on board 
this ship ; this they objected to, until an overpowering 
force compelled them. Much persuasion was used and a 
little force, and at about two o'clock they were brought 
on board this ship and received by me. Two other boats 
were then sent to expedite the removal of their baggage 



3 Naval War Records, i, 130. 



The Trent Afjair 



253 



and some stores, when the steamer, which proved to be 
the Trent, was suffered to proceed on her route to the east- 
ward, and at 3.30 p.m. we bore away to the northward 
and westward. The whole time employed was two hours, 
thirteen minutes. 

" It was my determination to take possession of 
the Trent and send her to Key West as a prize, for resist- 
ing search and carrying these passengers, whose character 
and objects were well known to the captain, but the 
reduced number of my officers and crew, and the large 
number of passengers on board bound to Europe who 
would be put to great inconvenience, decided me to allow 
them to proceed." 

The prisoners were taken to Boston and confined in 
Fort Warren. Captain Wilkes became at once a popular 
hero. He was given a grand ovation in Boston and New 
York, lauded by the public press, and thanked by a joint 
resolution of Congress. Even the Cabinet with one excep- 
tion, the Postmaster-General, were delighted with the 
capture. But while the country was being thus swept by 
an outburst of enthusiasm, President Lincoln, with his 
rare discernment, perceived the complications that were 
soon to follow. He remarked : ' ' I fear the traitors will 
prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American 
principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought 
Great Britain for insisting, by theory and practice, on the 
right to do exactly what Captain Wilkes has done. If 
Great Britain shall now protest against the act, and 
demand their release, we must give them up, apologize 
for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus 
forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to 
neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for 
sixty years. ' ' 9 

Great Britain did protest, and Lord Lyons, the British 
9 Lossing, History of the Civil War, ii, 156. 



254 



The United States Navy 



minister, was instructed, unless redress including the 
surrender of the commissioners was forthcoming within 
seven days, to depart with "the archives of the legation, 
and . . . repair immediately to London." 10 Mean- 
while, the British Government, without waiting for devel- 
opments, embarked troops for Halifax, conveyed muskets 
from London Tower for shipment, and made ready all 
kinds of warlike munitions. 

Although the matter primarily concerned only Eng- 
land, the Emperor of France, the King of Prussia, and 
the Emperor of Austria had within a month of the receipt 
of the news communicated with the Foreign Office, London, 
and their own diplomatic representatives in Washington, 
expressing their approval of England's attitude in the 
controversy. In short, just as emphatically as the United 
States had approved of Wilkes 's act, Europe disapproved 

War was averted, however, by the United States' dis- 
avowing the act and surrendering the prisoners to English 
custody, January 1, 1862. As the affair involves such an 
important point in international law much has since been 
written on it. The best authorities of recent years agree 
in condemning the act of Captain Wilkes. While he had 
the right to stop the Trent and search her, he could not 
possess himself of any persons on her without taking the 
ship into port as a prize. Neither the commissioners nor 
their dispatches, being of a non-military character, could 
be regarded as contraband of war, and therefore the ship 
was not liable to capture except on the ground of resist- 
ance to search. Since obstacles in the way of search were 
interposed by the captain of the Trent, Wilkes would 
have been justified in taking the ship into port, though 
whether a court would have considered the resistance as 
sufficient to condemn her is a matter of conjecture. 11 



10 Naval War Records, i, 161. 

11 Harris, The Trent Affair, p. 264. 



XVI 



THE BATTLE OF HAMPTON ROADS: THE DE- 
STRUCTION OF THE CUMBERLAND 
AND THE CONGRESS 

Norfolk Navy Yard Abandoned 

Some of the large guns the Confederates used at 
Hatteras and Port Royal, as well as later about New 
Orleans, Port Hudson, and Vicksburg, were secured from 
the Norfolk Navy Yard. The loss of this yard in the latter 
part of April, 1861, was the greatest disaster sustained 
by the navy during the war. It was caused, not by an 
overwhelming force of hostile arms, but by the prevalent 
policy of inaction, and by panic. The administration, 
the Navy Department, and several of the senior officers 
of the army and the navy, all shared in the blame. 

The situation in Virginia previous to the firing on 
Sumter had been extremely delicate ; as the State wavered 
in her choice of sides, friends of the Confederacy who 
were closely watching the Norfolk Navy Yard found it easy 
to dissuade the administration from taking any measures 
to protect the government property there, arguing that 
this would indicate distrust and thus alienate the State. 

General Scott, the head of the army, a Virginian, and 
conservative by reason of age (he was nearly seventy-five 
years old), did not favor sending troops to Norfolk. And 
when Commodore C. S. McCauley, commandant of the 
yard (sixty-eight years old), was instructed on April 10 
that " great vigilance should be exercised in guarding and 
protecting the public interests and property," he did 
nothing. He was misled by Southern advisers, and seemed 

255 



256 



The United States Navy 



to lack all power of action; so far as is known, he made 
not even a plan in defense of the yard. 

A week before Virginia passed the ordinance of seces- 
sion (April 17), the Department had become apprehensive 
and had sent confidential orders for the removal of the 
Merrimac and other ships at the Norfolk Yard. On April 
12 Engineer-in-Chief Isherwood was sent from Washing- 
ton expressly to take out the Merrimac. He found her 
engines in bad condition; but putting a large force of 
men to work on Monday morning, the day after his arrival, 
and employing shifts so as to push the work day and night, 
he reported Wednesday afternoon that everything was in 
readiness for firing. On Thursday morning he had steam 
up, and waited only for the commandant's order to cast 
loose and take the Merrimac, with the Germantown in tow, 
to a place of safety. But the commandant hesitated, and 
hesitation at this critical moment was fatal. Finally, when 
Isherwood reminded him of the peremptory orders given 
by the Department for sending the ship out, McCauley 
said that he had decided to retain her, and directed that 
the fires be drawn. 

The patriotism of Commodore McCauley was never 
seriously doubted. But he was quite unequal to the 
emergency. Distressed and anxious, he was led by some 
of his officers who shortly entered the Confederate service 
to believe that moving the Merrimac would incite to vio- 
lence the mob collecting outside the yard. Although he 
had a force which, with the guns of the ships, could have 
resisted several regiments of militia without artillery, he 
was persuaded that the security of the yard depended 
on avoiding a rupture. He was also induced to believe 
that some obstructions the Confederates had placed in the 
channel, really insignificant, would prevent the Merrimac 's 
passing. 

When Engineer-in-Chief Isherwood and Commander 



Norfolk Navy Yard Abandoned 257 



Alden (who was to have been captain of the Merrimac) 
found they could do nothing, they departed for Washing- 
ton and made their report. 1 Immediately Commodore 
Hiram Paulding, in the Pawnee, and a detachment of 
500 men were dispatched to relieve McCauley and save the 
ships. But it was too late. 

The greater part of McCauley 's officers had resigned 
or deserted. Mechanics and watchmen had joined the 
secessionists outside, who were collecting in scattered 
groups. The unfortunate commandant, dejected by this, 
and dismayed by the reports that State troops were 
arriving from Richmond and Petersburg, decided to 
destroy all the ships in the yard except the Cumberland. 
Accordingly, on Saturday, April 20, he scuttled the Merri- 
mac, Germantown, Plymouth, and Dolphin. 

At the very hour when the destruction began, Com- 
modore Paulding, who had progressed as far as Fortress 
Monroe, was embarking a regiment of Massachusetts 
volunteers. They were only twelve miles away, and were 
coming as fast as the Pawnee could bring them to save 
the ships. 

On Paulding's arrival Commodore McCauley 's courage 
revived, and he was in favor of remaining and defending 
the yard. There is little doubt that it might have been 
held for some weeks even without the reinforcements 
already on their way. Commodore Paulding had all to- 
gether 1000 effective men under his command. Though 
not much reliance could be placed on the strength of the 
walls enclosing the yard, the guns of the receiving-ship 
Pennsylvania, the Cumberland, and the Pawnee com- 
manded the entire yard, and could have set fire to Norfolk 
and Portsmouth. On the other hand, the Confederates 
had only a few companies of soldiers and no heavy guns. 



1 To be found in the Naval War Records, iv, 280. 
17 



258 



The United States Navy 



Whatever Commodore Paulding's possibilities may- 
have been, he was just as plainly a victim of panic as 
Commodore McCauley had been before him. Within an 
hour after his arrival, Paulding decided to abandon the 
yard. On reaching this decision he immediately began 
making preparations. One hundred men were to render 
useless the guns in the yard by knocking off the trunnions 
with sledges; they pounded well, but accomplished noth- 
ing. Other men were set to work rolling cannon and shells 
into the river. Still others were to prepare the ships and 
buildings for firing. The Cumberland, the only ship to 
be saved, was towed a short distance out by the Pawnee, 
and at four or five in the morning, a rocket from the 
Pawnee gave signal that the fires were to be ignited. 

But even the work of destruction suffered from panic, 
and evidently had been poorly planned. The moment 
the National forces had withdrawn, the crowds outside the 
yard rushed in. Extinguishing a slow fuse attached to a 
mine designed to destroy the drydock, they saved it intact. 
At the same time others checked the flames in the build- 
ings (only a few of which had been really set on fire), 
and secured most of the valuable shops uninjured. As 
but very few of the cannon were destroyed, the Confed- 
erates gained nearly 3000 pieces of ordnance of all kinds, 
300 of them Dahlgren guns of the latest type. 2 

The events at the Pensacola Navy Yard furnish a 
companion piece to the story just narrated. On January 
12 preceding, Captain James Armstrong, in command, 
had weakly surrendered to the State militia of Florida. 



2 These are the figures given by Commodore Paulding in his 
report to the Department of April 23, 1861; Commodore McCauley's 
estimate is about the same; other estimates vary greatly, but all 
are less; Scharf in his history states, "There were 1198 guns of 
all kinds captured with the yard, of which fifty-two were 9-inch 
Dahlgren guns." 



Development in Guns 259 



Had it not been for the guns captured at Pensacola and 
Norfolk, according to the belief expressed later by Admiral 
Porter, the Confederates could not have armed their 
fortifications until they had built gun factories of their 
own, or imported cannon from Europe ; that is, not until 
nearly a year after the beginning of hostilities. 

The Union lost at Norfolk the steam frigate Merrimac, 
40 guns, the sloop of war Germantown, 22, the sloop of 
war Plymouth, 22, the brig Dolphin, 4. all of which were 
practically ready for sea; also, the older ships, still pos- 
sessing some usefulness, Pennsylvania, United States, 
Columbus, Delaware, Raritan, and Columbia; and, last 
an unfinished ship-of-the-line, the New York. But " great 
as was . . . the loss of our ships, it was much less 
than the loss of our guns. ' ' 3 

Development in Guns and Ships 

The Civil War marks the end of the old in the ships 
and guns of our navy, and the beginning of the new. 
Since the events following the loss of the Norfolk Navy 
Yard instituted this revolution, it is worth while here to 
pause and note certain changes that had taken place in 
the half century preceding. 

Smooth-bore guns, firing solid shot, had increased 
from the earlier 18- and 24-pounders to 32 's. The 
" Columbiads " used in the War of 1812 and in the Civil 
War were guns of this type, though previous to the later 
war the model had been changed by lengthening the bore 
and increasing the weight of metal so as to adapt it for 
a heavier charge. As it was discovered that the improved 
guns frequently did not possess the requisite strength, 
they were degraded to the rank of shell-guns, and fired 
with diminished charges of powder. 



Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, p. 33. 



260 



The United States Navy 



The "Dahlgren" gun, designed by Admiral Dahlgren 
in the '50 's, was regarded as the most advanced type of 
smooth-bore at the time of the Civil War. This was of 
large calibre and made of cast-iron. Its special feature 
was the " curve of pressures," making it heavy at the 
breech and light at the muzzle. It meant a great gain in 
power with a minimum of weight, and thus was especially 
adapted for naval use. 

All smooth-bore ordnance was muzzle-loading. These 
pieces fired round shot, canister, common shells, and 
shrapnel shell. The first rifled guns were also muzzle- 
loaders ; and it was not until 1875-80 that breech-loading 
rifles were generally accepted. 

Experiments in rifled cannon began in Russia about 
1836. In the Crimean War these guns did not prove 
very successful, but by the beginning of the Civil War 
they were regarded no longer as experiments. The 
moment armor tvas introduced on ships they became a 
necessity. Rifled cannon had the advantage of greater 
penetrating power, greater range, and increased accuracy. 

The "Parrott" rifle gun was probably the best of the 
large ordnance that found extensive use in the war. This 
was a cast-iron rifled tube, strengthened by a coiled 
wrought-iron hoop shrunk on the breech. The Parrott 
guns were 100-, 200-, and 300-pounders. 

In the construction of ships there had been but one 
important innovation since the W T ar of 1812, and that was 
caused by the introduction of steam as the propelling 
power. Ships were still built on the general lines of 
frigates and sloops of war, and were fully rigged, for it 
was supposed that warships would ordinarily use steam 
only as auxiliary power. There were some side-wheelers, 
but ships of the latest approved type built in the United 
States, such as the Merrimac and the Hartford, had screw 
propellers, which evidently would be much less vulnerable 



Development in Ships 261 



in battle. Such vessels were capable of making, under 
steam alone, from eight to twelve knots. The first steam 
man-of-war ever launched was the U. S. S. Fulton, 1814, 
and the first screw warship, the U. S. S. Princeton, 1843. 
In thus leading the navies of the world, the United States 
Navy, insignificant as it was in number of ships, won 
distinction. 

By the introduction of steam as the motive power, 
ships not only gained in speed, but could be maneu- 
vered regardless of the wind. In consequence, they were 
much better able to attack or pass forts commanding har- 
bors and rivers. Further, they were adapted for a new 
mode of attacking other vessels, that is, by ramming. This 
method of fighting was virtually a return to the tactics of 
the Greek and Roman galleys, and it proved very effective 
in the confined space of rivers and narrow bays. 

The Confederate Navy Department early recognized 
that, having no ships, shipbuilders, or seamen, they could 
not hope to battle successfully with the National Navy 
except by some new and quite superior kind of fighting 
machine. They began studying the torpedo and the iron- 
clad, the principles of both of which were well known in 
navy circles. 

The ironclad, of which alone we shall speak in this 
chapter, had its beginning in the Crimean War, in which 
it was used by the French. On October 17, 1855, three 
so-called floating batteries, the Lave, Tonnante, and Devas- 
tation, their hulls of timber covered with four inches of 
iron armor, advanced to the attack of Kinburn and deliv- 
ered a very destructive fire, which, with that of the ships- 
of-the-line, frigates, and mortar boats, compelled the 
Russian forts to surrender after three hours' resistance. 
The significant feature of the engagement was that 
although the floating batteries took a position only a few 
hundred yards distant from the forts, and received a 



262 



The United States Navy 



terrific bombardment in return, they suffered practically 
no injury. This set progressive naval constructors to 
thinking; France shortly planned in her navy various 
changes which Great Britain viewed with apprehension. 

The Rebuilding of the Merrimac 

On the 23d of June, 1861, Mr. Mallory, the Confed- 
erate Secretary of the Navy, met a board consisting of 
Chief Engineer William P. Williamson, Lieutenant John 
M. Brooke, and Naval Constructor John L. Porter, to 
make plans for an ironclad. Since the Confederates 
had failed in their attempt to purchase one, they 
were obliged to rely on their own resources. Mr. Porter, 
who had submitted the plans for an ironclad to the U. S. 
Navy Department as early as 1846, brought to the con- 
ference a model of a boat of shallow draft, its upper works 
entirely inclosed by a shield with armored sloping sides. 
But the building of such a vessel would require twelve 
months, and presented many difficulties, for the South had 
practically no facilities for making engines, and almost no 
machinists. Aid was found in the Norfolk Navy Yard. 

When Commodore Paulding was leaving the yard, he 
set fire to the abandoned ships; but as the Merrimac 
had already been scuttled, the flames destroyed only her 
upper works, and, stopping with the berth deck, left 
her engines and boilers practically uninjured. To save 
time, and to take advantage of the machinery of the 
Merrimac, the board, meeting at Richmond, adapted 
its plan to this vessel, which already had been raised and 
placed in drydock. 

The South showed splendid energy in the recon- 
struction of the Merrimac, as most of the world have con- 
tinued to call her, rather than the Virginia, as she was 
renamed by the Confederates. Officers and constructors 



The Rebuilding of the Merrimac 263 

did their utmost to hasten the work ; even the blacksmiths, 
machinists, and bolt drivers caught the spirit, and signed a 
voluntary agreement to work until eight o'clock every 
evening without extra pay. 

The Merrimac was originally a screw frigate, of 3500 
tons burden. Her hull, 263 feet long, was covered amid- 
ships with a shield of 178 feet ; the sides of which slanted 
at an angle of 35°, and rose, when she was trimmed for 
battle, seven feet above the water. The shield was made 
of rafters of yellow pine, fourteen inches thick; on this 
was a course of four-inch pine planks running fore and 
aft, and on this another of four-inch oak planks placed 
up and down. Superposed on the wood was a layer of 
rolled iron bars, eight inches wide and two inches thick, 
running fore and aft, and on these another layer of 
similar size, up and down. The whole was bolted through 
and through. Thus the vessel had an armor which, meas- 
ured perpendicularly to the slanting sides, was four inches 
of iron supported by twenty-two inches of wood, but which 
horizontally gave a thickness very much greater. The 
knuckle, where the armor joined the hull, and the two ends 
of the vessel beyond the armor, were submerged to a 
depth of two feet, rendering those parts invulnerable. 
The rudder and propeller were protected by a heavy 
solid deck or fan tail. 4 The top of the shield was pro- 
tected from a plunging fire by an iron grating in which 



4 There is considerable variance in the descriptions of the 
Merrimac, even in statements made by officers who served on her; 
e.g., some give the slant of her shield as 45°, affirming that her 
decks were merely awash when in battle, instead of submerged, and 
that her rudder and propeller were unprotected, etc. In this account, 
the authors have relied chiefly on statements by Naval Constructor' 
J. L. Porter, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, i, 716, and by 
John W. B. Porter, A Record of Events in Norfolk County, pp. 
327-366. 



264 



The United States Navy 



the bars were two inches wide and thick, separated by 
meshes two inches square. 

The armament of the Merrimac consisted of ten guns ; 
of the eight, comprising her broadsides, six were smooth- 
bore 9-inch Dahlgrens, part of her original battery, and 
two were 6.4-inch rifle guns; there were also two 7-inch 
rifle guns on pivot, one at each end. The rifle guns were 
made at the Tredegar Iron Works, Richmond, where the 
armor plate was rolled, the work being under the super- 
vision of Lieutenant Brooke. The Merrimac was further 
armed with a cast-iron beak, wedge shaped, weighing 
1500 pounds. 

The Virginia, or, as we shall call her, the Merrimac, 
moved slowly down Elizabeth River, at the same time 
making ready for battle about midday, March 8, 1862, 
the very earliest moment she was available. Many of the 
workmen were still on her and hurried to give the finish- 
ing touches as she drew out of the navy yard. The engi- 
neer was running cautiously, for the shaft had scarcely 
been given a turn previous to this day. The officers moved 
among their men, and sought to give them some acquaint- 
ance with their duties. The crew surely needed instruc- 
tion, for it was made up largely of volunteers from the 
army. No wonder many of the people of Norfolk, as 
they cheered the Merrimac, supposed that she was going 
merely on a trial trip. 

The Ramming op the Cumberland 

It was about twelve o'clock when Lieutenant George 
U. Morris, of the Cumberland, 24 guns, discovered three 
vessels under steam standing down Elizabeth River 
towards Sewell's Point. The sense of peace and security 
then prevailing on the Union side was indicated by the 
sailors' washing, which decorated the rigging, and hung 



The Ramming of the Cumberland 265 



limp in the breathless air. The captain of the Cumber- 
land, Commander William Radford, was absent, having 
been ordered to the Roanoke as member of a court of 
inquiry. The Congress, 50 guns, was a quarter of a mile 




Hampton Roads 



distant from the Cumberland; both were near Newport 
News, while the remaining ships of the fleet, the Roanoke, 
Minnesota, and St. Lawrence, were anchored off Fortress 
Monroe, eight miles distant. 

The Cumberland and the Congress, though suddenly 



266 The United States Navy 



awakened from their repose, had ample time to clear for 
action and to study the strange foe 5 approaching. The 
Merrimac was deliberate in her movements ; her engines, 
condemned as worn out and useless a year before, when 
the yard was in the possession of the Government, had 
since not been improved by fire and water. At their best 
they could not drive her five knots an hour. The great 
bulk of the Merrimac, and her draft, made her difficult to 
maneuver. She drew twenty-one feet forward and twenty- 
two aft, and many times in the battle of this day and the 
day following her keel dragged in the mud. It took over 
half an hour to wind her. 

The commanding officer of the Merrimac was Captain 
Franklin Buchanan, who had been forty-six years in the 
United States Navy, and who was in command of the 
Washington Navy Yard at the outbreak of hostilities. 
By one of the accidents not infrequent in this war, his 
favorite brother was purser on the Congress, which the 
Confederate ram was about to engage. 

When the Merrimac had passed the Confederate bat T 
teries at Sewell's Point, where she was heartily cheered 
by the troops that lined the shores, she was seen to take 
the South Channel and head for Newport News. The two 
National ships lying there at anchor opened fire on her 
when she was three-quarters of a mile distant, the Cumber- 
land first with her heavy pivot guns. The shore batteries 
at Newport News also brought their guns into action. 

Many of the shot struck the Merrimac, but bounded off 
without effect. Of this hostile demonstration the strange 
monster took no notice, but in silence, and with an awful 
deliberation, continued to advance. Finally, when within 
close range, Lieutenant Charles Simms carefully aimed 

5 Stiles, in his Military Essays and Recollections, says the 
Merrimac looked " like a house submerged to the eaves, borne 
onward by a flood." 



The Ramming of the Cumberland 267 



her forward pivot, and the shell, going true to its mark, 
swept away practically the entire crew of the after pivot- 
gun of the Cumberland* Passing near the Congress, the 
Merrimac gave the old frigate a destructive broadside with 
her starboard battery, and received a heavy fire in return 
though with no effect. Without stopping to repeat the 
fire, the ironclad then headed direct for the Cumberland, 
and rammed her under the starboard forechannels. 

The beak of the Merrimac was under water, but when 
it pierced the side of the Cumberland the smashing of 
timbers could be heard above the roar of cannon. The 
shock was scarcely felt on the Merrimac, but the Cumber- 
land had received a fatal wound. The tide began to swing 
the Merrimac around, and as she was disengaging herself 
and backing clear, the ram broke off short. The hole made 
in the Cumberland was large enough to admit a man. 

Just previous to the moment of impact, the forward 
pivot-gun of the Merrimac had again been fired, a second 
time doing terrible execution. On the other hand, as one 
of the Merrimac's crew in his excitement and enthusiasm 
imprudently leaped into the porthole to sponge out his 
gun, he was immediately shot through the head by a 
musket ball. 

Although the Cumberland had been rammed, her men, 
controlled by splendid discipline, did not flinch because 
of the hopelessness of the contest or the carnage on their 
decks, and, reforming the gun-crews, continued the fight. 
Their shot did not penetrate the ironclad, yet they were 
not altogether wasted. For when the ships, close along- 
side, chanced to fire at the same moment, the shot shat- 
tered the muzzles of two guns of the Merrimac and ren- 
dered them useless. Fragments of guns and shells killed 
one man on the Merrimac, while " sixteen more were 



6 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, i, 698. 



268 



The United States Navy 



scorched with powder or scratched with minor particles 
of the debris." (Surgeon Phillips, of the Merrimac.) 

The Merrimac, on disentangling herself, laboriously 
proceeded to turn, that she might engage the Congress. 
Meanwhile the crew of the Cumberland, under Lieutenant 
Morris, heroically held to the fight. As she began to 
settle, the men were driven from the lower decks, but 
fought with the guns on the spar deck. Nor did they 
leave them so long as the guns were above water, that is, 
not until forty-five minutes after the ship had been 
rammed. As the Union vessel careened and went down, 
some of the wounded were saved by being placed on racks 
or mess-chests, but the loss was large. Out of a comple- 
ment of 376 officers and men, only 255 responded to 
muster the following day; nearly all of the others had 
been killed or drowned. 

The Cumberland partly regained an upright position 
on sinking in the shallow water; her mastheads were not 
submerged, and the American flag still flew. Thus Com- 
mander Radford, who had come from Fortress Monroe on 
horseback, and who reached his ship only in time to witness 
her end, had the consolation of seeing the colors still 
flying. 7 

The Destruction of the Congress 8 

Meanwhile Captain Buchanan, who, on leaving the 
Cumberland, had headed up the James, put his helm 
hard-a-starboard, and as he was coming about, Colonel 
J. T. Wood, in charge of the after pivot, put three raking 
shells into the Congress. Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith, 

7 Radford's and Morris' reports will be found in the Naval 
War Records, vii, 20 ff. 

8 Built at Portsmouth, N. H., in 1841, and connected only in 
name with the old Congress, one of the six frigates forming the 
first permanent navy of the United States. 



The Destruction of the Congress 



269 



commanding the Congress, attempted to save his ship by 
setting jib and topsails, and, with the assistance of the 
tug Zouave, running under the protection of the shore 
batteries. But the Congress soon grounded in shoal water, 
out of reach of the Merrimac's prow, but not of her guns. 
Of the events that followed, Lieutenant Pendergrast, the 
executive officer, says in his official report: 

"At 3.30 the Merrimac took a position astern of us, 
at a distance of about 150 yards, and raked us fore and 
aft with shells, while one of the smaller steamers kept 
up a fire on our starboard quarter. 

"In the meantime, the Patrick Henry and Thomas 
Jefferson [Jamestown], rebel steamers, approached us 
from up the James River, firing with precision and doing 
us great damage. 

"Our two stern guns were now our only means of 
defense. These were soon disabled, one being dismounted 
and the other having its muzzle knocked away. The 
men were swept away from them with great rapidity and 
slaughter by the terrible fire of the enemy. 

"At about 4.30 I learned of the death of Lieutenant 
Smith, which happened about ten minutes previous. See- 
ing that our men were being killed without the prospect 
of any relief from the Minnesota, which vessel had run 
ashore in attempting to get up to us from Hampton Roads, 
not being able to bring a single gun to bear upon the 
enemy, and the ship being on fire in several places, . . . 
we deemed it proper to haul down our colors without 
any further loss of life on our part. 

"We were soon boarded by an officer from the Merri- 
mac, who said that he would take charge of the ship. He 
left shortly afterwards, and a small tug came alongside, 
whose captain demanded that we should surrender and 
get out of the ship, as he intended to burn her immediately. 

"A sharp fire with muskets and artillery was main- 



270 



The United States Navy 



tained from our troops ashore upon the tug, having the 
effect of driving her off. The Merrimac again opened 
on us, although we had a white flag at the peak to show 
that we were out of action." 9 

The Confederates thought that the fire directed against 
them came in part from the ship, and were highly indig- 
nant. Captain Buchanan, who was naturally excitable, 
snatched a carbine from one of his men, and, exposing 
nearly his whole body above the shield of the Merrimac, 
began firing. His anger and recklessness, however, met with 
a heavy penalty. His thigh bone was broken by a musket 
ball from the shore, and he was obliged to yield the 
command to his lieutenant, Catesby ap R. Jones. The 
Confederate steamers, although driven away from the 
Congress by the rifle guns on shore, set the Union ship on 
fire by red-hot shot. She burned until past midnight, 
when the flames reached the magazine and blew her up. 

At the beginning of the battle, the Minnesota, the 
Eoanoke, and the St. Lawrence, leaving Fortress Monroe, 
had attempted to move up the Roads and take part in 
the action. But by the middle of the afternoon the tide 
was ebbing, and, as they drew considerable water, all 
three grounded; the Minnesota, which had gone farthest 
of the three, succeeded in getting within a mile and a half 
of Newport >Tews, and witnessed the Cumberland sink 
and the Congress surrender, without any power on her 
part to aid. However, if the Minnesota could not rush 
forward and grapple with the Merrimac, no more could 
the Merrimac cross the shoal water and engage the Minne- 
sota, and to this the Minnesota owed her salvation. 

The fire of the Merrimac was not very accurate, and 
at the distance of a mile her gunners succeeded in putting 
only one shell through their enemy 's bow. But the James- 



Naval War Records 3 yn, 23. 



The North Alarmed 271 



town and the Patrick Henry, taking positions on the 
Minnesota's port bow and stern, with their rifle guns did 
considerable damage until the Union vessel, bringing a 
heavy gun to bear, forced them to withdraw. 

About this time the St. Lawrence succeeded in reach- 
ing a position near the Minnesota before grounding again, 
where she fired several broadsides at the Merrimac. Hos- 
tilities ceased about 6.30, when the pilot of the Merrimac 
declared that the tide would leave her aground if she 
continued longer in her present position. The Confederate 
vessels then steamed back to Seweirs Point, where they 
anchored for the night. 

The South had won a decided victory. The conflict, 
according to the Confederate historian Scharf, was 
1 'twenty -seven guns [the combined batteries of the Merri- 
mac and the small steamers] against an armament of over 
300 guns, of which 100 could be brought into action at 
every moment, and on every point." The Merrimac had 
moved about at will in the destruction of the Union ships, 
checked only by the shallow water of the Roads and her 
own awkwardness. The heavy guns of the Union ships 
and shore batteries had swept her decks, carrying away 
davits, anchors, and flagstaffs. Her smokestack and steam- 
pipe were riddled; her beak was broken off and prow 
twisted ; the muzzles of two guns had been shattered. But 
as her armor had been scarcely so much as dented, the 
injuries were insignificant, and the Confederates awaited 
only daylight to complete the work of destruction. 

Reports of the victory of the Merrimac were soon 
spreading in all directions. No wonder that the South 
became ecstatic and that the North was filled with the 
gravest apprehension. When the news reached Washing- 
ton next morning (Sunday), a Cabinet meeting was imme- 
diately called. As the members assembled it was evident 
that they were suffering from the general alarm. In the 



272 



The United States Navy 



deliberation that followed, excited fears were expressed 
that the blockade might now be broken, and the Richmond 
campaign thwarted ; and, who could tell, even New York 
might soon be laid under contribution, and Washington 
burned ! 10 

For where were the helpless ships of the Union to find 
succor? Without seeking on their part, however, help 
came in a strange, most unseamanlike craft, the Monitor, 
which arrived in Hampton Roads that evening at nine 
o 'clock. 



Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, v, 226. 



XVII 



THE BATTLE OF HAMPTON ROADS (CON- 
TINUED) : THE MONITOR AND 
THE MERRIMAC 

A Race in Shipbuilding 

It was seemingly a strange coincidence that within 
eight hours after the first ironclad of the South had 
entered so brilliantly on her career, an armored champion 
of the North, also the first of its kind, should come upon 
the same scene. But the coincidence admits of explanation. 

The South, recognizing her inability to build and 
man a navy, was virtually forced into trying the iron- 
clad, and, as we have seen in the last chapter, began 
work on the Merrimac two months after the beginning of 
the war. News of this alarmed the North, and three or 
four months later the Department signed contracts for 
three ironclads. The smallest of these, the Monitor, was 
to be completed in the almost unprecedented time of 100 
days. As the navy departments of the North and South 
were kept fairly well informed of the progress made by 
each other, there ensued a race in shipbuilding of grave 
importance ;. in which the North had the advantage of 
superior shops and mechanics, the South of a long start 
and intensity of feeling, stimulated by the constant pres- 
ence of her enemy. This nearness of her foe promised the 
South another important advantage: her ironclad would 
have to steam fewer hours than the Monitor would days 
before striking the first decisive blow. 

The South won the race by half a day, and thus was 
able to destroy two staunch old sailing ships. This, com- 
pared with the losses suffered by the army, was trivial, 
18 273 



274 



The United States Navy 



But although the navy did not in general bear the brunt 
of the fighting, much depended on the ships. If the 
Monitor had been delayed another week in reaching Hamp- 
ton Roads, the whole character of the war might have 
been changed. 

Early in August, 1861, Congress, convened in extra 
session, had appropriated $1,500,000 ' ' for the construction 
or completing of iron- or steel-clad steamships or steam 
batteries." Commodore Joseph Smith, Commodore Hiram 
Paulding, and Commander Charles H. Davis were ap- 
pointed a board to investigate the plans and specifications 
that were submitted. These old and tried officers, schooled 
in everything that pertained to the earlier navy, admitted 
in their report that they approached "the subject with 
diffidence, having no experience and but scanty knowledge 
in this branch of naval architecture." Nevertheless, they 
did not shirk their responsibility, and after careful con- 
sideration approved the plans for the Monitor, the Galena, 
and the New Ironsides, which ships were soon begun. In 
fact, the Monitor's keel-plate was passing through the roll- 
ing mill while the clerks of the Navy Department were 
drawing up the formal contract. The Monitor was 
launched January 30, 1862, and was turned over to the 
Government on February 19. 

The inventor of the Monitor was John Ericsson, 1 born 
in Sweden in 1803. His strange craft showed nothing 
less than genius in its adaptation to the service required. 
She was of light draft to navigate the shallow bays and 



1 Already Ericsson had given evidence of genius. While living 
in England he invented the screw propeller (1836); and it was 
because his invention met with utter indifference from British ship- 
owners and naval officers that on the encouragement of an Amer- 
ican consul and naval officer he came to the United States. The 
U. S. S. Princeton, already mentioned as the first warship with a 
screw propeller, was of his designing. 



The Building of the Monitor 



275 




276 The United States Navy 



rivers of the Southern States. As light draft made impos- 
sible high armored sides, her exposed surface was small, 
but heavily armored, and thus invulnerable to any guns 
of this period. A revolving turret was introduced that 
she might use her few guns in narrow streams where 
maneuvering would be impossible. Engines below the 
water line, and propeller and rudder protected by a wide 
overhang, were other elements of strength; the overhang, 
on sides as well as ends, protected her from ramming and 
also from shot directed at the water line, besides giving 
her increased stability in a rough sea. 2 

The original Monitor was, in simple terms, a turret 
on a raft, and the whole was superposed on a flat-bottomed 
boat. She was of 776 tons burden. Her extreme length 
was 172 feet; breadth, forty-one and a half feet; draft, 
ten and a half feet ; inside diameter of turret, twenty feet ; 
height of turret, nine feet. 3 The turret was composed of 
eight thicknesses of wrought-iron plates, each one inch 
thick, firmly riveted together. The sides of the hull, which 
rose scarcely two feet above the water, were protected 
by five inches of armor, and the deck was covered with 
a plating one inch thick. She had an armament of two 
11-inch Dahlgren guns, the muzzles of which were run 
out through ports placed side by side. When the guns 
were drawn back, the ports were closed by heavy iron 
stoppers, acting like pendulums. 

Even after the Monitor had been launched and had 
convinced the skeptical — of whom there were many — 
that she would at least float, duty on her was thought to 
be so hazardous that a crew was not detailed to man her, 



2 Church, Life of John Ericsson, i, 263. 

3 Executive Doc, House of Rep., 48th Cong. 1st Sess., Report 
No. 1725. 



The Trip to Hampton Roads %77 



but volunteers were called for. Lieutenant J. L. Worden 
was given the command, and Lieutenant S. D. Greene was 
made executive officer. 

The Hazardous Trip to Hampton Roads 

The Monitor was built at Green Point, Long Island. 
After two short and rather unsatisfactory trial trips, she 
started for Hampton Roads. She left New York on 
Thursday, March 6, towed by the tugboat Seth Low. Of 
the experiences on that dangerous voyage, Lieutenant 
Greene wrote to his mother a week later: "About noon 
[Friday] the wind freshened and the sea was quite rough. 
In the afternoon the sea was breaking over our decks at a 
great rate and coming in our hawse-pipe forward in per- 
fect floods. Our berth-deck hatch leaked in spite of all 
we could do, and the water came down under the tower 
like a waterfall. . . . The water came through the 
narrow eye-holes in the pilot house with such force as to 
knock the helmsman completely around from the wheel. ' ' 4 

The men on the Monitor had to meet all kinds of 
dangers. Water swept over the craft in such a volume 
that it went down the blowers and the smokestack. Engi- 
neers and firemen narrowly escaped asphyxiation, and 
when the engines stopped, the pumps were rendered use- 
less, and the water in the hold increased rapidly. As the 
wind was from the west, by signaling the tug to go nearer 
the shore, the crew found relief in smoother water. At 
eight p.m. they succeeded in starting the engines, and all 
went well till midnight, when, passing a shoal, they once 
more encountered a heavy sea. The wheel ropes then 
jumped off the steering gear and became jammed. The 
vessel came very near foundering, but by heroic persever- 
ance, Worden and his men finally succeeded in weathering 



4 Published in United Service, April, 1885. 



278 



The United States Navy 



the storm. At four p.m. the following afternoon the 
Monitor passed Cape Henry, and shortly after dark 
reached Fortress Monroe. According to orders already 
sent by the Department to Captain Marston of the 
Roanoke, the senior officer present, the Monitor on arrival 
was to proceed immediately to Washington; but in view 
of the desperate state of affairs at Hampton Roads, Cap- 
tain Marston decided to disregard the orders and detain 
her for the defense of the fleet. 

The Battle of the Ironclads 

Shortly after sunrise on Sunday morning, March 9, 
1862, the Merrimac, attended by the Patrick Henry and 
the Jamestown, got under way and headed for Fortress 
Monroe; then, striking the channel up which the Minne- 
sota had labored the day before, the squadron came slowly 
about and made for the Union ship. When still a mile 
distant, the Merrimac opened fire and planted a large 
shell under the counter near the water line. Before any 
considerable damage had been done, however, the Monitor 
appeared from the shadow of the Minnesota and boldly 
advanced to meet the Merrimac. Such a novelty in ship 
construction mystified the lookouts on the Merrimac. 
Lieutenant Davidson of the Confederate ship is said to 
have remarked, "The Minnesota's crew are leaving her on 
a raft." Soon the new vessel was recognized as Ericsson's 
invention, and many were the observations concerning the 
absurdity of this "immense shingle floating on the water, 
with a gigantic cheese box rising from its centre. ' ' 

At a time seemingly so unpropitious, the officers and 
crew of the Monitor showed no ordinary courage in offer- 
ing battle. All the night before they had been hard at 
work preparing for action ; two days and a night previous 
to that, they had been struggling for their lives, and twice 



The Monitor and the Merrimac 279 



had narrowly escaped shipwreck; thus for forty-eight 
hours they had had almost no sleep or food. Further, it 
required unusual spirit to disregard the gloomy forebod- 
ings that surrounded the Union fleet, and advance in a 
small, untried craft to meet a foe that had just been proved 
to be practically invulnerable. 

At about 8.30, on the Monitor's coming within short 
range, Lieutenant Worden changed his course so as to 
pass the Merrimac abeam, and gave the order to com- 
mence firing. Up went a port, a gun was thrust out, and a 
heavy shot struck the Merrimac; the latter responded with 
a broadside. Then the vessels, after passing, came about 
and passed again somewhat nearer. The firing now became 
regular; the Monitor discharged her guns every seven or 
eight minutes, and used solid shot ; the Merrimac with her 
larger number of guns fired more often, and used only 
shells. Most of the early shot of the Merrimac had gone 
wide of the mark, for her gunners had a far smaller target 
than that offered the day before by a frigate. And later, 
as their missiles struck, they made no impression on the 
Monitor's turret, which continued to revolve freely — a 
fact which brought great relief to the men inside the 
turret, now being tested for the first time. When, how- 
ever, as happened in three cases, a man was leaning even 
slightly against the wall of the turret on its being struck, 
he was knocked down and stunned. Thus Master Stodder, 
who had charge of the machinery controlling the turret, 
was disabled about ten o'clock, and had to be carried 
below. Fortunately, Chief Engineer Stimers, who was 
on board as official inspector, was eager to take part in 
the action ; and as he knew more about the machinery of 
the turret than any one else on the vessel, his service was 
of great value. 

The Monitor, because of the anchor-well in her bow, 
was scarcely adapted for ramming. The well was a device 



£80 



The United States Navy 



of Ericsson that permitted the anchor to be raised or 
lowered through the bottom without exposing men or 
machinery to the fire of the enemy. Nevertheless, Lieu- 
tenant Worden, on seeing that his heavy 11-inch shot were 
glancing off the slanting sides of the Merrimac, secured a 
favorable position and made a dash for the ram, hoping 
thereby to disable her rudder and propeller. He missed 
his mark by three feet, and the Monitor passed clear of 
the Merrimac. 

It had been a part of Worden 's plan in engaging the 
Merrimac to protect the Minnesota by offering battle at 
some distance from her. The Merrimac was, however, 
within long range of the Minnesota, and when in the 
middle of the engagement the Monitor withdrew for a 
few minutes, Lieutenant Catesby ap R. Jones, who was 
commanding the Merrimac, gave all his attention to the 
wooden ship. Captain Van Brunt of the Minnesota says, 
■ ' On her second approach, I opened with all my broadside 
guns and 10-inch pivot, a broadside which would have 
blown out of water any timber-built ship in the world. 
She returned my fire with her rifled bow gun with a shell, 
which passed through the chief engineer's stateroom, 
through the engineer's mess room, amidships, and burst 
in the boatswain's room, tearing four rooms all into one 
in its passage, exploding two charges of powder, which set 
the ship on fire, but it was promptly extinguished by a 
party headed by my first lieutenant; her second went 
through the boiler of the tugboat Dragon." 5 By the time 
the Merrimac had fired a third shell, the Monitor had 
again taken the offensive, and coming between the Minne- 
sota and the Merrimac, compelled the latter to change her 
position, in doing which she grounded. Fifteen minutes 
later she was free, and then headed down the bay, with 



5 Naval War Records, vii, 11. 



The Monitor and tlie Merrimac 



281 



the Monitor in pursuit. This was but a ruse on the part 
of the Merrimac, for, getting into deeper water, after 
considerable maneuvering she attempted to ram the 
Monitor. But the smaller craft, much the more agile, 
put her helm over and received only a glancing blow. The 
heavy beak of the Merrimac that had gone down with 
the Cumberland had not yet been replaced, and the light 
iron shoe now on her stem was cut by the Monitor's sharp 
edge. This opened a leak on the ram, which had been 
started the day before and had been only temporarily 
checked. At the moment of contact, Lieutenant Greene, 
who with his own hands fired all the guns of the Monitor 
until he left the turret near the close of the battle, 6 planted 
a solid 180-pound shot in the forward casemate of the 
Merrimac. The shot broke some of the iron plate and 
bent in the timber. Another shot striking in the same 
place would probably have penetrated. By order of the 
Department, only fifteen pounds of powder was used to 
a charge. Had thirty pounds been used, which later was 
found to be not too heavy for the guns, it is thought that 
several of the shot might have pierced the shield. A gun 
crew on the Merrimac were so affected by the concussion 
that they bled from nose and ears, but there was no further 
injury. 

After the Monitor had been fighting for two hours, 
ammunition began to fail in her turret, and as this could 
be replenished only by bringing a hole in the turret 
directly over a scuttle, she withdrew into shallow water, 
where the Merrimac could not follow. Fifteen minutes 
later she was back and ready for the fight. 

6 By the strange fortune of war, Lieutenant Butt, an old Naval 
Academy chum of Greene, also took part in this battle. As Greene 
wrote to his mother, " My old room-mate was on board the 
Merrimac. Little did we think at the Academy we should ever 
be firing 150-pound shot at each other, but so goes the world." 



£82 



The U nited States Navy 



The engagement had at this time been fought for three 
hours without either antagonist's securing the advantage. 
Each was powerful in defense, and each met with many 
difficulties on assuming the offensive. The Merrimac was 
cumbrous and unwieldy, and her draft of twenty-two feet 
was ill adapted to Hampton Roads. Her smokestack had 
been so riddled by the fight of the previous day, that the 
fires did not draw well, and steam got so low as scarcely 
to drive her defective engines. The Monitor, much 
shorter, and with a draft of less than twelve feet, re- 
sponded quickly to her helm; as she also had twice the 
speed of her antagonist, she showed a marked superiority 
in maneuvering. She would dart about, assume a position 
where for a time the Merrimac could not bring a gun to 
bear, and, when threatened, retreat to shoal water, where 
her huge enemy could not follow. But the turret of the 
Monitor could be operated only with great difficulty; it 
was hard to start, and when started it was still harder to 
stop. Consequently the guns had to be fired "on the fly," 
and it was anything but a simple matter to secure a good 
aim when all that a man in the turret could see of the 
outside world was what he saw through the narrow cracks 
between the guns and the sides of the ports. By the 
revolving of the turret, the men at the guns lost their 
sense of direction; white guide marks painted on the 
stationary platform below were soon covered with grime, 
so that when word was brought from the pilot house that 
the Merrimac bore off the starboard or port bow, the 
gunners had little to guide them. It was a constant source 
of anxiety to Lieutenant Greene 7 lest in the smoke and 
confusion the guns of the Monitor might be trained on 
their own pilot house, which, being in almost the extreme 



7 Greene's story of the battle will be found in Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War, i, 719. 



The Monitor and the Merrimac 283 

bow, was separated from the turret by a third of the 
length of the ship. Communication between pilot house 
and turret was by a speaking-tube, and when this was 
disabled early in the engagement, the paymaster and cap- 
tain 's clerk were employed as messengers ; since they were 
without sea-training, orders were not always rightly 
understood. 

At about half past eleven, the gunners of the Merrimac, 
despairing of doing any injury to the turret of the 
Monitor, directed their fire against the pilot house. This 
projected four feet above the deck, and was made of 
wrought-iron beams, nine inches thick and twelve inches 
deep, dovetailed together at the corners. By crowding, 
it now held three people, Lieutenant Worden, the quarter- 
master, and the pilot. While Worden was looking through 
the long narrow slit interposed between the iron beams, 
which served as a sight hole, a shell fired by the Merrimac 
only a few yards distant exploded directly outside, and 
his face and eyes were painfully wounded with powder 
and fine fragments of iron. The explosion also partially 
raised the heavy iron cover of the conning tower, which 
had been laid in a groove, not bolted down. Though 
suffering extreme pain, and temporarily blinded, Worden 
retained his presence of mind; conscious of the flood of 
light streaming in from above, he feared that the pilot 
house had been demolished, and gave orders to sheer off, 
a maneuver that brought the vessel into shallow water 
towards Fortress Monroe. 

Lieutenant Greene, who had been summoned to take 
command, after helping Worden to the cabin, found that 
the Monitor, though drifting aimlessly about beyond the 
reach of the Merrimac, was practically as fit for engage- 
ment as ever ; the pilot house had suffered little harm, and 
the steering gear was uninjured. Accordingly, after fif- 
teen or twenty minutes' absence, the Monitor was again 



284 



The United States Navy 



pointed towards the Merrimac; but it was towards a retir- 
ing foe. The Merrimac was on her way back to Norfolk. 
The Monitor followed her a short distance, fired a few shot 
to indicate her willingness to continue the engagement, and 
then returned to the Minnesota. This was shortly after 
twelve o'clock; the battle had been fought nearly four 
hours without either ironclad's losing a man. 

Both sides later expressed surprise that the Merrimac 
should have retired when she did. Captain Van Brunt 
of the Minnesota in his official report said that on seeing 
the Monitor withdraw after Worden's accident, he in- 
ferred she was leaving because she had run short of 
ammunition or had met with serious injury. And he 
admitted that, since the Minnesota was immovably 
aground, and had expended most of her solid shot, he had 
decided, when the Merrimac returned to the attack, to 
destroy his ship. 

Lieutenant Catesby Jones, who was severely criticised, 
defended his action as follows: 

' 'We had run into the Monitor, causing us to leak, 
and had received a shot from her which came near dis- 
abling the machinery, but continued to fight her until 
she was driven into shoal water. The Minnesota appeared 
so badly damaged that we did not believe that she could 
ever move again. The pilots refused to place us any 
nearer to her (they had once run us aground). About 
twelve [o'clock] the pilots declared if we did not go up 
to Norfolk then, that we could not do so until the next 
day. " 8 If this explanation is not wholly satisfactory, 
further light may be gained from a letter of Lieutenant 
Davidson, C. S. N. : "Our officers and men were com- 
pletely broken down by two days' and a night's continu- 
ous work with the heaviest rifled ordnance in the world. ' ' 9 



8 Naval War Records, vii, 59. 

9 Ibid., vii, 61. 



Results 



285 



During the engagement, the Monitor fired forty-one 
solid cast-iron shot. A proof of the fair marksmanship 
was found when the Merrimac went into dry dock ; twenty 
of the 100 indentations in her armor were recognized as 
caused by the shot of the Monitor. While six of the outer 
plates of the Merrimac were cracked, and had to be 
replaced, none of the inner course were broken. The 
Monitor had been struck twenty-two times. The armor 
of her turret had been indented in one place two and a 
quarter inches, but none of the plates had been cracked. 
As has been narrated, one of the wrought-iron beams of 
the pilot house, however, had been fractured by a 68- 
pound shell. 

Results 

The fight between the Monitor and the Merrimac, so 
far as the ironclads were directly concerned, ended at 
noon, March 9 ; but on paper, a contest of the same name 
has been fought over again and again in a fruitless effort 
to decide who was victor. Whether it was a defeat, a 
victory, or a drawn battle, it relieved the North of the 
greatest apprehension. The Monitor, by her remarkable 
defense, had saved the Minnesota, the Roanoke, and the 
St. Lawrence. She had prevented the blockade from 
being broken at Hampton Roads, its most important point. 
She insured the supremacy of the sea to the North. She 
allayed the discouragement and terror felt through the 
loyal States on the overwhelming defeat of the previous 
day, and checked the wild rejoicing of the South. 

These results were of such moment that the battle is to 
be classed with Gettysburg and Vicksburg in its influence 
on the war. Its fame, for other reasons as well, went far 
beyond the United States. ''Probably no naval conflict 
in the history of the world ever attracted so much atten- 
tion as did the battle in Hampton Roads, between the 
Monitor and the Merrimac. It revolutionized the navies 



v 



286 The United States Navy 

of the world, and showed that the wooden ships, which 
had long held control of the ocean, were of no further use 
for fighting purposes." 10 

The conservative London Times observed, on receiving 
the news of the battle, ''Whereas we [the English] had 
available for immediate purposes 149 first-class warships, 
we have now two, these two being the Warrior and her 
sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in the English 
Navy, apart from these two, that it would not be madness 
to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor." 11 

As the North immediately proceeded to construct other 
monitors of an improved type, the danger of armed inter- 
vention by England and France in behalf of the seceded 
States was materially lessened. 

The Subsequent Careers of the Monitor and the 
Merrimac 

Each side made elaborate plans for boarding or ram- 
ming the ironclad of the other in a later engagement ; but 
each, recognizing how disastrous would be a defeat, refused 
to fight except on terms promising a decided advantage. 

The Merrimac, after being repaired, appeared twice 
in the Roads, but made no further attempt against the 
Union fleet, and no engagement followed. On the 10th of 
May, 1862, when the Confederates evacuated Norfolk and 
Portsmouth, it became a question what should be done 
with the Merrimac. Commodore Tattnall, who had suc- 
ceeded to the command of the ram, despairing, because 
of her draft, of taking her up the James for the defense 
of Richmond, as had been planned, applied the torch and 
destroyed her on May 11. 



10 Knox, Decisive Battles since Waterloo, p. 228. 

11 Quoted by Knox. 



The Sinking of the Monitor 



287 



The career of the Monitor was also brief, and she sur- 
vived her great rival by only little more than half a year. 
She was once more actively engaged; the occasion, May 
15, 1862, was a bombardment of Drewry's Bluff, seven 
miles below Richmond, by the Monitor, Galena, Aroostook, 
Naugatuck, and Port Royal. The ironclad Galena was 
perforated eighteen times by plunging shot, and had thir- 
teen men killed and eleven wounded. The Monitor was 
struck three times, but not injured. The end of this, 
the most famous ship of modern history, came at the very 
conclusion of the year 1862. On December 29 the Moni- 
tor left Hampton Roads, towed by the Rhode Island, 
bound for Charleston, S. C. All went well until the even- 
ing of the 30th, when, being about fifteen miles south of 
Cape Hatteras Shoals, she struck a rough sea and yawed 
badly. The wind was from the south. Had the Rhode 
Island, with her tow, early come about, and run before 
the gale, the Monitor might have been saved ; but the Rhode 
Island held determinedly to her course. About eight 
o 'clock in the evening the sea rose rapidly ; from that time 
till midnight Commander J. P. Bankhead, with his men 
on the Monitor, made a heroic fight against the waves, 
which swept repeatedly over the decks, poured through 
innumerable crevices, and made the engines work harder 
and harder. Shortly before midnight two boats of the 
Rhode Island began taking off the shipwrecked crew. 
This, in the raging sea, with the Monitor submerged much 
of the time, was a most hazardous undertaking; and four 
officers and twelve men of the Monitor were lost. Shortly 
after Commander Bankhead had reached the Rhode Island, 
the red light in the turret of the Monitor disappeared, 
for the waves had closed over her. 12 



" Commander Bankhead's report will be found in the Naval 
War Records, viii, 347. 



XVIII 



OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS 

The organization of combined naval and military 
operations for gaining control of the Mississippi and its 
tributaries was one of the three cardinal recommendations 
of the Secretary of the Navy at the beginning of the war. 
This appealed with especial directness to the people of 
the North Central States, who realized that with the Union 
divided the vast system of waterways, the avenues of 
commerce, might become useless. They also perceived 
that the side which held the Mississippi could easily carry 
war into the territory of the other. 

Cairo, Illinois, at the junction of three States as well 
as two great rivers, occupied a strategic position, and 
became the naval arsenal and depot of supplies for the 
Union flotilla. Nearly all the Mississippi south of Cairo, 
1097 miles by stream, 480 by direct line, was in 1861 con- 
trolled by the Confederates. They had also a strong line 
of fortifications from Columbus, Kentucky (twenty-one 
miles down the river from Cairo), extending east to Fort 
Henry, Fort Donelson, and to the Cumberland Mountains. 
Attacking this line of Confederate defenses, the Union 
forces early in 1862 gained several important victories; 
and the navy, though not always the chief factor, was 
undeniably essential. 

Gunboats, well protected and adapted to service on 
shallow rivers, were at once demanded, and the Govern- 
ment contracted in August, 1861, with James B. Eads 
of Sj^fco'uis for seven ironclads. In size and form these 
were practically all the same, 175 feet long, fifty-one and 
/ 288 



Operations on the Western Rivers 289 




290 



The United States Navy 



a half feet beam, and six feet in draft; each carried 
thirteen heavy guns, and had a casemate, sloped at an 
angle of 35° and plated at the forward end and abreast 
the engines with two and a half inches of iron. There 
was a single, large paddle wheel placed in an opening 
forward of the stern and thus protected from shot by the 
casemate and sides. The speed required by contract was 
nine miles an hour. Thus were built and made ready for 
active service in January, 1862, the gunboats St. Louis, 
Carondelet, Cincinnati, Louisville, Mound City, Cairo, 
and Pittsburg. These with the Benton, a government 
snagboat that had been made over into an ironclad larger 
and stronger than any of the rest, formed the backbone 
of the river fleet throughout the war. 1 

The fleet was built under the general supervision of 
the War Department. However, the Navy Department 
co-operated by detailing one of its officers to direct the 
work. Commander John Rodgers began the construction, 
and Captain Andrew H. Foote, relieving him on Septem- 
ber 6, 1861, carried it on to its completion. Foote, a true 
sailor, would have much preferred a command on the sea ; 
for the peculiar duty given him included operations on 
land and swamp as well as river, and he met problems 
utterly different from any encountered previously in his 
long service. The fact that he was under the direction of 
the War Department, receiving orders from generals who 
little comprehended what a gunboat could and could not 
do, was not the least of his difficulties. In fitting out the 
fleet he was frequently embarrassed by lack of materials, 
money, and credit, but he carried forward the work with 
magnificent patience and determination. He later gained 
high praise for the successes he won with this fleet, yet 

1 Eads, Recollections of Foote and the Gunboats, in Battles 
and Leaders, i, 338 ff. 




I-rom Hoppin's Life of Foote 

Andrew H. Foote 



292 The United States Navy 



he is said to have looked upon the fighting as secondary, 
and the creation of this fleet as being the great achievement 
of his life. 

The Action at Belmont 

The first important service rendered by the river 
navy was on November 7, 1861, the day Port Royal was 
taken by DuPont. General Grant, with 3000 troops, sur- 
prised a Confederate force of 2500 at Belmont, Missouri, 
just across the Mississippi from Columbus. The Union 
army had come down the river in transports, convoyed by 
the Tyler, Commander Walke, and the Lexington, Com- 
mander Stembel. These were river boats which, with the 
Conestoga, had been purchased and made into wooden 
gunboats the summer preceding by Commander Rodgers. 

The Union army swept all before them, but when a 
decisive advantage had been gained, were slow in obeying 
orders to fall back. As a consequence they were in immi- 
nent danger of being overwhelmed by the large Confederate 
reinforcements that had crossed over from Columbus. The 
gunboats, which had three times engaged the heavy Con- 
federate batteries above Columbus commanding Belmont, 
now from an advantageous position opened on the Con- 
federate troops advancing to attack the retreating army 
even at their transports ; with grape, canister, and 5-second 
shell they enfiladed the Confederate lines and drove them 
back with considerable loss. They had occasion to pro- 
tect the transports even after they had got under way; 
moreover, when they had proceeded a few miles up the 
river, and General McClernand discovered that some of 
the troops had been left behind, the gunboats went back, 
picked up the troops with their wounded and forty pris- 
oners, and then returned to Cairo. The incident may 
seem not very important in the history of the navy, and 



The Capture of Fort Henry 



293 



yet without the Tyler and the Lexington the capture of a 
large part of the Union force could scarcely have been 
averted. Such a disaster would have caused distrust of 
Grant, and might have long prevented his being given an 
opportunity to show his great abilities. 

The Capture of Fort Henry 

In January, 1862, when Grant had his army fairly 
well disciplined, and Foote had the seven ironclads ready, 
they considered attacking the Confederate lines. Colum- 
bus, with its admirable situation and heavy batteries, gave 
promise of being able to withstand a direct attack for a 
long while. Forts Henry and Donelson were not so 
strong, and if they should fall the Union forces would 
have access to Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, and 
could compel the evacuation of Columbus. 

Having gained General Halleck's permission to attack 
Fort Henry, Foote left Cairo, on February 2, with four 
ironclads and three wooden gunboats. Progress up the 
Tennessee was slow because of torpedoes, eight of which 
the squadron fished out of the channel. At the same 
time Grant's army came up the river in transports, con- 
voyed by gunboats, and landed within a few miles of the 
fort. For the plan was that the troops, making a detour, 
should attack the rear of the fort when the squadron 
attacked from the river. Fort Henry in the official report 
of J. F. Gilmer, Chief Engineer, Western Department, 
C. S. A., is described as "a strong field work of fine 
bastion front, ... in good condition for defense," 
with "seventeen guns mounted on substantial platforms, 
twelve of which were so placed as to bear well on the 
river. ' ' The twelve guns were, one 10-inch columbiad, one 
60-pounder rifle, two 42-pounders, and eight 32-pounders, 



294 



The United States Navy 



"all arranged to fire through embrasures formed by rais- 
ing the parapet between the guns with sand bags care- 
fully laid." 2 

On the morning of February 6, according to agree- 
ment, Foote steamed towards the batteries, and at half 
past twelve, when 1700 yards distant, opened fire. "The 
three old [wooden] gunboats," writes Foote, " took posi- 
tion astern and inshore of the [four] armored boats doing 
good execution there in the action, while the armored boats 
were placed in the first order of steaming, approaching 
the fort in a parallel line. ' ' 3 Foote 's plan was to present 
the bows, the least vulnerable part of his boats, to the 
enemy, and rely on his bow guns, of which in the armored 
vessels he had eleven; then, by advancing, to compel the 
Confederate gunners constantly to alter their aim and 
make it difficult for them to secure the right elevation for 
their pieces. 

The fire of the gunboats called forth a spirited reply 
from the fort, and as the squadron slowly approached 
to within 600 yards, the shooting on both sides increased 
in rapidity and accuracy. About an hour after the battle 
had begun, the armored Essex had her casemate pene- 
trated by a shot ; this killed one man, then plowing its 
way back, exploded the boiler and wounded by scalding 
twenty-eight, among them Commander W. D. Porter. 
The Essex, rendered helpless, slowly drifted out of line 
astern, and was carried by the current from the fort down 
the river. The other gunboats also were struck several 
times. The flagship Cincinnati, particularly, was a target 
and had many plates of her casemate broken, while her 
smoke stacks, after-cabin, and boats were completely 
riddled. She received only one shot that caused loss of 



2 Army War Records, vii, 132. 
9 Ibid., vii, 122. 



The Capture of Fort Henry 



295 



life; this, penetrating the forward casemate on the port 
side, killed one man and wounded several. 

Meanwhile the Confederates were finding it increas- 
ingly difficult to defend their works. Their gunners were 
" under a most terrific fire from the advancing foe, whose 
approach was steady and constant." 4 Early in the action 
their rifled cannon burst, killing three of the men at the 
piece and disabling a number of others. Next, one of the 
32-pounders was struck by a heavy shell, which rendered 
the gun useless and wounded all its crew. Then the 
10-inch columbiad became silent; the priming wire had 
been jammed and broken in the vent, and efforts to 
remove it were unavailing. At 1.45 p.m., General Tilgh- 
man, commanding the fort, saw that further resistance 
was useless, for he had but two guns now in action. After 
an engagement that had lasted one hour and fifteen min- 
utes, he lowered his flag and surrenderd to Foote. 

An hour later Foote turned over the fort with the 
prisoners to Grant. The army had been so impeded by 
well-nigh impassable roads and swollen streams (the result 
of heavy rains for two days previous to the battle), that 
it had been able to take no part in the attack. In recog- 
nition of the splendid service rendered by the gunboats 
and their commanding officer, the captured fort was at 
once renamed "Fort Foote." 

On the surrender of Fort Henry, Lieutenant- Com- 
mander Phelps, with the three wooden gunboats, pro- 
ceeded twenty-five miles up the Tennessee, where he 
destroyed the bridge and rendered useless for through 
traffic the important Memphis and Charleston Railroad. 
Having compelled the Confederates, whom he surprised 
near the bridge, to destroy three boats loaded with mili- 
tary stores to prevent their capture, he continued to Cerro 



* Report of Chief Engineer Gilmer. 



296 The United States Navy 



Gordo, Tennessee. There he seized a large steamer, the 
Eastport, which was being remade into a gunboat. She 
was such a valuable prize that the Tyler remained to 
guard her and to put on board the materials that had been 
gathered for her rebuilding. She was later taken into the 
navy, and served for two years in the river operations. 
The Conestoga and the Lexington, going farther up the 
river, had seized two more steamers, one freighted with 
iron to be sent to Richmond. At Florence, Alabama, they 
discovered three steamers, but these were fired on their 
approach. They could not go beyond Florence because 
of the Muscle Shoal. Destroying the military stores along 
the route which they could not carry back, the gunboats 
then returned to Cairo, just in time to join the expedition 
against Fort Donelson. 5 

The Attack on Fort Donelson 

Because the Union army had been delayed in reaching 
the position in the rear of Fort Henry, most of the Con- 
federate army had escaped. While a hundred men under 
General Tilghman had been replying to the attack of the 
gunboats, the main force had slipped past the Federal 
army and gone to Fort Donelson, twelve miles distant on 
the Cumberland River. Here the Confederates, drawing 
in their lines, concentrated about 18,000 men, the com- 
mands of Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner. The fort 
occupied a bluff on the west bank of the Cumberland, and 
commanded the navigation of the river. It was much 
stronger than Fort Henry, and the Confederates realized 
its great importance to them. It was defended on the 
water side by two batteries, each about thirty feet above 
high water and well constructed; the lower, or down- 
stream, battery was armed with nine guns, one 10-inch 

• For Phelps's report see Army War Records, vii, 153. 



The Attack on Fort Donelson 297 



columbiad and eight 32-pounders ; the upper battery with 
three guns, a e^-inch rifled gun and two 32-pounder 
carronades. 

After the capture of Fort Henry, General Grant, know- 
ing that the Confederates would make every effort to 
increase their force at Donelson, recommended that the 
Union forces move forward at once and make a combined 
attack. Foote protested that the flotilla needed time for 
preparation, but as Halleck and Grant both deemed imme- 
diate action to be a military necessity, he yielded to their 
judgment. Since he had a force insufficient to man more 
than four of his ironclads, he substituted fcr the two 
gunboats that had been most injured in the recent battle 
two others that had been left behind at Cairo, and on 
February 12 he advanced up the Cumberland. 

At three o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th, Foote 
engaged the water batteries at Fort Donelson. His plan 
of attack was similar to that employed at Fort Henry. 
With the armored gunboats St. Louis, Carondelet, Louis- 
ville, and Pittsburg in line abreast, he slowly advanced 
upon the enemy's works, beginning the action at the dis- 
tance of a mile, and reaching a position less than 400 yards 
away. The wooden gunboats Tyler and Conestoga, form- 
ing a second division, were to shell the batteries from a 
position considerably astern. As a slight protection from 
the plunging shot of the fort, all the hard materials of 
the boats, such as chains, coal in bags, and lumber, had 
been placed along the upper decks. 

The contest was sharply fought, and lasted for an 
hour and a half. The fire of the batteries was terribly 
accurate, and not only swept the tops of the ironclads, 
destroying everything that was exposed, but occasionally 
penetrated the casemates or ports. ' ' The St. Louis alone, ' ' 
Foote writes of his flagship, "received fifty-nine shots, 
four between wind and water, and one in the pilot house, 



298 



The United States Navy 



mortally wounding the pilot and others. ' ' 6 The shot that 
entered the pilot house of the St. Louis carried away the 
wheel. About the same time the Confederates' fire injured 
the tiller-ropes of the Louisville. The attempt made to 
steer by relieving tackles failed in the rapid current, and 
the two boats, becoming unmanageable, drifted down the 
river and out of action. On the Carondelet, two pilots 
had already been disabled, and now the third was 
wounded. The wheel had been injured, and finally her 
starboard rudder was broken by the Pittsburg's fouling 
her. There was no alternative — the gunboats were un- 
equal to the task and had to withdraw. 

Admiral Mahan remarks on the attack, "Notwith- 
standing its failure, the tenacity and fighting qualities of 
the fleet were more markedly proved in this action than 
in the victory at Henry. The vessels were struck more 
frequently (the flagship fifty-nine times, and none less 
than twenty), and though the power of the enemy's guns 
was about the same in each case, the height and character 
of the soil at Donelson placed the fleet at a great disad- 
vantage. The fire from above, reaching their sloping 
armor nearly at right angles, searched every weak point. 
. . . Despite these injuries, and the loss of fifty-four 
killed and wounded, the fleet was only shaken from its 
hold by accidents to the steering apparatus, after which 
their batteries could not be brought to bear. ' ' 7 

In his report, Foote expressed confidence that the gun- 
boats would have captured both batteries, had their steer- 
ing apparatus not been disabled, and had the action con- 
tinued fifteen minutes longer. But the statements made 
by the defenders of the fort scarcely support his belief. 
General A. S. Johnston reported at the close of the engage- 

6 Foote's report will be found in the Army War Records, vii, 

166. 

7 Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters, p. 27. 



Operations at Island No. 10 299 

ment, "No damage done to our battery and not a man 
killed," and Chief Engineer Gilmer said the same. The 
gunboats when near were at a disadvantage because of 
the elevation of the batteries. Foote perhaps could have 
fought on more equal terms by bombarding the works 
from a distance, but later experience at Island No. 10 
and at the forts below New Orleans showed that a bom- 
bardment from a safe distance might be kept up day after 
day and cause little damage. Foote was looking for imme- 
diate results, and his dashing style of attack would have 
secured them had not the fort been so ably defended. 

A hard fought battle followed the next day between 
the Union and Confederate armies, in which the Con- 
federates at first had the advantage, but later were driven 
back to their fortifications. Early on the morning after, 
February 16, Fort Donelson surrendered. Grant had 
shown wisdom in beginning operations immediately on 
the capture of Fort Henry. The gunboats had been neces- 
sary for bringing up the troops in safety, and although 
the river attack had been checked, the navy was essential 
to the ultimate success. 

Operations at Island No. 10 

Less than a week after the capture of Fort Donelson, 
the Confederates had begun to transfer the military sup- 
plies at Columbus to a point farther south, but they con- 
trived to make the evacuation so skilfully that Flag- 
Officer Foote, making a reconnoissance while it was in 
progress, suspected nothing. The next stand the Con- 
federates made at Island No. 10, so called because of its 
numerical position in the series of islands south of Cairo. 
It was fifty-five miles from that city, and lay near the 
shore opposite Missouri close to the boundary separating 
Kentucky from Tennessee. The island has since been 



300 



The United States Navy 



swept away, and the river has somewhat changed. Here, 
at that time, the river by an extraordinary twist, like an 
"S" reversed (fu)> gained in its now of twelve miles 
just three to the south. The island, two miles long by two- 
thirds of a mile wide, lay at the bottom of the loop to the 
right, occupying, with the batteries on the Tennessee shore, 
a position admirably adapted for defense. For the Con- 




ISLAND NO. 10 



federates had the river before them, and behind them 
(to the east) a large, impassable swamp, which made attack 
by land forces impossible so long as the defenders could 
control the river. But their position was one of great 
isolation. Supplies could reach them only by the river 
from the south, and when their communications from that 
quarter were cut off, they were helpless, and retreat was 
practically impossible. 

On March 15, 1862, Flag-Officer Foote, with a squad- 



Operations at Island No. 10 301 



ron consisting of six ironclads and ten mortar boats, 
supported by Colonel Buford with 1200 troops, moved 
down the river to attack the island. General Pope, who 
had begun operations previous to their arrival, had occu- 
pied New Madrid on the loop above and to the northwest 
of Island No. 10. Though he was unable to cross the 
river because of Confederate gunboats, he planted bat- 
teries on the west bank as far south as Tiptonville (on 
the opposite bank, fifteen miles down the river from New 
Madrid), and by them prevented Confederate transports 
from taking up supplies. On the 16th Foote 's mortar 
boats took position and, opening fire, compelled several 
regiments on the island to change the location of their 
camp. Next day, at noon, the gunboats joined in an attack 
on the uppermost fort on the Tennessee shore, but kept 
at a safe distance of 2000 yards or more. Throughout 
the siege Foote was cautious. He well knew that if his 
gunboats were disabled, they would not be carried out of 
action by the current as at Henry and Donelson, but 
would be swept immediately under the enemy's guns. 
Further, he had to take into consideration that there was 
a Confederate fleet stationed below the island near Fort 
Pillow, reported to be not less powerful than his own; 
for if several of his boats should be lost, the Confederate 
fleet might capture the rest, and, steaming up the river, 
strike a heavy blow at Cairo. 

The bombardment of the 16th and 17th, as of the 
days following, annoyed the enemy, at times temporarily 
silencing certain of the batteries, but seems to have done 
little injury. A rifle gun on the St. Louis burst during 
the engagement of the 17th, killing two and wounding 
thirteen, probably a much greater loss than the Confed- 
erates suffered from the combined fire of gunboats and 
mortars. The mortars, as Foote later observed, lacked 
effectiveness because the forts were widely separated and 



302 



The United States Navy 



presented a small target. The Confederate position, 
indeed, was too strong to be captured by direct attack, 
even if the Union fleet had been increased to two or three 
times its size. On the island were four batteries mount- 
ing twenty-three guns, on the Tennessee shore six bat- 
teries with thirty-two guns; and there was, besides, a 
floating battery moored near the middle of the island 
reported as carrying nine or ten 9-inch guns. 

While the flotilla continued to bombard the forts dur- 
ing the latter half of March, General Pope was digging a 
canal to cut off the loop on which were all the fortifica- 
tions ; by means of this on April 4 he was able to take his 
light transports from above the Confederate works to 
New Madrid without passing Island No. 10. The gun- 
boats, however, drew too much water to pass through the 
canal, and until Pope had gunboats to protect his troops 
in crossing from Missouri to Tennessee, he could not 
attack from the rear the Confederate works just opposite 
Island No. 10. 

On March 20 Foote held a council of war and con- 
sidered running the batteries with part of his squadron. 
All of his officers with the exception of Commander 
Walke opposed the plan. The risk was undeniably great, 
yet so urgent was the need of a gunboat to co-operate 
with the army below New Madrid, that on March 30 
Foote ordered Commander Walke, who was eagerly wait- 
ing for permission, to prepare for the perilous enterprise. 

Meanwhile, an expedition, consisting of fifty men from 
the squadron and the same number from the army under 
the command of Colonel Roberts, performed a hazardous 
service. Late in the evening of April 1, the party, in 
five boats, crept down the river, keeping close under the 
shadow of the Kentucky shore towards the nearest bat- 
tery, known as "No. 1 Fort." Taking the greatest care 
to avoid discovery, the men had come within ten yards 



The Carondelet Passes the Batteries 303 



before the sentinels at the guns saw them and gave the 
alarm. Landing with great quickness, the Union force 
met with no resistance, and having spiked every gun, 
returned without losing a man. 

This exploit was especially timely for the Union forces, 
as they were about to send a gunboat down the river. 
They gained another advantage three days later, when 
the fleet, by their fire, managed to cut loose the floating 
battery, which had been an important defense of the 
island. As the current was strong, the Confederates were 
not able to secure the battery till it had drifted three miles 
below. 

On the 4th of April, Walke announced to Foote that 
his vessel, the Carondelet, was ready to run the blockade. 
He had made use of some clever expedients to protect 
her from the enemy 's fire. Around the boilers and engine 
room he had placed a barricade of heavy timber and loose 
iron. The parts of the sides without iron plating he had 
strengthened with bales of hay, lumber, and chain-cables ; 
and to her port quarter had lashed a coal barge as an 
added safeguard to the magazine and shell rooms. The 
upper deck he had covered with lumber, cord wood, coal 
bags, chain-cables, and hawsers. And around the pilot 
house he had coiled cables and ropes from twelve to eigh- 
teen inches thick. 8 

The plan was to run the batteries that evening, though 
conditions were not altogether favorable, for the after- 
noon indicated that a clear night was to follow. How- 
ever, at sunset the sky became hazy, and at ten o'clock, 
when the Carondelet got under way, a thunder storm 
was about to break — conditions decidedly more promising. 

During the first half mile everything went well, and 

8 Walke's own account of the preparations and the exploit is 
to be found in his Scenes and Reminiscences, p. 120 ff. ; also in 
Battles and Leaders, i, 441 ff. 



304 



The United States Navy 



the Carondelet, with her lights covered, was running so 
silently that there was hope that she might pass the bat- 
teries unobserved. But just as she came abreast the first, 
her flues caught fire, and, blazing up, disclosed her posi- 
tion. The flames were quickly checked, but five rockets, 
followed by a cannon shot from Fort No. 2, showed that 
the alarm had been given. Since the only course of safety 
for the Union vessel then lay in quick action, Walke 
crowded on steam and made all haste to pass the batteries. 

The thunder storm now burst with great violence, and 
vivid flashes of lightning showed the hurried movements 
of the Confederates as they were running to their guns 
and charging them. Soon, with the heavy crashes of 
thunder and the torrents of rain were mingled the roar 
of the cannon and the fall of shot and musket balls. In 
order to avoid needless exposure, the men of the Camn- 
delet were for the most part under cover. But Com- 
mander Walke, First Master Hoel (the chief pilot), and 
Wilson and Gilmore (the two leadsmen at the bow) kept 
their stations on deck through this double storm, exhibit- 
ing splendid coolness and courage. 

It was difficult to keep the Carondelet with the cum- 
bersome coal barge on the course because of the rapid 
current. And once, after an unusually long pause between 
the flashes of lightning, a timely illumination showed the 
pilot that he was running on a bar right under the enemy's 
guns. His prompt command, * 1 Hard-a-port ! " saved the 
boat. The Confederates fired at almost the same moment, 
but they either did not sufficiently depress their guns or 
were firing without taking aim, for their shot had no 
effect. The Carondelet was subjected for thirty minutes 
to an almost uninterrupted fire of the batteries on the 
Tennessee shore, besides one at the head of the island: 
and when she had passed these, there was still the floating 
battery three miles below to reckon with. A light burning 



The Capture of Island No, 10 



305 



on its deck showed that the Confederates were there 
awaiting the gunboat. The Carondelet was not prepared 
to engage it, for in running past the forts everything on 
her decks and in her hold had been arranged with the 
idea of protection. Therefore, bearing over to the Mis- 
souri shore, she slipped by, being fired on only six or 
eight times. About midnight she arrived at New Madrid, 
and was joyfully welcomed by the forces of General Pope. 

It seems almost incredible that in passing the gantlet 
of six forts and more than fifty guns the Carondelet 
should have escaped all injury. Not only had most of the 
Union officers believed that the project was too hazardous 
to justify attempting it, but the Confederates manning 
the forts had been confident that it was impossible of 
execution. The risk was unquestionably somewhat over- 
estimated, for two days later the Pittsburg repeated the 
exploit. However, this does not detract from the courage 
of Walke and his men. 

"The passage of the Carondelet," remarks Mahan, 
"was not only one of the most daring and dramatic events 
of the war ; it was also the death-blow to the Confederate 
defense of this position." Events followed in rapid suc- 
cession. On April 6 General Granger accompanied Com- 
mander Walke in the Carondelet in making a reconnois- 
sance of the fortifications on the Tennessee shore down to 
Tiptonville. Before their return the Union force stopped 
to engage one of the works, and, having silenced it, landed 
and spiked the guns. On the 7th the Carondelet and the 
Pittsburg took in succession the Confederate batteries on 
the east bank of the river and enabled Pope's army to 
cross in safety. Already the Confederates had become 
convinced that it was impossible to hold Island No. 10 
much longer, and most of their force had withdrawn, 
leaving but a hundred artillerymen, who surrendered 
the forts to Flag-Officer Foote late in the evening of 
20 



306 



The United States Navy 



April 7. But the Confederates' retreat had begun too 
late. Because of the impassable swamp on the east, their 
only road to safety was by way of Tiptonville ; and when 
Pope with great celerity threw his army across the river, 
he captured the entire force. In this move of the Union 
army the Carondelet and the Pittsburg had been abso- 
lutely essential, and Pope recognized them as having an 
important part in his success. The number of prisoners 
taken by Pope and Foote together was 7273. Pope writes 
in his report of April 9, "Three generals, seven colonels, 
seven regiments, several battalions of infantry, five com- 
panies of artillery, over 100 heavy siege guns, twenty- 
four pieces of field artillery, an immense quantity of 
ammunition and supplies, and several thousand stand of 
small arms, a great number of tents, horses, wagons, etc., 
have fallen into our hands. Before abandoning Island 
No. 10, the enemy sank the gunboat Grampus and six of 
his transports. These last I am raising and expect to have 
ready for service in a few days. The famous floating 
battery was scuttled and turned adrift, with all her guns 
aboard. She was captured and run aground in shoal 
water by our forces at New Madrid. ' ' 9 

While the gunboats on the Mississippi were co-oper- 
ating with Pope to such advantage, the Tyler and the 
Lexington on the Tennessee River were rendering service 
not less important to Grant at Pittsburg Landing. On 
April 6 General A. S. Johnston had unexpectedly fallen 
upon the Union army, and in a fiercely contested battle 
lasting all day had driven the Federal troops from their 
camp, half way to the river. In the afternoon the fighting 
was especially determined on the Union army's left wing, 
which Johnston attempted to turn so as to get possession 
of the landing and the transports. General Hurlbut, 



Army War Records, viii, 78. 



Capture of Fort Pillow and Memphis 307 

commanding this wing, was so hard pressed that he felt 
that without reinforcements he could not hold out for 
more than an hour longer. Then it was that the Tyler, 
by a rapid and well-directed fire, not only silenced the 
hostile batteries, but checked the Confederate advance. 
Later in the afternoon the Tyler and the Lexington shelled 
the Confederate batteries three-quarters of a mile above 
the landing, and silenced them in thirty minutes. At 5.30 
the enemy, almost everywhere victorious, had succeeded 
in gaining a position on the Union left, but the gunboats, 
with the Federal field batteries, drove them back in con- 
fusion. Early that evening the advance of Buell's army, 
from Nashville, came to the support of the shattered left 
wing. A disastrous defeat had been averted, and the 
battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, renewed on the 
following day, ended in victory. 

The Capture of Fort Pillow and Memphis 

Four days after the surrender of Island No. 10, Flag- 
Officer Foote started down the river, and, aside from one 
slight skirmish, met with no opposition until he reached 
Fort Pillow, eighty miles below New Madrid on the Ten- 
nessee side. Here General Pope joined him with 20,000 
troops, and though Fort Pillow was a strong position, 
the combined force would have captured it at an early 
date, had not Pope almost immediately been withdrawn 
by Halleck with all but 1500 of his army. 

Among the enemies the squadron had to meet was the 
so-called River Defense Fleet. This was composed of 
river steamboats, which, strengthened by iron casings at 
their bows and by an improvised protection for their boil- 
ers and engines, were to serve as rams. The commanders 
were Mississippi River captains and pilots, supposed to be 
under the military chief of department, but not subject to 



308 



The United States Navy 



orders from any naval officers. Farragut was destined 
to meet some of this fleet below New Orleans; and eight 
vessels of this class were now lying under the guns of 
Fort Pillow. 

On May 9, Captain C. H. Davis took temporary com- 
mand of the squadron, relieving Flag-Officer Foote, who 
was in need of rest and was troubled by a wound received 
at Fort Donelson. The next morning the Confederate 
rams made a sudden attack upon the Cincinnati, which, 
with a mortar boat, had moved down to bombard the fort. 
There was a difficulty in signaling, and as a result only 
four of the seven Union gunboats took part in the fight. 
The Confederates succeeded in ramming two of the gun- 
boats so that they had to be run ashore to avoid sinking ; 
on the other hand, three of the Confederate rams were 
disabled. 

The Confederates had shown considerable dash and 
spirit as they made the attack, and the injuries they 
received were of such a character as to admit of speedy 
repair. However, this was the only time the River Defense 
Fleet ever performed any service of special value. Their 
lack of organization rendered them incapable of vigorous 
and sustained action. 

The bombardment of Fort Pillow continued until the 
night of June 4, when it was evacuated. Next morn- 
ing the squadron steamed down to Memphis and engaged 
the Confederate rams before the city. These were eight 
in number, and to oppose them Davis had five gunboats 
and two rams. A one-sided engagement followed, in which 
the Confederates lost four of their boats, in return dis- 
abling only slightly one of the Union rams. The other 
four Confederate vessels then fled down the river; how- 
ever, they were pursued, and in a running battle one 
was destroyed and two were captured. On the same day 
the city of Memphis surrendered ; so that when Farragut, 



Results of the Western Campaign 309 

who had already captured New Orleans, brought his fleet 
up the river and passed the fortifications of Vicksburg, 
Davis was able to join forces with him. 

During four months the army and navy, co-operating 
on the western rivers, had broken the Confederate line 
of defense along the southern border of Kentucky, and 
had pierced the second line at Corinth, Mississippi (near 
Pittsburg Landing). They had also captured all of the 
fortifications on the Mississippi down to Vicksburg. Thus 
they had saved Kentucky for the Union, and had largely 
retaken Tennessee. 

The battles at Fort Donelson and Shiloh were the 
first great defeats that the Confederate land forces had 
received, and served to weaken the confidence in their 
armies, which the South had come to believe were invincible. 
The people of the North were in danger of entertaining 
the same view, especially as McClellan, with the superior 
Army of the Potomac, was meeting with reverse after 
reverse in the Peninsula Campaign. The successes won 
by Grant and Foote in the West, almost at the same time, 
afforded a striking contrast, and served to keep the North 
from discouragement. 



XIX 



OPERATIONS ON THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI 

Passing the Forts Below New Orleans 

Scarcely had the Department received news of the 
success of the expedition against Port Royal, when Assist- 
ant Secretary Fox was planning another expedition for 
the capture of New Orleans. 

New Orleans was the largest city in the Confederacy; 
its population in 1860 was 168,675, more than twice that 
of Richmond and Charleston combined. It was also the 
richest city, and, being the natural commercial centre for 
Louisiana and Texas, was forwarding great quantities 
of food supplies to the Confederate armies. 

The general opinion of the North, as well as of the 
South, was that any attack on New Orleans would be 
by a slow advance down the Mississippi. But Mr. Fox, who 
knew the lower Mississippi from having taken an ocean 
steamer under his command up to New Orleans, believed 
that it was within the power of the navy, operating from 
the Gulf, to capture the city. 

Strongly impressed with his project, Mr. Fox arranged 
for a conference at which, besides the Cabinet officers, 
General McClellan and Commander David D. Porter were 
present. Porter unhesitatingly expressed his confidence 
in the plan ; the others showed some doubt, yet gave their 
assent. 

To command the expedition, the Department, after 
some hesitation, agreed on a captain comparatively un- 
known — David Glasgow Farragut, the choice of Mr. Fox. 
This officer, born near Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1801, 
310 



David G. Farragut 



311 



was but nine years and five months old when he was 
appointed midshipman in the navy. As has been narrated 
in previous chapters, he had seen active service in the 
War of 1812, had taken part in suppressing the West 
Indian pirates, and had engaged in the Mexican War. 
But none of these operations had given him a chance to 
show his extraordinary abilities, and at the age of nearly 
sixty-one he was unrecognized. 

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Farragut was 
awaiting orders in Norfolk, Virginia, which for forty 
years had been his home. There was no wavering in his 
allegiance. On the secession of Virginia he immediately 
left for the North and applied for a command. The 
Government kept him waiting for several months, for 
after several unhappy experiences it had grown sus- 
picious of Southerners. However, the sacrifice made by 
Farragut did not altogether escape notice: it was the 
spirit that he had shown in so promptly leaving his State 
and in volunteering for service that caught the attention 
of Mr. Fox. This argued, in the latter 's opinion, " great 
superiority of character, clear perception of duty, and 
firm resolution in the performing of it." 

When Farragut was called to Washington in Decem- 
ber, 1861, and was informed of the expedition planned, 
he said without hesitation that it would succeed, and he 
manifested almost a boyish enthusiasm on learning that 
he was to command it. 1 He was to have even more ships 
than he said were required. The expedition was to be 
purely naval, and the responsibility for success or failure 
would rest on the naval commander. Nevertheless, the 
co-operation of the army to hold whatever the navy 

Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-General in Lincoln's Cabinet, 
was present at the first interview between Farragut and Fox, and 
gives a highly interesting report, to be found in The United 
Service, 1881, p. 39. 



312 



The United States Navy 



captured was guaranteed, and accordingly 18,000 troops 
under Major-General Butler were sent later. 

In the latter part of February, 1862, Farragut arrived 
at the mouth of the Mississippi. He had come in the 
Hartford, which he continued to make his flagship. She 
was a sloop of war with auxiliary steam power capable 
of propelling her eight knots an hour. She was a new 
ship, having sailed on her first cruise to China in 1859. 
Although rated a sloop of war, she had a greater tonnage, 
and was more formidable, than the ordinary ship-of-the- 
line of the War of 1812. Farragut believed in intro- 
ducing a gun wherever there was a place, and the Hart- 
ford, with twenty-two 9-inch Dahlgren guns, had twice as 
heavy an armament as many a cruiser of her size. 

After the Hartford had joined the blockading squad- 
ron in the Gulf, two months of preparation followed. To 
get the large ships over the bars before the Passes at the 
mouth of the Mississippi was an undertaking that required 
resourcefulness and patience; thus it was two weeks' 
work to drag the Pensacola through the mud and into the 
deep water inside. Finally, on April 7, Farragut had his 
fleet in the river and ready for active operations. It 
included, not counting the boats in the mortar flotilla 
under Commander Porter, seven steam sloops of war, one 
large side-wheel ship-of-war, and nine gunboats. These 
seventeen vessels were armed with 154 cannon. 

To oppose the progress of this force, the Confederates 
had two powerful forts, eighty miles below New Orleans 
and twenty miles above the head of the Passes. Fort 
St. Philip, mounting forty-two guns, was on the left bank 
(as one goes down the river), and being at a bend in the 
river it could not only command the river front but rake 
approaching ships; Fort Jackson, mounting fifty-eight 
guns, was lower down on the right bank, and was the 
stronger of the two. But, according to Mahan, about 



Preparations 



313 



half of the guns of the forts were obsolete 24-pounders, 
for the Confederates were so imbued with the idea that 
any attempt to seize the Mississippi must be made from 
the north, that they had given no heed to the warnings of 
army and navy officers at New Orleans. Besides the forts 
the Confederates had a flotilla of fifteen gunboats, two 
of them ironclad rams, and had stretched across the river 
under the guns of Fort Jackson two heavy chains sup- 
ported by a series of hulks. 

On April 18 Porter's mortar boats took a position 
about 3000 yards below Fort Jackson, and began to 
bombard the forts. If Farragut had been consulted by 
the Department, he would have declined the assistance of 
the mortar boats, for he had little confidence in their 
power to reduce a strong fortification. However, he gave 
them opportunity to do their utmost. For six days and 
nights the mortars poured forth an unremitting fire 
mainly on Fort J ackson, throwing nearly 6000 shells. The 
aim seems to have been good, yet the damage done to the 
forts was but trifling. 

When the mortars had kept up their fire for three 
days without appreciable effect, Farragut felt that it was 
time to bring the ships into action. Accordingly, on the 
night of the 20th he sent his fleet-captain, Henry H. Bell, 
with two gunboats, to destroy the barrier of logs and 
schooners joined by chains stretched across the river. The 
men worked under the fire of the forts, and were greatly 
embarrassed when one of the gunboats ran aground. Still 
they succeeded in making an aperture sufficiently wide for 
the largest ship to pass through. 

Then followed two days spent in preparing the ships 
to run the forts. Each vessel was trimmed a few inches 
by the head, so that if she touched bottom she would not 
swing down river. Sheet cables were stopped up and 
down on the sides in line with the engines; and ham- 



314 



The United States Navy 



mocks, coal, and bags of sand were piled up to protect 
the boilers from shot coming from forward or aft. Some 
of the commanders had the hulls of their ships rubbed 
with mud to make them less visible at night, and one had 
his decks whitewashed to make guns and ammunition more 
easily seen and handled. In the afternoon previous to 
the attack, Farragut visited each ship to make sure that 
the commanding officer had all in readiness and under- 
stood the orders. Though Farragut is popularly known 
for his quickness and power in action, he was no less 
remarkable for the wisdom and thoroughness of his 
preparation. 

Two o'clock in the morning, April 24, 1862, was the 
time set for the attacking ships to get under way. They 
were to advance in two columns ; one was to take a course 
well to the right and attack Fort St. Philip, the other, to 
the left, and attack Fort Jackson. The original plan of 
having the two columns advance side by side was later 
changed ; and the column on the right, which consisted of 
the First Division, three ships of war, one side-wheeler, 
and four gunboats, led by Captain Bailey in the Cayuga, 
was to precede the column on the left, which consisted of 
the Second Division, three sloops of war under Flag- 
Officer Farragut, and the Third Division, one sloop and 
five gunboats under Captain Bell. This change made the 
fleet weaker by being less compact, but more than com- 
pensated for the disadvantage by reducing the danger of 
collision when the ships were passing the narrow opening 
in the chain-barrier. 

At the appointed hour, two red lights displayed from 
the flagship gave the signal to the commanders to get 
under way. In a few minutes the clink-clank of the 
anchor chains was heard throughout the fleet, but because 
of various little delays, it was not until 3.30 that the First 
Division reached the barrier. The Cayuga was nearly 



Passing the Forts below New Orleans 315 

abreast the forts before the Confederates opened fire. 
Not strong enough to deal with her powerful foes, she 
sped along; but the sloop Pensacola, which followed, 
carried twenty-three heavy guns, and as she passed Fort 
St. Philip steamed slowly, frequently stopping to return 
the fire. Meanwhile the mortar flotilla had moved forward 
so as to shell both forts. 

Twenty-five minutes after the Cayuga had begun the 
attack, the Hartford, leading the Second Division, had 
passed the barrier and was opening with her bow guns 
on Fort Jackson. The darkness and smoke, together with 
the terrific fire from the forts, made it difficult for the 
Union ships to keep their course or to distinguish friend 
from foe. Suddenly, out of the gloom and confusion, 
Farragut saw a fire-raft coming directly for his ship. 
The helm of the Hartford was put over in order to avoid 
the raft, whereupon ,the ship grounded on a shoal near 
Fort St. Philip. Under the heavy fire of the forts she 
was in a trying position; and what was far worse, a 
Confederate tugboat, till then unnoticed, was pushing the 
fire-raft down upon her. In an instant the port quarter 
of the Hartford was a mass of flames, which were licking 
the paint and rising half way to the tops. It was one of 
those moments that are full of destiny, but Farragut was 
equal to the crisis. His quiet self-possession reassured 
his men, and each with alacrity did his part in carrying 
out the orders. The ship's guns drove off the tug, and 
kept playing on the forts; the well-organized fire com- 
pany, by great exertion, put out the flames; the engines 
backed the ship off the shoal, and again she headed up the 
river. 2 

The Brooklyn, Captain Craven, which followed the 
Hartford, also had some grim experiences. In the dark- 

2 Farragut's report will be found in the Naval War Records, 
xviii, 155. 



316 The United States Navy 

ness and blinding smoke, Craven lost sight of the Hartford, 
and suddenly found his vessel running over one of the 
hulks that carried the chain-barrier. 

"For a few moments," writes Captain Craven, "I 
was entangled and fell athwart the stream, our bow 
grazing the shore on the left bank of the river. While 
in this situation I received a pretty severe fire from Fort 
St. Philip. Immediately after the ship had been extri- 
cated from the rafts, her head was turned up stream, and 
a few minutes thereafter she was feebly butted by the 
celebrated ram Manassas. The latter came butting into 
our starboard gangway, first firing from her trap-door, 
when within about ten feet of the ship, directly towards 
our smokestack, her shot entering about live feet above 
the water line and lodging in the sand-bags which pro- 
tected our steam drum. I had discovered this queer- 
looking gentleman, while forcing my way over the barri- 
cade, lying close to the bank, and when he made his 
appearance the second time, I was so close to him that he 
had not an opportunity to get up his full speed, and his 
efforts to damage me were completely frustrated, our 
chain armor proving a perfect protection to our sides. 
He soon slid off and disappeared in the darkness. A few 
moments thereafter, being all the time under a raking 
fire from Fort Jackson, I was attacked by a large rebel 
steamer. Our port broadside, at the short distance of 
only fifty or sixty yards, completely finished him, setting 
him on fire almost instantaneously. 

' ' Still groping my way in the dark, or under the black 
cloud of smoke from the fire-raft, I suddenly found 
myself abreast of St. Philip, and so close that the leads- 
man in the starboard chains gave the soundings ' Thirteen 
feet, sir. ' As we could bring all our guns to bear, for a 
few brief moments we poured in grape and canister, and 
I had the satisfaction of completely silencing that work 



Engaging the Confederate Gunboats 31? 

before I left it — my men in the tops witnessing, in the 
flashes of their bursting shrapnel, the enemy running like 
sheep for more comfortable quarters. 

" After passing the forts, we engaged, several of the 
enemy's gunboats. . . . This ship was under fire about 
one hour and a half. ' ' 3 

The fight was by no means ended for the ships of the 
First Division when they had passed the forts, for, await- 
ing them, the Confederates had a flotilla of thirteen gun- 
boats, besides two ironclad rams. The Cayuga, as has 
been told, had made it her chief business to get safely 
by the batteries of St. Philip, while the Pensacola had 
slowed down to engage them. As the Mississippi and the 
Oneida, which came next, had kept their positions in the 
column, the Cayuga emerged from the smoke to find 
herself unsupported. 

"After passing the last battery and thinking we were 
clear," writes Lieutenant George H. Perkins, of the 
Cayuga, who was acting as pilot, "I looked back for some 
of our vessels, and my heart jumped into my mouth, when 
I found I could not see a single one. I thought they all 
must have been sunk by the forts. Then looking ahead I 
saw eleven of the enemy's gunboats coming down upon us, 
and it seemed as if we were 'gone' sure. Three of these 
made a dash to board us, but a heavy charge from our 
11-inch gun settled the Governor Moore, which was one 
of them. A ram, the Manassas, in attempting to butt us, 
just missed our stern, and we soon settled the third 
fellow's ' hash.' Just then some of our gunboats which 
had passed the forts came up, and then all sorts of things 
happened. There was the wildest excitement all around. 
The Varuna fired a broadside into us, instead of the 
enemy. Another of our gunboats attacked one of the 



Naval War Records, xviii, 182. 



318 



The United States Navy 



Cayuga's prizes — I shouted out, 'Don't fire into that ship, 
she has surrendered!' Three of the enemy's ships had 
surrendered to us before any other of our vessels ap- 
peared; but when they did come up we all pitched in, 
and settled the eleven rebel vessels in about twenty 
minutes. ' ' 4 

The Varuna, the fifth vessel of the First Division, 
was the only Union ship to be lost. She had passed 
through the Confederate flotilla, firing right and left. 
Then, seeing ahead a small steamer that was fleeing, she 
started in pursuit. She had, however, been observed by 
Beverly Kennon, formerly of the United States Navy, 
now in command of the Governor Moore. Convinced 
that he could do nothing against the larger ships, he left 
the melee and went in pursuit. Displaying signal lan- 
terns such as he had noticed the Union ships were show- 
ing, he was almost upon the Varuna before he was recog- 
nized. He then fired two destructive shells from his bow 
gun, and when the Varuna's helm was put hard-a-port 
so as to bring her guns to bear, he rammed. The Varuna 
was a few minutes later struck also by the Confederate 
gunboat Stonewall Jackson, and in a sinking condition 
she was headed for the shore. But her guns, with those 
of the Cayuga, had in the meantime disabled the Moore, 
causing the latter to drop out of the action; and as the 
Varuna, which had settled on the bank, continued to 
pour shot into her. setting her afire, the Confederate 
gunboat surrendered to the Oneida, which had just come 
up. 

The Itasca, the Winona, and the Kennebec, of the 
Third Division, following at the end of the procession, 
had not the support of the heavy ships, and did not 
succeed in passing the forts. The Confederates, though 



4 Alden, George Hamilton Perkins, pp. 118, 119. 



The Capture of New Orleans 



319 



driven from many of their grins by the fire of the fleet, 
had quickly returned, and just as day was breaking, gave 
all of their attention to these small vessels. The Itasca 
received a shot through her boiler, disabling her so that 
she was compelled to drift back. The Winona and the 
Kennebec became entangled in the chain-barrier, and 
when they freed themselves and attempted to proceed, 
they found the concentrated fire of the forts too much 
for them. 

The Capture of New Orleans 

When Farragut collected his forces at Quarantine, 
five miles above the forts, he had thirteen vessels. Believ- 
ing the time had come when he could co-operate with 
the army, he sent a messenger to General Butler and also 
to Commander Porter. The Wissahickon and the Kineo 
were left behind to guard the landing of the troops, should 
they come by way of the Quarantine Bayou, as now they 
could with safety. With the rest of the fleet Farragut 
then slowly steamed towards New Orleans. 

About 10.30 the following morning the ships reached 
the English Turn, five miles below New Orleans, the spot 
where the British attack had been repulsed in 1815. Here 
the fleet was fired upon from some new earthworks erected 
on the lines of the old, but the ships as they drew abreast 
quickly silenced the shore batteries. 

"All the morning," writes Farragut, "I had seen 
abundant evidence of the panic which had seized the 
people of New Orleans. Cotton-loaded ships on fire came 
floating down, and working implements of every kind, 
such as are used in shipyards ; the destruction of property 
was awful. . . . The levee of New Orleans was one 
scene of desolation; ships, steamers, cotton, coal, etc., 
were all in one common blaze, and our ingenuity was 
much taxed to avoid the floating conflagration. . . . 



320 The United States Navy 



"We now passed up to the city and anchored imme- 
diately in front of it, and I sent Captain Bailey on shore 
to demand the surrender of it from the authorities, to 
Avhich the mayor replied that the city was under martial 
law, and that he had no authority. General Lovell, who 
was present, stated that he should deliver up nothing 
but, in order to free the city from embarrassment, he 
would restore the city authorities and retire with his 
troops, which he did. ' ' 5 

The mayor, in the further correspondence, continued 
to make evasive replies, which soon became a heavy tax 
on Farragut's patience. The State flag of Louisiana was 
still flying from the city hall. It might be some time 
before troops could be brought up to occupy the city. 
Farragut had the city helpless under his guns, but since 
he did not wish to destroy property or take the lives of 
women and children, he was in an awkward position. 
However, the Union commander, simple and direct, as he 
ever was, proved himself a statesman as well as a warrior ; 
he gained his point by insistence. The United States flag 
was raised from the city hall and the government build- 
ings, and the municipal officers acknowledged the authority 
of the National forces. 

On the evening of the 29th Captain Bailey brought 
the welcome news that Forts Jackson and St. Philip had 
surrendered. There had not been the necessity of imme- 
diate capitulation ; yet, as New Orleans was the source of 
supplies, the capture of the city made that of the forts, 
sooner or later, inevitable. The end was hastened by a 
mutiny which broke out in the forts, where a considerable 
proportion of the defenders are said to have been 
foreigners. 

Running past the forts below New Orleans was an 



5 Naval War Records, xviii, 158. 



The Capture of New Orleans 321 



exploit of surprising boldness. Previous to its accom- 
plishment several officers had disapproved of Farragut 's 
plan. They thought it bad policy to cut loose from the 
base of supplies, and doubted whether it were possible 
for wooden ships to pass two such powerful forts. The 
Confederates also had the utmost confidence in their forts, 
and, believing that they could annihilate any fleet coming 
within reach of their guns, had been slow in preparing 
other defenses. 

Two other modes of operation had been suggested by 
Commander Porter: an attack by the fleet, with reduc- 
tion of the forts before the fleet went farther ; and a com- 
bined attack by the fleet and the troops. Farragut 
favored neither plan, because of the delay it was sure to 
involve. To postpone decisive action was to give the Con- 
federates opportunity for strengthening their defenses; 
besides, ammunition for his mortars was running low. 
He was not averse to profiting by the assistance of the 
army, but he believed a joint movement could be made 
from above the forts much better than from below. 

Previous to the engagement, large stories had been 
circulating concerning the Confederate ironclads Manas- 
sas, Louisiana, and Mississippi; and if Farragut had been 
more leisurely in his attack, he might have found that 
the tales were not so greatly exaggerated. The Mississippi, 
being unfinished, was burned at New Orleans on his 
approach; and the Louisiana, which had been brought 
down to assist the forts, proved ineffective because her 
engines had not yet been put into working condition. The 
gunboats above the forts, commanded with two exceptions 
by captains of Mississippi steamboats, belonged to the 
River Defense Fleet, another part of which Foote and 
Davis were engaging at Fort Pillow and Memphis. They 
made but a weak, ill-organized fight, although they would 
undoubtedly have caused greater destruction had their 
21 



322 



The United States Navy 



foes acted with more deliberation. Farragut plainly had 
a strong grasp of the situation, and recognized the prin- 
ciple that to increase the vigor of the attack is to lessen 
the risk involved. 

From New Orleans to Vicksburg 

The Department, impressed by Farragut 's exploits 
at New Orleans, believed there was nothing to prevent the 
navy from quickly gaining entire control of the Missis- 
sippi. Flag-Officer Davis, who with his fleet was above 
Memphis, was ordered to move down the river; and Flag- 
Officer Farragut w T as similarly ordered to move up the 
river. The two forces, having cleared the river of all 
obstructions, were to combine. 

It was a simple matter for Farragut to send forward 
one of his smaller vessels and secure the submission of 
Baton Rouge and Natchez. Vicksburg, however, defiantly 
refused to surrender. Consequently, as soon as he was 
able, Farragut came up with his fleet, and was joined by 
1500 troops under Colonel Williams. A combined attack 
was considered, but the strong position of the batteries, 
some of them near the level of the river and others on a 
cliff 200 feet above, as well as Vicksburg 's excellent rail- 
road connections, by which the Confederates could secure 
an overpowering force of troops almost at an hour's 
notice, made it evident that the Union forces could do 
little. Williams' troops had come with only a few days' 
rations, supplies were short also on the ships, and the river 
was beginning to fall. These reasons seemed to Farragut 
sufficient for taking his fleet without delay down the 
river to New Orleans. 

The Department, however, was still determined to clear 
the Mississippi, and ordered the ships back to Vicksburg. 
Farragut obeyed as soon as he was able to secure coal and 



From New Orleans to Vicksburg 323 

supplies, but with none of the confidence and enthusiasm 
with which he had entered upon the operations against 
New Orleans. It was now June, and he was apprehensive 
lest in navigating the Mississippi 500 miles from its mouth 
with sea-going ships, such as the Hartford, some of his 
fleet might be caught in the mud, when their capture by 
the enemy would be easy. The ships were constantly 
running into snags, which, as Farragut wrote Secretary 
Welles, were "more destructive to our vessels than the 
enemy's shot." Also, their engines were showing signs 
of wear under the hard service, in which opportunities 
for rest and overhauling were lacking. And not the 
least of the difficulties was that of bringing coal and 
provisions up the river to the fleet. Confederate sharp- 
shooters on the banks were constantly picking off the 
crews ; masked batteries sprang up like mushrooms and 
made it impossible for the supply ships to move with safety 
except when attended by gunboats, which could not be 
sent without weakening the force at Vicksburg. 

When all was ready, Porter opened with his mortars 
and bombarded the forts of Vicksburg for two days. 
Then Farragut decided to run past the batteries, and, as 
the Department had requested, join Davis' fleet above. 
Forming his fleet in two columns, the gunboats and lighter 
vessels to the left, away from the shore batteries, he 
weighed anchor at two o 'clock on the morning of June 28, 
and at four was engaging the works. 

"The Hartford/' writes Farragut, "fired slowly and 
deliberately and with fine effect — far surpassing my expec- 
tations in reaching the summit batteries. The rebels were 
soon silenced by the combined efforts of the fleet and of 
the flotilla [the mortar boats], and at times did not reply 
at all for several minutes, and then again at times replied 
with but a single gun. . . . 

' ' The Department will perceive, from this report, that 



324 



The United States Navy 



the forts can be passed, and we have done it, and can do 
it again as often as may be required of us. It will not, 
however, be an easy matter for us to do more than silence 
the batteries for a time, as long" as the enemy has a large 
force behind the hills to prevent our landing and holding 
the place. ' ' 6 

At six o'clock Farragut met Lieutenant-Colonel Ellet 
with a division of Davis' fleet, and anchored. Seven of 
his ships had succeeded in passing" Vicksburg; but the 
Brooklyn, the Katahdin, and the Kennebec, which brought 
up the rear of the two columns, became separated from 
the rest of the fleet, and after enduring a heavy fire, 
retired below the town. 

Farragut had now carried out his order to the letter; 
he had cleared the river, at least temporarily, and had 
joined the upper fleet. In reality he had accomplished 
little, as he was well aware. Williams, who had accom- 
panied him with 3000 troops in transports, was unable 
to attack the heights of Vicksburg. The Confederates, 
having lost Island No. 10 and Memphis, were massing to 
defend the position they had still in their possession. The 
troops which the Government had intended that General 
Halleck should send to co-operate with the ships, he was 
unable to furnish. The Department, at length recogniz- 
ing the true state of affairs, ordered .Farragut to return 
to New Orleans. As he was about to obey, there occurred 
an incident which occasioned him much chagrin. 

Upon the capture of Memphis the Confederates had 
saved the ironclad Arkansas, then under construction, by 
hurrying her up the Yazoo River. The Yazoo flows into 
the Mississippi near Yicksburg", and only four miles below 
its mouth the combined fleets of Farragut and Davis had 
been at anchor since July 1. 



6 Naval War Records, xviii, 609, 610. 



The Career of the Arkansas 



325 



On July 15 Davis, at Farragut 's suggestion, sent 
Colonel Ellet with three vessels to learn what he might 
of the Arkansas. When Ellet had gone six miles up the 
Yazoo, he met the Arkansas coming down. A running 
battle ensued in which the light Union ironclad Carondelet 
doggedly clung to her enemy, but got rather the worst 
of it. The unarmored Tyler, after firing a few shots, 
sped down the river to give warning to the fleet. 

The ships were all at anchor with fires banked, and 
it was impossible for them to get steam up before the 
Arkansas appeared and was running the gauntlet for 
Vicksburg. The Carondelet : 's fire had already riddled the 
smokestack of the Arkansas and reduced her speed to 
one knot. But, aided by the current, the Confederate 
ram passed down the line, and, though receiving a terrific 
pounding, she suffered no vital injury, and reached 
Vicksburg. 

At once Farragut resolved to follow her up and destroy 
her under the guns of the town. Early that evening he 
took his ships down the river and past the forts. But as 
the Arkansas, when hidden by darkness, had been moved 
by the Confederates to a protected position, she escaped. 

The last of July, Farragut got his ships back to New 
Orleans, and none too soon, for a large number of the 
officers and men were sick with malaria. He was, however, 
still troubled that the Arkansas remained uncaptured. 
His anxiety was relieved on August 6, when, in an attack 
which the Confederates made on Baton Rouge, the 
Arkansas dropped down the river to lend her assistance. 
Her engines as usual were working badly, and when the 
Essex, Commander W. D. Porter, dashed forward to 
engage her, the Confederates set fire to the ram and 
withdrew. 

Nothing further of importance was done by the ships 
on the Mississippi during the remainder of 1862. Mean- 



326 The United States Navy 



while, the Confederates were preparing to make a des- 
perate resistance at Vicksburg, and had begun to fortify 
another strong position, at Port Hudson, twelve miles 
north of Baton Rouge. 

In October, 1862, David D. Porter was chosen to com- 
mand the Mississippi squadron, still operating above Vicks- 
burg. He succeeded to the post which, with its onerous 
duties, had worn out Foote and Davis. Previous to this 
time his dash and brilliant strategy had never had oppor- 
tunity for full exercise, because of his subordinate rank. 
But Lincoln divined his latent power, and, passing over 
eighty officers higher in rank, made him acting rear- 
admiral, and gave him the squadron. 

Early in January, 1863, Porter co-operated with 
McClernand in an expedition directed against Arkansas 
Post, a stronghold on the left bank of the Arkansas River, 
fifty miles from its mouth. Here in a two days' battle 
most of the fighting was done by the gunboats, which 
succeeded in silencing the batteries. And it was Admiral 
Porter who, just as McClernand 's army had finally secured 
a favorable position for assault, received the surrender 
of the fort with its garrison of 6000 men. As a result of 
this victory the fleet and transports above Vicksburg 
were secure from all molestation from the Arkansas and 
White Rivers. 

Yv^hen, in January, 1863, Grant took command in 
person of the operations against Vicksburg he promptly 
sought out Porter. In the long and arduous campaign 
that followed, the co-operation between the forces ashore 
and those afloat was remarkable for its heartiness and 
for the absence of friction. Of this General Grant says, 
"The navy under Porter was all it could be during the 
entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign 
could not have been successfully made with twice the 
number of men engaged. It could not have been made at 



Farragut at Port Hudson 



327 



all in the way it was, with any number of men, without 
such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned 
between the two arms of the service. There never was a 
request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer 
or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly com- 
plied with. ' ' 7 While the details of Porter 's service are 
too complex even for a general account, it should be noted 
that it was by the passing of Vicksburg by a large part of 
Porter's squadron that the Union army was enabled to 
cross the river below in safety, and suddenly to attack the 
Confederate fortifications from the south and east. Grant 
conducted in person the brilliant campaign that followed, 
and captured Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. 

A half year previous to the surrender of Vicksburg, 
while Grant and Porter were still above the city, Farragut 
had proposed to Banks, who had relieved Butler in 
command of troops at New Orleans, that the army and 
the navy should make a joint attack on Port Hudson. 
Because of the lack of preparation on the part of the 
army, the attack did not take place until March 14, 1863. 
Even then it was almost entirely the work of the navy, 
and was chiefly an attempt to get seven ships above Port 
Hudson, where they were very much needed. The fortifi- 
cations at this point were now so formidable, as Farragut 
was well aware, that this was an extremely hazardous 
undertaking. Only the two ships leading the column, the 
Hartford and the Albatross, succeeded in passing the 
batteries. The Mississippi, running aground under the 
works, had to be fired to prevent her falling into the pos- 
session of the enemy. The other four ships suffered so 
severely from the enemy's guns that they were obliged to 
retire. 

Small though his force was above Port Hudson, Farra- 



7 Memoirs, i, 574. 



328 The United States Navy 



gut was able in large part to accomplish his purpose. He 
intermittently patrolled the Mississippi from Port Hudson 
to Vicksburg — as yet Porter had been able to send only 
two of his squadron below Vicksburg, the Queen of the 
West and the Indianola, and these had been captured. 
Farragut also blockaded the Red River, and by cutting 
off supplies to Vicksburg and Port Hudson very materially 
assisted in their downfall. 

Results 

The importance of the naval operations on the Missis- 
sippi in 1862 and 1863 is not likely to be overestimated. 
At their termination, with the river in Union control, 
the Confederacy was split in two. The rich and fertile 
States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas could no longer 
forward supplies across the Mississippi to the armies 
fighting in Virginia and elsewhere. The Confederate 
States that were more particularly the seat of war could 
furnish little, and armies without food and clothing are 
doomed. 

The capture of New Orleans had still another very 
important result. It deterred France from action hostile 
to the United States. Louis Napoleon had already sug- 
gested to England the advisability of recognizing the 
Confederate States; and just as Farragut was about to 
open fire on Forts Jackson and St. Philip, Napoleon was 
conferring with Mr. Lindsay, a member of the British 
Parliament and a Southern sympathizer. i 'Mr. Lindsay 
spoke of the Federal blockade as being ineffectual, and 
not in accordance with the fourth article of the Congress 
of Paris, and mentioned facts in support of his opinion. 9 9 
The Emperor fully concurred in Mr. Lindsay's opinion, 
and said that "he had from the first considered the restora- 
tion of the Union impossible, and for that reason had 



Results 



329 



deprecated the continuance of a contest which could not 
lead to any other result than separation." Moreover, he 
assured Mr. Lindsay that "he would at once dispatch a 
formidable fleet to the mouth of the Mississippi, if Eng- 
land would send an equal force, and that they would 
demand free egress and ingress for their merchantmen 
with their cargoes of goods, and supplies of cotton which 
were essential to the world. ' ' 8 When the Northern troops 
were in possession of New Orleans, the Government was 
very willing that the city's commerce should again be 
renewed, but to have abandoned the blockade of the Con- 
federate ports would have been fatal to a successful ter- 
mination of the war. 



8 North American Review, cxxix, 346. 



XX 



BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY 

Had Farragut been free after the capture of New 
Orleans to choose the next point of attack, instead of 
making two futile expeditions to Vicksburg in the spring 
and summer of 1862, he would have moved against Mobile. 
At that time its capture would have been an easy matter 
for the fleet under his command. Two years later, when 
the Department ordered the attack, the undertaking was 
of much greater magnitude, for the Confederates had 
vastly strengthened the defenses. 

On the surrender of Port Hudson, July, 1863, Farragut 
turned over to Porter the command of all the Mississippi 
above New Orleans, and on August 1 sailed for New 
York. He needed rest, and the Hartford, the Brooklyn, 
and the Richmond required extensive overhauling. With 
both objects attained, the admiral and his ships returned 
in January, 1864, to take a further part in the blockade 
of the Gulf. 

After the fall of New Orleans, Mobile became the 
Confederates' most important port for the shipment of 
cotton. Its situation near the head of a bay thirty miles 
long, with two large rivers flowing into the bay, and with 
a railroad system well developed, made its retention by 
the Confederates of great importance. For nearly two 
years previous to Farragut 's return in 1864, the general 
blockade had been regarded as technically effective. Still, 
it constantly happened that the swift blockade runners, 
creeping along the shore on a dark night, would make a 
bold dash and gain the protection of the forts command- 
330 



Defenses of Mobile 



331 



ing the entrance to the bay before the Union ships could 
come up with them. 

These forts were, in the order of their strength and 
importance, Morgan, Gaines, and Powell. Fort Morgan, 
on the east side of the main channel at the southern end 
of Mobile Point, was a pentagonal, bastioned work, with 
a full scarp wall of brick, four feet and eight inches thick. 
It mounted eighty-six guns and had a garrison of 640 
men. As the channel passed close under its guns, it was 
an admirable defense to the bay. Fort Gaines was on 
Dauphin Island, three miles to the northwest of Morgan. 
And Fort Powell was six miles farther in the same direc- 
tion, commanding one of the passes navigable for small 
steamers only. Since neither Gaines nor Powell had any 
part in the battle about to be described, they will not be 
considered further. On the flats to the south and east of 
Gaines, a long row of piles had been driven to prevent the 
passage of small boats, and where the piles ended, a double 
row of torpedoes had been planted toward Morgan. 

Further to strengthen the forts, the Confederates had 
ready, some months before Farragut could make his attack, 
the ironclad Tennessee, built on the general lines of the 
Merrimac. Though not so long as the latter, the Tennessee 
had a somewhat heavier armor, and also had an advantage 
in her shallow draft of fourteen feet. Her beak and her 
powerful battery of four 6-inch and two 7-inch rifles 
made her a dangerous foe to the wooden ships; indeed, 
she was commonly regarded as the most powerful ship 
afloat. Supporting the Tennessee were three wooden gun- 
boats, which were reported to Farragut by refugees and 
deserters also as ironclads. 

After making a reconnoissance on arriving off Mobile, 
Farragut informed the Department of the need of an 
ironclad and of troops to make a successful attack upon 
the forts. It was not until the last of July that troops 



332 



The United States Navy 



could be sent, and not until the 4th of August that the 
four monitors assigned him had all arrived. On the 5th 
of August, 1864, Farragut proceeded to the attack. 

He had made careful preparations for passing the 
forts, similar to those in the operations below New 
Orleans; and since a large proportion of his fourteen 
wooden ships were only of the gunboat class, he resorted to 
the expedient tried at Port Hudson of having his ships 
proceed in pairs; on the port side of each of the heavy 
vessels was lashed a light vessel, the latter being thus 
protected from the fire of Fort Morgan. The fight was 
to be the most desperate one that Farragut had engaged 
in since he was a boy on the Essex; he seemed to know 
this in advance, and there is a deep seriousness, almost 
melancholy, not characteristic of the admiral, that 
appears in a letter written August 4 : 1 

' ' My Dearest Wife : I write and leave this letter for 
you. I am going into Mobile Bay in the morning, if God 
is my leader, as I hope He is, and in Him I place my 
trust. If He thinks it is the proper place for me to die, 
I am ready to submit to His will, in that as all other 
things. . . . 

"Your devoted and affectionate husband, who never 
for one moment forgot his love, duty, or fidelity to you, 
his devoted and best of wives, 

" D. G. Farragut." 

There were two favoring conditions that he desired in 
making the attack: a flood tide, and a westerly wind to 
blow the smoke of the guns from the ships upon Fort 
Morgan. Early Friday morning, August 5, he had both. 

Long before daylight Farragut had given orders for 
the ships to be ready to advance. At 5.30, while sipping 



1 Loyall Farragut, Life of Farragut, p. 405. 



Farragufs Preparations 



333 



\0j 

\ 



TENNESSEE 
SURRENDERED 




FORT GAINES 



\ 



\ 



1. Tecumseh 

2. Manhattan 

3. Winnebago 

4. Chickasaw 

5. Brooklyn 

6. Octorora 

7. Hartford 

8. Metacomet 

9. Richmond 

10. Port Royal 

11. Lackawanna 

12. Seminole 

13. Monongahela 

14. Kennebec 

15. Ossipee 

16. Itasca 

17. Oneida 

18. Galena 



\ 



' 

•3ELMA 

— GAINES 



•MORGAN 

' ' A FORT MORGAN^ 



BATTLE OF 
MOBILE BAY 



Battle of Mobile Bay 



334 



The United States Navy 



a cup of tea at the conclusion of breakfast, he turned to 
his fleet-captain and quietly said, "Well, Drayton, we 
might as well get under way." In a minute there came 
back answering signals from the expectant captains, and 
the ships, lashed in couples, took their assigned positions. 

The column was led by the Brooklyn, Captain James 
Alden, and the Octorora, Lieutenant-Commander Charles 
Green. Following them came the flagship Hartford, Cap- 
tain Percival Drayton, and the Metacomet, Lieutenant- 
Commander James E. Jouett. Since the ships would be 
subject to a raking fire on approaching Fort Morgan, and 
could bring but very few guns into action until abreast 
the fort, the monitors Tecumseh, Manhattan, Winnebago, 
and Chickasaw, which could fire in any direction, were to 
form a column to starboard and in advance of the ships, 
engaging the fort to protect the ships' approach. That 
the fleet might demoralize the gunners in Fort Morgan 
by a hot fire of grape and shrapnel, the vessels were to 
pass close to the fort, to the east of a certain red buoy. 
It was said that the buoy marked the limit of the line of 
torpedoes, so that this order had a double reason. 

The Tecumseh, Commander T. A. M. Craven, opened 
the battle, firing the first shot at 6.47. 2 Meanwhile, the 
Confederate vessels Tennessee, Morgan, Gaines, and 
Selma had emerged from behind the fort, and had taken 
position in echelon across the channel, with their port 
batteries toward the advancing fleet; the Tennessee was 
the farthest to the left, and rested a little to the west- 
ward of the red buoy. The ram had been designated by 
Farragut as the antagonist especially of the Tecumseh 
and Manhattan, and Craven was all eagerness to engage 
her. Accordingly, after his first fire, Craven loaded the 



2 For Farragut's report of the battle, see the Naval War 
Records, xxi, 405 ff. 



Passing Fort Morgan 335 



guns each with sixty pounds of powder and a steel shot, 
and held them in readiness. 

Fort Morgan had opened on the approaching ships 
shortly after seven, and for half an hour was raking them 
while they could answer only with their bow-chasers. At 
the end of that time, the Brooklyn and the Hartford, 
drawing abreast of the fort, brought their broadsides into 
action, and Farragut, from his station in the port main 
rigging, saw the gunners driven from the barbette and 
water batteries. But his satisfaction was of short dura- 
tion; suddenly all went wrong. 

Commander Craven, in the Tecumseh, was about 300 
yards in advance and to starboard of the Brooklyn, and 
as he approached the red buoy, remarked to his pilot, 
"The admiral ordered me to go inside [to the east of] 
that buoy, but it must be a mistake. ' ' 3 Just at that 
moment the Tennessee moved slightly forward and to the 
west. Craven, in his doubt as to the course and in his 
eagerness to grapple with the enemy, put on full speed 
and made directly for the ram. This led him slightly to 
the west of the buoy. 

The bow gun of the Tennessee was heavily loaded to 
meet the monitor, and the attention of onlookers was 



3 From Farragut's. notes on the battle, quoted by his son (Life 
of Farragut, p. 422 ) . Immediately after this the admiral added, 
" He ran just his breadth of beam too far westward, struck a 
torpedo, and went down in two minutes." There is, however, a 
lack of agreement in the reports of various officers as to just 
where the Tecumseh ran on the torpedo. This is important, for 
on it hinges the question, did Craven disobey the admiral's orders? 
Mr. Julian M. Spencer, who, as first lieutenant on the Morgan, 
was an eye-witness of the disaster, says, in a statement made to 
the authors, " The Tecumseh was well to the east of the red buoy. 
Craven did not strike the line of torpedoes, but he must have run 
upon a torpedo that was adrift and in the ship-channel. This I 
am positive of, not only because I saw the Tecumseh when she 



336 



The United States Navy 



eagerly directed towards the ironclads about to engage 
each other, when suddenly a muffled roar was heard ; the 
Tecumseh careened violently, and then settled so quickly 
that 113 men out of a complement of 135 were carried 
down with her. A torpedo had exploded under her turret, 
and within less than two minutes nothing but eddies 
marked where the large sea-going monitor had been. Com- 
mander Craven was among the lost. It is related by 
Mr. Collins, the pilot, who was with him in the conning 
tower when the explosion occurred, that as both instinc- 
tively turned to the ladder, the only means of escape, 
Craven drew back, saying, " After you, pilot." The 
commander's noble courtesy cost him his life. 4 

Captain Alden, in the Brooklyn, leading the column 
of wooden ships, was a close spectator of the disaster. 
At this time, or slightly earlier, his lookout reported 
torpedo-buoys, almost under his bows. Alden at once 
backed his engines, and then stopped. He was signaled 
by the admiral to go forward, but he either did not see 
the signal or, with the torpedoes ahead and the monitors 
close to starboard, did not know how to obey, for he 
remained inactive. Meanwhile, the other ships were com- 
ing on, and the column was in danger of becoming hope- 



sank, but also because it was what the other officers of the 
Morgan remarked when we talked over the fight afterwards in 
the wardroom." Supporting this view, at least in part, is a letter 
of Captain J. W. Whiting, of the Confederate Army (quoted in 
the Naval War Records, xxi, 598 ) : "I was on duty at Fort 
Morgan when the enemy's fleet entered the bay on the morning of 
August 5, and saw the monitor Tecumseh when she went down. 
I am of the opinion that she sank before reaching the line of 
torpedoes. This opinion is entertained by such other of the 
officers of the fort as witnessed the sinking, and by the pilots on 
lookout duty, and privates who had been detailed to assist in 
planting the torpedoes." 

4 Narrated in Parker's Battle of Mobile Bay, p. 27. 



Passing Fort Morgan 337 



lessly entangled right under the guns of Fort Morgan. 
Already the defenders, seeing the confusion, were firing 
with increased vigor. 

Admiral Farragut, from the rigging of the Hartford, 
had witnessed the destruction of the monitor. He had 
also seen the Brooklyn stop and back, though he did not 
know the reason why. On his starboard bow were the 
Brooklyn and the Octorora athwart the channel, on his 
starboard beam were the monitors Winnebago and CMek- 
asaw, while the fleet was rapidly massing together, so 
that in a minute more even retreat would be impossible. 
It was, as Mahan terms it, "the supreme moment of his 
life." On a right and immediate decision depended the 
crowning victory of his long naval career. An error 
would mean colossal defeat, of terrible costliness to the 
Union, and a tragic ending to all his years of preparation 
and his brilliant exploits on the Mississippi. "In later 
days, Farragut told that in the confusion of these 
moments, feeling that all his plans had been thwarted, 
he was at a loss whether to advance or retreat. In this 
extremity the devout spirit that ruled his life, and so 
constantly appears in his correspondence, impelled him 
to appeal to Heaven for guidance, and he offered up this 
prayer: '0 God, who created man and gave him reason, 
direct me what to do. Shall I go on?' 'And it seemed,' 
said the admiral, 'as if in answer a voice commanded, 
Go on.' " 5 

Since the signal to the Brooklyn, to go ahead, had 
produced no effect, Farragut decided to take the lead 
himself. And as he could not take the safe course to 
starboard, he determined to pass to port. Ordering the 
Hartford to drive her engine forward, and the Metacomet, 
lashed alongside, to back hers, he twisted short around, 



6 Mahan, Admiral Farragut, p. 277. 



338 The United States Navy 

and, passing the stern of the Brooklyn, made directly for 
the line of torpedoes. There came from the Brooklyn a 
warning cry of torpedoes ahead. 

"Damn the torpedoes!" shouted the admiral, intent 
only on his high purpose. "Four bells ! Captain Drayton, 
go ahead! Jouett, full speed!" The Hartford and M eta- 
comet crossed the line of torpedoes, and men on board 
said they heard some of the primers snap, but no torpedo 
exploded. The Brooklyn and Octorora followed in their 
wake, and the column straightened out as by magic. 

Meanwhile Farragut had not been forgetful of the 
few survivors of the Tecumseh, still struggling near where 
the monitor had sunk, but directed Jouett to send a boat. 
A.cting Ensign Henry C. Nields, a mere boy, had charge 
of the boat and pulled within a few hundred yards of 
the fort, where he was exposed to the fire of both foes 
and friends. He rescued ten men, and rowing back to the 
fleet, succeeded in reaching the Oneida, where he remained 
till the end of the battle. 

When the leading ships had passed beyond the danger 
of the torpedoes, they found the Confederate squadron 
awaiting them. The three wooden gunboats slowly 
retreated, firing as they went, and doing considerable 
damage to the Hartford, which for fifteen minutes was 
obliged to endure their fire, and because of the narrow 
channel could not bring her guns into action. Admiral 
Buchanan, who was commanding the Tennessee, made a 
dash at the Hartford, but the latter, which was much 
quicker, easily eluded the ram, and after returning her 
fire, continued up the bay. Then Buchanan gave his 
attention successively to the Brooklyn, the Richmond, and 
the Lackawanna, exchanging shots with each, but causing 
no serious damage. The Monongahela attempted to ram 
the Tennessee, but succeeded in giving her only a glancing 
blow. .■ ' 



Passing Fort Morgan 339 



By this time the Hartford had reached a position 
where she could bring her guns to bear on the three gun- 
boats that had been annoying her ; she then quickly drove 
them off, and so damaged the Gaines that the latter was 
with difficulty kept afloat till she had reached Fort 
Morgan. Meanwhile the Metacomet was pursuing the 
Selma, and succeeded in capturing her. The Morgan, and 
a little later also the Tennessee, took refuge under the 
guns of the fort. 

Shortly after eight o'clock, the three Union monitors 
and all fourteen of Farragut's wooden ships had safely 
passed the fort, with comparatively little injury except to 
the Oneida. This vessel, which occupied an exposed posi- 
tion at the end of the column, received a shot from Fort 
Morgan that penetrated her boilers and completely dis- 
abled her. Here the wisdom of Farragut's sending the 
ships in couples became apparent. The Oneida's consort, 
the Galena, aided by the tide, brought her through, and 
into the bay beyond. 

As the Union vessels one by one reached a position 
four miles above Fort Morgan, where there was a large 
pocket, they were directed to anchor. Soon the stewards 
had breakfast preparing, and officers and men were relax- 
ing after the intense strain. Farragut, on the poop of 
the Hartford, was talking with his fleet-captain, Drayton, 
who observed that although the engagement was ended 
they still had their strongest foe, the Tennessee, to meet 
again. The same thought had been in Farragut's mind, 
and he had resolved to go himself on the Manhattan, with 
the other monitors, to attack the ram that evening under 
the fort; he planned to board her, taking advantage of 
the darkness to compel the Confederate gunners, if they 
fired, to shoot at friend as well as at foe. But it proved 
unnecessary to resort to this desperate measure, for at 
8.45 a.m., before all his vessels had anchored, it was 



The United States Navy 

reported that the Tennessee was coming out, and later 
that she was heading for the Union flagship. 

One cannot but admire the daring of Admiral 
Buchanan in thus boldly advancing in broad daylight, 
single-handed, to engage an entire fleet. But his act was 
nothing less than recklessness, and by it he threw away 
the evident advantages he possessed. With his heavy 
rifled guns, of much greater range than the smooth-bores 
forming the chief part of the Union ships' batteries, he 
could have hammered at the wooden ships from a distance, 
dealing destruction and receiving no injury in return. If 
the fleet should have attempted to attack the ram, he 
could have retreated to the fort, or, choosing a position in 
shallow water, have prevented Farragut from using his 
heavier vessels. The Tennessee was too slow to be effective 
as a ram, so that she had little to gain by action at close 
quarters. Thus Buchanan, steaming into the midst of the 
Union fleet, where the water was deep and the channel 
broad, was offering battle on terms most advantageous to 
his enemies. 

Mess-gear on the Union vessels was hurriedly put away, 
and preparations were made for another engagement. 
The stronger wooden ships were ordered to attack "not 
only with their guns, but bows on at full speed." Dr. 
Palmer, the fleet-surgeon, who, in going his rounds, hap- 
pened to be just leaving the flagship in his launch, was 
dispatched by Farragut with orders for the monitors to 
attack. 

The Union ironclads had already shown themselves 
slow and difficult to maneuver, and it was the wooden 
Monongahela, which had not yet come to anchor, that 
began the second engagement. She struck the Tennessee 
a blow that carried away her own iron prow and cut- water 
(already weakened by the attempt to ram when passing 
the fort), but did no injury to the Confederate. The 



342 



The United States Navy 



Lackawanna followed close after, and struck the Tennessee 
at full speed. Again it was the attacking ship that 
suffered, for though her stem was crushed to the plank 
ends above and below the water line, the only perceptible 
effect on the Tennessee was to give her a heavy list. The 
Lackawanna received two destructive shells through her 
bows, but, in return, on separating, fired a 9-inch shell 
that destroyed one of her enemy's port shutters, driving 
the fragments into the casemate. 

The Hartford was the third vessel to strike the ram. 
The blow, however, was but a glancing one, for the Con- 
federate had turned towards the Union flagship on her 
approach. As the Hartford scraped past, she fired her 
entire port broadside of 9-inch guns, but the shot bounded 
off with no effect. The Tennessee in reply was able to 
fire only one shell, but this, passing through the berth 
deck of the Hartford, killed five men and wounded eight. 
When the two vessels came together, Admiral Farragut, 
who had been standing on the quarter-deck, jumped on 
the rail, holding to the port mizzen rigging, just above 
the ram. His flag lieutenant, Watson, fearful for his 
safety, passed a rope around him and secured it to the 
rigging — this had been done also on entering the bay, 
when Captain Drayton, seeing the admiral; in the main 
rigging near the top, ordered Quartermaster Knowles thus 
to protect him from a fall. 

Both the Hartford and the Lackawanna now made a 
circuit to get into position to charge again on the ram, but 
while thus maneuvering, the Lackawanna came crashing 
into the flagship just forward of the mizzenmast, breaking 
two ports into one, dismounting a Dahlgren gun, and 
cutting the hull down within two feet of the water. In a 
moment Farragut was climbing over the side to see the 
extent of the damage. "Immediately," says Captain 
Drayton, "there was a general cry all round, 'Get the 



The Fight with the Tennessee 



343 



admiral out of the ship ! ' and the whole interest of every 
one near was, that he should be in a place of safety. " 
Farragut, however, had no intention of leaving the Hart- 
ford, and when he discovered that she would still float, 
he repeated his orders to make for the ram. But again 
there was confusion in the maneuvers, and the flagship 
narrowly escaped being rammed a second time by the 
Lackawanna. 

In the meantime the monitors had approached and 
were attacking the ram. One gun of the Manhattan was 
disabled, but with the other she planted a 15-inch shot that 
penetrated the armor and woodwork of the casemate, and 
was held only by the netting inside. The turrets of the 
Winnebago would not turn, and her guns could be fired 
only by pointing the ship ; in consequence, her effectiveness 
was much lessened. But the double-turreted monitor 
Chickasaw, brilliantly handled by Lieutenant-Commander 
Perkins (the youngest of Farragut 's captains), secured 
a position under the stern of the Tennessee, and there 
she stuck, as the Confederate pilot said later, "like a 
leech." 

On the Tennessee, throughout the engagement, Admiral 
Buchanan superintended the handling of the guns. After 
the collision with the Hartford, the engineer reported that 
the ram was leaking rapidly, whereupon the Confederate 
admiral sent word to Commander J. D. Johnston, in the 
pilot house, to steer for Fort Morgan. Then it was that 
the Chickasaw secured her position under the stern and so 
annoyed the ram. 

The wheel chains of the Tennessee, which by a colossal 
blunder in construction lay exposed on the deck, were 
carried away. Next, a port cover was struck by an 11-inch 
shot from the Chickasaw; the impact instantly killed a 
machinist who was working there, and threw iron splinters 
which mortally wounded one of the gunners and broke 



344 



The United States Navy 



Buchanan's leg above the knee. Johnston, to whom 
Buchanan then gave over the command, did his utmost 
to save the vessel, but he could do very little. The reliev- 
ing tackles by which he was steering the ship were shot 
away, and the tiller was unshipped from the rudder head. 
The smokestack, riddled by shot, had fallen over when the 
Tennessee was struck by the wooden vessels, and the 
steam was going down rapidly. Two quarter ports in- 
tended for the after gun had been so jammed that they 
could not be removed, and two of the broadside port covers 
had been entirely unshipped by the fire of the fleet. 
Because of these injuries it happened that in the last 
half hour of the fight, that is, following the collision with 
the Hartford, the Tennessee was unable to fire a shot. 
During this period the Chickasaw had kept up a persistent 
pounding from her position under the stern, never more 
than fifty yards away, and had fired fifty- two 11-inch 
shot. Of the monitor's fire Johnston remarks in his report, 
"the shot were fairly raining upon the after end of the 
shield, which was now so thoroughly shattered that in a 
few moments it would have fallen and exposed the gun 
deck to a raking fire of shell and grape. ' ' 6 

The Tennessee lay helpless as a log, and Buchanan, 
recognizing her condition, said to Johnston, who had 
sought him out on the berth deck, "Do the best you can, 
sir, and when all is done, surrender." The Ossipee was 
now charging down at full speed, and the Hartford, the 
Monongahela, and the Lackawanna were seeking another 
opportunity to ram. Convinced that the Tennessee was 
nothing more than a target for the Union ships, J ohnston 
went out on the casemate and hauled down her colors, 
shortly afterwards reappearing and hoisting a white flag. 



6 Buchanan's and Johnston's reports will be found in the Naval 
War Records, xxi, 576-581. 



The Capture of the Forts 



345 



LeRoy, of the Ossipee, at once attempted to stop his ship, 
but the momentum carried him on, and he struck the 
ram on her starboard quarter. The blow, however, did 
no harm. 

The engagement ended at ten o'clock, having lasted 
three hours and a quarter, with a half hour's intermis- 
sion. The losses of the Union fleet were large, amounting 
to fifty-two killed and 170 wounded. The Hartford 
suffered far more severely than any other ship ; twenty- 
five of the killed, or nearly one-half of the entire number, 
were of her crew. This was because for several minutes 
she had endured the concentrated fire of the Confederate 
gunboats without being able to reply, and also twice had 
entered into close action with the Tennessee. The fire 
of the Confederate ships did far more damage than that 
of Fort Morgan. When the men drowned in the Tecumseh 
are included, the total Union loss mounts to 335. That of 
the Confederate fleet was in comparison very small, ten 
killed and sixteen wounded. 

On the afternoon of the same day, August 5, the 
Chickasaw shelled Fort Powell and compelled its evacua- 
tion during the night, The following day she attacked 
Fort Gaines, and, assisting the army, induced that work 
to capitulate on August 7. Fort Morgan had defiantly 
refused to surrender, and held out several days longer. 
When, however, heavy siege guns and the whole fleet, 
including the three monitors and the captured Tennessee, 
opened on it, resistance soon became impossible ; the 
defenders endured the bombardment for one day, and on 
the next, August 23, surrendered. 

Farragut, having now complete control of the bay, 
could seal the port to blockade runners, and had accom- 
plished all that he had contemplated. It was not his pur- 
pose to attempt the capture of the city of Mobile — of 
questionable advantage when it was taken. An army 



346 The United States Navy 



of 20,000 to 30,000 men, he estimated, would be required 
for this, and almost as many to hold it ; only the lighter- 
draft monitors and the gunboats would be able in the 
shallow water to lend their co-operation. Consequently 
he was content to clear the lower bay of torpedoes and 
remain there quietly for several months. 

As we consider the importance of the battle of Mobile 
Bay, it is evident that the perfecting of the blockade in 
the Gulf States, accomplished by the capture of the forts 
and the possession of the bay, was of great moment. 
More than that, Farragut's victory came at a political 
crisis, and, because it was opportune, strongly affected a 
decision of vital consequence to the republic. 

Near the close of summer, 1864, the friends of Lincoln, 
looking forward to the election of the following November, 
had become greatly alarmed. Reliable reports from 
Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania indicated that those 
States were strongly opposed to the administration and 
its policies. They were tired of war. And the platform 
adopted by the Democratic party at its national conven- 
tion — in substance, resolved, that the war is a failure — 
indicated what kind of policy was likely to be substituted 
if Lincoln were not re-elected. But the battle of Mobile 
Bay and Sherman's capture of Atlanta, which followed 
shortly after and gave it a cumulative force, put a new 
aspect upon the war. As Seward, in a brief speech at 
Washington, said, ' ' Sherman and Farragut have knocked 
the bottom out of the Chicago [Democratic] nomina- 
tions." In September, Sheridan won his brilliant suc- 
cesses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill. The political 
campaign was now prosecuted with vigor. Lincoln's 
adherents had little need to argue ; they had but to point 
to recent events. On November 8, when the election took 
place, the people gave Lincoln 212 electoral votes to his 
opponent's twenty-one. " In spite of burdensome taxa- 



Farragut Honored 



347 



tion, weariness of war, and mourning in every household, 
they had decided on this election day of 1864 to finish the 
work they had begun. ' ' 7 

After his exploits in Mobile Bay, Farragut had been 
ordered to command the expedition planned against Fort 
Fisher. But his long service in the Gulf States had been 
unusually severe ; any man, no matter how young, must 
have felt the strain, and Farragut, who was past sixty- 
three, could not go on indefinitely. Accordingly, the 
command of the expedition was given to Admiral Porter, 
and Farragut was ordered north. His arrival in New 
York City, December, 1864, was an occasion for universal 
rejoicing. A committee of municipal officers and repre- 
sentative citizens waited on him, inviting him to make New 
York City his home, and accompanying their invitation 
with a gift of $50,000. The same month the Government 
showed its appreciation by creating for him the grade of 
vice-admiral. In July, 1866, Congress passed an act mak- 
ing him admiral, an honor which it had never conferred 
before, and has but twice since. The following year, when 
commanding the European squadron, he was received 
with marked attention by the crowned heads of Europe, 
and everywhere was greeted "with the enthusiasm and 
distinguished consideration that were aroused among naval 
officers by the presence of the man who had bestowed upon 
their profession a lustre unequalled by any other deeds 
of that generation. ' ' 8 



7 Rhodes, History of the United States, iv, 539. 
8 Mahan, Admiral Farragut, p. 298. 



XXI 



THE WAR ON ALBEMARLE SOUND 

Importance of Albemarle Sound 

During the winter of 1861-62, following up the suc- 
cesses at Hatteras and Pamlico Sound, the North had 
taken measures to gain control of Albemarle Sound. This 
step was necessary for several reasons : the Confederates 
found this sound a refuge from which to prey upon coast- 
wise commerce; the North needed harbors in Southern 
territory for repair shops and coaling stations ; numerous 
rivers penetrating the heart of the Confederacy flow into 
this sound, and on their banks are many important towns ; 
two railroads and four canals formed excellent means of 
communication, and, most important of all, Norfolk might 
be severed from her main sources of supply in the rear, 
and troops might thus co-operate in the attacks on this 
important city. Furthermore, the control of Albemarle 
Sound threatened the Norfolk Navy Yard, and made 
imminent the cutting off of Norfolk from Richmond and 
the severing of railroad communication between these 
cities and the States farther south. The South, after the 
loss of Pamlico Sound, made strenuous efforts to fortify 
Roanoke Island, commanding the entrance to Albemarle 
Sound, but the scant forces under General Wise and the 
small fleet of Captain Lynch proved inadequate. 

Early in January, 1862, 12,000 troops under General 
Burnside, and a large but nondescript naval force, con- 
sisting mainly of river steamers, ferry-boats, and tug- 
boats, under Flag-Officer Goldsborough and Commander 
Rowan, sailed for Albemarle Sound. The army and navy, 
co-operating most harmoniously, captured the Confederate 
348 



Events on Albemarle Sound 349 



forts and garrisons on Roanoke Island, February 8. They 
next took possession of Elizabeth City and the Pasquotank 
River, which commanded the approach to the Dismal 




Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds 



Swamp Canal to Norfolk. Having gained control of the 
sound, the Union forces steamed up the Neuse River, and, 
in spite of the fact that New Berne was protected by forts 
and barricades of sunken vessels and iron-pointed piles, 



350 The United States Navy 



captured the town, at that time the second commercial 
city in North Carolina. This was on March 14; and 
when, a month and a half later, the Union forces had taken 
Fort Macon, Federal control of the sounds and the adja- 
cent rivers was virtually complete. 

The Ram Albemarle 

The Confederates, feeling keenly the loss of their 
power on the sounds, made two abortive attempts, on 
March 14, 1863, and on January 30, 1864, to recapture 
New Berne. Moreover, the attempts made by the Southern 
Government to build ironclads on the rivers emptying into 
the sounds kept the Union forces busy in making incur- 
sions up the streams to the towns of Washington, Ply- 
mouth, and Hamilton. Notwithstanding the Northern 
fleet and army in these waters, Captain Cooke and Gilbert 
Elliott, early in 1863, managed to lay, at Edward's Ferry 
on the Roanoke River, the keel of a ram, the Albemarle. 
Cooke, who, by reason of his zeal, gained the name " iron- 
monger captain," ransacked the adjacent country for iron, 
and by the spring of 1864 launched and armed a vessel 
that threatened for a time to destroy the wooden Union 
fleet, and restore the sounds to Southern control. 

The Albemarle was 122 feet in length, with a beam 
of forty-five feet and a draft of eight feet. She was 
built of massive pine timbers, dovetailed, and covered 
with four-inch planking. On her deck was an octagonal 
shield, or casemate, sixty feet long, with faces sloping so 
as to make projectiles glance off. This casemate was also 
of very heavy timber covered with planking, and was 
sheathed in two layers of two-inch iron. The ram of the 
Albemarle was of solid oak, plated with heavy iron, and 
tapering to an edge. The ironclad had two engines, each 
of 200 horsepower, to drive her twin screws. Her arma- 



The Ram Albemarle 



351 



ment consisted of two 100-pound Armstrong grins, 
mounted one in the bow and the other in the stern ; and 
the casemate was so pierced that these guns on pivots 
could be used on either broadside, or as quarter guns. 

On the morning of April 18, 1864, the Albemarle 
started down the Roanoke to co-operate with General 
Hoke, who had on the previous day begun an assault on 
Plymouth. As the ram could not be steered in the swift 
current, she proceeded down stream stern foremost, 
with chains dragging from the bow. Forges and sledge 
hammers were still at work completing the armor of the 
casemate. "The never-failing Cooke had started his 
voyage in a floating workshop. . . .On the turtleback 
numerous stages were suspended, thronged with sailors 
wielding sledge hammers. Upon the pilot house stood 
Captain Cooke, giving directions. Some of the crew were 
being exercised at one of the big guns. 'Drive in spike 
number ten!' sang out the commander. 'On nut below 
and screw up ! Serve vent and sponge ! Load with car- 
tridge ! ' was the next command. 'Drive in number eleven, 
port side — so! On nut and screw up hard! Load with 
shell — Prime!' And in this seeming babel of words the 
floating monster glided by on her trial trip and into 
action. ' ' 1 

The ram made her way safely over the obstructions of 
old sunken vessels, piles, and torpedoes placed in the river 
near Warren's Neck to prevent her co-operation in an 
attack on Plymouth. Early on the morning of the 19th, 
Captain Cooke saw, farther down the stream, two Union 
gunboats, the Miami and the Southfield, coming up to in- 
tercept him. These vessels, under the command of Lieu- 
tenant Flusser, had been lashed together, by means of 
long spars and chains festooned between them, with the 



1 Quoted in Maclay, History of the United States Navy, ii, 525. 



352 



The United States Navy 



object of seizing the ram as in a vise and then pounding 
her to pieces by means of their heavy 9-inch guns and 
rifled 100-pounders. But Cooke was on his guard; he 
hugged the shore until nearly abreast of the Union vessels, 
then turning suddenly toward mid-stream, with throttles 
wide open he passed the bow of the Miami, and plunged 
the heavy ram into the Southfteld's starboard side, sinking 
her instantly. The ram's sharp beak was held and her 
bow submerged by the Southfield. As the water poured 
into the Albemarle's ports, it looked for a moment as if 
she, too, were doomed. But when the Union vessel rolled 
heavily on her side in the shallow water, she released her 
hold of Cooke's ironclad, which was rapidly filling from 
the forward ports. 

Lieutenant Flusser on the Miami at once opened with 
his heavy guns, and he himself fired a shell with a ten- 
second fuse, which, on rebounding from the ram 's slanting 
sides, exploded and killed him. The Miami's crew, seeing 
that their projectiles were glancing off harmlessly like 
so many pebbles, now attempted to board, but the 
Albemarle's deck was quickly crowded with men ready to 
thwart this attempt. Hereupon the Union vessel, a fast 
side-wheeler, without receiving a blow, made good her 
escape. The Albemarle kept up a steady fire the rest of 
the day into the forts defending Plymouth, and on April 
20, General Wessells, with 1500 Union soldiers, surren- 
dered to the Confederates under General Hoke. 

On May 5, the Albemarle, accompanied by the Bomb- 
shell, captured at Plymouth, and the transport Cotton 
Plant, emerged from the Roanoke River to attack Captain 
Melancton Smith's " pasteboard fleet," consisting of the 
double-enders Mattabesett, Sassacus, Wyalusing, and 
Miami, the ferryboat Commodore Hull, and the gunboats 
Whitehead and Ceres. The Union commander had been 
preparing for the inevitable conflict as best he could. He 



Attack on Smith's Fleet 353 



had equipped the Miami with a torpedo, and a strong 
net with which to foul the rani's propellers. His plan 
of attack was to take advantage of the double-enders ' 
quick maneuvering qualities, approach the enemy as near 
as possible without endangering the side-wheels, discharge 
his powerful guns, and then quickly return for a similar 
circuit. 

The Albemarle opened the battle at long range with 
a well-aimed shot at the Mattabesett, which cut away her 
rails and spars and wounded six men at the guns. But 
as the Albemarle then attempted to ram, the Union ship 
skilfully avoided her. Like a pack of wolves attacking 
a stag, Captain Smith's fleet surrounded the ironclad. 
The firing from the Union vessels was rapid, but had no 
effect on the ram's iron sides; even the 100-pound shot 
from the pivot-rifles glanced harmlessly off. All attempts, 
also, to send shot through the ports of the ram, or to find 
vulnerable spots on her, proved futile. At this juncture 
Captain Roe's ship, the Sassacus, whose prow had a three- 
ton bronze beak, backed slowly; then, with waste and 
oil thrown on her fires, the Union vessel sprang at the 
iron monster. "All hands lie down," was the order as 
the frail vessel crashed into the ram, careening the iron- 
clad and hurling her crew off their feet. At the same 
moment a shell from the Albemarle tore through the 
Sassacus. A second shot exploded the double-ender's 
boiler. Mingled with the cries of agony from the scalded 
and frantic men was heard the rattle of small arms as 
the crew of the Sassacus, with pistols, muskets, and hand- 
grenades, repelled the boarders. During this time the 
other vessels, except the Miami, could not or did not 
make any attempt to come to close quarters, owing partly 
to a signal, given by mistake, that the Wyalusing was 
sinking. An attempt of the Miami to use her torpedo, 
owing to her poor maneuvering, failed. In the gathering' 
23 



354 



The United States Navy 



darkness, the Albemarle retreated up the river; the muzzle 
of one of her guns was cracked, her tiller disabled, and her 
smokestack riddled. 

The ram's object in thus giving battle to the Union 
fleet in order to co-operate with the Confederate land 
forces in an attack on New Berne had failed. On May 24, 
the Albemarle again appeared, this time at the mouth 
of the Roanoke to drag for torpedoes laid there for her 
destruction. From this date until October 27 she lay in 
" inglorious inactivity" at Plymouth. Meanwhile Captain 
Cooke, by reason of illness, was superseded by Lieutenant 
Warley. The existence of the ram continued, in spite of 
her inaction, to be a grave menace to the Union fleet, 
and consequently to the control of the sounds. 

Lieutenant Cushing Plans to Destroy the Ram 

In this crisis Lieutenant William B. Cushing, then 
only twenty-one years old, made a suggestion to the Navy 
Department to destroy the Albemarle by torpedoes. This 
young man had on several previous occasions been remark- 
ably successful in dare-devil adventures. In November, 
1862, he made a successful raid in the Ellis up New River 
Inlet, N. C. The following January, with twenty-five 
men, he captured an earthwork at Little River. In Feb- 
ruary, 1864, in the Cape Fear River, Cushing boldly 
entered the Confederate lines and captured one of General 
Hebert's staff officers. In a cutter, with fifteen men, the 
following June, he made a reconnoissance near Wilming- 
ton, N. C, preliminary to destroying the ironclad Raleigh, 
captured the mail" from the fort orderly, and ascertained 
that the Raleigh, retreating up Cape Fear River after an 
attack on a Union fleet, had 1 'broken her back" on a bar. 
Thereupon Cushing, with remarkable skill, having eluded 
a large force of guard boats, returned safely to his vessel 



Development of Torpedo Warfare 355 

without the loss of a man. To such a youngster the 
Department readily entrusted the destruction of the 
Albemarle. 

Gushing was sent to New York to select suitable vessels 
for his "torpedo-boats/' and chose two boats built for 
picket duty. "They were open launches, about thirty 
feet in length, with small engines, and propelled by a 
screw. A 12-pounder howitzer was fitted to the bow of 
each, and a boom was rigged out some fourteen feet in 
length, swinging by a goose-neck hinge to the bluff of the 
bow. A topping lift, carried to a stanchion inboard, 
raised or lowered it, and the torpedo was fitted into an 
iron slide at the end. This was intended to be detached 
from the boom by means of a heel-jigger leading inboard, 
and to be exploded by another line, connected with a 
pin which held a grape shot over a nipple and cap." 2 

Torpedoes in the Civil War 

Various forms of early torpedoes or submarine mines 
had been invented by Bushnell during the Revolution, 
and by Robert Fulton during the War of 1812, but the 
first successful mechanisms for submarine explosion came 
into use during the Civil War, in the course of which 
about twenty-eight vessels were either sunk or seriously 
injured by such devices. The ingenious machines included 
such classes as frame torpedoes, floating or buoyant tor- 
pedoes, electric torpedoes, spar torpedoes made fast to 
the early forms of torpedo-boats, and submarines or 
"Davids," as the Goliath slayers were called. Under 
the general term of torpedoes were included even such 
infernal machines as the coal torpedoes, irregular cast- 
iron shells filled with powder, painted to resemble coal, 
and surreptitiously hidden in coal heaps intended for 



2 dishing, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, iv, 634. 



356 



The United States Navy 



Union vessels; another form was a clockwork device with 
a harmless-looking exterior intended to be carried aboard 
ship and exploded at the time set. Numerous forms of 
mines were planted in rivers and bays to destroy vessels, 
which frequently provided themselves with nets and guard 
boats to fend these off. 

The Confederates were the first to adopt the new 
weapon. In spite of considerable opposition even in the 
South to what was regarded as an inhuman mode of 
warfare, the Southern Government established in October, 
1862, a torpedo bureau in its Navy Department. In 
1863 one of its ''cigar-shaped torpedo-boats" made an 
attack off Charleston on the New Ironsides, and failed 
only because of the Union vessel's great thickness of iron 
and timber. Another form of these "Davids," on Feb- 
ruary 17, 1864, sank in four minutes the heavily armed 
steam sloop of war Housatonic, also off Charleston. This 
torpedo-boat had been a submarine, but after suffocating 
three crews in attempts at submersion, it made its final 
and only successful attack on the surface, when its crew 
perished with the Housatonic. 

Of the spar torpedo there were various forms that 
had been successfullly used in the war. The type adopted 
by Cushing was the invention of Engineer Lay of the 
navy. It consisted of a copper cylinder at the bottom of 
which was a cone containing a fulminate cap. "Within the 
cylinder was a tube running the whole length, in the 
end of which a grape shot, held up by a trigger pin, was 
so arranged that by a slight pull the pin was withdrawn 
and the grape fell on the cap in the cone and exploded a 
charge of from fifty to seventy pounds of powder in the 
space between the outer cylinder and the tube. In the 
upper part of the apparatus was an air chamber that 
enabled the torpedo, when detached from the spar, to 
float in an upright position. In handling such a complex 



disking Destroys the Albemarle 



357 



mechanism the most delicate touch was required. The 
torpedo-boat had to stop just at the right place to give 
free play for lowering the spar under the overhang of 
the vessel. Gushing, as he used the torpedo against the 




From Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, by permission 

Cushing's Launch and Torpedo 

A, Spar. B, Torpedo. C, Stanchion. D, Windlass. E, Topping Lift. F, Heel- 
Jigger. G, Trigger Line, a, Powder Chamber, b, Air Chamber, c, Pin holding 
Grape Shot in place and attached to Trigger Line G. d, Grape Shot. 



Albemarle, had attached to his person four lines: the 
detaching lanyard, the trigger line, and two cords run- 
ning respectively to the engineer's wrist and ankle to 
direct the movements of the launch. 3 

The Destruction of the Albemarle 

On the way southward, through the canals to Chesa- 
peake Bay and thence to Norfolk, Cushing had lost one of 
his picket boats. With the other, after many adventures 
in passing through hostile country, he finally reached the 
Union fleet anchored off the mouth of Roanoke River. 

3 Submarine Warfare, by Lieut. -Commander J. S. Barnes, 
U. S. N. a gives a brief but excellent history of early forms of 
torpedoes. 



358 



The United States Navy 



The young officer then disclosed his plan to his crew, and 
gave them the chance to avoid the hazardous undertak- 
ing, but they volunteered to a man. 

The Albemarle, protected by several thousand soldiers 
deployed in the surrounding country, was moored at 
Plymouth, eight miles from the mouth of the river. A 
mile below the town was the wreck of the Southfield, on 
whose hurricane deck a guard was stationed to give 
warning of the approach of danger. The ram, according 
to her commander, Captain Warley, had a crew of only 
sixty, — "too small to keep an armed watch on deck at 
night and do picketing besides." 

On the dark and slightly rainy night of October 27, 
1864, Cushing started up the river and passed the wreck 
of the Southfield unobserved. His own very interesting 
account of his adventures that night and the next day is 
in part as follows: 

"We passed within thirty feet of the pickets without 
discovery, and neared the vessel. I now thought that it 
might be better to board her, and 'take her alive,' having 
in the two boats twenty men well armed with revolvers, 
cutlasses, and hand-grenades. To be sure, there were 
ten times our number on the ship, and thousands nearby ; 
but a surprise is everything, and I thought if her fasts 
were cut at the instant of boarding, we might overcome 
those on board, take her into the stream, and use her iron 
sides to protect us afterward from the forts. Knowing 
the town, I concluded to land at the lower wharf, creep 
around, and suddenly dash aboard from the bank; but 
just as I was sheering in close to the wharf a hail came, 
sharp and quick, from the ironclad, and in an instant was 
repeated. I at once directed the cutter to cast off, and go 
down to capture the guard left in our rear, and, ordering 
all steam, went at the dark mountain of iron in front of 
us. A heavy fire was at once opened upon us, not only 



Cushing Destroys the Albemarle 359 



from the ship, but from men stationed on the shore. This 
did not disable us, and we neared them rapidly. A 
large fire now blazed upon the bank, and by its light I 
discovered the unfortunate fact that there was a circle 
of logs around the Albemarle, boomed well out from her 
side, with the very intention of preventing the action of 
torpedoes. To examine them more closely, I ran along- 
side until amidships, received the enemy 's fire, and sheered 
off for the purpose of turning, a hundred yards away, 
and going at the booms squarely, at right angles, trusting 
to their having been long enough in the water to have 
become slimy — in which case my boat, under full headway, 
would bump up against them and slip over into the pen 
with the ram. This was my only chance of success, and 
once over the obstruction my boat would never get out 
again. As I turned, the whole back of my coat was torn 
off by buckshot, and the sole of my shoe was carried away. 
The fire was very severe. 

"In a lull of the firing, the captain hailed us, again 
demanding what boat it was. All my men gave comical 
answers, and mine was a dose of canister from the 
howitzer. In another instant we had struck the logs and 
were over, with the headway nearly gone, slowly forging 
up under the enemy 's quarter port. Ten feet from us the 
muzzle of a rifle gun looked into our faces, and every 
word of command on board was distinctly heard. 

"My clothing was perforated with bullets as I stood 
in the bow, the heel- jigger in my right hand and the 
exploding line in the left. We were near enough then, 
and I ordered the boom lowered until the forward motion 
of the launch carried the torpedo under the ram's over- 
hang. A strong pull of the detaching-line, a moment 's 
waiting for the torpedo to rise under the hull, and I hauled 
in the left hand just cut by a bullet. 

"The explosion took place at the same instant that 



360 



The United States Navy 



100 pounds of grape, at ten feet range, crashed among 
us, and the dense mass of water thrown out by the torpedo 
came down with choking weight upon us. 4 

Cushing's Escape 

" Twice refusing to surrender, I commanded the men 
to save themselves; and throwing off sword, revolver, 
shoes, and coat, struck out from my disabled and sinking 
boat into the river. It was cold, long after the frosts, and 
the water chilled the blood, while the whole surface of 
the stream was plowed up by grape and musketry, and my 
nearest friends, the fleet, were twelve miles away; but 
anything was better than to fall into the enemy's hands, 
so I swam for the opposite shore. As I neared it a man 
[Samuel Higgins, fireman], one of my crew, gave a great 
gurgling yell and went down. 

' 'The Confederates were out in boats, picking up my 
men ; and one of the boats, attracted by the sound, pulled 
in my direction. I heard my own name mentioned, but 
was not seen. I now 'struck out' down the stream, and 
was soon far enough away again to attempt landing. This 
time, as I struggled to reach the bank, I heard a groan in 
the river behind me, and, although very much exhausted, 
concluded to turn and give all the aid in my power to the 
officer or seaman who had bravely shared the danger 
with me. 

' 1 Swimming in the night, with eye at the level of the 
water, one can have no idea of distance, and labors, as, I 
did, under the discouraging thought that no headway is 
made. But if I were to drown that night, I had at least 
an opportunity of dying while struggling to aid another. 

4 Captain Warley, of the Albemarle, states that the launch 
was at this time " so close that the gun could not be depressed 
enough to reach her." Battles and Leaders, iv, 642. 



Cushing's Escape 



361 



The swimmer proved to be Acting Master's Mate Wood- 
man, who said that he could swim no longer. Knocking 
his cap from his head, I used my right arm to sustain 
him, and ordered him to strike out. For ten minutes at 
least, I think, he managed to keep afloat, when his phys- 
ical force being completely gone, he sank like a stone. 

" Again alone upon the water, I directed my course 
toward the town side of the river, not making much head- 
way, as my strokes were now very feeble, my clothes being 
soaked and heavy, and little chop-seas splashing with 
choking persistence into my mouth every time I gasped 
for breath. Still there was a determination not to sink, 
a will not to give up, and I kept up a sort of mechanical 
motion long after my bodily force was in fact expended. 
At last, and not a moment too soon, I touched the soft 
mud, and in the excitement of the first shock I half raised 
my body and made one step forward; then fell, and 
remained half in the mud and half in the water until 
daylight, unable even to crawl on hands and knees, nearly 
frozen, with my brain in a whirl, but with one thing 
strong in me — the fixed determination to escape. 

"As day dawned I found myself in a point of swamp 
that enters the suburbs of Plymouth, and not forty yards 
from one of the forts. The sun came out bright and 
warm, proving a most cheering visitant, and giving me 
back a good portion of the strength of which I had been 
deprived before. Its light showed me the town swarming 
with soldiers and sailors, who moved about excitedly, as 
if angry at some sudden shock. It was a source of satis- 
faction to me to know that I had pulled the wire that set 
all these figures moving, but as I had no desire of being 
discovered, my first object was to get into a dry fringe 
of rushes that edged the swamp ; but to do this required 
me to pass over thirty or forty feet of open ground, right 
under the eye of a sentinel who walked the parapet. 



362 



The United States Navy 



"Watching until he turned for a moment, I made a 
dash across the space, but was only half way over when 
he again turned, and forced me to drop down right 
between two paths, and almost entirely unshielded. Per- 
haps I was unobserved because of the mud that covered 
me and made me blend with the earth; at all events the 
soldier continued his tramp for some time, while I, flat 
on my back, lay awaiting another chance for action. Soon 
a party of four men came down the path on my right, two 
of them being officers, and passed so close to me as almost 
to tread upon my arm. They were conversing upon the 
events of the previous night, and were wondering 'how 
it was done, ' entirely unaware of the presence of one who 
could give them the information. This proved to me 
the necessity of regaining the swamp, which I did by 
sinking my heels and elbows into the earth and forcing 
my body, inch by inch, toward it. For five hours then, 
with bare feet, head, and hands, I made my way where 
I venture to say none ever did before, until I came at 
last to a clear place, where I might rest upon solid ground. 
. . . A working-party of soldiers was in the opening, 
engaged in sinking some schooners in the river to obstruct 
the channel. I passed twenty yards in their rear through 
a corn furrow, and gained some woods below. Here I 
encountered a negro, and after serving out to him twenty 
dollars in greenbacks and some texts of Scripture (two 
powerful arguments with an old darkey), I had confidence 
enough in his fidelity to send him into town for news of 
the ram. 

"When he returned, and there was no longer doubt 
that she had gone down, I went on again, and plunged into 
a swamp so thick that I had only the sun for a guide and 
could not see ten feet in advance. About two o'clock in 
the afternoon I came out from the dense mass of reeds 
upon the bank of one of the deep, narrow streams that 



Cushing's Escape 



363 



abound there, and right opposite to the only road in the 
vicinity. It seemed providential, for, thirty yards above 
or below, I never should have seen the road, and might 
have struggled on until, worn out and starved, I should 
find a never-to-be-diseovered grave. As it was, my fortune 
had led me to where a picket party of seven soldiers were 
posted, having a little flat-bottomed, square-ended skiff 
toggled to the root of a cypress tree that squirmed like 
a snake in the inky water. Watching them until they 
went back a few yards to eat, I crept into the stream and 
swam over, keeping the big tree between myself and them, 
and making for the skiff. Gaining the bank, I quietly 
cast loose the boat and floated behind it some thirty yards 
around the first bend, where I got in and pulled away as 
only a man could when his liberty was at stake. 

* 'Hour after hour I paddled, never ceasing for a 
moment, first on one side, then on the other, while sun- 
shine passed into twilight, and that was swallowed up in 
thick darkness only relieved by the few faint star rays 
that penetrated the heavy swamp curtain on either side. 
At last I reached the mouth of the Roanoke, and found the 
open sound before me. My frail boat could not have lived 
in the ordinary sea there, but it chanced to be very calm, 
leaving only a slight swell, which was, however, sufficient 
to influence my boat, so that I was forced to paddle all 
upon one side to keep her on the intended course. 

" After steering by a star for perhaps two hours for 
where I thought the fleet might be, I at length discovered 
one of the vessels, and after a long time got within hail. 
My ' Ship ahoy ! ' was given with the last of my strength, 
and I fell powerless, with a splash, into the water in the 
bottom of my boat, and waited results. I had pulled 
every minute for ten successive hours, and for four my 
body had been 'asleep,' with the exception of my arms 
and brain. The picket-vessel, Valley City, upon hearing 



364 



The United States Navy 



the hail, at once got under way, at the same time lowering 
boats and taking precaution against torpedoes. It was 
some time before they would pick me up, being convinced 
that I was the rebel conductor of an infernal machine, and 
that Lieutenant Cushing had died the night before. At 
last I was on board, had imbibed a little brandy and water, 
and was on my way to the flagship. 

' 'As soon as it became known that I had returned, 
rockets were thrown up and all hands were called to cheer 
ship ; and when I announced success, all the commanding 
officers were summoned on board to deliberate upon a 
plan of attack. In the morning I was well again in every 
way, with the exception of hands and feet, and had the 
pleasure of exchanging shots with the batteries that I 
had inspected the day before. I was sent in the Valley 
City to report to Admiral Porter at Hampton Roads, and 
soon after Plymouth and the whole district of the Albe- 
marle, deprived of the ironclad's protection, fell an easy 
prey to Commander Macomb and our fleet. ' ' 5 

The Albemarle had sunk instantly at her moorings. 
Of Cushing 's crew, he himself and Houghton escaped, 
Higgins and Woodman were drowned, and the remain- 
ing eleven men were captured. 

For his brave deed, than which, as Captain Warley 
said, "a more gallant thing was not done during the 
war," Cushing received substantial recognition. He was 
given a vote of thanks by Congress, and although not yet 
twenty-two was promoted to the rank of lieutenant- 
commander. 



5 Battles and Leaders, iv, 634, tf. 



XXII 



ACTIONS IN FOREIGN WATERS 

The Wyoming at Shimonoseki 

While the Federal Navy was using the utmost of its 
resources in tightening the line of blockade, in opening 
the Mississippi, and in capturing harbor defenses, the 
activity of Confederate commerce-destroyers made it 
necessary to detach several cruisers to hunt them down in 
foreign waters. One of these Federal cruisers, the screw- 
sloop Wyoming, Commander David McDougal, was 
ordered to the Pacific in pursuit of the Confederate steam- 
ship Alabama. As the Alabama's business was to destroy 
commerce rather than to engage a man-of-war, she avoided 
meeting the Federal vessel. 

After a fruitless search for the Alabama, Commander 
McDougal, early in the summer of 1863, arrived on the 
Japanese coast. There he received a dispatch from the 
American minister to the effect that the guns of the 
Wyoming were greatly needed to protect American 
lives and property at Yokohama. McDougal went thither 
at once and made his vessel a refuge for American resi- 
dents until safe quarters could be found for them on shore. 
The American commander found himself face to face with 
a wholly unexpected situation. At that time Japan was 
on the verge of a civil war which, like the Boxer rebellion 
in 1900, represented a determined effort on the part of 
the rebels to expel the "foreign devils" from the nation. 

This disturbance was the sequel of Perry's mission to 
Japan. In 1858, the Japanese prime minister signed the 
completed treaty establishing commercial and diplomatic 
relations with the United States, but this act of amity 

365 



366 The United States Navy 



five years later precipitated civil war in Japan. Although 
for 250 years Japan had been at peace, the embers of 
rebellion had long been smoldering, and the act that 
admitted the foreigner only fanned them into open blaze. 
The trouble at bottom was that the "Shogun," or 
"Tycoon" — the viceroy of Japan — had become all-power- 
ful; while the Mikado himself, because of a policy of 
seclusion that had been forced on him, had become only 
a figurehead. Since the treaty with America had been 
signed under the authority of the Tycoon, the rebels took 
up arms in a double cause of patriotism, to restore the 
Mikado to his old-time authority and to expel the 
foreigner. 

The insurgents represented some of the most warlike 
elements of the population, especially the great clans of 
Choshiu and Satsuma, which surrounded the Mikado at 
Kioto, and proclaimed his throne the seat of authority. 
They persuaded him to issue an edict setting J une 25, 
1863, as the date on which all foreigners should be ex- 
pelled. The Tycoon, who was bound by treaty to the 
United States and other powers, was helpless. He sent in 
his resignation, but the Mikado refused to accept it, and 
left the viceroy to get out of his predicament as best he 
could. 

The chief of the Choshiu clan proceeded at once to 
fortify the straits of Shimonoseki, the gateway to the 
inland sea of Japan, and to make war on his own account. 
On the 11th of July, McDougal received the news that an 
American steamer, the Pembroke, had been fired on with- 
out warning in the straits, and, according to the report, 
had been sunk with all on board. At this time McDougal 
was under orders to return to America, but realizing that 
the situation called for prompt action on his part, he 
weighed anchor and on the evening of the 15th arrived 
off the eastern end of the straits. 



The Attack of the Wyoming 367 



At this point the inland sea narrows down to a channel 
about three miles in length, and varies from one-half 
mile to a mile in width. The town of Shimonoseki lies 
at the foot of high bluffs which overlook the channel. 1 
Through this the tides run like a mill race, over sunken 
rocks and shoals that have long made the place famous 
for shipwrecks. 

It was here that the Pembroke, while she awaited a 
pilot and the turn of the tide, had been fired on. As a 
matter of fact, she came off with small injury, but others 
were not so fortunate. A French dispatch boat was 
attacked shortly after the Pembroke and narrowly escaped 
sinking in mid-channel. Her commander reported his 
experience to Captain Casembroot of the Dutch steam 
frigate Medusa of 16 guns. On account of the long- 
standing friendship between the Dutch and the Japanese, 
Casembroot went to Shimonoseki with the expectation of 
making peace ; but hardly was the Medusa in the channel 
when she was under heavy fire. Before she could get 
away she had been hulled thirty-one times, and had lost 
four killed and five wounded. A day or two later, a 
French gunboat was hulled three times as she dashed past 
the batteries at full speed, and a Satsuma vessel, which 
was mistaken for a foreigner, was sent to the bottom. It 
was evident that the Japanese knew how to handle their 
guns, and had the range of the channel. 

At five o'clock on the morning of the 16th, the 
Wyoming got under way. Her entry into the straits was 
announced by signal guns on shore, and as soon as she 
came in range she was fired upon by the batteries. She 
made no reply, however, until she reached the narrowest 
part of the straits. At that point the larger shore bat- 
teries concentrated their fire ; beyond, in more open water 



T For map of Japan, see p. 228. 



368 



The United States Navy 



lay three armed merchantmen, all heavily manned, and 
with their crews yelling defiance. These ships were the 
bark Daniel Webster, the brig Lanrick, and the steamer 
Lance field, all, oddly enough, American vessels which had 
been purchased by the Choshiu clansmen. In the land 
batteries, too, were five 8-inch Dahlgren guns which had 
recently been presented to Japan by the United States. 
The bark lay anchored close to the town on the northern 
shore, the brig was about fifty yards outside and a little 
beyond, while the steamer lay further ahead and outside, 
that is, nearer mid-channel. As McDougal approached the 
narrows, he noticed a line of stakes which he rightly 
guessed had been used by the Japanese to gauge their aim. 
Accordingly, he avoided the middle of the channel and 
steered close under the batteries. This shrewdness prob- 
ably was the salvation of the Wyoming, for the batteries 
at once opened a tremendous cannonade which would have 
sunk a dozen vessels in mid-channel, but which only tore 
through her rigging. She soon cleared the narrows and 
bore out into the open water where her guns could reply. 

Commander McDougal then gave orders to " go in 
between those vessels and take the steamer." The 
Yokohama pilots 2 protested loudly, but the American 
had made up his mind to take the chances of shallow 
water and headed for the three ships. At this moment 
a fresh battery of four guns opened a raking fire, but 
the Wyoming answered with a single shell so accurately 
aimed that it tore the entire battery to pieces. Dashing 
ahead, she passed abreast the bark and the brig at 
close quarters and exchanged broadsides with both. The 
firing was so close that the long guns of the Wyoming 
seemed almost to touch the muzzles of the enemy, and it 



2 These pilots had been furnished by the Tycoon's government. 



The Attach of the Wyoming 



369 



was in these few minutes at close quarters that the greater 
part of the American loss occurred. The forward gun 
division suffered most on account of its exposed position, 
sustaining, in fact, all the casualties of the day except 
three. The Japanese handled their guns so rapidly that 
the brig alone managed to pour three broadsides into the 
Wyoming. On the latter every gun was served to the 
utmost and every shot told on the hulls of the enemy. 

Passing on, McDougal rounded the bow of the steamer 
and maneuvered for a fighting position. The brig was 
already settling, but the Daniel Webster, in spite of the 
great holes in her side, still kept up a steady fire, and six 
land batteries now reopened with the Wyoming as a fair 
target. The steamer, meanwhile, weighed anchor and, 
moving to the opposite side, seemed to be getting ready to 
ram the American. At this critical moment the rushing 
tides sent the Wyoming's bow aground, but after some 
minutes her engines succeeded in backing her off. 

Then, ignoring the shore batteries and the Daniel 
Webster, McDougal opened fire with his two 11-inch 
Dahlgren pivot guns on the steamer Lancefield. Both 
shells took effect in her hull; another from the forward 
pivot tore through her boiler, and in a cloud of smoke 
and steam the vessel went down. Meanwhile, the bark 
Daniel Webster had been firing as fast as the guns could 
be loaded, and the six shore batteries were a continuous 
line of smoke and flame. McDougal now trained his guns 
to reply. In a few minutes the bark was wrecked, and 
then one shore battery after another was silenced. When 
satisfied that he had destroyed every thing within range, 
he turned and steamed slowly back. On his return he 
was practically unmolested. 

This action had lasted one hour and ten minutes, in 
the course of which the Wyoming had been hulled ten 
times, her rigging had been badly cut, her smokestack 



370 



The United States Navy 



perforated, and she had lost five killed and seven wounded. 
The battle had been won by the coolness and nerve of 
the American commander, and a fine feature of the story 
is that while most of the Wyoming's crew had never 
before been under fire, even when the ship was aground 
and the pilots were paralyzed with terror the bluejackets 
stood by their guns like veterans. Those were the days, 
too, when a white man caught by the insurgents endured 
the unspeakable death of the "torture cage," and the 
men knew that their commander had ordered that if the 
ship became helpless by grounding or by shot she was 
to be blown up with all on board. 

A few days after McDougal's exploit a heavy French 
frigate with a gunboat entered the straits and destroyed 
what was left of the batteries by landing a force of 
marines. Some months later, however, the clansmen 
rebuilt their forts and succeeded in closing the straits 
for fifteen months. Finally, a large allied fleet put an 
end to the uprising and restored safety to the foreigner 
in Japan. But no other operation impressed the insur- 
gents with the same respect as the attack of the Wyoming, 
singlehanded, against their entire force. 

The Dutch captain who had taken his punishment 
, without accomplishing anything in return, was knighted 
on his arrival in Holland, and all his crew received medals. 
McDougal, on the other hand, got no promotion and not 
even contemporary fame among his countrymen, for 1863 
was the crucial year of the Civil War, and his exploit in 
far-away Japan was lost in the roar of battles at home. 
As Roosevelt once said of this fight, "Had that action 
taken place at any other time than during the Civil War, 
its fame would have echoed all over the world. ' ' 3 



3 Quoted by E. S. Maclay, A History of the United States Navy 
ii, 396. 



The Cruise of the Alabama 



371 



The Alabama and the Kearsarge 

The Confederate sloop of war Alabama, which Com- 
mander McDougal failed to meet in the Pacific, had, in 
the course of two years, practically banished American 
merchantmen from the ocean. Built like her sister ships, 
Florida, Georgia, and Shenandoah, in the dockyards of 
Liverpool, she was from the first suspected of being a 
vessel of war designed for the Confederacy; and the 
United States minister, Adams, was so energetic in pressing 
on Lord Russell his evidence of her destination that even 
the British authorities, pro-Confederate as they were, 
reluctantly issued orders to restrain her from getting 
to sea. 

As the Confederate agents learned of these orders in 
advance, the Alabama was hastily taken out (July 29, 
1862) on a " trial spin" in the Mersey, from which she 
never returned. Instead, she steamed to the secluded port 
of Praya in Terceira, one of the Azores. There she was 
met by the bark Agrippina from London, carrying a cargo 
of ammunition, coal, and supplies of various sorts, which 
was transferred to the Alabama. Scarcely was this done 
when the steamer Bahama from Liverpool arrived with 
the future officers of the Alabama — including Captain 
Semmes — thirty of her crew, and $100,000 in money. Con- 
siderable difficulty was experienced in fitting out the 
Alabama in the Azores on account of the evident pur- 
pose for which she was intended, but under cover of 
various excuses to the Portuguese officials, the work went 
on rapidly. On August 24, after gaining the open sea, 
Captain Semmes summoned his crew and announced to 
them the character of his ship and of the cruise he intended 
to make. Then he lowered the English ensign, hoisted the 
Confederate colors, and read aloud his commission from 



372 



The United States Navy 



President Davis. With that formality the Alabama began 
her career. 

After a few minutes of deliberation, eighty-five of the 
crew who had shipped in the Alabama at Liverpool stepped 
to the capstan and signed the articles as seamen in the 
Confederacy. Among them were many English man-of- 
warsmen, who were the bone and sinew of the crew. The 
rest of the complement — except the southern coast-pilots 
who came with the Bahama — was made up later by volun- 
teers from the crews of the prizes. 

Of the officers, Master 's-mate Fullam, Assistant Sur- 
geon Llewellyn, and Fourth Lieutenant Low also were 
Englishmen; Fullam and Low were at the time of their 
enlistment members of the Royal Naval Reserve. It was 
due to the latter 's superb seamanship that the Alabama 
was saved from foundering during a hurricane early in 
her career. The remaining watch officers, the captain, and 
the surgeon were from the Southern States. 

Captain Semmes, like most of the Confederate naval 
officers, had received his training in the "old navy," in 
which he had risen to the grade of commander. He was 
captain of the Somers at the time she foundered off Vera 
Cruz during the Mexican War, but had been honorably 
acquitted of blame by the subsequent court-martial. His 
first command under the Confederacy was the Sumter, a 
converted packet steamer; but this, after a brief though 
successful cruise, he was forced to abandon at Gibraltar, 
where it had been blockaded by Federal vessels. His 
second command, the one with which his name is chiefly 
associated, was the Alabama. This vessel, rated as a 
"screw-sloop," was 220 feet long, thirty-two feet in 
beam, and eighteen feet from deck to keelson. She 
carried two horizontal engines of 300 horsepower each, and 
bunkers holding coal sufficient for eighteen days' steaming. 
In order to economize his coal supply, Semmes cruised 



The Cruise of the Alabama 373 




374 



The United States Navy 



most of the time only with his sails. The Alabama was 
rigged as a barkentine, and proved a good traveller under 
canvas. She had a device by which her propeller could 
be quickly detached from the shaft and hoisted so as not 
to retard her progress while under sail. 

Captain Semmes did not have far to seek for his first 
prizes. After capturing and burning nine American 
merchantmen in the vicinity of the Azores, he steered 
across the Atlantic, taking in all twenty prizes before he 
headed toward the West Indies for fresh coal. At one 
time he took a ship within 200 miles of New York, and 
though searched for by Federal war vessels, managed to 
keep out of sight. While he was at Martinique, coaling 
from the Agrippina, which met him by appointment, he 
was blockaded by the San Jacinto, Commander Roncken- 
dorff, but two nights later Semmes escaped to sea unob- 
served. From the West Indies he sailed to the Gulf ; and, 
hoping to intercept some Federal transports that he knew 
were due at Galveston, he laid his course for that point. 
While off Galveston he lured away one of the blockading 
squadron, the Hatteras, a converted paddle-wheel river 
boat, and sank her, getting away again before the other 
vessels could come to the rescue. From this point Semmes 
began a slow cruise, along the Brazilian coast, round the 
Cape of Good Hope, to the East Indies. There he re- 
mained seven months; then, eluding the Wyoming, he 
returned round the Cape. 

On June 11, 1864, the Alabama entered the harbor of 
Cherbourg for fresh coal and general overhauling. Since 
the day she went into commission, August 24, 1862, she 
had been on one continuous cruise, covering about 75,000 
miles, during which she had burnt fifty-seven merchant- 
men and released a large number on ransom bond. The 
total valuation of these vessels reached a high figure, but 
the loss to American commerce was far more serious 



The Cruise of the Alabama 



375 



because the ships that were not captured were sold or 
kept in port, and the American carrying trade was turned 
over to British bottoms. By the time the Alabama entered 
Cherbourg practically all American shipping, save the 
Arctic whalers, had been annihilated or driven to cover, 
and even the whaling fleet was soon afterwards destroyed 
by the Shenandoah. 

The amount of damage inflicted by the Shenandoah 
came within half a million of the sum represented by the 
work of the Alabama, but since the depredations of the 
former in the whaling fleet took place after June, 1865 — 
t when the war had been ended two months — her cruise, as 
an act of hostility, was worse than useless. While the dam- 
age inflicted by these two vessels more than doubled that 
of the ten other Confederate cruisers combined, it is neces- 
sary to bear in mind that there were these others as well, 
operating with varying degrees of success, but on a com- 
paratively insignificant scale. 4 Like the Alabama and the 
Shenandoah, the most efficient of these minor commerce- 
destroyers were built to order or purchased on the Clyde, 
and some of them never saw the Southern coast during 
their entire career. The extraordinary success of Captain 
Semmes was due to the diligent study he had made of 
trade routes during his brief cruise on the Sumter, and 
his careful system of time-calculation, by which he would 
remain in one vicinity just long enough for news of his 
whereabouts to start a Union man-of-war after him, and 
then shift to another cruising ground. 

The wholesale destruction of defenseless merchantmen 
naturally aroused the bitterest feeling in the North against 
Captain Semmes, and, it might be added, he reciprocated 

4 The following are the nanies of these cruisers, given in the 
order of the amount of damage inflicted by each: Florida, Talla- 
hassee, Georgia, Chickamauga, Sumter, Nashville, Retribution, Jeff. 
Davis, Sallie. and Boston, 



376 



The United States Navy 



the sentiment. He was referred to as a "pirate," not 
only by loyal newspapers, but also by Secretary Welles 
and the President, and there was much high talk of 
hanging the captain and crew of the Alabama at the yard- 
arm if they ever were caught. As a matter of fact, if 
Semmes was a pirate so also was Paul Jones, David Porter, 
or any other commissioned officer of any government who 
has attacked the commerce of his enemy. As a recog- 
nized belligerent power, the Confederacy could commis- 
sion vessels entitled to all the privileges of a man-of-war, 
among which the destruction of the enemy's shipping 
could certainly be included. The irregularity of burning , 
his prizes instead of sending them to a Confederate prize 
court was forced on Semmes by the existence of the 
blockade, which made it impossible for a prize to reach a 
Confederate port. Semmes, who was a lawyer as well as 
a naval officer, examined the ship's papers himself, and 
constituted himself in all cases the prize court. He con- 
ducted his cruise with extraordinary skill, and it is not 
too much to say that Semmes with the Alabama injured 
the United States more than did all the rest of the Con- 
federate Navy put together. 

As soon as the Alabama arrived at Cherbourg, the 
United States minister to France telegraphed the fact 
to Commander Winslow of the United States sloop Kear- 
sarge, then lying at Flushing, Holland. Three days after 
the arrival of the Alabama the Kearsarge appeared off 
the port. Winslow came in close enough to send a boat 
ashore, but did not anchor, for fear the "twenty-four 
hour rule" might be applied to allow the Alabama to 
escape. Then for five days the Kearsarge maintained a 
patient blockade, steaming back and forth just outside the 
breakwater, waiting for the Alabama to come out. Semmes 
had asked permission to use the naval dock at Cherbourg 
for a stay of two months, during which he had intended 



The Kearsarge and the Alabama 377 

to give his ship a thorough overhauling; but this request 
was denied as being incompatible with the position of 
France as a neutral. Hitherto Semmes had very properly 
refused to fight the San Jacinto, the Wyoming, the Van- 
derbilt, and the other cruisers sent after him; but at 
Cherbourg the French naval officers gave him emphat- 
ically to understand that the conduct of the Kearsarge 
was a "challenge" which no "man of honor" could 
decline. 5 This made it virtually impossible for one like 
Semmes to avoid a combat, in which, as he must have 
realized, he had little to gain and everything to lose. The 
North could have readily made good the loss of the 
Kearsarge with any one of a number of cruisers in Euro- 
pean waters, but the South could not replace a sunken 
Alabama. Having applied for and received permission 
from Commodore Samuel Barron, the Confederate officer 
in charge of naval matters abroad, Semmes forwarded to 
Commander Winslow through the United States consul a 
note to the effect that if the Kearsarge would wait, the 
Alabama would come out and fight as soon as she could get 
her coal on board. On Saturday, he announced that on the 
next day he would go out to fight the Kearsarge. The 
sentiment in France was overwhelmingly in favor of the 
Confederate vessel, although the officials of Cherbourg 
were scrupulous in observing the laws of neutrality. 

By ten o 'clock in the morning of the 19th the prepara- 
tions on the Alabama were complete, and shortly after- 
ward she got under way. As she left the harbor she was 
escorted by the French ironclad Couronne, which stood 
by to see that the action took place outside the marine 
league. As soon as Commander Winslow of the Kearsarge 
saw his antagonist coming out to meet him, he sent his 
crew to quarters and headed out to sea, in order to draw 



6 Harper's Magazine, Nov. 1910, p. 873 ff. 



378 



The United States Navy 



her a safe distance from neutral waters. The Couronne, 
after accompanying the Alabama beyond the three mile 
limit, returned to port; but an English steam yacht, the 
Deerhound, which had also followed the men-of-war, kept 
on her course in order to be a spectator of the coming 
fight. 

When the Kearsarge had led the way about seven miles 
off the coast, she turned to meet her enemy. The follow- 
ing details of the engagement are from the narrative of 
Lieutenant Sinclair of the Alabama:* 

' 1 The Kearsarge suddenly turned her head inshore and 
steamed toward us, both ships being at this time about 
seven or eight miles from the shore. When at about one 
mile distant from us, she seemed from her sheer-off with 
helm to have chosen this distance for her attack. We had 
not yet perceived that the Kearsarge had the speed of us. 
We opened the engagement with our entire starboard 
battery, the writer's 32-pounder of the port side having 
been shifted to the spare port, giving us six guns in 
broadside; and the shift caused the ship to list to star- 
board about two feet, by the way, quite an advantage, 
exposing so much less surface to the enemy, but somewhat 
retarding our speed. The Kearsarge had pivoted to star- 
board also; and both ships with helms a-port fought out 
the engagement, circling around a common centre, and 
gradually approaching each other. The enemy replied 
soon after our opening ; but at the distance her pivot shell- 
guns were at a disadvantage, not having the long range 
of our pivot guns, and hence requiring judgment in 
guessing the distance and determining the proper elevation. 
Our pivots could easily reach by richochet, indeed by 
point-blank firing, so at this stage of the action and with 
a smooth sea, we had the advantage. 



6 Sinclair, Two Years on the Alabama, p. 267, ff. 



The Kearsarge and the Alabama 379 

"The battle was now on in earnest; and after about 
fifteen minutes' fighting, we lodged a 110-pound per- 
cussion-shell in her quarter near her screw; but it failed 
to explode, though causing some temporary excitement 
and anxiety on board the enemy, most likely by the con- 
cussion of the blow. We found her soon after seeking 
closer quarters (which she was fully able to do, having 
discovered her superiority in speed), finding it judicious 
to close so that her 11-inch pivots could do full duty at 
point-blank range. "We now ourselves noted the advan- 
tage in speed possessed by our enemy; and Semmes felt 
her pulse, as to whether very close quarters would be 
agreeable, by sheering towards her to close the distance; 
but she had evidently reached the point wished for to 
fight out the remainder of the action, and demonstrated it 
by sheering off and resuming a [course] parallel to us. 
Semmes would have chosen to bring about yard-arm quar- 
ters, fouling, and boarding, relying upon the superior 
physique of his crew to overbalance the superiority in 
numbers; but this was frustrated, though several times 
attempted, the desire on our part being quite apparent. 
We had therefore to accept the situation, and make the 
best of it we could, to this end directing our fire to the 
midship section of our enemy, and alternating our battery, 
with solid shot and shell, the former to pierce, if possible, 
the cable chain- armor, the latter for general execution. 

" Up to the time of shortening the first distance 
assumed, our ship received no damage of any account, and 
the enemy none that we could discover, the shot in the 
quarter working no serious harm to the Kearsarge. At 
the distance we were now fighting (point-blank range), 
the effects of the 11-inch guns were severely felt, and the 
little hurt done the enemy clearly proved the unservice- 
ableness of our powder, observed at the commencement of 
the action 



380 



The United States Navy 



"The boarding tactics of Semmes having been frus- 
trated, and we unable to pierce the enemy's hull with our 
fire, nothing could place victory with us but some unfore- 
seen and lucky turn. At this period of the action our 
spanker-gaff was shot away, bringing our colors to the 
deck; but apparently this was not observed by the Kear- 
sarge, as her fire did not halt at all. We could see the 
splinters flying off from the armor covering of our enemy ; 
but no penetration occurred, the shot or shell rebounding 
from her side. Our colors were immediately hoisted to the 
mizzenmast-head. The enemy having now the range, and 
being able with her superior speed to hold it at ease, had 
us well in hand, and the fire from her was deliberate and 
hot. Our bulwarks were soon shot away in sections ; and 
the after-pivot gun was disabled on its port side, losing in 
killed and wounded all but the compressor-man. The 
quarter-deck 32-pounder of this division was now secured, 
and the crew sent to man the pivot gun. The spar deck 
was by this time being rapidly torn up by shell burst- 
ing on the between-decks, interfering with working our 
battery; and the compartments below it had all been 
knocked into one. The Alabama was making water fast, 
showing severe punishment; but still the report came 
from the engine room that the ship was being kept free 
to the safety-point. She also had now become dull in 
response to her helm, and the sail-trimmers were ordered 
out to loose the head-sails to pay her head off. We were 
making a desperate but forlorn resistance, which was 
soon culminated by the death blow. An 11-inch shell 
entered us at the water line, in the wake of the writer's 
gun, and passing on, exploded in the engine room, in its 
passage throwing a volume of water on board, hiding for 
a moment the guns of this division. Our ship trembled 
from stem to stern with the blow. Semmes at once sent 
for the engineer on watch, who reported the fires out, and 



The Kearsarge and the Alabama 



381 



water beyond the control of the pumps. We had pre- 
viously been aware that our ship was whipped, and fore- 
and-aft sail was set in endeavor to reach the French coast ; 
the enemy then moved inshore of us, but did not attempt 




Drawn prom the Diagram Submitted to the Secretary of the Navy by 
Commander Winslow 



to close any nearer, simply steaming to secure the shore- 
side and await events. 

"It being now apparent that the Alabama could not 
float longer, the colors were hauled down, and the pipe 
given, 'All hands save yourselves.' Our waist-boats had 



382 



The United States Navy 



been shot to pieces, leaving us but two quarter-boats, 
and one of them much damaged. The wounded were 
dispatched in one of them to the enemy in charge of an 
officer, and this done we awaited developments. The 
Kearsarge evidently failed at once to discover our sur- 
render, for she continued her fire after our colors had 
been struck — perhaps from the difficulty of noting the 
absence of a flag with so much white in it, in the powder 
smoke. But be the reason what it may, a naval officer, a 
gentleman by birth and education, would certainly not 
be guilty of firing on a surrendered foe ; hence we may 
dismiss the matter as an undoubted accident. 

"The Kearsarge was at this time about 300 yards 
from us, screw still and vessel motionless, awaiting our 
boat with the wounded. The yacht was steaming full 
power towards us both. In the meantime the two vessels 
were slowly parting, the Alabama drifting with her fore- 
and-aft sails set to the light air. . . . 

"The Deerhound approached the Kearsarge and was 
requested by Captain Winslow to assist in saving life ; and 
then, scarcely coming to a full stop, turned to us, at the 
same time lowering all her boats, the Kearsarge doing the 
same. The officers and crew of our ship were now leaving 
at will, discipline and rule being temporarily at an end. 
The ship was settling to her spar deck, and her wounded 
spars were staggering in the ' steps, ' held only by the rig- 
ging. The decks presented a woeful appearance, torn up 
in innumerable holes, and air-bubbles rising and bursting, 
producing a sound as though the boat were in agony. . . . 
The Alabama's final plunge Avas a remarkable freak. 
She shot up out of the water bow first, and descended on 
the same line, carrying away with her plunge two of her 
masts, and making a whirlpool of considerable size and 
strength. ' ' 

The loss of the Alabama in this engagement amounted 



The Controversy 383 



to twenty-six killed or drowned and twenty wounded, 
three mortally. The wounded were brought to the Kear- 
sarge, and her boats picked up fifty prisoners more. Nine 
escaped to Cherbourg on a French pilot boat and forty- 
two were carried to Southampton on the Deerhound. 7 

Captain Semmes, who had been wounded in the arm 
by a fragment of shell, was kept afloat by his first lieu- 
tenant, Kell, until both were picked up by one of the 
Deerhound's boats. Master 's-mate Fullam, who brought 
the first boat load of wounded to the Kearsarge, was sent 
back under parole in order that he might assist in 
the rescue of the drowning crew. Before this task was 
finished, he, too, made for the Deerhound. In a few 
minutes the yacht, instead of returning with the prisoners 
to the Kearsarge as Winslow expected, put on full speed 
for Southampton. 

The reception of Captain Semmes and his officers in 
England was most enthusiastic. A few newspapers, like 
the London Daily News, took the opposite side, and 
referred to the hero of the hour asa" runaway smuggler ' ' 
and ''nimble-footed buccaneer," but these were rare 
exceptions. This general cordiality on the part of the 
English is not surprising in view of the fact that the 
welcome accorded to the Alabama in the ports of the 
British empire had invariably been so hearty as to strain 
to the breaking point all pretense of neutrality. The 
reasons were that the ship was a product of a British 
shipyard, manned chiefly by a British crew, and number- 
ing British officers in the wardroom ■ and in less than two 
years she had driven from the seas England 's most formid- 
able commercial rival. 

Scarcely was the defeated captain on English soil 
before he wrote to the press, opening a controversy re- 



7 Figures from Ellicott's Life of Winslow. 



384 The United States Navy 



markable for the violence of its contradictions. In the 
first place he charged the Federal captain with lack of 
' ' chivalry ' ' in hanging chains over the sides amidships to 
protect the engines. To Semmes this was a sly "Yankee" 
trick, constituting the Kearsarge ironclad, while she was 
rated only as a wooden ship. If he had known this cir- 
cumstance, he declared, he would never have risked the 
Alabama in such unequal combat. The idea had been 
suggested to Winslow the year before by his able execu- 
tive, Lieutenant-Commander Thornton, who had seen the 
device used by Farragut during the passage of the 
defenses of New Orleans. The idea had been put into 
effect at once as a special protection to the engines when 
the coal bunkers were empty, as was the case when the 
Kearsarge fought the Alabama, and it attracted no little 
attention in European ports. Lieutenant Sinclair, who 
must have known his commander's statements to the 
contrary, says in half a dozen places that the chain pro- 
tection of the Kearsarge was a matter of common knowl- 
edge on the Alabama. He adds, " Winslow for protecting 
his ship with chain armor should, in the humble judg- 
ment of the writer, submitted with diffidence, be accounted 
as simply using proper prudence in the direct line of duty. 
He had not given, accepted, or declined a challenge. But 
it was his duty to fight if he could and to win. Semmes 
knew all about it and could have adopted the same scheme. 
It was not his election to do so. " 8 

The more serious charge that Semmes brought against 
Winslow was that of inhumanity. He declared that 
Winslow had fired into a surrendered ship, and was crim- 
inally negligent in the rescue of the Alabama's crew. 
These statements provoked equally scathing counter- 
charges from Winslow and his officers. According to 
them, after the Alabama surrendered she fired two guns 



8 Two Years on the Alabama, p. 273. 



The Controversy 



385 



at the Kearsarge. Furious at this breach of the flag of 
truce, Winslow opened fire again till he was assured of 
the Alabama's surrender. Surgeon Brown of the Kear- 
sarge fully corroborated Winslow 's account, adding that 
he was informed by the prisoners that two of their junior 
officers ''swore they would never surrender, and in a 
mutinous spirit rushed to the two port guns and opened 
fire on the Kearsarge." 9 This Lieutenant Kell of the 
Alabama emphatically denied, and so the question of fact 
must always stand in doubt. 10 As to the dilatory rescue of 
prisoners, Surgeon Brown gave as his opinion that 
Winslow would have done better to run alongside the 
sinking Alabama than to lie some 400 yards away. How- 
ever, Winslow 's asking the Deerhound to save lives, and 
allowing Fullam's boat to return, together with the fact 
that his own uninjured boats were immediately called 
away, clear him of the charge of inhumanity. The diffi- 
culty with the Kearsarge' s boats lay in the fact that only 
two were uninjured — the sailing launch and the second 
cutter — and these were the least accessible. 

In the North, as well as among the officers of the 
Kearsarge, indignation was kindled by the conduct of 
Semmes in escaping to an English vessel after his sur- 
render to the Kearsarge, and by the conduct of the 
Deerhound in running away with the prisoners. For thus 
allowing the yacht to get away, Winslow was, in many 
quarters, sharply criticised. The only justification of 
Semmes 's conduct lies in his belief that the Federal ship 
had already broken faith by firing on a surrendered vessel, 
and that fact relieved him of all obligations. Second 
Lieutenant Joseph Wilson of the Alabama, however, 
refused to go aboard the Deerhound, and was the only 
officer to surrender his sword to Commander Winslow. For 



9 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, iv, 619. 

10 Ibid., p. 610. 

25 



386 



The United States Navy 



this he was released on parole by Winslow with a special 
letter of recommendation which gave him a speedy ex- 
change. This conduct makes a sharp contrast with that 
of Fullam, which is inexcusable. 

As to the Deerhound, the Federal commander should 
have known that once his prisoners were on her decks 
they were on neutral territory, and could neither be 
touched by him nor surrendered by her captain. Any 
attempt to take them by force would have been only a 
repetition of the Trent blunder. The case of the Deer- 
hound led subsequently to special rulings in international 
law covering the services of neutral vessels in saving the 
drowning. To-day, in the same situation, the Deerhound 
would be obliged to give up the rescued men to the vic- 
torious commander. 

The Eearsarge in this engagement had a broadside 
of five guns to her opponent's six, but the Federal bat- 
tery was heavier at the point-blank range in which the 
greater part of the action was fought. The conclusive 
victory, however, was due rather to the great superiority 
in the gunnery of the Eearsarge. The Alabama's crew 
fired three broadsides to the Eearsarge' s one, but this 
rapidity seems to have contributed to the wildness of 
the Confederate fire. 11 Only one dangerous wound was 
inflicted, a 100-pound shell that lodged in the stern post 
of the Eearsarge, but failed to explode. Two shots were 
deflected by the chains that hung over the side, but accord- 
ing to the testimony of the Federal officers, even if these 
shots had penetrated they would have cleared the engines 
and boilers. Eleven other shot or shell pierced the hull, 
most of them through the bulwarks. The rest of the 
shot seem to have gone high, for three boats were de- 

11 Lieutenants Kell and Sinclair attributed the ineffectiveness 
of the Alabama's fire to damaged powder, a circumstance which 
Kell says he did not discover in the careful overhauling of ammu- 
nition made by him prior to the battle. 



The Alabama Claims 



387 



stroyed, the smokestack was badly perforated, and the 
rigging was considerably cut. On the other hand, the guns 
of the Kearsarge were handled deliberately and with such 
precision that the Alabama was literally shot to pieces. 

The newspaper warfare over this battle was not its 
most important sequel. In September, 1872, the 1 ' Geneva 
Tribunal," which had convened as a board of arbitration 
on the claims of the United States against Great Britain, 
found the defendant guilty of a violation of neutrality in 
that she had permitted Confederate men-of-war to be 
built, bought or equipped in her ports, and awarded, to 
the plaintiff $15,500,000 for the value of ships and cargoes 
destroyed by the Alabama, Shenandoah, and Florida. 
This sum was increased by interest to about $16,000,000. 

The theory, which is still widely held, that the Alabama 
was responsible for the disappearance of the American 
merchant marine after the war cannot be maintained. 
Though she and her consorts drove practically all Amer- 
ican ships to cover, they captured only five per cent of 
the whole number, and only thirty-two per cent were sold 
or transferred temporarily to neutral hands. 12 Under 
normal conditions, the American carrying trade ought to 
have revived after the Civil War as it had done after 
the War of 1812. The reason it did not revive is to be 
found in changed economic conditions brought about, at 
least in part, by an increased tariff, which made it impos- 
sible to build and man ships as cheaply as our commer- 
cial rivals, and by the laws of navigation, which forbade 
the purchase of foreign vessels for use under the American 
flag. These measures operated severely against the mer- 
chant marine and drove American capital from ships 
into railroads, factories, and mines. 

12 Figures from " A Memorandum of the Admiralty to the Royal 
Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Materials to the War," 
quoted by Thursfield, Nelson and Other Naval Sketches, p. 306. 



XXIII 



THE BLOCKADE AND THE END OF THE WAR 

The Blockade 

The blockade of the entire Southern coast, the begin- 
ning of which has been described in Chapter XV, was in 
part prompted by the proclamation of President Davis, 
April 17, 1861, calling for privateers to prey on the 
commerce of the Northern States. In respect to both the 
blockade and privateering, the United States, although 
not a signatory to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, was 
considerably affected by it. In this compact the great 
powers of Europe had denned a blockade to be binding 
only when it had been made effectual (thus refusing to 
recognize "paper blockades") ; and they had agreed not 
to resort to privateering. To make Europe respect the 
blockade, therefore, the North was obliged to put forth 
prodigious efforts to close the Southern ports; and yet, 
since the United States had not signed the Declaration of 
Paris, the North was precluded from objecting to the 
South 's resorting to that last hope of a country without 
a navy — privateering. Furthermore, as a nation does 
not blockade its own ports, the adoption of this mode of 
warfare against the South put the Union in an anomalous 
position. In spite of the efforts of the administration at 
Washington at the beginning to regard the closure of 
ports in the nature of an embargo, or ' * domestic municipal 
duty," Europe could not so consider it, and hence the 
proclamation of a blockade left England no alternative 
except to recognize the South as a belligerent. This 
England did in a proclamation of neutrality on May 13 ; 
but she declined to go beyond this, and refused to recog- 

388 



David D. Porter 



Southern Privateers 



389 



nize the Confederate States as a sovereign power. To 
make the blockade effective, therefore, so as to avoid Euro- 
pean intervention, the small navy of the United States 
had before it an enormous task ; for by ' * effective, ' ' within 
the meaning of the law of nations, was understood that 
there must be " evident danger in entering or leaving 
port." In spite of the greatness of the undertaking, 
this blockade was legally effective after being in operation 
six months. Furthermore, by the capture of one Southern 
port after another, the cordon was drawn so tight that it 
became gradually a military occupation. 

In accordance with President Davis' proclamation, 
letters of marque were issued to owners of private vessels. 
As the North had a commerce ranking second in the 
world at that time, this was a means of striking the Union 
in its most vulnerable point ; on the other hand, the South 
had no commerce on which the North could retaliate. The 
later stringency of the blockade, and the nondescript 
character of the letters of marque, caused the gradual 
dying out of this mode of warfare — not, however, before 
considerable damage had been done on the unsuspecting 
trading vessels of the North. 

The first privateer to be captured, the Savannah, 
brought up anew the question of the status of the Con- 
federacy. The crew of this vessel were tried for treason, 
on the ground that they were levying war against their 
own country. Moreover, the North maintained that an 
insurgent's man-of-war was, in the eyes of international 
law, a pirate. The crew of the Savannah were kept in 
prison for several months, but no further penalty was 
applied. The South had threatened to treat a like number 
of army prisoners in its hands in the same way that the 
Federal Government dealt with the Savannah's crew. 
Lincoln had from the first been in favor of a liberal policy, 
and the insurrection had assumed such proportions that it 



390 



The United States Navy 



would have been impossible to regard a whole section of 
the country as guilty of treason. No real justification 
could be given for imprisoning privateersmen as pirates, 
and on February 16, 1862, they were put on the same 
footing as army prisoners. 

The blockade began at Hampton Roads, which was 
nearest to both centres of government. The only serious 
attempt to break it at this point was made by the Merri- 
mac. The other two lines of blockade were on the Atlantic 
and the Gulf coasts. In the Gulf the capture of New 
Orleans, the principal commercial city in that quarter, 
made the task less difficult than along the Atlantic, and 
as the plans of operation of the two squadrons were very 
similar, we can gain sufficient idea of the operations of 
the blockaders by considering only the work of the 
Atlantic squadron. 

The duties of this squadron proved so difficult that it 
was divided early in the war between two squadrons : the 
North Atlantic, under Goldsborough, and later under 
Porter; and the South Atlantic, successively under 
DuPont and Dahlgren. The task of these squadrons was 
arduous for several reasons: the Atlantic seaboard from 
the Carolinas to Florida, with its numerous inlets and sand 
bars, has practically a double coast line ; several friendly 
ports not far away, particularly Nassau and the small 
towns of the Bermudas, gave the blockade-runners a 
convenient market for the cotton so much needed by 
British manufacturers; furthermore, specially designed 
steam blockade-runners, connecting the three important 
commercial centres, Wilmington, Charleston, and Savan- 
nah with Nassau and Europe, kept the squadron always 
on the qui vive. 

This remarkable type of vessel, the blockade-runner, 
had no armament to speak of, nor was it intended to 
make any resistance. It was presumably a merchantman. 



Blockade Running 



391 



The South, not being a manufacturing community, had 
to import munitions, and to pay for military stores it had 
to send abroad its one great staple, cotton. To effect 
this exchange and to elude the Federal ships, the blockade- 
runners early in the war came into being. As the cordon 
of Northern vessels grew more taut, there was an increas- 
ing need in the South for ships whose main points were 
speed, stowage space, and invisibility. ''The typical 
blockade-runner of 1863-64 was a long, low side-wheel 
steamer of from 400 to 600 tons, with a slight frame, sharp 
and narrow, its length perhaps nine times its beam. It 
had feathering paddles, and one or two raking telescopic 
funnels, which might be lowered close to the deck. The 
hull rose only a few feet out of the water, and was painted 
a dull gray, or lead color. ... Its spars were two 
short lower-masts, with no yards, and only a small crow 's- 
nest on the foremast. The deck forward was constructed 
in the form known as 'turtle-back' to enable the vessel to 
go through a heavy sea. Anthracite coal, which made no 
smoke, was burned in the furnaces. . . . When running 
in, all lights were put out ; the binnacle and fire-room 
hatch were carefully covered, and steam was blown off 
under water. ' ' 1 

The blockading squadrons had to be eternally vigilant, 
with steam up night and day, to catch these vessels, which 
frequently made fifteen knots. Some of the Northern 
ships cruised in wide circuits in the neighborhood of 
Nassau and the Bermudas, where they were often more 
successful than nearer home; the unsuspecting blockade- 
runner was thus at times caught off his guard. To circum- 
vent the vigilant Northern fleets, the steamers, with their 
cargoes of "hardware," the innocent name under which 
they listed the arms and ammunition in their holds, prac- 



1 Soley, The Blockade and Cruisers, p. 156. 



392 



The United States Navy 



tised every ruse to avoid capture. When the beacon 
lights on the coast were extinguished, these craft made 
their dash for port, guided by signal fires, or by the lights 
on the blockading fleet. If the squadron commander, dis- 
covering this, kept a light only on the flagship, or on a 
different blockader every night, the information was 
carried with remarkable speed to Nassau, and the next 
runner was ready for the new order of things. At one 
time an order was issued that a vessel, discovering a 
steamer slipping in under cover of darkness, should fire 
a gun in the direction the pursued was taking, in order to 
give a clue of the whereabouts of the chase. A few days 
afterwards blockade-runners were equipped with rockets 
to be shot off at right angles to the intended course. 
Wilkinson, in his interesting Narrative of a Blockade- 
Runner, describes another device frequently used by the 
pursued vessel. The engineer was ordered to make a 
black smoke; at the moment when the lookout with his 
glass gave the word that the pursuer in the gathering 
twilight was just out of sight, the dampers were closed, 
and the runner sped away in a different direction, leav- 
ing the Union vessel to chase a shadow. The start from 
Nassau or the ports in the Bermudas was made when there 
would be a high tide and no moonlight for the run into 
port. If very hard pressed, the pursued vessel might 
run ashore, where a nearby battery could cover the land- 
ing of the cargo, though the vessel might be sacrificed. 

Many of the blockade-runners were owned by com- 
panies financed by Southern and British investors. Even 
the Confederate Government shared in the business. 
Suitable vessels were bought in England, and were put 
in command of naval officers of the Southern Government. 
One of these owned by the Government was the famous 
R. E. Lee, a Clyde-built side-wheel steamer, which, under 
the able Captain Wilkinson, ran the blockade successively 



Operations before Charleston 393 



twenty-one times within a year. Indeed, this vessel and 
the Kate made trips as regularly as a packet. The traffic 
became so profitable that even officers of the British Navy 
condescended to take command, under assumed names, 
for ships often paid as high as £1000 to their captains 
for the round trip from a Southern port to Nassau. With 
cotton at four pence a pound in Wilmington, and two 
shillings a pound in Liverpool, these captains could gain 
sufficient to retire on after six months' service. The com- 
panies engaged in this lucrative trade could afford to 
lose a vessel after two successful trips. 

The strictness of the blockade and the occupation of 
one Southern port after another eventually put an end 
to this trade. During the war the blockading fleets capt- 
ured or destroyed 1150 vessels, with their cargoes, aggre- 
gating in value $30,000,000. 

Operations Before Charleston 

After the capture of Port Royal, DuPont had directed 
his energy to making the blockade — especially of Charles- 
ton — thoroughly effective. The able Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, Fox, who had the greatest faith in monitors, 
hurried as many of these ' ' marvelous vessels ' ' to DuPont 
as he could, and ordered the latter to capture Charleston. 

This city was well defended by a large army under 
Beauregard, by numerous forts, by ironclads, and by 
mines, to say nothing of the natural defenses of sand 
bars, which kept the blockading fleet well outside and 
gave the shallow draft blockade-runners an opportunity 
to make their dashes through the inlets. Moreover, the 
harbor was a veritable cut de sac, from which there was 
little chance of escape for vessels of any type once caught 
inside. 

The Confederates made several attempts to break the 



394 



The United States Navy 



blockade on the South Atlantic coast, which kept DuPont 's 
attention too much occupied to risk the loss of vessels in 
premature attempts on Charleston. In January, 1863, 
the ironclad rams Chicora and Palmetto State emerged 
early one morning from Charleston harbor and inflicted 
signal damage on the wooden gunboats Mercedita and 
Keystone State, before the scattered blockaders could close 
in on the rams. In this affair there seems, on the Union 
side, to have been a lack of co-operation and of rapid 
communication by signal; for the dispersed ships took 
the sally of the rams for one of the frequent attempts 
of blockade-runners, and when they came up the Con- 
federate vessels were retreating to the cover of the forts. 
As a result of this attack Beauregard, by proclamation, 
declared that the blockade of Charleston was raised, a 
statement which was soon proved untrue. 

Admiral DuPont determined to test the new monitors 
before he made his attempt on Charleston. These vessels 
were still largely an experiment, and the commander of 
the squadron was by no means so sure of their endurance 
against powerful forts as was the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy. With this object in view, DuPont sent, in 
February, 1863, the Montauh to test her powers against 
Port McAllister. At this time the Nashville, a Con- 
federate cruiser, was lying in the Great Ogeechee River 
behind the fort. With her cargo of cotton, she had been 
trying for some time to slip through the blockade. Cap- 
tain Worden, of the Mont auk, found that he could bear 
the fire of the earthwork with little damage to his vessel, 
but he noticed also that he did no harm to the fort. More- 
over, as the Nashville had retreated up the river, he could 
not get within striking distance of her. Worden kept a 
close watch, however, and on the evening of February 27, 
after a careful reconnoissance, he discovered that the 
Nashville was aground. Waiting until daylight, that he 



Operations before Charleston 395 



might see better, he planted his ironclad under the guns 
of Fort McAllister, and coolly dropped his 11-inch and 
15-inch shells with fatal precision upon the Nashville; in 
a few minutes the cruiser was in flames, and later blew 
up. The Montauk, under the concentrated fire of the 
fort, had been hit only five times, and retreated unharmed 
from her target practice. On her way out, however, she 
struck a torpedo, which caused a serious leak, neces- 
sitating her running on a mud flat for temporary repairs. 
She was able later to rejoin the fleet. 

Shortly afterwards three monitors were sent to make 
a further test against the same fort. In these attacks the 
vessels did little damage to the fort, and the admiral 
wrote to the Department, " Whatever degree of impene- 
trability they might have, there was no corresponding 
quality of destructiveness against forts." 

Under Department coercion, however, Admiral 
DuPont, with the New Ironsides 2 and his seven monitors, 
made an attack on Charleston on April 7, 1863. The 
channel was not deep enough for vessels of the draft of 
the Ironsides; moreover, there was continual danger from 
the torpedoes at the entrance to the harbor. After an 
hour's fighting under these difficulties, DuPont withdrew 
his ships to ascertain the damage received, with the pur- 
pose of renewing the battle next day, if after consultation 
with his captains he felt the risk was not foolhardy. The 
ironclad Keokuk, which had been stationed nearest to 
Fort Sumter, had been struck ninety times, nineteen shot 



2 The New Ironsides was a ship-rigged armor-clad, the most 
powerful vessel in the Northern Navy. Over her heavy oak 
framework she had four inches of armor. With her engines of 
1800 horsepower and her sails she could make eleven knots. Her 
armament consisted of sixteen 11-inch Dahlgren guns and of two 
200-pounder Parrott rifles. 



396 



The United States Navy 



penetrating her below the water line. Both her turrets 
were pierced in many places. She sank the following 
morning. The other vessels had been struck in a degree 
corresponding to their proximity to the forts. The defenses 
of Charleston, on the other hand, seemed practically 
intact. 

In spite of another proclamation of General Beaure- 
gard that the blockade of Charleston was raised as a 
result of the battle of April 7, Admiral DuPont quickly 
repaired his vessels and kept the cordon of ships around 
the harbor. General Gilmore, a Federal engineer of great 
ability, succeeded in landing troops at Morris Island, and 
thus enabled the fleet to operate closer in shore and render 
blockade-running more difficult than before. 

At this time information came to the fleet that the 
powerful ram Atlanta and other Confederate ironclads 
at Savannah were about to leave Wilmington River for 
Warsaw Sound to break up the blockade in this vicinity. 
The Atlanta, formerly the Fingal, a Clyde-built iron 
steamer, had been transformed into a ram. The usual 
heavy-timbered casemate covered with four inches of iron 
had been superposed on the razed deck. Brooke rifles 
were so placed in the casemate as to be fired either laterally 
or fore-and-aft. Admiral DuPont dispatched two moni- 
tors, the Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, and the 
Nahant, Captain Downes, to intercept the Atlanta. 

Early on the morning of June 17, 1863, Captain 
Rodgers discovered the ram coming down the river. With 
the cool deliberation that characterized him, Rodgers let 
the ram open fire and approach to within 300 yards of 
the Weehawken. Then he discharged his huge Dahlgren 
smooth-bores. The first four shot struck with terrific 
effect. The very first missile, a 15-inch cored shot, pene- 
trated the armor. Just fifteen minutes after the Wee- 



Fall of Charleston 



397 



haivken opened, the Atlanta hauled down her colors. The 
Nahant did not get a chance to take part in the contest. 

Captain Rodgers was an excellent disciplinarian, and 
by much practice had made his men skilled marksmen. 
On the other hand, the Atlanta had a new crew, and went 
into battle in great hurry and disorder. Of the eight shot 
which she fired, none hit. The result showed also that in 
the contest between armor and guns, some improvement 
had been made in penetrating power since the day when 
the first Monitor tried to pierce the Merrimac. 

Admiral DuPont decided not to renew the attack on 
Charleston without the co-operation of a large land force. 
The admiral, earlier in his career, had shown no com- 
punction in attacking, even with wooden vessels, Port 
Royal, but on that occasion he could pass the forts and 
attack them from the rear. On account of his decision not 
to make another attempt on Charleston, the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy ordered Admiral Dahlgren to the 
command of the South Atlantic squadron; the latter 
relieved DuPont on July 6, 1863. 

Admiral Dahlgren soon realized that much was ex- 
pected of him. He was told that Charleston must be 
taken. Yet his judgment coincided with his predecessor's ; 
and when, goaded by official pressure and newspaper 
attacks, he called in October a council of war, finding that 
his officers thought as he did, he decided not to attack 
Charleston with his present force. The city was finally 
taken sixteen months later in just the way that DuPont 
had urged, by a powerful army operating from the rear. 
General Hardee, who had escaped from Savannah before 
the capture of that city by Sherman, had assumed com- 
mand of the Confederate forces at Charleston. Hemmed 
in here by Sherman's army, he was compelled to evacuate 
on February 18, 1865. 



398 



The United States Navy 



Capture of Fort Fisher 

We have seen in a former chapter that the North 
Atlantic squadron under Goldsborough wrested the con- 
trol of the North Carolina sounds from the Confederates 
and destroyed the Albemarle, the greatest menace to the 
blockade in these waters. After Goldsborough was 
relieved, Admiral Lee took command and brought the 
squadron to a still higher degree of efficiency. In October, 
1864, Admiral David D. Porter succeeded Lee and began 
preparations for the capture of Fort Fisher. 

The possession of this earthwork, commanding " the 
last gateway between the Confederate States and the out- 
side world, ' ' was of the utmost importance to the North to 
end the long-drawn-out agony of the war. It defended the 
approach to Wilmington, N. C, on which the starving, 
ill-clad, and poorly equipped remnant of Lee's army 
depended for its supplies of food, clothing, and ammuni- 
tion, brought by blockade-runners from Nassau. The 
stores of flour in Virginia were exhausted; bread was 
three dollars (Confederate currency) a loaf in Richmond, 
and Lee's army was on half-rations. Meat, too, was very 
scarce, and the soldiers often eked out their scanty fare 
with rats, muskrats, etc. Lee had informed Colonel Lamb, 
the commander of Fort Fisher, that if Wilmington was 
lost, his troops would have to fall back from Richmond. 
The importance of Wilmington to the Confederates may 
be inferred from the fact that "between October 26, 1864, 
and January, 1865, 8,632,000 lbs. of meat, 1,507,000 lbs. 
of lead, 1,933,000 lbs. of saltpetre, 546,000 pairs of shoes, 
316,000 pairs of blankets, half a million pounds of coffee, 
69,000 rifles, and 43 cannon were obtained through this 
port from the outer world, while cotton sufficient to pay 
for these purchases was exported. ' ' 3 

* Cambridge Modern History, vii, 557. Figures taken from the 
report of the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury. 



Fort Fisher and Wilmington 



399 



On December 20, 1864, the largest fleet hitherto 
assembled under the Union flag, commanded by Admiral 
Porter, and accompanied by 6500 troops under General 
Butler, arrived off Fort Fisher. The armada consisted 
of nearly sixty vessels, five of which were ironclads; the 
powerful New Ironsides and the four monitors, Monad- 
nock, Canonicus, Saugus, and Mahopac. In Porter's fleet 
were also our largest steam-frigates, Minnesota, Colorado, 
and Wabash. 

Fort Fisher was situated at the southern extremity 
of a narrow tongue of land, called Federal Point. The 
earthwork was in the shape of a right angle, the vertex 
of which pointed northeast. One leg of this angle ex- 
tended westward across the peninsula from the ocean to 
Cape Fear River, and the other ran southward along the 
sea-shore. Hence the fort had a land face and a sea face. 
It was the best-constructed earthwork known, and had 
the most recent ideas adopted in its structure. The para- 
pets were twenty-five feet thick. Heavy traverses had 
been constructed to protect the gunners against enfilading 
fire, and there were numerous bomb-proof chambers. On 
the land face twenty heavy guns were mounted, and on 
the sea face twenty-four, all in barbette, and among these 
guns, which ranged from six to ten inches, were eolum- 
biads, Brooke, and Blakely rifles, a 150-pounder Arm- 
strong, and some mortars. Moreover, in front of the land 
face was a high palisade of logs pierced for musketry, 
and farther out, a network of subterranean torpedoes was 
set as a defense against infantry. The defenders of this 
great work, however, had many difficulties to overcome. 
The walls of the fort were so massive that soldiers in the 
gun chambers could not see the approach immediately in 
front for a hundred feet. Hence they had to expose 
themselves on the parapet to make a reconnoissance of an 
attack at close quarters. To defend the huge work, 



400 The United States Navy 



Colonel Lamb had only 1900 men. His supply of ammuni- 
tion was also small; he had not over 3600 shot and shell 
for his forty-four heavy guns and three mortars, and only 
thirteen shells for his 150-pounder Armstrong. 

On the night of December 23, the Louisiana, an old 
Union gunboat, loaded with powder, was sent in close to 
the fort and exploded by means of a clockwork device. 
This preliminary attempt to destroy the earthwork proved 
an utter failure. The next day the Federal fleet in four 
great lines made the attack. The first line bombarded the 
land face; the ironclads, which constituted a separate 
unit, anchored farther inshore to concentrate their fire 
on the bastion at the northeast salient ; lines numbers two 
and three attacked the sea face ; and the reserve line was 
to land troops, cover landings, and carry dispatches. The 
ships kept up the bombardment all day of the 24th. The 
next day, Christmas, the troops landed, but General 
Butler, after a reconnoissance, declared that "the place 
could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially 
unimpaired by the navy fire." To the great dissatisfac- 
tion of Porter and Grant, the first attack on Fort Fisher 
proved 1 ' an ignominious failure. ' ' The fleet had suffered 
little damage from the fort's fire, but the bursting of 
100-pounder Parrott rifles on five of the Union vessels 
had killed sixteen men and wounded many others. 

General Grant, at the request of the Secretary of the 
Navy, immediately sent, in Butler's stead, General Terry, 
an officer of great decision. On January 13, the fleet, 
in formation like that of the previous attack, renewed 
the bombardment of Fort Fisher. Line number one 
shelled the woods to the north of the land face to clear 
the way, and by afternoon 6000 troops, with twelve days' 
provisions, were landed. The fleet's fire continued night 
and day. The vessels aimed with deliberation, making 
the guns of the fort their targets. Notwithstanding this 



Second Attack on Fort Fisher 



401 



slow shooting, the naval fire of the fleet's 600 guns, 
Colonel Lamb tells us, amounted often to two shots per 
second, while the gunners in the fort, being compelled to 
husband their ammunition, were ordered to fire each piece 
only once every half hour. In the interim of firing, the 
gunners took refuge in the bomb-proofs, but the bursting 
of the 11- and 15-inch shells from the New Ironsides and 
the monitors, to say nothing of the countless shot from 
the other vessels, was doing terrible execution in the 
little garrison. Colonel Lamb had appealed in vain to 
General Bragg for reinforcements. ' 

General Terry was meanwhile entrenching himself two 
miles north of the fort. All day of the 14th and the fol- 
lowing night the fleet kept up the relentless fire on the 
earthwork, especially on the land face, with the purpose 
of making the attack for the troops as easy as possible. 
The network of torpedoes had been cut to pieces by the 
navy gunners. Admiral Porter and General Terry had 
prearranged the final plan of assault. At a signal from 
the troops, the fleet was to change the direction of its fire, 
and a detachment of sailors and marines was to attack 
the sea face, while the soldiers were to attempt to scale 
the parapets at the western end of the land face. 

On the morning of the 15th, the navy gunners, who 
had had ample practice to get accurate range, renewed 
the storm of shot and shell, and by noon there was but one 
serviceable heavy gun left on the land face. By three 
in the afternoon the signal came from General Terry, and 
at the blast of the whistles of fifty vessels, the direction 
of the navy fire was changed to the higher parts of the 
earthwork. The detachment of sailors and marines, armed 
only with cutlasses and revolvers, advanced along a half- 
mile of sand dunes, exposed to the rifles of the defenders, 
and to the enfilading fire of grape and shells from the 
guns of the fort. The 2000 sailors, in three divisions, 
26 



402 The United States Navy 




Results 



403 



under Lieutenant-Commander Breese, acted as a diversion, 
and thus helped toward the success of the troops. But, 
although the bluejackets showed magnificent courage, yet 
in their exposed positions, with no means of throwing up 
entrenchments, they were foredoomed to failure in their 
attack. The navy lost 300 killed and wounded in this 
assault. 

Meanwhile, the troops were taking one traverse after 
another on the land face. The accurate fire, especially 
of the Ironsides, prepared the way for the capture by the 
soldiers of each new traverse to the eastward. Under the 
cover of night, the disorganized companies of sailors and 
marines emerged from their shelters behind sand dunes, 
and crept around the northeast salient to join the soldiers 
in their attack. The Confederates were compelled to 
abandon the bastion, and then one traverse after another 
on the sea face. Colonel Lamb and his handful of men, 
having fought to the last ditch, surrendered at ten o 'clock 
on the night of the 15th. 

The capture of Fort Fisher had cost the Federal army 
691 men, and the navy 309, killed, wounded, and miss- 
ing, but the results were worth while. The fall of Fort 
Fisher opened the way for General Schofield, who now 
joined Terry and assumed command, to capture Wilming- 
ton a few weeks later. Of this event, Scharf, the Con- 
federate historian, says: " The fall of Wilmington was 
the severest blow to the Confederate cause which it could 
receive from the loss of any port. It was far more 
injurious than the capture of Charleston, and, but for 
the moral effect, even more hurtful than the evacuation 
of Richmond. With Wilmington open, the supplies that 
reached the Confederate armies would have enabled them 
to maintain an unequal contest for years; but with the 
fall of Fort Fisher the constant stream of supplies was 
effectually cut off." In March, Schofield joined Sherman, 



404 The United States Navy 



who was marching up through the Carolinas. In April 
Lee retreated from Richmond to meet his fate at Appo- 
mattox. 

The surrender of Lee at Appomattox practically ended 
the war. After the capture of Mobile, which took place 
contemporaneously with Grant's victory over Lee, the 
Confederate troops and ships in Alabama retreated up 
the Tombigbee River. On May 4, Commander Farrand, 
in charge of the Confederate naval forces in this State, 
made a proposal to give up all the vessels under him. ' ' On 
the 10th of May the formal surrender took place, and the 
insurgent navy ceased to be an organization. ... On 
the second of June, Galveston was surrendered, and the 
supremacy of the Government was once more established 
on the entire coast, from Maine to and including Texas. 

' i Immediately after the fall of Fort Fisher and the 
capture of Wilmington, measures were taken for the 
gradual reduction of the naval forces employed on the 
duties of blockade. The recovery of Charleston, Mobile, 
and Galveston justified a still further diminution, and as 
these events occurred, measures were promptly taken to 
reduce the squadrons and economize expenses. " 4 Finally, 
by a series of proclamations of President Andrew John- 
son, made from May 22 to August 29, 1865, the blockade 
of Southern ports was gradually ended. 

What the Navy Accomplished 

The importance of the control of the sea was strik- 
ingly exemplified in the Civil War. For the reason that 
the Union navy had this control it often exercised a 
shaping influence in events. Its work consisted of both 

4 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, December, 1865, pp. 
viii, ix. 



The Navy in the Civil War 405 



what it accomplished and what it prevented the Con- 
federate navy from accomplishing. 

The great achievements of the navy were the block- 
ade of the Confederate coast and the splitting of the 
Confederacy into two parts by taking the Mississippi 
River. Both of these operations were essential for the 
shutting off of munitions and supplies from the Con- 
federate armies fighting in the east. The war was prima- 
rily a land fight, and the greatest campaigns were aimed 
at Richmond. The heart of the Confederacy was in 
Virginia, and when the navy stopped the flow of the life 
currents, one by one, the heart was no longer nourished, 
and the end came. 

Further the importance of the control of the sea was 
shown in what the ^orth, with its organized naval force, 
prevented the South, with no organization at the begin- 
ning, from doing. The South had an ambitious building 
program, and the Merrimac, Albemarle, Mississippi, 
Manassas, and Tennessee (which were only a part of 
this program), crude though they were, at various times 
made the North tremble. If the South could have brought 
in the necessary materials and ship builders, these and 
other craft might have changed the character of the 
blockade. So strong was the Southern army, and so well 
adapted was their territory for defense, that without the 
blockade we can only speculate as to how long the war 
would have lasted and what would have been its outcome. 

While it remains true that the Civil War was pri- 
marily a military war, still the army received great help 
from the navy, and vice versa. The Mississippi could 
probably not have been opened without Farragut's help, 
and, on the other hand, the navy needed a Sherman to 
bring about the capture of Charleston. 



XXIV 



THE NAVY IN THE YEARS OF PEACE 

The Period of Naval Decay 

In the brief period since 1850, the United States Navy 
had been revolutionized. The wooden frigates of other 
days were supplanted in this short interval by ironclads 
propelled by steam. So great was this sudden change 
that it has been aptly said that the sailor of the Invincible 
Armada would have been more at home on a frigate in 
1840, than the ''marline spike seaman " of the middle 
of the nineteenth century was in the new types of ships 
that came into being during the Civil War. In other 
words, three centuries had not effected such great changes 
as had the brief quarter of a century ending in 1865. 

These revolutionary changes were mainly the inven- 
tion of rifled guns, the heavy smooth-bores of Dahlgren, 
and the torpedo; the introduction of ironclads; and the 
application of steam to ships of war. Of all these changes, 
perhaps the greatest was the supplanting of sail by steam. 
This made possible the revival of the ram, which had gone 
out after the oar-galleys were succeeded by sailing vessels. 
The first forms of steam ships, the side-wheelers, were 
exceedingly vulnerable ; but a great advance was made by 
the invention of the screw-propeller, which permitted the 
defense of the machinery by submersion and by armor- 
plating on the sides. And, as every new mode of defense 
leads to new means of offense, the torpedo was devised 
for use against the under-water body, the only vulnerable 
part of this latest type of ironclad. Thus began the race, 
still going on, between armor and ordnance. 

But, as far as the United States was concerned, the 

406 



The Period of Naval Decay 407 



development in the science of naval warfare that had been 
so rapid during the Civil War ceased abruptly with its 
close. The nation, weary of the tremendous burden of 
armies and fleets, demanded a wholesale reduction in the 
military establishment. The general opinion was that the 
chances of a conflict with any European nation were 
remote, and since ships and men had been forthcoming in 
sufficient numbers to crush the forces of secession in the 
greatest civil war in history, there would be time enough 
to raise armies and build fleets when another war came. 

For the reduction of the navy at this time there were 
also special reasons. An inventory of the ships made 
after the war showed that most of them were unfit because 
of faulty design, the use of unseasoned timber, and hur- 
ried construction. Common sense demanded the weeding 
out of these, and the few vessels that remained Congress 
regarded as sufficient for a peace footing, with the addi- 
tion of four new monitors. These monitors, however, were 
built in the style prevailing during the Civil War, with 
wooden hulls heavily plated with iron ; and by 1874 they 
had rotted so badly that they were ordered broken up 
and rebuilt in iron. Congress subsequently stopped the 
work of reconstruction, and for twenty years the United 
States had not a single armored ship. During the admin- 
istration of President Hayes our navy was inferior to 
that of any European nation ; even Chile 's two ironclads, 
if properly handled, would have been more than a match 
for all our ships combined. The most discouraging feature 
of the situation was that the navy at this time seemed to 
be without friends at Washington, and the country at 
large was wholly indifferent to its needs. All naval appro- 
priations that could be got out of Congress were designed 
to keep existing ships in repair, and much of this money 
was wasted because the congressmen were more interested 
in ' 'making business" for their constituencies than in 



408 



The United States Navy 



repairing the ships. The Navy Department, in order to 
have any men-of-war at all, was forced to rebuild ships 
under the old names, paying for them out of the proceeds 
from the sale of condemned hulks and out of the appro- 
priation for " repairs." 

One excuse can be offered for the attitude of Congress 
towards the navy. After the Civil War, changes in naval 
construction followed each other with such bewildering 
rapidity that naval constructors and line officers held the 
most divergent opinions as to the types of ship worth 
building, the amount of sail power to be retained, the 
kind of engines, the use of steel or iron, the amount of 
armor plate, etc. Naturally, this utter lack of agreement 
among the experts made Congress unwilling to appropriate 
money for new vessels which might prove costly blunders. 

The year 1881, when Garfield succeeded to the Presi- 
dency, marks the lowest point to which the navy has ever 
sunk since the days when the United States had to pay 
a ransom to Algiers. Out of the 140 vessels on the navy 
list in 1881, twenty-five were tugs, and only a few of the 
rest in condition to make a cruise. Not a single ship 
was fit for warfare. An engraving published in 1881 
pictured the "Fleet" being reviewed by the President, a 
pathetic attempt to put the best face possible on our 
miserable ships. This group represented the best dozen 
vessels in the navy at that time; they were all built of 
wood, and included not only the side-wheel steamer Pow- 
hatan, a relic of the forties, but also the ancient frigate 
Constitution! And the batteries mounted by these ships 
were chiefly smooth-bores left over from the Civil War. 
No wonder that an American captain in those days was 
ashamed to take his ship to European waters! 

If the year 1881 represents the lowest ebb in the Amer- 
ican Navy, it marks also the turning of the tide. The 
policy of trusting to luck in our relations with foreign 



The Birth of the New Navy 



409 



nations began to lose favor. Long before this the weak- 
ness of our navy had been felt during the strained rela- 
tions with Great Britain arising from the Alabama Claims 
shortly after the war, and again when war with Spain 
seemed imminent over the Virginius affair in 1873. And 
when, in 1880, France laid hands on the Isthmus of Pana- 
ma without any regard for the Monroe Doctrine, it began 
to dawn on the Americans that European nations laughed 
at the demands of our State Department when backed 
by nothing better than a few, rotting, wooden hulls mount- 
ing antiquated guns. 

The Birth of the New Navy 

The first step toward a new navy was taken by Sec- 
retary Hunt, with the approval of President Garfield, in 
the appointment of an advisory board to prepare a report 
on the needs of the navy. President Arthur, in his first 
annual message (1881), declared his policy in regard to 
the navy in the following words, "I cannot too strongly 
urge upon you my conviction that every consideration of 
national safety, economy, and honor imperatively demands 
a thorough rehabilitation of the navy." Although he 
was hampered by the reluctance of Congress, President 
Arthur succeeded in beginning the regeneration of the 
American Navy. 

The advisory board, mentioned above, recommended 
the construction of thirty-eight unarmored cruisers, five 
rams, five torpedo gunboats, ten cruising torpedo-boats, 
and ten harbor torpedo-boats. The smaller vessels were 
to be all of steel, and of the cruisers it was recommended 
that eighteen should be of steel and twenty of wood. 
Strange as it seems now, the minority members of the 
board, including three naval constructors and Chief 
Engineer Isherwood — the great engineer of the Civil 



410 



The United States Navy 



War — opposed the use of steel and recommended iron, 
largely on the ground that we had no plants capable of 
producing the steel required. The new market, however, 
created new plants to meet its needs, and the decision of 
the majority resulted in the rapid development of one of 
the greatest American industries, the manufacture of 
steel. 

Congress was now willing to do something to better 
the navy, but not prepared for the ambitious program 
recommended by the Advisory Board. The House Naval 
Committee accepted the decision on steel as "the only 
proper material for the construction of vessels of war," 
and urged the building of two cruisers capable of an 
average speed of fifteen knots, four cruisers capable of a 
speed of fourteen knots, and one ram. It ignored the 
torpedo-boats and recommended only one ram because it 
regarded the type as experimental. 

The House Committee had thus made a sweeping reduc- 
tion of the number of ships called for by the Board, but 
Congress was not willing to go even as far as the Com- 
mittee. The act of August 5, 1882, called for only "two 
steam cruising vessels of war ... to be constructed of 
steel of domestic manufacture: . . . said vessels to be 
provided with full sail power and full steam power." 
Then Congress neglected to make any appropriation for 
them! The only effective clause of this act was a pro- 
vision appointing a second advisory board. This board 
promptly recommended five vessels, one of about 4000 
tons, three of about 2500 tons, all of steel, and one iron 
dispatch boat of 1500 tons. 

The act of March 3, 1883, provided for these ships 
with the exception of one of the smaller cruisers. These 
four, the first of the "white squadron," were the Chicago, 
the Boston, the Atlanta, and the Dolphin. In the same 
year, to put an end to the practice of rebuilding old ships 



The Birth of the New Navy 



411 



out of money for "repairs," Congress prohibited the 
repairing of any wooden vessel when it amounted to 
twenty per cent of the cost of building a new one. This 
action instantly dropped forty-six ships from the naval 
list. Later on the figure was changed from twenty to 
ten per cent, and the . patchwork policy was definitely 
abandoned. 

The decay of the navy after the Civil War had 
resulted in the lack of facilities in this country for the 
manufacture of steel plates or of modern ordnance. 
American inventors of guns, like Hotchkiss, for example, 
had been compelled to go abroad to sell their patents. 
When in 1885 the Government was ready to mount modern 
guns on the warships, it had to get the forgings and cast- 
ings abroad. In five years, however, by the creation of 
a home market for ships and guns, manufacturing plants 
were developed in America capable of turning out the 
highest types of large calibre and machine guns, as well 
as every other requisite for the construction of a modern 
battleship. 

Four more vessels were ordered in 1885, the cruisers 
Newark and Charleston, and the gunboats Yorktown and 
Petrel. The Charleston was the first of our men-of-war 
to abandon sail power and to use only military masts. The 
following year Congress ordered the completion of the 
four monitors, work on which had been suspended twelve 
years before, and the construction of one other. These 
were the Miantonomoh, Amphitrite, Monadnock, Terror, 
and Monterey. With each succeeding year thereafter, 
new vessels were added. In 1890 the Government took a 
long stride forward in naval construction ; hitherto there 
were no ships larger than cruisers, but in this year Con- 
gress authorized three first-class battleships — the Indiana, 
the Massachusetts, and the Oregon. Eight years later 
our successes in the War with Spain gave the navy a 



412 



The United States Navy 



tremendous impetus, which has since put the United States 
for the first time in the front rank among the naval 
powers of the world. 

The Navy in Polar Exploration 

The years of peace have afforded splendid instances 
of heroism in the service of polar exploration, which are 
well worthy to rank with the more famous deeds of war. 
The record begins with the year 1837, when an expedi- 
tion was fitted out for ''maritime observation" in the 
South Pacific and Antarctic. So much quarrelling marked 
the organization of the expedition that several officers in 
turn declined to accept the command. Finally it was 
given to a junior officer, Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, 
U. S. N., noted later for his connection with the "Trent 
affair. ' ' The squadron consisted of five small ships rang- 
ing from 780 to 96 tons,." wretchedly prepared for an 
extended voyage, and especially unsuited for Antarctic 
navigation. ' ' 1 However, what his expedition lacked in 
equipment, Wilkes very nearly made up by his resource- 
fulness, persistence, and courage. It was not until fur- 
ther exploration was a physical impossibility that he 
reluctantly turned his ice-shattered squadron home. 2 
The most important result of his voyage of three years 
and ten months was conclusive evidence as to the exist- 
ence of the Antarctic continent, which had been a matter 
of speculation. The next naval expedition and all sub- 
sequent ones were sent to the Arctic. 

In the spring of 1845 Captain Sir John Franklin, of 
the British Navy, set sail with two ships to discover the 
Northwest Passage. The last message received from him 



freely, Handbook of Arctic Discoveries, p. 289. 
2 One of his vessels was lost with all on board. 



The Search for Franklin 413 



by the Admiralty was dated the following July, and 
although the squadron was fitted out with supplies for 
three years, as time went by with no word whatever from 
the party, anxiety deepened, and one relief expedition 
after another was dispatched. In 1850 American sym- 
pathy was represented by a squadron of two ships under 
Lieutenant E. J. De Haven, U. S. N. The expenses of the 
enterprise were shared by private subscription, headed by 
Mr. Grinnell of New York, and by the Government. The 
American vessels entered northern waters almost at the 
same time as those of English relief parties. No clues 
except a few graves of the Franklin party were dis- 
covered. In August Lieutenant De Haven decided to 
return, but a succession of gales, combined with severe 
cold, caught his ships before he could reach clear water. 
The two vessels were frozen into the ice pack, and drifted 
helplessly with the currents. The imprisonment lasted 
over eight months, and all the while the two vessels were 
in daily peril of being crushed. The life on board was made 
almost unendurable by the strain of constant danger, the 
monotony, the privations, and the fearful cold, against 
which there was no adequate protection. For 1050 miles 
the ships were carried by the drift before the midsummer 
sun released them from their prison of ice. During the 
northerly drift of the floe, De Haven discovered Mur- 
daugh Island and the wide plateau to which he gave the 
name "Grinnell Land." His ships were so weakened by 
the strain they had undergone, that he abandoned the idea 
of continuing the search for the Franklin party, and sailed 
for the United States, reaching New York on September 
30, 1851. 

The next expedition had for its aim the discovery of 
the Pole. In the summer of 1879 a party left San Fran- 
cisco in the steamer Jeannette, Lieutenant-Commander 



414 



The United States Navy 



G. W. De Long, U. S. N., commanding. It was organized 
by James Gordon Bennett, proprietor of the New York 
Herald, with the co-operation of the Government. It 
was known that the Japanese current splits in Behring 
Strait, sending one branch to the west coast of North 
America, and the other into the Arctic Ocean in a north- 
easterly direction. Before this time no polar explorers 
had ever set out by way of Behring Strait, and the idea 
of the Jeannette party was to try to reach the Pole by 
following this northeasterly branch of the Japanese cur- 
rent. The first voyage, however, was to be more of a 
preliminary or experimental nature than of an actual 
dash for the Pole. 

The Jeannette early encountered ice floes, which 
crowded her off her intended course. Finally, De Long 
decided to winter at Wrangell Land, then supposed to be 
part of a huge Arctic continent. By September 6, the 
vessel was wedged and frozen solidly into a floe and 
carried to the northwest of Wrangell Land, which proved 
to be only a small island. All winter she drifted with the 
ice, in imminent danger of being crushed. Once she cer- 
tainly would have foundered but for the skill of her 
chief engineer, G. W. Melville. Summer did not bring 
the party their expected release, and still another year 
dragged by in the icy prison, with only sickness to vary 
the fearful monotony of their existence. Finally, on 
June 12, 1881, the loag-threatened disaster fell — the 
Jeannette was sunk by the ice, leaving her people stranded 
on the floes in mid ocean. To add to the hardships of their 
situation, two of the officers and three of the men were 
sick, provisions were scanty, and the clothing of the entire 
party was so worn that many a march had to be made 
over the snow and ice with bare feet. 

There was one chance of escape, and that was to reach 
the settlements on the Lena delta, 500 miles away. To this 



The Jeannette Expedition 415 



end De Long and his men laid their course, partly by 
boat and partly by sledge. Unluckily, at the outset they 
had against them the northerly drift of the ice noes, 
which carried them twenty-eight miles in the opposite 
direction, to the northernmost point ever reached in that 
sea, before they could make any gains to the southward. 

On September 12, exactly three months after their 
desperate retreat began, the three boats of the expedition 
were separated by a violent gale, just off the Lena delta. 
Melville, commanding the whale boat, entered a mouth of 
the Lena and succeeded, with his nine men, in reaching a 
Siberian village on its banks, after fearful sufferings. 
The second cutter, commanded by Lieutenant Chipp, 
evidently foundered, for nothing was ever heard or seen 
of it or its crew after the night of the storm. The first 
cutter, under Commander De Long, with the surgeon and 
twelve men, succeeded in entering the Lena delta, and 
struggled southwards. 

It was the fate of this party not to meet any of the 
natives of the region or to know of villages nearby which 
might have proved their salvation. They were soon fac- 
ing death from starvation. De Long, remaining with his 
sick and dying, dispatched his two strongest seamen to 
hasten up the course of the Lena and bring relief. By 
the end of October these men managed to reach a village, 
more dead than alive. They gave one of the natives a 
pencil message to be taken with quickest dispatch to the 
nearest Russian official, thence to be forwarded to St. 
Petersburg; but the native, having heard that another 
American — Melville — was .in the neighborhood, carried 
the dispatch to him. 

This was the first word Melville had heard from his 
shipmates, and although the early winter had set in, and 
his feet and legs were still in such condition from frost- 
bite that he was unable to stand, he organized a sledging 



416 



The United States Navy 



outfit and made the journey to the village where the two 
survivors were. Thence, with these two seamen and some 
native guides, he started north to find De Long and his 
men. At various points along the river he found records 
left by De Long, but was baffled by the fact that De Long 
had, toward the end of his march, crossed on the ice to the 
opposite banks. The search was blocked by a furious 
snowstorm on November 14, and Melville narrowly missed 
giving his own life in the vain quest. 

As early as possible the following spring he renewed 
his search, and on the 23d of March, 1882, he came upon 
the bodies of De Long and his men. The last entry in the 
commander's diary was October 30, 1881, recording briefly 
the death of two and the approaching end of a third in the 
party. Probably by the first of November the last man 
had died of starvation. 

Meanwhile, in 1881, a party under Lieutenant A. W. 
Greely, U. S. A., had gone north for three years of explora- 
tion and scientific observation in Grinnell Land. A store 
ship was to be sent them in 1882, and another in 1883. As 
it happened, the first supply ship was unable, on account 
of ice, to reach either Fort Conger or Lady Franklin Bay, 
and instead of leaving the supplies ina" cache ' ' on shore, 
returned to the United States with everything on board. 
The second vessel was sunk by the ice, its crew returning 
on the steamer Y antic which accompanied it. The failure 
of these two expeditions made the situation of the Greely 
party critical. While Congress wasted valuable time in 
quarrels over the necessary appropriation, Secretary 
Chandler took the responsibility on himself of purchasing 
two Scotch whalers, the Bear and the Thetis, and fitting 
them out to undertake the rescue at the earliest prac- 
ticable moment in the summer of 1884. Queen Victoria 
gracefully repaid the American efforts for the relief of 



The Arctic Regions 417 




418 



The United States Navy 



the Franklin party by contributing the Alert, a ship espe- 
cially designed for polar service and regarded as the 
stoutest wooden vessel afloat. The squadron of three 
vessels was placed under Commander W. S. Schley, who 
conducted the relief with the most praiseworthy skill and 
dispatch. On June 22, 1884, they discovered the sur- 
vivors of the Greely party, including Lieutenant Greely 
himself, in a tent on Cape Sabine, and conveyed them to 
the ships, with the greatest difficulty, during a violent 
gale. These survivors were almost at the point of death 
from starvation, but all except one recovered on the 
return voyage to the United States. The indomitable 
Melville had returned from Siberia just in time to go 
north again with the Schley expedition, and was one of 
the first to clasp hands with Lieutenant Greely in the 
tent on Cape Sabine. 

The conquest of the Pole was at last accomplished by 
an officer of the American Navy after a siege of twenty- 
three years. In 1886, Civil Engineer Robert E. Peary, 
U. S. N., made a reconnoissance of the Greenland ice cap. 
In 1891-2 he discovered and named Melville Land and 
Heilprin Land, lying beyond Greenland, and by the same 
expedition he determined the insularity of Greenland. 
The ten years between 1892 and 1902 were spent in explora- 
tion. In the expedition of 1898-1902 Peary attained a 
new ' ' farthest north" for the western hemisphere. 3 His 
expedition of 1905-1909, with the Roosevelt, was crowned 
with success. On April 6, 1909, the climax of all northern 
exploration was reached, and the American flag was 
unfurled at the North Pole. The attainment of this point 
revealed the fact that the supposed Polar continent did 



8 Till then the farthest north had been a point reached by 
Lieutenant Lockwood, U. S. A., a member of the Greely expedition. 



Diplomatic Services 



419 



not exist, and that the pole was only a point in the ice- 
covered Arctic sea. 

Peary's success was the logical outcome of his years 
of preparation. Every expedition heretofore had been 
defective in important details of planning and equipment. 
Peary made the most of the experience of each voyage. 
He established the most practicable route to the Pole, he 
invented his own sledge to meet the local conditions, and, 
in short, reduced, detail by detail, the whole problem of 
Arctic exploration to a science. 

Diplomatic Services of Naval Officers 

The exploit of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, in 1854, 
in opening the trade of Japan to the world, thus induc- 
ing the " Hermit Nation " to take her rightful place 
in the family of nations, is probably the greatest feat 
of the kind in the history of the world. But it is by 
no means the only instance of the navy's being called on 
to act in a diplomatic capacity. 

In the famous letter of Paul Jones to the Marine 
Committee (September, 1775), defining the duties of the 
naval officer, occurs this passage: "The naval officer 
should be familiar with the principles of international 
law. ... He should also be conversant with the usages 
of diplomacy and capable of maintaining, if called upon, 
a dignified and judicious diplomatic correspondence; 
because it often happens that sudden emergencies in 
foreign waters make him the diplomatic as well as mili- 
tary representative of his country, and in such cases he 
may have to act without opportunity of consulting civic 
or ministerial superiors at home, and such action may 
easily involve the portentous issue of peace or war between 
great powers." The introduction of cables and wireless 
plants has in nowise lessened this service, for, seemingly, 



420 



The United States Navy 



instructions that leave the conduct of affairs, often of the 
most delicate and important nature, to the 1 1 discretion and 
sound judgment" of the senior naval officer present, are 
issued as frequently as in the earlier period of our history. 
A reading between the lines of some of the paragraphs 
of the navy blue book is enough to show the extent 
and nature of the mental equipment required for the 
successful performance of the trying duties that so often 
confront the officer in times of peace. For instance, the 
commander-in-chief of a naval force, in the absence of a 
diplomatic or consular officer of the United States at a 
foreign port has authority — 

{a) To exercise the powers of a consul in relation to 
mariners of the United States • 

(6) To communicate or remonstrate with foreign civil 
authorities as may be necessary ; 

(c) To urge upon citizens of the United States the 
necessity of abstaining from participation in political 
controversies or violations of the laws of neutrality. 

"On occasions where injury to the United States or 
to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in viola- 
tion of the principles of international law or treaty rights, 
he shall . . . take such steps as the gravity of the case 
demands. . . . The responsibility of any action taken 
by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the com- 
manding officer thereof." 

" Although due weight should be given to the opinions 
and advice of the consular and diplomatic representa- 
tives of the United States, a commanding officer is solely 
and entirely responsible to his own immediate superior 
for all official acts in the administration of his command. ' ' 

' ' The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, 
or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. 
The right to self-preservation, however, is a right which 
belongs to states as well as to individuals, and in the case 



Diplomatic Services 



421 



of states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, 
and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citi- 
zens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, 
whereby the state or its citizens may suffer irreparable 
injury. The conditions calling for the application of the 
right of self-preservation can not be denned beforehand, 
but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible 
officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect 
with all possible care and forbearance." 

"He shall exercise great care that all under his com- 
mand scrupulously respect the territorial authority of 
foreign civilized nations in amity with the United States. ' ' 

"So far as lies within their power, commanders-in- 
chief and captains of ships shall protect all merchant 
vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and 
advance the commercial interests of this country, always 
acting in accordance with international law and treaty 
obligations." 

Two prominent things are noted in the above : first, 
the requirement of a thorough knowledge of international 
law and various treaty provisions; second, the insistence 
upon the responsibility remaining, in all circumstances, 
with the naval officer — a responsibility not lessened by 
advice from diplomats, nor removed by general instruc- 
tions from the Government. The officer must decide, and 
quickly, grave questions that may involve peace or war. 

That the confidence reposed in the abilities of officers 
by both the Navy and State departments has not been 
misplaced, is shown by many instances of fine work done 
by naval officers in various ports of the world. 

President Cleveland, in one of his annual messages, 
wrote : "It appearing at an early state of the Brazilian 
insurrection that its course would call for unusual watch- 
fulness on the part of the Government, our naval force 
in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro was strengthened. Our 



422 The United States Navy 



firm attitude of neutrality was maintained to the end. 
The insurgents received no encouragement of eventual 
asylum from our commanders." Again, in the same 
message it is reported that ' ' our naval commanders at the 
scene of disturbances in Bluefields, Nicaragua, by their 
constant exhibition of firmness and good judgment, con- 
tributed largely to the prevention of more serious con- 
sequences and to the restoration of quiet and order. . . . 
Although the practice of asylum is not favored by this 
Government, yet in view of the imminent peril which 
threatened the fugitives, and solely from considerations 
of humanity, they were afforded shelter by our naval 
commander. ' ' 

An event in which readiness in dealing with a critical 
situation was strikingly shown, occurred in the Brazilian 
insurrection of 1894. The Brazilian Navy was in pos- 
session of the revolutionists, who held the bay of Rio 
de Janeiro, where much interference was made with the 
movements of peaceful merchantmen. Saldanha da 
Gama, the rebel leader, threatened to fire on any ship 
that should go to the piers to discharge its cargo; and 
merchantmen, despite the fact that yellow fever was 
decimating their crews, were obliged to lie out in the bay 
and await the end of the war. 

Such was the condition of affairs when Rear-Admiral 
A. E. K. Benham, U. S. N., arrived. He at once told the 
American captains to go to the piers and trust him to 
protect them from harm. Inspirited by this promise, 
Captain Blackford, of the bark Amy, and two other 
captains, gave notice on Sunday, January 29, 1894, that 
they would take their ships in to the wharves on the 
following morning. Da Gama, hearing of this, made 
proclamation that he would fire on any vessel that ven- 
tured to do so, and a conflict seemed impending. The 
commanders of the war-vessels of other nations looked 



Diplomatic Services 423 



anxiously to see if the American admiral would hold fast 
to his position. Day had hardly dawned before active 
preparations were visible on the small American squadron, 
which was soon cleared for action, the cruiser Detroit 
taking a station from which she could command two of 
Da Gama's vessels, the Guanabara and the Trajano. 

When the Detroit reached her station, the Amy began 
to warp in towards her pier. From the Guanabara came 
a warning musket shot. In an instant more a ball from 
the Detroit hurtled across the bow of the Brazilian, fol- 
lowed by another that struck her side. These were in 
the way of admonition. Seeing a couple of tugs maneuver- 
ing as if with purpose to ram his vessel, Commander 
Brownson took the Detroit in between the two Brazilian 
warships, and occupied a position that would have enabled 
him to sink them and their tugs at the same time. 

This decisive action ended the affair. No further 
shot came from a Brazilian gun, and the Amy, followed 
by the other two vessels, made her way unharmed to the 
wharves. 

President McKinley 's message of December, 1898, con- 
tained the following: "A menacing rupture between 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua was happily composed by the 
signature of a convention between the parties, the act 
being negotiated and signed on board the United States 
steamer Alert, then lying in Central American waters. It 
is believed that the good offices of the commander of that 
vessel contributed largely toward this gratifying out- 
come." Another incident involving the navy is referred 
to in the same message: "Pending the consideration of 
the treaty providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian 
Islands, I directed the U. S. S. Philadelphia to convey 
Rear-Admiral Miller to Honolulu, and intrusted to his 
hands an important legislative act, to be delivered to the 
President of the Hawaiian Republic, with whom the 



424 



The United States Navy 



admirai and the minister were authorized to make appro- 
priate arrangements for transferring the sovereignty of 
the islands to the United States. ' ' 

That Admiral Dewey's valuable services did not end 
with the battle of Manila Bay is shown by the words of 
the Secretary of the Navy on the occasion of the presen- 
tation of a sword, the nation's gift, October 3, 1899: 
"Later [after the battle], by your display of large powers 
of administration, by your poise and prudence, and by 
your great discretion, not only in act but also in word, 
you proved yourself a great representative citizen of the 
United States, as well as already its great naval hero." 

Finally, President McKinley, in 1899, wrote: "The 
habitual readiness of the navy for every emergency has 
won the confidence and admiration of the country. The 
officers have shown peculiar adaptation for the perform- 
ance of new and delicate duties which our recent war has 
imposed." 

Thus ministers, secretaries, and presidents acknowl- 
edge the indebtedness of the country to the services of 
naval officers in the preservation of order, the settlement 
of difficult problems, and the upholding of the country's 
honor. 

A survey of the general work of officers other than that 
directly connected with the preparation and conduct of 
war is arrested at once by the name of Rear- Admiral A. T. 
Mahan. Uniting as he does the professional knowledge 
of the naval officer with the endowment of the scholar and 
historian, he stands unique, and enjoys a reputation as 
an expert in naval matters even higher in Germany and 
England than in the United States. "It is a mere 
truism," writes a British naval authority, "to say that 
Captain Mahan has taught all serious students of naval 
warfare in two worlds how to think rightly on the prob- 



Special Duties 



425 



lems it presents. The phrase 'sea power,' as applied, 
though not invented, by him, is one of those happy 
'inspirations of genius which flash the light of philosophy 
on a whole department of human action. ' ' 4 

In the field of science, no other officer in the nine- 
teenth century rendered to the world a service equal to 
that of Commander Matthew Fontaine Maury, "Path- 
finder of the Seas." Maury in the 40's, being in charge 
of the Depot of Charts and Instruments (the predecessor 
of the United States N~aval Observatory), conceived the 
idea of collating the data available in the numberless old 
log books stored in the !STavy Department. These he sup- 
plemented with observations made at his request several 
times each day by ships in the navy and by merchant 
ships, American and foreign. From such materials he 
drew definite conclusions in regard to winds and cur- 
rents, the paths of storms (showing the season when they 
might be expected and the locality), the shortest routes 
between the great shipping ports, etc. The results were 
published and distributed, commonly without charge. 
In 1853 at his prompting an international congress met 
at Brussels, attended by representatives of ten great 
nations, and he secured a world-wide cooperation in his 
work. Maury's charts, with modifications that bring them 
up to date, continue to the present time, and for making 
ocean travel safe and expeditious they are indispensable. 



4 Thursfield, Nelson and Other Naval Studies, p. 82. 



XXV 



WAR WITH SPAIN: THE BATTLE OF 
MANILA BAY 

Causes op the War 

The intervention of the United States on behalf of 
Cuba, against the mother country Spain, was the logical 
result of many years of misrule in the island. The unwise 
and sometimes cruel governors were responsible for con- 
stant insurrections, which provoked filibustering on the 
part of American sympathizers and caused almost inces- 
sant friction between our country and Spain. In 1854 
the seizure of the American ship Black Warrior, on a 
charge of violating the custom-house regulations, seriously 
menaced our peace. Again, in 1869, the seizure and long 
detention of the American steamer Colonel Lloyd Aspin- 
wall, on the apparently unfounded charge of landing 
arms for the insurgents, excited public feeling. And in 
1873, when the Spaniards captured the filibuster Virginius 
(claiming American registry) and summarily shot several 
Americans in her crew, there was a burst of indignation 
throughout the United States. In each case war was 
averted by Spain's making a tardy reparation, but the 
settlement served only to postpone the final conflict. 

In 1876 General Campos was sent to Cuba. Adopt- 
ing a conciliatory tone, he brought peace to the island, 
which lasted from 1878 to 1895. Then an insurrection 
occurred which he was unable to suppress. He resigned, 
in consequence, and was succeeded by General Weyler 
in February, 1896. This governor determined to rule 
with an iron hand. He decreed the death penalty for 
numerous petty offenses, and by his reconcentration policy 
426 




Copyrighted, 1903, by Clinedinst, Washington 

George Dewey 



Causes of the Spanish- American War 427 

huddled the people into the cities so that plantations were 
left uncultivated. Cuba now entered upon a terrible era 
of famine and desolation. President Cleveland offered, 
through Secretary Olney, to help Spain in bringing peace 
to the island, but the offer was refused. Relief, in the 
form of food and supplies, was sent to Cuba by our 
Government and by charitable associations. Weyler was 
recalled in October, 1897, and the new Spanish ministry 
under Sagasta sent General Blanco, an honest but weak 
governor, to bring order out of chaos. Blanco offered 
autonomy to the Cubans, but could not induce the insur- 
gent leaders to listen to him. The good intentions of 
Spain came too late. 

The distress in the island became greater. Consul- 
General Lee reported to Washington, in May, 1897, that 
from 600 to 800 Americans were among the destitute. 
President McKinley made a public appeal for funds, 
which resulted in contributions amounting to $200,000. 
The American Red Cross Society took charge of the relief 
work. Meanwhile, Congress was from time to time debat- 
ing whether or not to recognize Cuba as a belligerent, or 
even as an independent state. In our country at large, 
the activity of Cuban agents and sympathizers in the 
United States, and the inflammatory editorials of certain 
of our newspapers, increased the popular feeling against 
Spain. Moreover, affairs in Havana had assumed so 
threatening an aspect that Consul Lee feared for the 
safety of our citizens in that city. Hence the battleship 
Maine, which had been lying for some time at Key West 
in readiness for an emergency call, was sent to Havana, 
where she arrived on January 25, 1898. 

A succession of events followed that had an important 
bearing in fanning into flame the smoldering fires of war. 
On February 9, 1898, a private letter, written by the 
Spanish minister at Washington to the editor of a 



428 



The United States Navy 



Madrid newspaper, had, through theft in the Havana 
post office, come into the hands of the insurgents. In 
this communication the diplomatist had declared that 
Sagasta's policy of conciliation was ''a loss of time and 
a step in the wrong direction." Commenting on a mes- 
sage of President McKinley, he had characterized the 
American executive as "weak and catering to the mob," 
and had used other objectionable language. The publica- 
tion of this letter aroused the wrath of the American 
people. Instead of peremptorily recalling her representa- 
tive, Spain allowed him to resign, and sent another in 
his place. This scant reparation for a serious offense did 
not help matters. To cap the climax, a few days later 
the people of the United States were horrified to hear of 
the blowing up of one of their finest battleships in Cuban 
waters. 

On February 15, 1898, the Maine, after an uneventful 
three weeks at Havana, was lying in apparent security 
moored to a buoy 500 yards from the arsenal ; about 200 
yards distant lay the Ward Line steamer City of Wash- 
ington, and a little farther off the Spanish cruiser 
Alphonso XII. At 9.45 that evening, without the slightest 
warning, there was an explosion under the keel of the 
Maine, so violent as to shake the whole water front of the 
city, put out the adjacent electric lights, and throw down 
many telephone poles. The unfortunate ship had been 
wrecked in a moment's time, and her total destruction 
followed in a great flame that shot up from her magazines, 
illuminating the whole harbor, and showing to the hurry- 
ing people on shore the locality of the disaster. 

All of the officers but two were saved, but of the 
ship 's company of 353 men only forty-eight escaped unin- 
jured, and the number of the dead in the end reached 266. 

A naval court of inquiry entered upon an exhaustive 
investigation of the affair, sending down divers to examine 



Events Preceding Hostilities 429 



the hull of the Maine, then fast sinking into the mud of 
Havana harbor. These divers found evidence that the 
cause of the explosion had been external, the bottom of 
the hull having been driven upward to the level of the 
gun deck. The decision of the court was that, in its 
opinion, "the Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine, 
which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her 
magazines." 

A hasty investigation made subsequently by the 
Spanish authorities led to the opposite verdict, that the 
cause of the disaster was internal, and that the destruction 
of the Maine was due to the explosion of her own maga- 
zines. But this decision had no effect on American public 
opinion. 

The real causes of the war were the conditions in Cuba 
and the long-standing wrongs to our trade and citizens. 
But, as is often the case in wars, the great causes lie 
dormant until some acute crisis, as in this case the destruc- 
tion of the Maine, stretches public patience to the breaking 
point. General Woodford, the American minister to 
Spain, was advised to defer decisive action regarding the 
unfortunate event, in order to give the United States a 
brief interval to prepare the navy, and especially the 
army, for the threatening war. 

Events Preceding Hostilities 

On the 9th of March, both Houses of Congress, by a 
unanimous vote, appropriated fifty million dollars "for 
the national defense to be expended at the discretion of 
the President." That this was none too soon was dis- 
closed when the application of the fund was undertaken. 
Our coasts were practically undefended. Our navy needed 
large provision for increased ammunition and supplies, 



430 The United States Navy 



and even for additional ships to cope with any sudden 
attack from the navy of Spain. 

The battleship Oregon, which was on the Pacific coast 
at the time of the destruction of the Maine, was at once 
put into drydock. She was of little use in the Pacific 
and would make a great addition to the Atlantic naval 
strength in case of war. Her famous trip of 15,000 miles 
around the Horn, begun on March 6, caused the Wash- 
ington authorities considerable alarm. The Oregon 
learned of the existence of war on April 30, when she 
reached Rio de Janeiro. As the destination of a Spanish 
fleet under Admiral Cervera was a matter of conjecture, 
Captain Charles E. Clark had considerable anxiety lest 
his vessel, deemed so essential to our needs on the Atlantic 
coast, should be caught by a whole squadron. On May 
25, however, with his ship in excellent condition, he 
reached the coast of Florida. But we have been antici- 
pating the events that culminated in war. 

The proposals of Spain to the Cuban people, offering 
autonomy and other measures of relief, had been rejected 
by the Cubans, and the insurrection continued. Where- 
upon President McKinley, seeing no prospect of a change, 
sent a special message to Congress on April 11, 1898: 
"The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of 
subjugation or extermination a final military victory for 
either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in 
the physical exhaustion of the one or the other, or perhaps 
of both. The prospect of such a protraction and con- 
clusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be 
contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, 
and least of all by the United States, affected and injured 
as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence. 

"The only hope of relief and repose from a condition 
which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacifica- 
tion of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of 



Events Preceding Hostilities 431 



civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests 
which give us the right and duty to speak and to act, the 
war in Cuba must stop. 

"I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the 
President to take measures to secure a full and final 
termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain 
and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the 
establishment of a stable government, capable of main- 
taining order and observing its international obligations, 
insuring peace and tranquillity, and to use the military 
and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary 
for these purposes." 

The response of Congress to this message was, on the 
19th of April, by a vote of 42 to 35 in the Senate and 
311 to 6 in the House of Representatives, the passage 
of a joint resolution declaring — "First, That the people 
of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free 
and independent. Second, That it is the duty of the 
United States to demand, and the Government of the 
United States does hereby demand, that the Government 
of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government 
in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval 
forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. Third, That the 
President of the United States be, and he hereby is, 
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval 
forces of the United States, and to call into the actual 
service of the United States, the militia of the several 
States, to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these 
resolutions into effect. Fourth, That the United States 
hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except 
for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination 
when that is accomplished to leave the government and 
control of the island to its people. ' ' 

In accordance with this joint resolution, President 



432 The United States Navy 



McKinley immediately forwarded, on April 20, to General 
Woodford an ultimatum to which a ' ' full and satisfactory 
response ' ' was required by noon of April 23. The Spanish 
minister at Washington, on hearing of this joint resolution 
and the instructions to Woodford, at once demanded his 
passport. On April 21, before our minister at Madrid 
could deliver the ultimatum, he was informed by the 
Spanish Government that diplomatic relations between 
the countries were at an end. 

Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Sicard, commanding the 
North Atlantic Squadron, had kept his men busy for two 
months at target practice, in anticipation of war, and had 
brought his command to a high standard of efficiency. 
During this time he kept his squadron off Key West in 
order to be near Cuba in case of a declaration of war. On 
April 21, on account of ill health, he was relieved by Cap- 
tain William T. Sampson, now made an acting rear- 
admiral. Sampson was at once ordered to proceed to Cuba 
to institute a blockade of the north coast of the island for 
a distance ranging between forty miles west of Havana 
and fifty miles east of that city. He was also to blockade 
on the south side of Cuba the port of Cienfuegos, which 
had railroad communication with the capital. This block- 
ade was published to the world next day, April 22, by 
President McKinley 's proclamation. On April 25, an 
act declared that war between the United States and 
Spain existed and had existed from and including April 
21. A Spanish fleet, which had been mobilized at the 
Cape Verde Islands under Admiral C'ervera, left this 
rendezvous on April 29 for unknown parts. Two days 
later came Admiral Dewey's crushing blow to the power 
of Spain in the East, which relieved the military tension 
somewhat on the Atlantic coast. In this rapid sequence 
of events the United States, in the early days of the war, 
played an extremely cautious game. This country 



Comparison of Naval Forces 433 



credited Spain with ample preparations for a war that 
had been threatening for some months. The inefficiency 
of the Castilian Government and its military weakness 
became apparent only after the first moves in the great 
game had been made. 

On paper the naval strength of Spain was greater than 
that of the United States. It was said at the beginning of 
hostilities that Spanish warships in commission numbered 
137, to eighty-six in the American service. But such 
figures are deceptive. The United States had, besides 
vessels of less tonnage, six armored ships of 8000 tons 
or more. In this number were the four first-class battle- 
ships Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon, each 
of which was of 10,000 tons or more. Spain had nothing 
equal to these. The flower of the Castilian Navy con- 
sisted of nine armored men-of-war, ranging from 6840 to 
9900 tons. The rest of the Spanish Navy comprised, for 
the most part, old iron and wooden ships. 1 But the dis- 
parity between the figures on paper and the real facts 
was not known even among some leading Spanish officials. 
Lieutenant Jose Muller y Tejeiro, the second in command 
of the naval forces of the Province of Santiago, says, if 
we may anticipate: 4 'No one wanted to believe that they 
[Cervera's ships] were the only ones that Spain was going 
to send, since they were called the 'first division,' and at 
least two more divisions were expected. The only ones 
who had no illusions, who knew what to expect, who were 
acquainted with the true condition of affairs, were those 
who had arrived in the ships. From the admiral down 
to the last midshipman, they knew perfectly well that 
there were no more fleets, no more divisions, no more 
vessels, and that these six ships (if the destroyers may be 

1 These figures were taken from Brassey, Naval Annual, 1898, 
pp. 332, 340. Compare also the Naval Pocket Book, p. 750, and 
Titherington, History of the Spanish- American War, pp. 99-100. 
28 



434 



The United States Navy 



regarded as such) were all that could be counted on to 
oppose the American fleet. ' ' 2 

Since this was not a matter of common knowledge, 
the American Navy made its preparations to meet a 
superior foe. It is greatly to the credit of the United 
States, as it is to the discredit of Spain, that the former 
was ready for the emergency and the latter was not. 
At the first real intimation of war, the officers at Key 
West drilled their crews night and day, especially at 
target practice, while the Spaniards let the valuable time 
between February and April slip by in procrastination. 
Hence, if it be said that the enemy had to fight against 
great odds, we may answer that the disgrace of Spain 
was all the greater. Besides, American officers at the 
beginning of hostilities had no idea of the weakness of 
the Spanish Navy, or if they did, they acted as if the 
enemy's paper statements were truths. 

The War in the Philippines 

An encounter had taken place April 27, at Matan- 
zas, Cuba, where a detachment of the blockading squadron 
shelled the harbor forts, but the first engagement of im- 
portance occurred four days later in the Philippines, a 
colonial possession of Spain since the days of Magellan. 
As in Cuba, the rule of Spain in the East was a long 
story of misgovernment and rebellion. In 1896 a formid- 
able revolt broke out, and Blanco, the captain-general at 
Manila, did not succeed in suppressing it. Other Spanish 
generals followed Blanco with similar lack of success, 
and early in 1898 General Basilio Augustin was put in 
command of the Spanish forces in the Philippines. Mean- 
while the leader of the Filipinos, Aguinaldo, opened nego- 

2 Tejeiro, Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, pub- 
lished by the Office of Naval Intelligence, War Notes, No. I, p. 28. 



Dewey in the East 



435 



tiations with the United States through the American 
consul at Singapore ; the insurrection in these islands, in 
the end, however, served only to complicate the problem 
for the United States. 

Commodore Dewey, with his squadron consisting of 
the Olympia, flagship, the Baltimore, the Boston, the 
Raleigh, the Concord, the Petrel, and the McCulloch, was 
lying in the cosmopolitan harbor of Hong Kong, when, 
on April 24, he was notified by the Navy Department of 
the beginning of war, and was ordered to proceed at once 
to the Philippine Islands and to capture or destroy the 
enemy's vessels. 

Dewey had not been idle while lying in this neutral 
port. For weeks he had been preparing for the threaten- 
ing conflict. He had dismantled the unserviceable 
Monocacy, a wooden vessel, and had distributed her crew 
among his other men-of-war. He purchased, right at 
hand, two ships of considerable size — the Zafiro and 
Nanshan — loaded them with coal and provisions, and 
also filled the bunkers of all his other vessels with coal. 
And, finally, he dressed his white squadron in a war-coat 
of drab. 

As the law of nations allows belligerents a stay of 
only twenty-four hours in a neutral port after war has 
been declared, Dewey was requested by the British Gov- 
ernment to leave Hong Kong. He therefore withdrew to 
Mirs Bay, about thirty miles distant. As the latter port 
is in Chinese territory, and as China had not at this time 
announced her position of neutrality, the American com- 
modore could take refuge here until he had completed his 
preparations. From Mirs Bay, on April 27, he set forth 
upon his quest for the Spanish fleet. 

On arriving at the Philippines, Dewey sent his scouts 
into every harbor and inlet likely to be tenanted by the 



436 The United States Navy 

enemy. Subig Bay, where it was half hoped the Spanish 
admiral would be found, was empty of war vessels. Still 
skirting the Luzon coast, Dewey's ships arrived off the 
entrance to Manila Bay at midnight, April 30. 

With an opening on the China Sea to the westward, the 
Bay of Manila is in shape not unlike a vast balloon. In 
this entrance, ideally placed by nature to guard the 
approach to Spain's richest spot in her Oriental colonies, 
tower the islands of Corregidor and Caballo. Twenty- 
six miles to the northeast lies the city of Manila, the 
commercial centre of the vast Philippine group. 

Ten miles to the south and west of Manila is Cavite, 
on an arm of land which points outward, completely 
sheltering a large sheet of water, where the Spanish 
Admiral Montojo had anchored his fleet. Cavite was the 
seat of Spanish naval activity in the East. It contained 
a dock, an arsenal, and a marine railway. 

Dewey's hardihood in entering hostile waters during 
the hours of darkness will be best understood when it is 
remembered that throughout the Eastern seas it was the 
belief that the defenses of Manila were impregnable, so 
ample had been the precaution of Spain. Strong testi- 
mony to Dewey's heroism is the fact that he went to 
his work anticipating all the dangers that his own skill, 
prudence, and scientific knowledge could suggest. He 
naturally supposed that Spain's chief city in the East was 
prepared for such an onset as he meditated. He gave 
his enemy credit for the plans of defense that he himself 
would have adopted, had their positions been reversed. 
Before entering Manila Bay, he called his captains 
together and made known his plan of operations. The 
ships were to slip past the islands and into the bay under 
cover of the darkness, and when inside they were to 
engage the enemy wherever found. 



The Battle of Manila Bay 



437 



The Battle of Manila Bay 

With all lights extinguished, on a night of misty dark- 
ness, the commodore led the way, followed by the re- 
mainder of the line. "When the lights of Corregidor were 
plainly visible, and while under the very sweep of its guns, 
"Air hands" was called and coffee served. The fleet 
was passing without challenge, when suddenly a shower 
of sparks from the McCulloch's funnel was followed by 
the boom of a gun from the enemy, then another, and still 
a third. To this last the Boston and the McCulloch replied. 
The flashing and booming from the island continued for 
a few minutes longer — then silence. 

The perils of torpedoes and mines still remained to 
the groping vessels; the possibility of being rammed by 
the Spanish fleet was present in every mind, yet Dewey's 
squadron kept on. Afterward, an officer, in analyzing the 
sensations of that time, said: " This invisible fleet ahead 
was a test out of which no man came without a sigh of re- 
lief. It is a hard thing to whisper an order, I know, so 
perhaps it is not to be wondered at that there should have 
been a break or vibration in men's voices as they passed 
the necessary word from mouth to mouth. We were all 
keyed up, but it was not long before the fighting string in 
every man's heart was twanging and singing like a taut 
bow." 

After safely anchoring his supply ships out of range, 
Dewey led his fleet in a circle to the eastward to meet 
the Spanish admiral, who had aligned his ships at Cavite 
with the intention of compelling a standing fight. 

Admiral Dewey reported under date of May 4, 1898 : 
" The squadron then proceeded to the attack. The flag- 
ship Olympia, under my personal direction, led, fol- 
lowed at a distance by the Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, 
Concord, and Boston, in the order named, which forma- 



438 



The United States Navy 




The Battle of Manila Bay 



439 



tion was maintained throughout the action. The squadron 
opened fire at 5.41 a.m." 

The enemy had been firing without effect at the Amer- 
icans for half an hour before Commodore Dewey had his 
vessels in the formation he desired. At the end of this 
time he turned to the captain of the Olympia and said, 
"You may fire when you are ready, Gridley!" Almost 
simultaneously with the quietly uttered permission to 
return the enemy's fire, the roar of the Olympia 's guns 
sounded as the flagship presented her side to the line of 
fire, and each ship in turn took up the refrain. Dewey's 
plan was to begin firing when at a range of 5000 yards, to 
pass the Spanish ships, gradually lessening the range to 
2000 yards, and then to countermarch in a line approxi- 
mately parallel to that of the enemy's fleet. His vessels 
would thus turn an alternate side in firing, enabling every 
battery to come into play in succession, thereby easing the 
strain on each. Such a plan was not counted upon by 
the Spanish admiral, who had anticipated a combat ship 
to ship, and it reflects the highest credit upon Dewey's 
strategy. 

Again referring to the American commodore's account 
of the action, we find: "The enemy's fire was vigorous, 
but generally ineffective. Early in the engagement two 
launches put out towards the Olympia with the apparent 
intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk, and the 
other disabled by our fire and beached, before an oppor- 
tunity was had to fire torpedoes. At 7.00 a.m. the Spanish 
flagship, Reina Cristina, made a desperate attempt to 
leave the line and came out to engage at short range, but 
was received with such a galling fire, the entire battery 
of the Olympia being concentrated upon her, that she was 
barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The 
fires started in her by our shells at this time were not 
extinguished until she sank. 



440 



The United States Navy 



"The three batteries at Manila had kept up a contin- 
uous report from the beginning of the engagement, which 
fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these 
batteries was situated on the south mole head, at the 
entrance to the Pasig River. The second was on the 
south bastion of the walled city of Manila, and the third 
at Malate, about one and a half miles farther south. At 
this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to 
the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing, the 
city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing 
them." 

Admiral Montojo's report gives the following view 
from the Spanish side: "Although we recognized the 
hopelessness of fighting the American ships, we were busy 
returning their fire. The Reina Cristina was hit repeat- 
edly. Shortly after 6.30 o'clock I observed fire forward. 
Our steering gear was damaged, rendering the vessel 
unmanageable, and we were being subjected to a terrible 
hail of shot and shell. The engines were struck. We esti- 
mated we had seventy hits about our hull and super- 
structure. The boilers were not hit, but the pipe to the 
condenser was destroyed. A few minutes later, I observed 
the after part on fire. A shell from the Americans had 
penetrated and burst with deadly effect, killing many of 
our men. The flag lieutenant said to me: ' The ship is in 
flames. It is impossible 'to stay on the Cristina any 
longer.' He signaled to the gunboat Isla de Cuba, and I 
and my staff were transferred, and my flag was hoisted on 
her. My flagship was now one mass of flames ; I ordered 
away all the boats I could to save the crew. ' ' 

Commodore Dewey, continuing his report, says : "At 
7.35 I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for break- 
fast. At 11.16 a.m. [the squadron] returned to the attack. 
By this time the Spanish flagship, and almost the entire 
Spanish fleet, were in flames. At 12.30 p.m. the squadron 



The Battle of Manila Bay 441 



ceased firing, the batteries being silenced, and the ships 
sunk, burned, or deserted. At 12.40 p.m. the squadron 
returned and anchored off Manila, the Petrel being left 
behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gun- 
boats that were behind the point of Cavite. This duty 
was performed by Commander E. P. Wood in the most 
expeditious and complete manner possible." 

Says an eye-witness of the battle, "Every ship in the 
Spanish fleet, with one exception, fought valiantly; but 
to the Don Antonio de Vlloa and her commander, Robion, 
should be given the palm for that form of desperate 
courage and spirit which leads a man to die fighting. The 
flagship and the Boston were the executioners. Under 
their shells the Vlloa was soon burning in half a dozen 
places, but her fighting crew gave no sign of surrender. 
Shot after shot struck her hull until it was riddled like 
a sieve, Shell after shell struck her upper works, but 
there were no signs of surrender. The main deck crew 
escaped, but the captain and his officers clung to the 
wreck. On the lower deck the gun crews stuck to their 
posts like the heroes they were. . . . Her commander 
nailed the Spanish ensign to what was left of the mast, 
and the Don Antonio de Vlloa went down, not only with 
her colors flying, but also with her lower guns still roar- 
ing defiance. ,, 

Having completed his work of destruction, Dewey 
now turned to a task of mercy — that of caring for the 
wounded. These he established in hospitals on shore. To 
Admiral Montojo he sent the following message : "I have 
pleasure in clasping your hand and offering my congratu- 
lations on the gallant manner in which you fought." 

Of the annihilated Spanish squadron, the Reina Cris- 
tina, a steel cruiser of 3500 tons, built in 1886, was the 
only vessel that might be considered formidable. The 
Isla de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon were small cruisers 



442 The United States Navy 



of 1030 tons each, and the Don Antonio de JJlloa and 
the Don Juan de Austria were old iron ships in need of 
repairs. The Castilla, of 3342 tons, was a wooden relic of 
older days. She rapidly became, under the fire of the 
American vessels, a burning slaughter house. Montojo 
should have dismantled her and mounted her guns ashore. 
Besides these vessels, the Spaniards had two gunboats, the 
General Lezo and the Marques del Duero, of 500 tons 
each, two transports, the Manila and Isla de Mindanao, 
and four little torpedo boats. ' 1 In offensive and defensive 
power the squadron was far inferior to Dewey's fine 
quartette of cruisers, but it had a great advantage in 
position, fighting in its own waters, where it knew the 
ranges, and had the aid of batteries on shore. ' ' 3 

According to Admiral Montojo 's report, the enemy 
lost 381 killed and wounded. The damage done to the 
American squadron was inconsiderable. Several of the 
vessels were struck, and even penetrated, but the slight 
injuries admitted of speedy repairs, and the squadron 
was soon after the battle in as good condition as before. 
There were none killed, and only seven men very slightly 
wounded. 

Although Dewey had a more powerful force than the 
Spanish, he had the disadvantage of advancing into 
strange waters, where, for all he knew, torpedoes and 
mines were laid. He had also the shore batteries to con- 
tend against, which made the opposing weight of metal 
more than equal to his. "The Spanish admiral," says a 
contemporary journal, "though he must have been aware 
that the American squadron was somewhere in the vicinity, 
could not bring himself to believe that the American 
commodore would have the audacity to steam into a 
mined harbor in the night time, with forts on both sides, 



3 Titherington, History of the Spanish- American War, p. 136. 



The Battle of Manila Bay 443 



and the Spanish squadron ready to receive him. But 
Dewey took the chances, and his being beforehand was 
half the victory. Many men, equally as brave in action, 
would have delayed to reconnoitre, and thereby have given 
time for the enemy to make additional preparations to 
receive him." 

Some of the qualities of character that contributed to 
Dewey's success were referred to soon after the war by 
one who knew him well: "Dewey has been a life-long 
student of everything connected with the sea. He is a 
constant reader, but in his studies he seldom goes outside 
of nautical science, or some collateral branch, such as 
naval history. He made a study of harbors, too, and is 
a thorough geographer. I attribute his success at Manila 
in part to his knowledge of the harbor. He undoubtedly 
knew just what he was doing and where he was going 
when he made that midnight dash which seems to be so 
amazing to people who don't know him. ,, 

Although Dewey had seized the cable connecting the 
Philippine Islands with the rest of the world, he was 
prevented from using it by Spain's contract with the 
company at Hong Kong. Hence he had to send dispatch 
boats back and forth to Hong Kong to communicate with 
Washington. During the battle, the Spanish general 
Augustin had sent a dispatch to his home Government 
which gave the impression that the victory was Spain's, 
and this was the only news the Americans had until 
May 7, when Dewey's cablegram, sent from Hong Kong, 
told a different story. This w T as received with great 
joy in the United States, and immediately upon its 
arrival the Secretary of the Navy congratulated Commo- 
dore Dewey upon the overwhelming victory. He also 
communicated to the American commander that the Presi- 
dent had appointed him an acting rear-admiral. Congress 



444 



The United States Navy 



shortly after passed a resolution giving the victor a vote 
of thanks and a sword. 

As a result of the battle, Dewey was in possession of 
the arsenal at Cavite, and of the fort on Corregidor, but 
he decided not to bombard the defenses nearer the city 
until he had troops to hold what the navy might capture. 
He was also short of ammunition. In answer to his 
request for supplies and troops, the Washington authori- 
ties at once dispatched the cruiser Charleston, loaded with 
ammunition, and on May 11 the War Department put 
General Merritt in command of the new Philippine army 
corps to be organized immediately. The Charleston was 
ordered to capture en route the Spanish island Guam, a 
task which it easily accomplished. The first instalment 
of troops arrived at Manila on June 30, the same day that 
the Charleston reached her destination. Of the monitors 
Monterey and Monadnock, which had also been dispatched 
on the long journey across the Pacific, the former arrived 
in time for the bombardment of the Philippine capital, 
which will be taken up in a later chapter. 

Dewey's victory of May 1 destroyed Spain's power 
in the East, Its completeness everywhere caused sur- 
prise, and not only aroused tremendous enthusiasm for 
the navy at home, but strongly impressed Europe with 
the growth of American sea power. The victory gave 
promise of a speedy conclusion of the war. 



XXVI 



THE WEST INDIAN CAMPAIGN 

The Blockade of Cuba 

The orders to Sampson of April 21 had definitely 
forbidden, for the present, an attack on Havana, which 
had been considered by the captains of his fleet. There 
were no troops ready to hold what ground the navy might 
gain. Also, it was of the greatest moment to save the 
vessels under Sampson 's command for the more important 
work of destroying Spain's naval force. But according 
to these orders his chief duty for the time being was to 
institute a blockade. This at once isolated the Spanish 
army in Cuba, and forced upon Spain a counter naval 
move, unless she were willing to abandon her most impor- 
tant insular possession in the West Indies. Since the 
holding of Cuba was the issue of the war, Spain would 
naturally make every effort to relieve her army in the 
island. 

The United States rightly directed the energy of the 
navy in the first days to the blockade of Cuba. Some 
writers maintain that the seizure of private property at 
sea is a relic of barbarism, and should be tolerated no 
more than such seizure by troops on land. But if the 
end can be attained without bloodshed; if, for instance, 
by a siege on land a garrison can be starved into sub- 
mission, why waste unnecessarily the lives of men? The 
blockade, says Mahan, "is the most scientific warfare, 
because the least sanguinary, and because, like the highest 
strategy, it is directed against the communications — the 
resources — not the persons of the enemy. It has been the 

445 



446 



The United States Navy 



glory of sea-power that its ends are attained by draining 
men of their dollars instead of their blood. ' ' 1 

The blockade was effective from the very beginning. 
All told, the United States Navy took about fifty-six 
prizes during the war, while the Spanish captured but 
one, the Saranac, a seizure which was subsequently 
declared illegal. To avoid any possible conflict with 
neutral governments regarding the closure of Cuban 
ports, the United States limited the parts of the island 
to be blockaded so that there could be no doubt raised 
as regards effectiveness of blockade. 

In the threatening state of affairs just prior to the 
breaking out of hostilities, and during the early days of 
the war, there had been some time to mobilize the vessels 
on the Atlantic coast. Rear- Admiral Sampson's com- 
mand comprised two main divisions : his own, with its base 
at Key West, within easy reach of Cuba ; and Commodore 
Schley 's ' ' flying squadron, ' ' assembled at Newport News 
in readiness to meet any move of the Spanish fleet under 
Cervera, who was tying at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde 
Islands. Also a " northern patrol squadron," under 
Commodore Howell, was hurriedly organized to protect 
the coast from Delaware northward. Gradually, as the 
weakness of Spain's military power and the destination 
of Cervera 's fleet became more apparent, the fears of 
the coast cities were allayed, and the vessels of Howell's 
squadron were, one by one, withdrawn to aid in the 
blockade of Cuba. 

Search for Cervera 's Squadron 

As stated in the last chapter, Admiral Cervera left the 
Cape Verde Islands on April 29, for an unknown destina- 
tion. As early as February 12, 1898, he had written to 



1 Mahan, Lessons of the War icith Spain, p. 106. 



Movements of Cervera and Sampson 447 

the Minister of Marine, asking for information regarding 
the distribution and movements of United States ships, 
their bases of supplies, charts and plans of the possible 
theatre of war, and the objective of his fleet in the event 
of hostilities. "I cannot help thinking," writes the 
admiral, ' k of a possible war with the United States, and 
I believe it would be expedient if I were given all available 
information." He then enumerated some of the matters 
on which he sought enlightenment, and continued, "If 
I had information on these matters, I could go ahead and 
study, and see just what is best to be done, and if the 
critical day should arrive, we could enter without vacilla- 
tion upon the course we are to follow." The reply to 
this reasonable and pathetic request was vague and un- 
practical. Again and again Admiral Cervera wrote for 
information and instructions, and as often he was put 
off by the incapacity or ignorance of the Minister of 
Marine. Finally, the orders above mentioned were issued, 
and Cervera sailed westward with a squadron consisting 
of the cruisers, Maria Teresa (flagship), Cristobal Colon, 
Vizcay a and Almirante Oquendo, and the three torpedo- 
boat destroyers, Furor, Pint on, and Terror. 

Immediately upon hearing the news, Secretary Long 
informed Sampson of Cervera 's departure and suggested 
the West Indies as his probable destination. At the same 
time, the Harvard, St. Louis, and Yale, vessels that had 
been taken into the navy from the merchant marine, were 
sent as scouts to cruise off Martinique, Guadeloupe, and 
Porto Rico, to bring back word of the first appearance 
of the Spaniards. The strategists at Washington assumed 
quite naturally that the probable objective of Cervera 
was Porto Rico; this Spanish possession, lying nearest 
to the enemy's sources of supplies, would be an excellent 
stopping place for coaling and for further operations at 
Cuba or against the Atlantic coast. As the vessels of 



448 The United States Navy 




Movements of Cervera and Sampson 449 



Cervera's squadron were credited with great speed, they 
were expected to arrive in West Indian waters about 
May 8. To intercept him, Sampson left his naval base, 
Key West, on May 4, but on account of the slowness of 
the monitors Terror and Amphitrite, he did not reach 
San Juan, Porto Rico, until early in the morning of 
May 12. At once he began a bombardment of the forts 
defending the city, but as daylight dawned, it became 
clear that Cervera was not in the harbor. The American 
fleet, having ascertained the strength of the defenses of 
San Juan, then turned backward unscathed to its other 
duty, the blockade of Cuba. Doubtless Sampson could 
have forced the surrender of San Juan, but, without 
troops to hold the city, he would have had to keep his 
fleet at Porto Rico, at the risk of not destroying the 
enemy's fleet, and to the neglect of the blockade. 

The first American vessel to get any news of the 
movements of the enemy's squadron was the Harvard, 
which on May 11 learned that the Furor had that day 
called at Fort de France. But the Harvard was detained 
at St. Pierre by rumors that the enemy were lying in 
wait for her outside. As a matter of fact, Cervera was 
at this time making for Curacao. As soon as it became 
clear that the Spanish fleet was in the southeastern part 
of the Caribbean, Secretary Long, surmising that the real 
destination must be Cuba, ordered Schley to proceed to 
Key West, and on the same day, May 15, he sent the 
swift scouts Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Harvard to follow 
Cervera. Sampson, meanwhile, had left his squadron off 
the north coast of Cuba, and hurried in the New York 
to Key West, where he met Schley on May 18. On the 
morning of the 19th, Schley, with his squadron, pro- 
ceeded to Cienfuegos, at the very hour when Cervera 
entered Santiago. On nearing his destination, Schley 
noticed volumes of smoke arising from behind the high 

29 



450 



The United States Navy 



forts that screened the entrance to the harbor, and hence 
he inferred that the enemy's fleet must be here. The 
signal corps had, meanwhile, sent the news of the arrival 
of Cervera at Santiago, but there was considerable doubt 
in which of the two harbors the enemy was really hidden. 
This uncertainty entailed considerable delay. Only after 
thorough confirmation of the Santiago report, and after a 
reconnoissance at Cienfuegos, did Commodore Schley 
start, on May 24, for Santiago. As it was thought that 
Cervera would try to reach Havana, Admiral Sampson did 
not dare leave the north coast of Cuba until he felt sure 
that Cervera was bottled up at Santiago. After coaling 
some of his vessels, Sampson on May 29 withdrew the main 
part of his force from the blockade of Havana, and 
hastened to Santiago. 

All this shows that despite the weakness of Cervera 's 
squadron, the Spaniards had a great advantage in so 
far as they prevented concentration of power on the 
part of the Americans at any one spot. This is only one 
of the many illustrations in history of what naval strate- 
gists call the advantage of a "fleet in being"; that is, a 
fleet at large, not itself in command of the sea, but suffi- 
ciently strong to deny that command to the other side. 
As long as the Spanish fleet was "in being," especially 
as its destination was unknown, it threatened not only the 
military operations in Cuba but the entire coast of the 
United States. 

On his arrival Commodore Schley instituted a block- 
ade of Santiago, after having definitely assured himself 
that the enemy were in the bay. On May 31 he bombarded 
the forts guarding the entrance, but without material 
result. It was evident that well-ordered land operations 
were indispensable to hold what the navy might gain. 

Admiral Sampson, shortly after his arrival early in 
June, formulated a careful and complete plan of blockade 



Preparations for Battle 



451 



of Santiago. A mile from the Morro he placed three 
steam launches as picket boats. Outside of these he 
stationed the smaller vessels of the fleet, and three or four 
miles from shore he arranged his battleships and cruisers 
in a semicircle. At night a battleship approached to the 
middle line and kept its searchlight steadily on the harbor 
entrance, while a sister ship lay close by to answer any 
fire from the enemy. 

On June 6 Sampson bombarded the Morro, Fort Agua- 
dores, and Socapa. The fleet fired in all about 2000 shots. 
The batteries were frequently hit and lost three men 
killed and forty wounded. As the forts were so much 
above sea level, many of the shells passed over them and 
did considerable damage in the village on Smith Key. It 
was by these high shots that the Reina Mercedes, which 
was lying in the harbor, was injured; she was struck 
thirty-five times and was twice set on fire. The reply 
of the Spanish batteries was feeble; the Massachusetts 
was hit once, but the other vessels of Sampson 's fleet were 
unscathed. 

Meanwhile, on the night of June 3, Naval Constructor 
Hobson, aided by seven volunteers, had attempted to 
block the narrow outlet from Santiago harbor by sinking 
the collier Merrimac in the channel, under a fierce fire from 
the shore batteries. All the men escaped with their lives, 
as by a miracle, but fell into the hands of the Spaniards. 
It is most gratifying to note that the bravery of this little 
band of heroes was cordially appreciated by the Spanish 
admiral, who sent a flag of truce to notify Admiral 
Sampson of their safety, and to compliment them on their 
daring act. They were subsequently exchanged, July 7. 

On June 7, the cutting of the last Cuban cable isolated 
the island. Thereafter the invasion was vigorously prose- 
cuted. Three days later, under a heavy protecting fire, a 
landing force of 600 marines from the Oregon, Marble- 



452 



The United States Navy 



head, and Yankee, was effected in Guantanamo Bay, where 
it had been determined to establish a naval station. This 
important and essential port was taken from the enemy 
after severe fighting by the marines, who were the first 
organized force of the United States to land in Cuba. 

The position thus won was held in spite of desperate 
attempts to dislodge our troops. By June 16 additional 
forces of marines had been landed and strongly intrenched. 
On June 22 the advance of the invading army under 
Major-General Shafter made at Daiquiri, about fifteen 
miles east of Santiago, a landing which was accomplished 
under great difficulties, but with dispatch. On June 
23 the movement against Santiago was begun. On 
the 24th the first serious engagement took place. By 
nightfall ground within five miles of Santiago was won, 
and this advantage was steadily increased. On July 1 a 
severe battle took place, our forces gaining the outworks 
of Santiago; on the 2d El Caney and San Juan were 
taken after a desperate charge, and the investment of the 
city was completed. The navy co-operated by shelling 
the town and the coast forts. 



The Battle of Santiago 

On the third of July, the day following this success 
of our land forces, occurred the decisive contest of the 
war. The line of blockading ships at this time formed a 
long arc about the harbor entrance, lying at distances 
varying from one and a half to two miles off shore. The 
squadron ranged from east to west in the following order : 
the Indiana, New York, Oregon, Iowa, Texas, and 
Brooklyn. Shortly before nine o'clock on the morning 
of the 3d, the flagship New York left her place between 
the Indiana and the Oregon to go four miles east of her 
station in order that Admiral Sampson might confer in 



The Battle of Santiago 



453 



person with General Shafter. With the flagship were the 
converted yacht Hist and the torpedo-boat Ericsson. The 
auxiliary Gloucester, formerly the yacht Corsair, lay 
slightly to the east of the Indiana and closer to the harbor ; 
while to the west of the Brooklyn lay the gunboat Vixen. 

About forty minutes after the New York left her 
station, the prow of a Spanish cruiser was discovered 
heading out of the harbor, and at the same instant several 
of the American ships hoisted the signal, " Enemy's ships 
escaping. " ' ' General quarters ' ' was sounded throughout 
the squadron, the men sprang to the guns, and forced 
draft was applied to the furnaces in the effort to get up 
enough steam to close in upon the Spanish squadron 
before it could escape. The Spanish column, headed by 
the flagship, left the harbor mouth in the following order : 
Infanta Maria Teresa, Yizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and 
Almirante Oquendo. As soon as the Maria Teresa cleared 
the harbor, she turned sharply to the west, followed by 
the rest of the line, all under full speed. 

The New York, lying so far to the eastward, could 
take no part in the early stages of the action, though 
her engines were taxed to the limit in the effort to get 
within range. As soon as the enemy was sighted, she flew 
the admiral's signal, " Close in toward harbor entrance 
and attack vessels," but the other ships of the squadron, 
owing to the complete preparation that had been made 
for every emergency, needed no orders to begin the engage- 
ment. In a few minutes the Spanish cruisers, with their 
running start, had swung past the blockading line, and 
the battle became a chase, in which the Texas and the 
Brooklyn had the advantage of position. 

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright of 
the Gloucester, as soon as he saw the enemy heading west, 
steamed directly toward the Spanish vessels and opened 
fire upon them with his light guns. Then, anticipating 



454 



The United States Navy 



the appearance of the two torpedo-boat destroyers, Pluton 
and Furor, he slowed down, giving his ship a heavy head 
of steam, so that when the destroyers appeared at the 
end of the column, he dashed for them at full speed and 
opened fire at close quarters. The Gloucester was entirely 
unprotected, and had a battery inferior in weight to that 
of either of the destroyers. In a few minutes the leading 
destroyer, the Pluton, turned and ran upon the beach, 
where a moment later she was broken in two by an 
explosion. The Furor kept going a few minutes longer, 
though in evident distress, hounded by the guns of the 
Gloucester and the secondary battery of the Indiana. 
finally, a shot from the approaching New York sent her 
to the bottom in deep water. It should be added that 
during this plucky attack at close quarters, the Glou- 
cester was under the fire of the Socapa shore battery as 
well as that of the destroyers, but it is an astonishing 
fact that she was not hit once by either. 

Hardly had the cruisers turned westward before they 
began to show the effect of the American guns. In about 
fifteen minutes the Maria Teresa caught fire, and in less 
than three-quarters of an hour from the time she was 
sighted in the harbor entrance, she turned and ran ashore 
in flames. Five minutes later, the Oquendo also was 
beached in the same condition. The Colon, the fastest 
vessel in the two squadrons, now passed the Vizcaya and 
forged ahead, beyond the range of the leading American 
ships. Shortly before the Maria Teresa had run aground 
she made a desperate effort to ram the Brooklyn. The 
latter, which was heading toward the approaching Teresa, 
suddenly ported her helm and made a wide turn to the 
south off shore. She then resumed a course parallel to that 
of the Spanish column, though at a greater range. The 
Brooklyn thus avoided being rammed but, by putting the 
helm to port instead of to starboard, she lost ground in 



The Battle of Santiago 



455 



pursuit and nearly collided with the Texas. This much- 
discussed maneuver was due, according to Commodore 
Schley 's testimony before the Senate Committee, to a desire 
to avoid blanketing the fire of the other American vessels. 

At about eleven o 'clock the Vizcaya also was set on fire, 
and was compelled to turn and run ashore. At this time 
the speedy Colon, the only remaining vessel of the Spanish 
squadron, was six miles ahead of the Brooklyn and the 
Oregon. In the pursuit the latter vessel had outstripped 
and passed both the Iowa and the Texas and taken second 
place. As the Colon was supposed to have a speed of 
twenty knots, she seemed to have an excellent chance of 
escape. 

Sampson now detailed the slower vessels to remain 
behind to attend to the rescue of prisoners, and with 
the New York joined the Brooklyn, Vixen, Oregon, and 
Texas in the chase. By the end of an hour it was 
evident that the Colon, for some reason, was not able to 
keep up her spurt, and that the American ships were 
gaming. About one o'clock the Oregon dropped a 13-inch 
shell just ahead of the Spaniard, and fifteen minutes later, 
though practically uninjured, the latter fired a gun to lee- 
ward, lowered her colors, and ran ashore. After striking 
on the beach, her crew treacherously opened the sea 
valves and sank her. This incident completed the destruc- 
tion of Admiral Cervera's fleet. 

The following extract from Admiral Sampson's report 
of the battle bears gratifying testimony to the efforts of 
the American officers and men in the work of rescue : 

"When about ten miles west of Santiago the Indiana 
had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and 
at Acerraderos the Iowa was signaled to ' resume block- 
ading station.' The Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson and 
the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the 
Harvard and the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta 



456 The United States Navy 



Maria Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo. This rescue 
of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning 
Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most 
daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were 
burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition 
were exploding, and it was not known at what moment 
the fire would reach the main magazine. In addition to 
this, a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish 
ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until 
their work of humanity was complete. ' ' 2 

The number of prisoners amounted to 1300, including 
the Spanish admiral. According to the latter 's estimate, 
some 600 Spaniards were killed. On the American side 
but one man was killed (on the Brooklyn) , and one man 
was seriously wounded. Although some of our ships were 
repeatedly struck, not one was seriously injured ; and the 
Oregon, Indiana, Gloucester, Vixen, and New York were 
untouched. 

A comparison of forces at the battle of Santiago shows 
that the advantage lay with the Americans. Cervera's 
four cruisers were modern steel vessels, three of 7000 tons, 
and one of 6840 tons. Besides these he had two destroy- 
ers. 3 On the other hand, Sampson had four battleships 
of more than 10,000 tons, besides two armored cruisers 
upward of 8000 tons and a small converted yacht. 

Comments on the Battle 

Commander Jacobsen, of the German Navy, made the 
following suggestive comments on the disastrous attempt 
of Cervera's fleet: 

" There was only one chance for the success of the 



2 Goode, With Sampson Through the War, p. 299. 

3 Admiral Cervera had to leave his third destroyer, the Terror. 
at Martinique. 



Comments on the Battle 457 



sortie. It should have been made at night in scattered 
formation. After a personal investigation of the locality, 
it is my opinion that it is entirely practicable for a fleet 
to leave Santiago harbor at night. The wreck of the 
Merrimac did not constitute an obstruction. The dark 
nights at the time of the new moon about the middle of 
June would have been best suited for the enterprise. The 
vessels should have steered different courses, previously 
determined, with orders not to fight except when com- 
pelled to do so by the immediate vicinity of a hostile ship 
or when there was no possibility of escaping the enemy 
in the darkness. A rendezvous should have been fixed 
for the next day, where the ships that succeeded in escap- 
ing were to assemble. 

"If the fleet did not dare to attempt a night sortie, 
and was nevertheless compelled to leave the harbor in 
obedience to orders, then the ships should have been 
headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, including 
the torpedo and the ram, should have been used. A bold 
attack in close formation was the only chance of success 
against the superior hostile fighting forces, who would 
hardly have found time to form their lines. ' ' 4 

In connection with the views of Commander Jacobsen, 
it is interesting to note that at conferences called on 
board the Spanish flagship in Santiago harbor on May 
26 and June 8, to consider the advisability and means of 
a sortie, the chief of staff, Captain Bustamente, and 
Captain Concas of the Maria Teresa, voted in favor of 
an immediate sortie at night, in which the vessels should 
scatter and create as much confusion in the blockading 
squadron as possible, in much the same manner as that 
suggested by the German officer. The other officers of 



4 Jacobsen, Sketches from the Spanish- American War, Office 
of Naval Intelligence, War Notes, No. iv, pp. 17, 18. 



458 The United States Navy 



the squadron, including the admiral, voted against the 

sortie. 

Commander Jacobsen mentions among the lessons to 
be learned from this battle the following: the abolition 
of all woodwork and of unprotected torpedo tubes ; better 
protection for gun crews and for fire extinguishing appa- 
ratus against shell fire; the greatest possible simplicity 
in gun mechanism, and the greatest possible rapidity of 
fire; good speed of ships under normal conditions; and 
thorough training of crews in all branches of the service. 5 

The capitulation of Santiago followed very shortly 
after the destruction of the Spanish fleet. The city had 
been closely besieged by land, and the entrance of our 
ships into the harbor had cut off all relief on that side. 
On the 17th General Shafter occupied the city. The 
capitulation embraced the entire eastern end of Cuba. 
The number of Spanish soldiers surrendered was 22,000, 
all of whom were subsequently conveyed to Spain at the 
charge of the United States. 

Occupation of Porto Rico 

With the fall of Santiago, the occupation of Porto 
Rico became the next strategic necessity. General Miles 
had previously been assigned to organize an expedition 
for that purpose. Fortunately he was already at San- 
tiago, where he had arrived on the 11th of July with rein- 
forcements for General Shafter 's army. With these 
troops, consisting of 3415 infantry and artillery, two 
companies of engineers, and one company of the Signal 
Corps, General Miles left Guantanamo on July 21, having 
nine transports convoyed by a squadron under Captain 
Higginson. The expedition landed at Guanica, Porto 
Rico, July 25, which port was entered with little opposi- 

5 Jacobsen, Sketches from the Spanish- American War, Office 
of Naval Intelligence, War Notes, No. iv, p. 18. 



Conclusion of the War 



459 



tion. From here two of the ships went to San Juan and 
thence to Fajardo and Ponce. On July 27 the major- 
general commanding entered Ponce, one of the most 
important ports of the island, from which place he there- 
after directed operations for the capture of the island. 

The campaign, which met with no serious resistance, 
was now prosecuted with great vigor, and by the 12th of 
August much of Porto Rico was in our possession, and 
the acquisition of the remainder was only a matter of a 
short time. At most of the points in the island our troops 
were enthusiastically welcomed. 

Conclusion of the War 

With the catastrophe of Santiago, Spain's efforts upon 
the ocean virtually ceased. A spasmodic attempt toward 
the end of June to send her Mediterranean fleet under 
Admiral Camara to relieve Manila was abandoned, the 
expedition being recalled after it had passed through the 
Suez Canal. 

The last scene of the war was enacted at Manila, its 
starting place. On August 13, after a brief assault upon 
the works by the land forces, in which the squadron 
assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally. The 
casualties were comparatively few. By this the conquest 
of the Philippine Islands, virtually accomplished when 
the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed by 
Admiral Dewey 's victory of the 1st of May, was formally 
sealed. 

The total casualties in the American Navy in killed 
and wounded during the war were: killed, seventeen; 
wounded, sixty-seven; died as result of wounds, one; 
invalided from service, six ; total, ninety-one. Among the 
number of American killed was Ensign Worth Bagley, 
who lost his life on the torpedo-boat Winslow in its attack 



460 The United States Navy 



on May 11, on some batteries at Cardenas, Cuba. On the 
other hand, the Spaniards had at least 1000 killed and 
wounded ; this is a conservative estimate, as Cervera 
reported 600 and Montojo 381 killed and wounded in the 
two great battles. This disparity in casualties was caused 
by the greater accuracy of Dewey's and Sampson's gun- 
nery. Even if we admit that the American weight of 
metal was fifty per cent greater than the Spanish — a 
conservative estimate — it nevertheless remains true that 
the hits were out of all proportion to the respective 
numbers of guns, or respective weight of metal thrown. 
For instance, at Santiago the United States vessels made 
about 123 hits to thirty-five of the Spaniards, 6 and the 
latter were mostly by small projectiles that did little or 
no damage. With such a difference, the enemy might have 
had a much larger number of ships and guns, with the 
victory still on the side of the United States. 

It is noteworthy, further, that while the American 
Navy was engaged in two great battles, besides difficult 
and perilous undertakings in blockade and bombardment, 
and transported more than 50,000 troops to the scenes of 
action, it did not lose a gun or a ship, and the crew of the 
Merrimac were the only prisoners captured by the 
Spaniards during the war. 

The Peace Treaty 

The annihilation of Admiral Cervera 's fleet, followed 
by the capitulation of Santiago, brought to the Spanish 
Government a realizing sense of the hopelessness of con- 
tinuing a struggle now become wholly unequal ; and over- 
tures of peace were made through the French ambassador, 

6 Figures compiled by the Scientific American, from the official 
report of the Survey Board, quoted by Spears, Our Navy in the War 
with Spain, p. 341. 



The Treaty of Peace 461 



who had acted as the friendly representative of Spanish 
interests during the war. On the afternoon of August 12, 
M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and our 
Secretary of State, as the plenipotentiary of the United 
States, signed a protocol which suspended hostilities. 

The protocol was followed by the treaty of peace 
between the United States of America and the kingdom of 
Spain, signed at Paris, December 10, 1898, and ratified 
and proclaimed at Washington, April 11, 1899. It was, 
in brief, as follows: 

Article I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty 
over and title to Cuba. 

Article II. Spain cedes to the United States the island 
of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sov- 
ereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in 
the Marianas or Ladrones. 

Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the 
archipelago known as the Philippine Islands. The United 
States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars 
($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of 
the ratifications of the present treaty. 



XXVII 



EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
AS A WORLD POWER 

The Philippine Insurrection" 

Spain's defeat and humiliation was so unexpected as 
to startle the more conservative European peoples; but 
America's new responsibilities, together with the sudden 
access of power, also came without warning and bewildered 
the people of the western hemisphere. The question, what 
should be done with the colonies wrested from Spain, was 
indeed a formidable one. It was not for territory that 
the United States had gone to war, and many leading 
citizens expressed the fear that we were departing from 
our early traditions and inclining towards " imperial- 
ism." Especially over the Philippines there were antag- 
onistic views. Though far from satisfying all, the 
President and Congress decided that, since the islands 
could not be returned or sold or left to shift for them- 
selves, they must be held at least for a period, and that 
the first step was to establish law and order. 

Immediately after the destruction of the Spanish 
fleet in Manila Bay, the great powers had displayed a 
lively interest in the islands, as evidenced by the German, 
English, and French warships dispatched to Manila. 
Japan was also represented. Had Dewey not been firm 
in upholding the rights of the victorious belligerent, as 
recognized by international law, he might have been 
embarrassed by the German force, which was steadily 
increased until it was stronger than his own. It was not 
merely the presence of their ships ; the German officers, 



The Philippine Insurrection 



463 



disregarding the blockade Dewey had established, even 
went so far as to land provisions for the Spaniards. 
Finally Dewey sent his flag lieutenant, Thomas M t 
Brumby, to inform Rear- Admiral von Diederich of this 
"extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval 
intercourse" and to tell him that "if he wants a fight he 
can have it right now." 1 

It was afterwards related that the German admiral 
sought out Captain Chichester, the senior English officer 
there, to induce him to join in opposing Dewey; but he 
obtained in reply a sharp refusal because "this American 
admiral is so deadly right in all that he has done." 

On the 26th of May, that is, three to four weeks after 
the battle, Secretary Long cabled Dewey, warning him 
not to enter into any "political alliances with the insurg- 
ents ;" and when General Merritt sailed from San Fran- 
cisco with an army to complete the work of the navy, 
he carried with him instructions not to recognize Agui- 
naldo but to set up a provisional government. Already 
the army of insurgents were strongly intrenched about 
Manila, and it remained only for a slight collision (Feb- 
ruary 4, 1899) between the two forces to supply the 
match that ignited the conflagration. 

The population of the Philippines was about twice 
that of the American colonies at the time of the Revolu- 
tion. But it was but a slight resistance that they could 
offer in open conflict to the American Army, which grew 
to more than 54,000 in number. 2 

The difficulty lay rather in the character of the coun- 
try. The Philippine Islands have a land area equal to 
that of the New England states and New York combined. 
From north to south, if superimposed upon the eastern 
United States, they would extend from Narragansett 

1 The New American Navy, ii, 111, 112. 

2 Secretary of War, Annual Report, 1900, i, part iv, 560. 



464 The United States Navy 



Bay to Key West, and their coast line, 11,000 miles, is 
greater than that of continental United States, excluding 
Alaska. Thus, even if the difficulties of the terrain, the 
mountains, the marshes, and the dense tropical forests, 
are passed over, the army had a hard problem to face and 
could not put down a general insurrection without the 
cooperation of the navy. This was given with the same 
decision and promptness that had brought the initial 
success. 

When fighting began between the two armies in and 
about Manila, the ships steamed in close to the shore and 
shelled the insurgents' trenches north and south of the 
city. A week later the navy landed a force at Iloilo, 
Panay, and occupied that important seaport until the 
army took it over. 3 

Sailors and marines landing at Olongapo, Subig Bay, 
destroyed a heavy rifled gun, mounted there by insurg- 
ents. Captain B. H. McCalla, commanding the 'Newark, 
in December, 1899, compelled the surrender of the north- 
ern provinces of Luzon, Oagayan, and Isabela, turning 
them over to the army. In February, 1901, when General 
Funston set out on the expedition to Isabela that resulted 
in the capture of Agumaldo, the gunboat Yicksbwg, 
Commander E. B. Barry, rendered important assitance. 
Meanwhile there was constant patrolling of islands that 
were the especial sources of trouble, thus cutting off war 
supplies that came from Hong Kong and Chinese ports. 
Also the ships were engaged in making surveys and cor- 
recting charts, which were needed for merchant vessels 
just as much as for war ships. The cruiser Charleston 
showed the need and the danger, for she struck on an 
uncharted reef and was lost. As the rivers and inlets 
were often too shallow to permit sea going ships to enter, 
a mosquito fleet of seventeen gunboats, four taken by 



3 Long, The New American Navy, ii, 115. 



The Samoan Trouble 465 



Dewey at Manila Bay and thirteen acquired by purchase 
from the Spaniards, was organized. They were com- 
manded for the most part by ensigns or naval cadets, and 
rendered efficient service. 

All open resistance to American forces was ended 
nine months after the beginning of the insurrection. But 
guerilla warfare following, two years more were required 
to stamp this out. Finally, determined efforts began to 
tell, and insurgent leaders having been for the most part 
captured, the islands one by one gave up the struggle. 
Then ensued an era of unprecedented progress. 

The Samoan Trouble 

Dewey's victory in the Far East had at once given 
us a new interest in tho Pacific. Hawaii, occupying 
a position of the greatest strategic importance at the 
"cross roads of the Pacific," had five years before asked 
to be joined to the United States, and on July 7, 1898, 
she was annexed by a joint resolution of Congress. Guam, 
and the tiny Wake and Midway Islands were occupied 
during the war, and became American territory. 

In 1898, Samoa, which had been governed for nine 
years by the natives, under the control of England, Ger- 
many, and the United States, was the scene of factional 
strife over the choice of a new king. The law said that 
when the natives could not agree on such a question they 
should refer it to the chief justice of the island court. 
Mr. W. L. Chambers, an American citizen, who held that 
office, on being appealed to, gave a decision that was im- 
partial and fair. The trouble would probably then have 
ended, had not the German consul secretly encouraged 
the losing faction. Guards became necessary to protect 
the English and American consulates in Apia, the chief 
city of Samoa, 

An act of heroism occurred when an expedition was 
30 



466 



The United States Navy 



organized with sixty-one Americans under Lieutenant 
P. V. Lansdale, U.S.N"., and sixty-three British under 
Lieutenant A. H. Freeman, R.N. They marched against 
Vailele, near Apia, where ammunition and supplies had 
been stored. Not encountering any opposition, they de- 
stroyed the camp ; but on the return march they were 
ambushed by an overwhelming force of natives. Lansdale 
was shot below the knee so that he could not walk, and 
Ordinary Seaman N. E. Edsall, who came to his assist- 
ance, was mortally wounded. The American and British 
forces happened to be so scattered that they were unable 
to make an effective resistance, and slowly gave way. But 
Ensign Monaghan, after doing his utmost to remove 
Lieutenant Lansdale to a place of safety, seized a rifle 
from a disabled man, and "stood steadfast by his wounded 
superior and friend — one brave man against a score of 
savages. . . . He died in a heroic performance of duty." 4 
Lieutenants Lansdale and Freeman were both among 
the killed. 

To settle the trouble a commission, with representa- 
tives from England, Germany, and the United States, 
visited the islands in one of our warships. As a result of 
their negotiations, the tripartite control of the islands 
ended. Germany was granted the largest islands to the 
west, England having ceded her claims in exchange for 
concessions elsewhere, and the United States was granted 
Tutuila and five other small islands to the east. This 
arrangement lasted till the World War, when New 
Zealand seized the German islands, her retention of them 
as a mandate being later established by the Treaty 
of Versailles. 

The advantage to the United States in these small 
islands (the total area of her share is about fifty-eight 



4 Report of Captain Edwin White, quoted by Long, The New 
American Navy, ii, 125. 



The Samoan Trouble 



467 




468 



The United States Navy 



square miles) lies in the possession of a coaling station at 
Pago Pago, Tutuila, one of the finest harbors in all the 
Pacific, and of great strategic importance. It is about 
4200 miles from San Francisco, 2275 from Hawaii, 1600 
from Auckland, and 2350 from Sydney. 

When our country assumed sovereignty over the 
islands in 1900, with the written consent of the native 
chiefs the Government appointed a naval officer as gov- 
ernor. This method of administration, as at Guam, is the 
system that still is in operation. 

The Boxer Rebellion 

While the uprisings just described were being met, 
trouble was brewing in China. This great country had 
been suffering from the rapacity of the western powers 
and there was much ground for believing that her dis- 
memberment was near. Thus when Secretary Hay in 
1899 addressed a note to Great Britain asking her to join 
in maintaining the "open door" policy so that all nations 
might carry on their commerce on equal terms even 
within the "spheres of influence or interest," it was 
timely. Great Britain assented, provided that the other 
powers concerned would agree. Like answers were ob- 
tained from Germany and Russia, and in time from 
Japan, France, and Italy. Hay then followed these notes 
by one addressed to the several nations, giving a resume 
of the negotiations and concluding that, since each nation 
had "accepted the declaration suggested by the United 
States concerning foreign trade in China," he considered 
the assent as no longer provisional, but "as final and 
definitive." 

The Chinese, however, already alarmed, were foster- 
ing a movement, secretly favored by the reactionary 
Empress Dowager, to drive out all foreigners. To accom- 
plish this they organized the society of the "I-Ho Ch'uan," 



The Boxer Rebellion 



469 



or "Fist of Righteous Harmony/' popularly known as 
the "Boxers." 

Disorder and acts of violence in 1900 were wide- 
spread. Mission stations in various places were attacked 
and destroyed. Toward the last of May, our minister in 
Peking, E. H. Conger, believing that the Boxer move- 
ment was threatening to become an open rebellion, tele- 
graphed Admiral Kempff, then at Taku in his flagship 
Newark, that the American legation needed a strong 
guard. Marines were dispatched and reached the capital 
just in time, for only a few days later all railroad com- 
munications were cut off, and the foreign legations were 
in a state of siege. The situation soon was so serious that, 
when the consuls and naval officers of the several nations 
at Tientsin could agree on no plan for relieving the lega- 
tions at Peking, Captain B. H. McCalla, U.S.K, in 
command of 112 officers and men, proposed to set out at 
once for Peking, even if his force should have to act alone. 
This decisive utterance had a good effect, and the British, 
Japanese, Austrian, and Italian officers joined with 
McCalla. Eventually the Germans, Erench, and Rus- 
sians added their detachments. The whole force, amount- 
ing to 2066 officers and men, was commanded by Vice- 
Admiral Seymour of the British Navy. They succeeded 
in reaching Langfang, forty miles from Peking, on June 
13, without great difficulty. Meanwhile the Imperial 
forces had joined with the Boxers and had cut the rail- 
road communications in their rear. The railroad to 
Peking had also been destroyed. Lacking food supplies 
and ammunition, and threatened by an enormous host of 
Boxers and Imperial troops, the council of senior officers 
decided to fall back to Tientsin. On the return march, 
which was made not without considerable fighting, the 
most dangerous position, that of advance guard, was given 
to the American sailors. Captain McCalla was wounded 



470 



The United States Navy 



three times, but he held to his post till the force reached 
Tientsin. Seven hundred allied troops remained here 
and were soon besieged by several thousand Boxers. 

It then became imperative to hurry forward men and 
supplies from Taku to Tientsin. The railway between 
these points, on being abandoned, had been plundered by 
Boxers and roving bands, and in places had been destroyed. 
To an American naval officer, with a force of bluejackets, 
was given the task of putting the miserably equipped 
single-track system into commission, and of operating 
it. It was new work for our sailors, but in a few weeks 
they transported 13,000 troops, besides horses, ammuni- 
tion, provisions, and water. 

Grave anxiety had in the meantime prevailed through- 
out the western nations for the safety of their people in 
China. It was commonly believed that all the ministers 
in Peking had perished. Large reinforcements of men 
and ships had been sent to China or were on their way, 
and the threat of dismemberment of the Empire was 
more grave than ever before. But Secretary Hay met the 
crisis; writing to the European Powers, he stated "the 
purpose of the United States to be the relief and protec- 
tion of American interests," and "reiterated the princi- 
ples of Chinese territorial and administrative entity, 
protection of treaty rights, and preservation of the 'open 
door.' " The stand taken by the United States influenc- 
ing the other nations, the dissolution of China did not 
take place. 

On the arrival of adequate reinforcements, another 
international expedition was organized, and on August 
14 it entered Peking. It was none too soon, for, since 
June 19, when Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, 
was killed, the besieged had been subjected to many 
fierce attacks. Our marines had intrenched themselves on 
the ancient city wall near the American legation, and there 



Influence in Foreign Affairs 471 



made a brave defense. Twice they were driven from their 
position, but both times they succeeded in retaking it. 

President McKinley during the time of hostilities 
had made it very clear to Minister Wu in Washington 
and to the viceroys in southern China (who throughout 
were helpful ) that the United States was fighting not the 
Imperial Government, but a large group of excited and 
rebellious fanatics. Thus it was not strange that Prince 
Ch'ing should at the conclusion have written to our 
minister in Peking, "I was profoundly impressed with 
the justice and great friendliness of the American Govern- 
ment, and wish to express our sincere thanks." 

The western nations affected required China to pay 
large indemnities. The United States, however, in May, 
1908, decided to remit to the Imperial Government the 
balance still due, which was about $12,000,000, or one- 
half. Whereupon China announced, in accordance with 
a suggestion made by the United States, that she would 
use the money to send selected students to American 
schools and universities. It is to be hoped that China will 
ever have reason to look on America as her best friend. 

Influence in Foreign Affairs 

Roosevelt, during his second term, showed himself 
much interested in foreign affairs. The first occasion was 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). In the encroach- 
ments upon Chinese territory Russia had been the worst 
offender, and Roosevelt had let Japan know, previous to 
the war, on which side his sympathies lay. When hostili- 
ties began, he used his influence, by addressing notes to 
the powers, (1) to keep Germany and France out of the 
conflict, that is, to keep it from becoming a world war, 
and (2) to localize the theater of operations, that is, to 
keep the war from spreading over China. When Japan 



472 



The United States Navy 



had won her decisive victory at Tsushima, it was 
Roosevelt that she asked to mediate, as the head of a great 
neutral power, in offering peace. The treaty conference, 
which was held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, seemed 
unable to agree on satisfactory terms. In fact it was 
about to break up when Roosevelt came forward and out- 
lined what he thought would be a just settlement. This 
led to further deliberation, and the terms which, he had 
proposed were what the two nations accepted. Undoubt- 
edly Roosevelt had saved the situation and had spared the 
belligerent countries the heavy sacrifices incident to many 
months of further warfare. For his service he was much 
lauded throughout Europe. 

Roosevelt added to American prestige also in quite 
another affair. At the time of the war just mentioned, 
Germany taking advantage of Russian preoccupation, 
acted towards France, the ally of Russia, in an arbitrary 
manner that was bitterly resented. This occurred as the 
Kaiser actively interested himself in the affairs of 
Morocco, which France by agreement with certain coun- 
tries had assumed a protectorate over, a year or more 
previous. The Kaiser now intervened with "terrible 
brusqueness." In the negotiations that followed Roosevelt 
took a leading part and, working in conjunction with 
others, induced the Kaiser to modify his demands. Thus 
a conflict which might have approximated almost the 
magnitude of that of 1914 was averted. 

Although these two achivements of President 
Roosevelt belong primarily to diplomatic history, they 
also bear a relation to the development of our navy. It 
was not a matter of accident nor merely because of his 
superabundant vigor that Roosevelt should have been the 
first president to take such an important part in world 
affairs. The United States had become a world power, 



Cruise of the Battle Fleet 



473 



and she had a navy. Koosevelt was known as one who 
believed in a strong navy and who would not hesitate to 
use it, if necessity arose. 

Cruise of the Battle Fleet 

The issue of the Russo-Japanese War was still unde- 
cided when certain newspapers tending towards sensa- 
tionalism began talking of the "yellow peril." There 
admittedly was commercial rivalry between Japan and the 
United States, and later something of sensitiveness on the 
part of Japan that her subjects should not be placed on 
a parity with other aliens. This to most people seemed an 
insufficient cause for war, but there was something omin- 
ous in the air, perhaps a lack of confidence on both sides. 
Even the conservative admitted that there was a growing- 
dread, which though it might be foolish and unreasonable, 
constituted a menace. 

In December, 1907, President Roosevelt reviewed at 
Hampton Roads the "Battle Fleet" consisting of sixteen 
battleships, all commissioned since the Spanish- American 
War, and six destroyers. They were starting for San 
Francisco, going around the Horn, setting out on a voyage 
which because of its length many regarded as imprac- 
ticable and ill advised. Scarcely had Roosevelt returned 
to Washington when he announced that the trip to San 
Francisco was only a part of their cruise, for from Cali- 
fornia they would go to our insular possessions and return 
home by the Suez Canal. Though on a gigantic scale, this 
was to be a practice cruise. As Roosevelt wrote in his 
Autobiography, "It seemed to me evident that such a 
voyage would greatly benefit the navy itself ; would arouse 
popular interest in and enthusiasm for the navy; and 
would make foreign nations accept as a matter of course 
that our fleet should from time to time be gathered in the 



474 



The United States Navy 



Pacific, just as from time to time it was gathered in 
the Atlantic." 5 

There were additional reasons, not given to the public, 
revealed in a letter Roosevelt wrote to Secretary Root: 
" I am more concerned over the Japanese situation than 
almost any other. Thank Heaven we have the navy in 
good shape. It is high time that it should go on a cruise 
around the world. In the first place I think it will have 
a pacific effect to show it can be done; and in the next 
place, after talking thoroughly over the situation with 
the naval board, I became convinced that it was absolutely 
necessary for us to try in time of peace to see just what 
we could do in the way of putting a big battle fleet in the 
Pacific and not make the experiment in time of war." 

High naval authorities in Germany and Italy told 
Roosevelt later that they had expected hostilities with 
Japan to begin when the ships passed the Straits of 
Magellan. Instead, invitations came, not only from New 
Zealand and Australia, but also from Japan and China 
that the fleet should make them a friendly visit. These 
countries then all began to make plans for elaborate 
entertainment. 

The voyage of the Battle Fleet, covering 46,000 sea 
miles, proved most uneventful so far as martial adventure 
is considered. But when the ships returned after an 
absence of fourteen months the benefits resulting from 
the cruise at once became apparent to those who had 
taken part in it. The fleet had found itself, the men had 
got the "sea habit," and the vast aggregation had become 
a unit in a sense such as had not been realized before. 
The fleet had been self-sustaining in the matter of 
repairs, and despite its long absence from the navy yards, 
had come back in the best of condition. New standards 
in steam engineering had been established, with economy 

5 P. 548. 



Cuba and the Caribbean 



475 



in coal consumption and increased radius of action. 
Officers and men had obtained daily practice in techni- 
cal work of all kinds ; they had profited from the unusual 
opportunities of maneuvering, and had improved in 
gunnery. 6 The cruise also brought home some needs of 
the navy, especially the lack of colliers. 

The relations with Japan, as well as with all the coun- 
tries visited, were improved. Koosevelt in his enthusiasm 
wrote : "The most noteworthy incident of the cruise was 
the reception given to our fleet in Japan. In courtesy and 
good breeding, the Japanese can certainly teach much to 
the nations of the Western world." 7 

Cuba and the Caribbean 

The second sphere of influence which the Spanish- 
American War pointed the way to, though marked by no 
international affair comparable with that of maintaining 
the integrity of China, still has been of wide significance. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England had 
commonly kept a squadron at her West Indian Station. 
But when the threat of her German rival required con- 
centration in the Home Fleet, she seemed very ready to 
turn over to the United States the responsibility of patrol- 
ling the Caribbean. 

The first duty of the United States when Spain had 
left Cuba was to put that country firmly on her feet. 
That she might be saved from foreign exploitation there 
was an agreement made with her commonly known as 
the Piatt Amendment, which was passed by both houses 
of Congress (March 2, 1901), and was incorporated by 
Cuba into her constitution. This contained among others 
the following provisions : 

6 Based on the statement of Admiral Sperry, quoted in Brassey's 
Naval Annual, 1909, p. 35. 

7 Autobiography, p. 553. 



476 



The United States Navy 



"I. That the government of Ouba shall never enter 
into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power 
which will impair or tend to impair the independence 
of Cnba .... 

"III. That the government of Cuba consents that the 
United States may exercise the right to intervene for the 
preservation of Cuban independence, maintenance of a 
government adequate for the protection of life, property, 
and individual liberty, and for discharging the obliga- 
itons with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris 
on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken 
by the government of Cuba." 

An election having been held in December, 1901, all 
United States troops were withdrawn the following May. 
But when an insurrection occurred after an election in 
1906, and the Cuban Congress could not or would not 
handle the difficulty, the United States intervened to save 
the island from anarchy. It was not, however, for annexa- 
tion, which many feared would be the outcome; and in 
January, 1909, our forces were again withdrawn. Two 
years later opposing factions were raising a storm, and 
intervention three times seemed imminent. In 1916 an 
election once more caused trouble and United States 
marines were landed in Santiago to protect American 
life and property. But the Cuban president then suc- 
ceeded in restoring order without our assistance. Thus 
the army and navy, working with the State Department, 
have been instrumental in maintaining peace and order 
in the new republic. 

What has been done for Cuba differs only in degree 
from the assistance rendered to other states in the Carib- 
bean. This work was practically a necessity after the 
United States in 1903 decided to build an Isthmian canal. 
From that time on the United States was an interested 
party. An uprising in countries neighboring upon the 



Naval Progress up to the World War 477 



canal meant a loss possibly of life, certainly of property, 
to the citizens of foreign nations concerned, for which the 
latter would be likely to demand substantial reparation. 
To secure this reparation they might resort to force and 
temporarily or permanently obtain a foothold in the 
unruly country. Such a procedure would make addi- 
tional protection necessary for the Isthmian canal and 
might rob the United States of her unique position in 
the Western Hemisphere. 

For these and like reasons the United States has 
established what amounts to a political or financial pro- 
tectorate over several of the Caribbean countries, as will 
be discussed later. To make unnecessary the use of force, 
periodic visits from our warships to the countries con- 
cerned have been deemed advisable. 

Naval Progress up to the World War 

After every great war there has always been a cry to 
do away with armaments, and beginning with the Revolu- 
tion, the rule has been on the termination of hostilities 
to decrease the naval establishment both in men and 
ships. The Spanish-American war stands out as the con- 
spicuous exception. Instead of there being a decline, the 
new navy went forward with leaps and bounds. There 
were two reasons why the American people turned from 
their traditional policy of keeping the naval establish- 
ment at a minimum: (1) we had acquired extensive 
insular possessions, some far removed, and there was need 
of a navy to look after them; (2) President Poosevelt, 
a student of naval affairs, was a warm supporter of 
the navy, and in keeping with his policies required an 
adequate force to make the United States a power among 
the nations. During his second administration, there 
was a spirit of uneasiness, of dread, felt round the world. 



478 



The United States Navy 



All the countries were preparing — for what, they did not 
know — and the spirit was contagious. 

It was the battleship that showed the most marked 
development during the period between the Spanish- 
American and the World War. Mahan had taught that 
capital ships are the strength of a fighting force, and it 
was to them that the United State devoted her attention. 
The strongest units of the United States Navy of 1898, 
the Indiana, Oregon, and Massachusetts (authorized in 
1890 and launched in 1893), were of 10,250 tons dis- 
placement, with moderate speed (designed speed, 16 
knots), low freeboard, small normal coal supply (400 
tons), heavy armament, and armor giving strong pro- 
tection. They were built when the idea prevailed that 
the chief duty of the navy was to defend our coasts. Their 
seagoing qualities were unsatisfactory, their low free- 
board in heavy weather causing general wetness and 
impairing the efficiency of the forward heavy and inter- 
mediate batteries. The territorial expansion that fol- 
lowed as a result of the Spanish- American War required 
our ships to render their chief service commonly in waters 
far from home ports. Thus a navy for coast defense 
was no longer adequate, and soon the naval policy of 
the United States had to conform largely to that of the 
leading European nations. Accordingly the Virginia 
class, authorized in 1899 and launched in 1904, possessed 
greater speed, increased length, and a high freeboard 
They carried four submerged torpedo tubes, and showed 
a rapid development in the application of electricity. 

In 1906 the British launched the Dreadnought, and 
she so plainly outclassed all previous battleships as to 
make them virtually obsolete. 8 

8 " While the Dreadnought affected injuriously the value of 
seven British vessels then under construction, it relegated to the 
background forty-one ships then building for the seven other great 
Powers of the world." Hurd, Our Navy, p. 191. 



Naval Progress up to the World War 479 



This type has, as its characteristics, simplicity and 
concentration of power. There are batteries of heaviest 
guns available (all of one size) and light torpedo defense 
guns, but nothing between. The speed, which is consider- 
ably higher, permits strategical and tactical concentration 
of gun power. The unusually heavy guns enable them to 
penetrate heavy armor and reach the vitals of the enemy. 
Their effectiveness was greatly increased at the time of 
the first Dreadnought by improvement in ballistics and 
in the accuracy of gun fire — due in the English Navy to 
Captain Percy Scott. "Spotting" at this time was in 
its early infancy. 9 

The United States quickly followed, and the Michigan 
and South Carolina were built with no intermediate bat- 
teries. Then came the Utah and Florida (21,800 tons 
displacement, speed 21 knots), and we had some of the 
units of our present navy. The Nevada (1914) showed 
the advantage of the exclusive use of oil fuel. The New 
Mexico (1916—32,000 tons, 21 knots, twelve 14-inch 
guns) had as her new feature, tried for the first time on 
a warship, the electric drive for the main propulsion ; and 
this, proving successful, was adopted as standard in 
American battleships. 

The cast iron shot of Civil War days had long ago 

9 Japan, Germany, and Italy had been working on the same 
problem, and, though the Dreadnought was the hist of its type, 
each nation claimed credit for originating the idea. The British 
writer Jane, remarks, however, that the claims of the United States 
Navy "rest on a stronger basis," for the South Carolina type with 
"all big guns in the center line, all bearing on either broadside, was 
a distinct advance and novelty." He says, further, that, since 
the actual date of laying down goes for nothing, inasmuch as ships 
are designed and authorized long before work on them commences, 
"a strong body of opinion will always credit the United States with 
being the first navy that adopted the 'all big-gun idea.'" Jane, 
The British Battle Fleet, pp. 326, 327. 



480 



The United States Navy 



given way to forged-steel, elongated, pointed shells, capa- 
ble of piercing armor, and carrying a charge of high explos- 
ive Black powder had been replaced by smokeless 
powder, because the energy of the latter was four or five 
times as great as that of old-time gunpowder, and the more 
gradual production of gas gave more uniform pressure 
in the bore and a higher velocity to the projectile ; and 
withal, it produced much less smoke, always confusing 
to gun pointers and those controlling gun fire. 

In only one other type of warship did the United 
States keep pace with her rivals, and that was the de- 
stroyer. Our navy of 1898 included eighteen torpedo 
boats, but though suggesting great possibilities for har- 
for defense they had never demonstrated their value. 10 
Already there had been evolved the effectual enemy 
of the torpedo boat, the torpedo boat destroyer, which 
was superior in seaworthiness, speed, and armament. 
Because of greater size, its cruising radius (dependent on 
fuel capacity) was enormously increased, and it could 
accompany the fleet and take part in maneuvers. At the 
beginning of the Great War (1914) we had about fifty 
destroyers, which though less than half of those in either 
the British or the German Navy, were a strong force, 
one that with the addition of those building was to> bring 
great credit to our navy. 

The two entirely new types of warship developed 
during this period were the submarine and the aeroplane. 

The pioneer in the development of the modern sub- 
marine, in the United States, was Mr. John P. Holland. 
Engineers in England and Erance were making progress, 
but they owed much to him. His first submarine, built 
in 1877, was a crude one-man boat with a petroleum motor. 

10 "In the war with Spain torpedoes were much more dangerous 
to those who attempted to use them than to their enemy." Brassey, 
Naval Annual, 1899, p. 112. 



Naval Progress up to the World War 481 



Later ones were also unsatisfactory, but each embodied 
some improvement, until in 1899 he built the first to be 
accepted by the navy. This was propelled by a gasoline 
engine on the surface and an electric motor when sub- 
merged. Holland was the first to use an internal com- 
bustion engine in conjunction with a storage battery and 
electric motor, and this feature was the chief cause of 
his success. But even at the time of the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904—1905), the submarine had not reached the 
point of development that rendered either belligerent 
willing to try it in actual service. Its real usefulness 
began with 1907-1912, when the Diesel engine, burning- 
heavy oil, was introduced. In the later developments 
the United States Navy for some time did much less than 
either England or Germany, and was considerably behind 
those countries as we entered the World War. 

The aeroplane and its development has almost the 
same story. The Wright brothers of Dayton, Ohio, were 
the first of any county to make a successful flight with a 
heavier-than-air machine, which they accomplished in 
December, 1903, when they flew for fifty-nine seconds 
going very nearly a mile. Two years later, by incessant 
labor, they had improved their machine so that in a flight 
of eighteen minutes they covered ten miles. However, 
it was the French, who had for years been btudying the 
possibilities of balloons and dirigibles, that were the 
first to take up aviation for military purposes on a 
large scale. 

The first practicable seaplane (1911) was the inven- 
tion of another American, Glenn H. Curtiss. In 1914 
he produced a flying boat double the size of those pre- 
viously made, named the America. She flew thirteen 
hours at a speed of about fifty knots, which was equal to 
that made by the best land aeroplanes of that time. 
Though she never was tried for a trans- Atlantic flight 

31 



482 



The United States Navy 



(for which she had been designed), it was the America 
type that was used by the British for patrol service over 
the North Sea. 

The Great War began the last of July, 1914. At once 
the submarine, aeroplane, and every type of ship that 
could be quickly built was so rapidly developed both in 
structural features and in operation that the United States 
within a few months seemed hopelessly out of the race. 
Actual use in war is so stimulating to naval progress that 
our officers, observing from far and near, felt that we had 
almost everything yet to learn. Very soon, however, the 
prospect of being drawn into the maelstrom quickened 
our naval service and preparations were begun on an 
extended scale. 



XXVIII 



THE WORLD WAR 

The Rights of Neutrals Ignored 

America joined in the war against Germany, April 
6, 1917. The events leading up to this decision went 
back two years and more. Both England and Germany 
had disregarded neutral rights. International law, with 
new conditions arising, had been set aside or had been 
changed to meet those conditions. At the hands of either 
belligerent American communications suffered. Eng- 
land's offense consisted in intercepting articles, consigned 
not only to Germany, but to countries neighboring upon 
her, from which they might be forwarded to her; also 
England greatly extended the classes of contraband. 
Germany's offense consisted in destroying merchantmen 
engaged in commerce with England and France, without 
exercising the right of visit and search, commonly with- 
out warning and often without making any effort to save 
passengers and crew. The first class of offenses caused 
irritation, but the trouble was only of money. In some 
cases compensation was made at the time; in others it 
bade fair to be settled by claims made after the war. The 
second class of offenses caused deep indignation. Among 
the people lost were American citizens, women and chil- 
dren as well as men, and for their lives there could be 
no compensation. Germany was said to be waging war 
against humanity. 

A conspicuous example of this kind of warfare, a suc- 
cess that was to prove unfortunate for Germany, was the 
sinking of the Lusitania. On May 7, 1915, without the 
slightest warning that ship was torpedoed off the Irish 

. 483 



484 



The United States Navy 



coast. She sank in eighteen minutes, and with her were 
lost 1153 men, women, and children, of whom 114 were 
citizens of the United States. Some people of our coun- 
try were for an immediate declaration of war, but Presi- 
dent Wilson bent his efforts to gaining a repudiation of 
the act, coupled with the promise of respecting in the 
future the rules of cruiser warfare. Although there were 
two further lapses that occasioned sharp notes, Germany 
was kept from unrestricted submarine warfare until 
February 1, 1917. Then diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Germany were severed, and when 
news came that three American ships had been sunk, an 
extra session of Congress was called and war was declared. 

General Character of the War 

From a naval point of view the World War was a 
conflict of two blockades. Great Britain, since the begin- 
ning of hostilities, had been so superior on the surface as 
to enforce a long distance blockade that prevented ships 
from the west entering or leaving German ports. Occa- 
sionally German warships slipped out, but it was only for 
short runs or raids, from which they returned after a 
few hours. Germany, on the other hand, had a force of 
undersea craft that came and went at pleasure, encircling 
the British Isles and sailing about the French coast. 
They sank so many merchantmen as to make hazardous 
the carrying of cargoes to the Allied countries. Though 
many ships eluded them, the large number lost seriously 
interfered with the Allies' prosecution of the war, and in 
1917 the menace was becoming worse. 

Thus when the United States joined the Allies, if 
the surface blockade could be maintained and avenues 
from the United States to the Allies be kept open, our 
vast resources in men and war supplies of all kinds would 
eventually insure victory. On the other hand, if the 



The Naval Situation, April, 1917 485 



undersea craft, with the increased force then available, 
could prevent men and supplies from reaching England 
and France, they felt confident of a result favorable 
to them. 

The Naval Situation, April, 1917 

Three days after the declaration of war there arrived 
in England the naval representative of the United States, 
Admiral W. S. Sims, who had been sent when the break 
with Germany was inevitable, in order that he might get 
ic touch with the British Admiralty and acquaint the 
Navy Department with the situation. He kept this 
position throughout the war, his duty for the most part 
being in London with his office near the Admiralty. 
When American naval forces were sent to join the British, 
French, and Italian, he was made "Commander of the 
IT. S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters." 

It was plain to him that the United States had not 
entered the war merely to be on the winning side. The 
prospects for the Allies in April, 1917, were bleak enough. 
Germany was making the unrestricted submarine cam- 
paign terribly effective, and in this month alone her 
boats sank 900,000 tons. This was out of all proportion 
to what the overworked British shipyards could do in 
making good the losses by building, and there was no 
disguising the truth that at this rate England would be 
isolated and starved out by the early fall. 

There had been published many lurid accounts of the 
destruction of German submarines. Many of them 
originated with eye witnesses who had seen oil slicks and 
wreckage of some kind or other, making them believe 
that a U-boat had been destroyed. Yet the Admiralty 
intelligence reports gave conclusive evidence of only fifty- 
four German submarines having been destroyed since the 



486 



The United States Navy 



beginning of hostilities, and the German shipyards were 
now turning out new boats at the rate of three a week. 

All the facts at their disposal the British put before 
Admiral Sims, and he and the American ambassador, 
Walter Hines Page, reported to Washington the critical 
situation. In conclusion, Sims said, "Briefly stated, I 
consider that at the present moment we are losing 
the war." 

Our army had promptly undertaken the task of 
organizing and training overseas forces, but it was plain 
that the process would take time, and there was the 
problem of transporting them to France. To make the 
United States at once effective, however, two kinds of 
assistance were possible: sending of destroyers and for- 
warding of supplies, both munitions and food. To this 
the United States promptly gave itself. 

The Destroyers First on the Scene 

From 1914 Great Britain had been sending a con- 
stant procession of troop and supply ships to France, and 
not a single one had been sacrificed to the U-boats. This 
showed plainly the power of the destroyers, which always 
served as escorts. But the undersea craft, carefully 
avoiding them near Dover, operated almost at will in the 
entrance to the English Channel, St. George's Channel, 
and Bristol Channel. In these waters only occasionally 
did a destroyer appear, for the British had not a sufficient 
force to patrol them. 

Thus to overcome the German submarine blockade 
American destroyers were essential. The Navy Depart- 
ment had surmised this even before Admiral Sims's urgent 
messages were received. A division was dispatched the 
instant it was ready, and on the fourth of May, less than 
a month after war had been declared, six American de- 
stroyers, under Commander J. K. Taussig, steamed into 



The Destroyers First on the Scene 



487 



Queenstown. No newspaper had announced their com- 
ing, but the whole city was out to welcome them. Their 
presence had the greatest significance to the Allies. Even 
more important than the increase of force was the visible 
evidence that the United States had entered the war and 
was taking her part. The moving pictures photographed 
at the time were soon shown all over England ; prefacing 
this with the story of a few Englishmen who in 1620 
went to North America to found a, state based on justice 
and liberty, they emphasized this home-coming three 
centuries later to fight for justice and liberty by calling 
it "The Keturn of the Mayflower." 

Admiral Bayly, K.N., the commanding officer at 
Queenstown to whom Commander Taussig and his asso- 
ciates hastened to report, was known to be a man of few 
words, but the response which he elicited became famous 
in British as well as American annals. 

"After acknowledging the introduction, Bayly's first 
words were these: 'Captain Taussig, at what time will 
your vessels be ready for the sea?' Taussig replied, 'I 
shall be ready when fueled.' The admiral then asked, 'Do 
you require any repairs?' [meaning, dockyard work]. 
Taussig answered, 'No sir.' The admiral's third and last 
question was, 'Do you require any stores V [meaning dry 
provisions]. Taussig answered, 'No sir! Each vessel 
now has on board sufficient stores to last for seventy days.' 
The admiral concluded the interview with these instruc- 
tions: 'You will take four days' rest. Good Morning.' 99i 

The grim Admiral Bayly, who was a lion in action, 
when he found that his new force were as bold and efficient 
in deeds as in words, became enthusiastically devoted to 
them, and their relations were most cordial throughout. 

On the 17th of May the second division of six de- 



1 Naval Institute Proceedings, December, 1922, vol. 48, p. 2036. 



488 



The United States Navy 



stroyers arrived, and another division appeared nearly 
every week thereafter until the fifth of July, when thirty- 
four destroyers were at Queenstown, the number that 
continued there until the end of the war. 

Certain areas for patrol were assigned to the Ameri- 
can force and a definite routine was established : six days 
of patrol, followed by two days in port; once a month, 
five days off for boiler cleaning and overhaul. 

It was hard, wearing duty for the destroyer force ; and 
only by constant vigilance was there safety for those 
intrusted to their charge as well as for themselves. There 
were repeated S.O.S. calls from ships attacked by 
U-boats, and the destroyers had to rush off to 'their rescue. 
There were boat loads of survivors to pick up and bring 
in. There were convoys to meet and escort through the 
danger zone. Occasionally they sighted a periscope, and 
by quick firers, ramming, and depth charges they hunted 
the hunter. The last of these three methods of attack, a 
new type of mine, was invented as America entered the 
war, and possessed great possibilities. If the submarine 
by delay disclosed even its approximate position, a mine, 
adjusted to explode at a certain depth, was dropped over- 
board (or projected by the Y-gun) from a destroyer, 
and it gave a frightful shock, in many cases causing 
serious damage. 

On an October morning as some destroyers were 
escorting a convoy of British ships to the east coast of 
England, they received a radio message from the American 
steamer L. Luckenback calling for help, for she was 
being shelled by a submarine. Though the position she 
gave was ninety miles away, the Nicholson went at once to 
her assistance. The Luckeriback, being an armed merchant- 
man, was by her guns keeping the submarine at a, distance, 
but as the latter outranged her, it had the game seem- 
ingly in its own hands. Yet when the Nicholson radioed, 



The Destroyers First on the Scene 



489 



"Do not surrender !" there came back the spirited answer, 
"Never." As the Nicholson appeared, the American 
merchantman, though crippled and on fire, was still fight- 
ing. The destroyer by her prompt response saved her 
and brought her to England with the convoy. 

At other times the destroyers were not so successful. 
The Cassin while on patrol was herself torpedoed, a 
torpedo striking the stern. She was kept afloat, however, 
and as the submarine appeared on the surface to complete 
its work it was driven away by the destroyer's guns. A 
storm followed, but the Cassin succeeded in weathering 
it, and when help arrived, after much labor she was towed 
into port. 

The most satisfactory engagement any of our de- 
stroyers had was that of the Fanning, Lieutenant A. S. 
Carpender, with the U-58 on the afternoon of November 
17, 1917. It occurred while, with the Nicholson, she 
was escorting a convoy of eight British merchantmen ten 
miles out from Queenstown. A vigilant coxswain espied 
the top of a periscope only 400 yards distant and ahead, 
slowly making toward the path of the convoy — the sub- 
marine in excellent position for firing. The torpedo was 
never discharged, however, for before the periscope went 
under it revealed the Fanning working up to a speed of 
twenty knots and charging down. 

Reaching the spot where the periscope had dis- 
appeared and going slightly ahead of the estimated posi- 
tion of the U-boat, the Fanning dropped a depth charge 
and then continued on the turn she was making. The 
Nicholson, having also circled about, was approaching so 
as to join the Fanning in laying a depth-charge barrage 
around their quarry. As she neared the spot where the 
depth charge had been dropped, her officers saw a bow 
and conning tower emerging; they released a depth 
charge alongside when they passed, and followed this by 



490 The United States Navy 



three shots from their stern gun. A minute later the 
conning tower opened and the officers and crew began 
crawling out, each one, with hands up, calling "Kamerad" 
to show he wished to surrender. Under cover of the 
Nicholson s guns, the Fanning approached, and as the 
bow of the submarine settled and the stern rose, the 
destroyer succeeded in picking up all but one of the 
German force, four officers and thirty-five men. While 
the prisoners were being taken on board, a chief phar- 
macist's mate and a coxswain of the Fanning jumped into 
the icy water to save a German sailor who was drowning. 
They succeeded in getting him on board, but efforts to 
resuscitate him were unavailing. Later it was learned 
from the commanding officer of the TJ-58, that the first 
depth charge (dropped by the Fanning) had wrecked his 
motors, had put the diving rudders out of commission, 
and broken the oil leads. When the submarine, utterly 
unmanageable, had sunk to a depth of 200 feet, the 
officers had blown the tanks and come to the surface ; in 
the choice between a horrible death on the bottom and 
surrender, they preferred the latter. 

In order to increase the number of small boats hunting 
submarines, the Navy Department accepted several large 
pleasure yachts which their owners offered. Also a new 
type was developed, the subchaser, 110 feet long and 
of 60 tons displacement. Some 400 of these were turned 
out by the shipyards in eighteen months, and 170 were 
dispatched to Queenstown, Brest, Gibraltar, and Corfu. 
We used, further, coast guard boats, gunboats, and old- 
time torpedo boats brought from the Philippines. Living 
conditions on these tiny craft were often grim enough, 
but they kept at sea no matter what was the weather. 
Although the larger number of their officers and crew 
were college men, new to the service, never having made 
an ocean voyage before, they made a splendid record. 



Work of the Subchasers 



491 



The little yacht Christabel won high honors. While pro- 
tecting a British merchantman that had fallen behind 
her convoy, off the coast of southern France, she had an 
engagement with a submarine that hovered about attempt- 
ing to sink the ship. A depth charge dropped where the 
periscope had disappeared brought up all kinds of debris 
followed by quantities of heavy black oil. A day or two 
later the TJC-56, battered and bruised, crawled into the 
Spanish port of Santander, so badly damaged that she 
was interned for the rest of the war. 

Thirty-six of the subchasers, which had steamed all 
the way from New London to Greece, 6000 miles, were 
based on Corfu. Under the command of Captain C. P. 
Nelson, they were very efficient in the patrol of the 
Straits of Otranto, where the Adriatic narrows down to 
forty miles. By their listening devices they became skill- 
ful in trailing submarines and they caused great disquiet 
*by dropping depth bombs. 

Early in October, 1918, Captain Nelson with twelve 
chasers was asked to cooperate with the British and Italian 
light cruisers in an attack on the Austrian base at Durazzo. 

"It's going to be a real party, boys," was Nelson's 
remark as he appeared after conferring with Commodore 
W. A. H. Kelly of the British Navy. And it was with 
a spirit emulating that shown by Decatur in his exploits 
in the Mediterranean one hundred years before that our 
force entered the affair. 

The subchasers had as their mission the screening of 
the cruisers from submarine attack, while the latter 
shelled the city, destroyed the shipping, and demolished 
military storehouses. Austrian batteries opened upon the 
small boats and the missiles fell all about them, but they 
held calmly to their work. At length one of the sub- 
chasers detected the presence of a U-boat making towards 
the British cruisers, and changed its course to meet it. 



492 



The United States Navy 



The second subchaser in the division following the new 
lead, its skipper caught a glimpse of a periscope. Smash- 
ing the periscope with a well-aimed shot, he dashed for- 
ward and began dropping depth charges, in which sport 
a third chaser also joined. One bomb evidently hit its 
mark, for steel plates and other wreckage were blown into 
the air. The first chaser was found with her engine 
broken down, but she announced that before this happened 
she had discharged eight depth charges, bringing up 
masses of oil and seven pieces of metal plate. 

Durazzo was ruined as a military base, but not an 
American in this exploit was injured. 2 

The Transport Service 

The raising and equipping of an army of two millions 
in the short time at our disposal was a great achievement. 
But that is a chapter of military history. It is the 
transportation of this army to France that belongs to 
naval annals. 

The British plan of escorting troop and cargo ships 
across the Channel proving successful was adopted by 
our forces, and was put into operation for the protection 
of shipping bound for England and western Europe, 
whether from the United States or from Africa and Gib- 
raltar. It slowed down the carriers by twenty per cent., 
but what did that matter if it made them safe — a result 
which in time was very largely accomplished. 

For the United States to send what the Balfour Mis- 
sion representing England and the Jo-fire Mission repre- 
senting France implored of the President, it was seen 
that a vast flotilla would be required, and accordingly 
the United States Shipping Board and the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation were created. Ships were procured 

2 Sims, Victory at Sea, pp. 233-239. 



The Transport Service 



493 



from every possible source. German merchant ships and 
interned warships lying in our harbors were overhauled 
and repaired for American service. American vessels in 
the coast trade were taken over, old shipyards were 
enlarged, and others newly established worked with fever- 
ish intensity, turning out craft of every kind. Of naval 
transports at the beginning we had only two, but this 
number during the war was increased to forty-eight. As 
escorts to the convoys while crossing the Atlantic, twenty- 
four cruisers were secured, some from the Atlantic Fleet, 
some from those on special assignments, and some from 
those out of commission. 3 

The large and faster cruisers were used to escort troop 
convoys, and the smaller vessels to escort cargo convoys. 

The duty of this deep-sea escort, which guarded the 
ships from destruction by German raiders as well 'as from 
attack by cruising U-boats, was indeed a strenuous one. 
"Theirs was the constant and unceasing toil, in summer 
and winter. . . . Seven days of rest in port, then out again, 
mothering liners and pot-bellied merchant ships loaded 
with their invaluable cargo. The hard part of it was that 
they rarely sighted land on the other side, but met the 
escorting destroyers far out from shore, where they had 
to turn around to buck the heavy nor'westers and so 
for home again, only to coal, have a little run on the 
avenue, a look at the movies, then back again with 
another convoy." 4 

The record they made was an enviable one. Not a 
troopship nor a single American soldier sent across by 
the United States Naval Transport Service was lost 
going over. 5 The ships did not have quite the same immu- 

3 Gleaves, History of the Transport Service, p. 28. 

4 Ibid., p. 154. 

5 Report of Secretary of Navy, 1918, p. 27; Gleaves, History 
of the Transport Service, p. 29. 



494 



The United States Navy 



nity returning, since five were torpedoed, three being 
lost, but two in spite of injuries making port. Every 
effort was made to protect the empty ships, but when it 
was necessary with the limited number of destroyers to 
choose between a heavily loaded convoy going over and 
empty ships returning, reason sent the escorts to 
the former. 

The submarine blockade which Germany had counted 
on to prevent America's taking any appreciable part in 
the war was overcome by two lines of operations. The 
first was the use of every available means of protection — 
such as has been described. The second was the careful 
routing of the convoys. Trip after trip was made without 
a lookout's sighting any U-boat. None was seen, for the 
ships had been directed in lanes where there was no 
enemy. This was the work of one or two officers in the 
convoy room in Brest or in London. 

In this room, from which no secrets issued, for prac- 
tically no one beyond a very few officers of the staff were 
admitted, a huge chart of the Atlantic Ocean filled a side 
of the wall. The position of every convoy was marked and 
its progress was indicated. Similarly the position of 
practically every German submarine was marked, sur- 
rounded by a circle equal to its estimated cruising radius 
during the day or since the time when last reported. 
These circles were the danger zones to be avoided. To 
those unfamiliar with the methods of the convoy room it 
seemed strange that its officers could obtain such definite 
information about the U-boats. In the first place, when- 
ever a ship sighted a submarine, or was attacked, it 
promptly sent a radio message reporting the fact with 
longitude and latitude. Second, whenever a U-boat 
opened up with its radio, the different stations quickly 
recognized it and with their direction-finders determined 
its position. The Allied submarines, destroyers, and con- 



The Transport Service 



495 



voys were cautioned not to use their radio except when 
absolutely necessary; but the German submarines were 
much given to talking, commonly getting into communi- 
cation about the same hour every evening and often talk- 
ing at other times. By patient observation, supplemented 
by information gained by the British intelligence office, 
the identity and habits of U-boats in certain areas were 
learned. Some of them had as their chief mission the 
laying of mines, others rarely used anything but tor- 
pedoes in attack, and others made a considerable use of 
their guns, staying out longer by holding their torpedoes 
in reserve. The number of torpedoes they commonly car- 
ried was known ; so if the data collected on a particular 
submarine showed that these had all been fired, one could 
be rather sure that it would soon be returning to port. 
Many a time when the routing officer in the convoy room 
saw peril for an approaching convoy, because, if it kept 
on its course, it would on the following day or night enter 
the circle where a U-boat was operating, he radioed to 
the convoy, sending it off on a wide detour or directing it 
to a different port. Thus it was that convoys arrived 
without sighting an enemy, in truth without having been 
within striking distance. 

Of the vast American army overseas at the time of 
the Armistice 46% per cent, had been carried in United 
States ships; or in figures given by the Secretary of the 
Navy, 924,578 of our troops in Europe, November 1, 
1918, had made the passage in United States naval con- 
voys under the escort of United States cruisers and 
destroyers. 6 Beginning with spring, 1918, when men 
were so much needed in France, they were transported 
at the rate of 10,000 a day, together with food supplies 
required for soldiers and civilians of all nationalities, 



6 Gtfeaves, History of the Transport Service, p. 25; Report of 
Secretary of Navy, 1918, p. 27. 



496 



The United States Navy 



and war munitions. Within ten months after work had 
begun in organizing the transportation service, the Secre- 
tary of the Navy estimated, a vessel manned by an Ameri- 
can naval crew, carrying subsistence and equipment for 
the American Expeditionary Forces, was leaving an 
American port on an average of every five hours. 7 At the 
head of the transport service and working indefatigably 
with his corps of assistants was Vice-Admiral Albert 
Gleaves. Its success was due in a very large degree to 
him and to Vice-Admiral Henry B. Wilson, our naval 
representative in France and the officer in charge of the 
naval base at Brest. 

It was Admiral Wilson who had the problem of cir- 
cumventing the U-boats operating in the Bay of Biscay 
and of safeguarding the two million soldiers sent to 
France, when they had reached the danger zone. This he 
did through the convoy room at Brest and by means of 
the large force of destroyers, yachts, and other auxiliary 
craft under his command. The receiving and unloading 
of troop- and cargo-ships was also his responsibility ; and 
their quick return was due in a large degree to his con- 
stant supervision and tireless energy. 

American Battleships Assist in Maintaining 
Surface Blockade 

Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, who for the first two 
years of the war (previous to America's entry) was the 
minister who had charge of the German Navy, records 
that even as early as August 19, 1914, he remarked to the 
chancellor of the German empire, "The decision of the 
war turns exclusively on whether Germany or England 
can hold out the longer and he observed to the chief of 
the naval staff, "The English fleet and England are 
Germany's most dangerous enemy." 

7 Report of Secretary of Navy, 1918, p. 20. 



Work of the Battleships 



497 



Whatever we may think of von Tirpitz's conduct of 
the war, his estimate of the situation was correct. It 
was the British Navy and more particularly the battle- 
ships and battle cruisers of the British Grand Fleet that 
were the backbone of the blockade, and the blockade was 
one of the two or possibly three great factors that brought 
Germany's downfall. 

The superiority of the Grand Fleet was such that 
the German High Seas Fleet never sought a general 
engagement, and with sound strategy pinned its hopes 
of success on the expectation of surprising and crushing- 
detached squadrons or units, until it had reduced this 
superiority. Consequently the activities of the High 
Seas Fleet (aside from Jutland when the general engage- 
ment came from a meeting unintended on the part of the 
Germans) consisted of raids and short runs with a home 
port near for a safe return. Had the Grand Fleet even 
momentarily neglected its vigilant watch, swarms of 
raiders might have dashed out, attacking the troop and 
cargo convoys bound for France, and defeating every 
means used by the Allies to overcome the submarine 
blockade. When the United States began sending its 
large convoys overseas, there was fear that Germany, 
taking a desperate chance, might send out even a battle 
cruiser and cause consternation in America as well as 
wild rejoicing in Germany by destroying a whole con- 
voy. It was to guard against such a disaster that three 
of our fastest and strongest battleships, the Nevada, 
Oklahoma, and Utah, under Rear-Admiral T. S. Rodgers, 
were dispatched to Bantry Bay, southwest Ireland, 
whence they might be ready to meet any raider. Perhaps 
it was the knowledge of this precaution that prevented 
an attack. 

Previous to the stationing of these ships in Ireland, 
Battleship Division E"o. 9 of the United States Atlantic 
Fleet had been sent to Scapa Flow to be combined with 

32 



498 



The United States Navy 



the Grand Fleet. The constant sea service of the latter 
required that strong units frequently drop out for over- 
haul. That the British numerical superiority might still 
be maintained, as well as to strengthen the morale by this 
visible evidence of our participation in the war, the 
division just mentioned consisting of five battleships, 
the New York (Captain C. F. Hughes), the Wyoming 
(Captain H. A. Wiley), the Texas (Captain Victor Blue), 
the Florida (Captain Thomas Washington), and the 
Delaware (Captain A. H. Scales), under Rear-Admiral 
Hugh Rodman, joined the British at Scapa Flow, Decem- 
ber 6, 1917. From that date until the end of the war it 
constituted the Sixth Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet. 

Every navy has its own codes, its own system of 
signals, and its own system of tactics. The Sixth Battle 
Squadron promptly began to study and to adopt British 
ways. To simplify the process, with each American was 
paired a British dreadnought, which should accompany 
her in all maneuvers and act as her mentor. So quick 
was the assimilation that in four days the new squadron 
went out for maneuvers, taking its assigned position in 
the fleet. 1 

It was not the contacts with the enemy but the con- 
stant vigilance that made this duty a severe one. The fleet, 
studying not to make its movements too regular, for the 
most part alternated between Scapa Flow in the Orkneys 
and Rosyth in the Firth of Forth. Some recreation was 
planned for the personnel, but it was necessarily limited 
when every ship, no matter how recent had been its patrol, 
must be ready to put to sea at four hours' notice. The 
winter nights in the northern latitude were long and the 
waters were cold and stormy. But cheerfulness and 
optimism were the prevailing note, and the only real 
grumbling was because the enemy would not come out 
and give the battleships a chance. Our force, however, 
found their service not without thrills. Some of the 



Work of the Battleships 



499 



thrills came from the maneuvers and others from attacks 
by the U-boats. 

In one of the frequent patrols, as the fleet steamed out 
of Kosyth on an afternoon, they ran into a blinding snow 
storm. The Delaware, which happened that day to be the 
last battleship in the column, lost touch with the other 
ships when the fog buoy, trailing along from the ship 
she followed, carried away. After that there was no 
alternative but strictly to follow sailing orders, which 
prescribed the course and included two right-angle turns. 
An anxious night for the skipper and his officers followed, 
but not only did they not collide with any of the other 
units, but they sighted none. When dawn came and the 
weather, clearing, lifted the veil, it disclosed to them 
just one ship in sight, the flagship of Admiral Sir David 
Beatty, who seeing them suddenly appear, trained his 
guns on them and demanded the recognition signal. Dur- 
ing the night they had steamed through the entire fleet 
to a position close to their flagship, which was supposed 
to be leading the column. 

The Germans plainly cherished hopes of bolstering 
up their morale by sinking one of the American dread- 
noughts, and singled them out for repeated attacks. In 
February, 1918, when the Florida and Delaware were 
escorting a convoy off the coast of Norway, a U-boat dis- 
charged four torpedoes at the former and two at the 
latter, but the battleships by quick turns avoided them 
all, and destroyers drove off the assailant. On a later 
day, in Pentland Firth, the skipper of the New York, 
seeing a suspicious object, changed his course, and then 
discovering that it was a U-boat, headed for it at full 
speed. Officers felt a blow on their starboard quarter, 
followed by a second blow. When the New York was 
examined, it was found that two blades of her propellers 
had been broken off. The submarine was not seen again 
and it was believed that it had sunk to rise no more. 



500 



The United States Navy 



Shortly after this, the dreadnought being on her way 
to be refitted, a U-boat attacked her and fired in quick 
succession three torpedoes, all passing ahead. Because 
of her damaged propellers she was making at the time 
but twelve knots ; it may have been this that caused the 
U-boat wrongly to estimate her progress and to miss her. 

Meanwhile the various squadrons in home waters had 
been brought together and organized in the Atlantic Fleet, 
of which Admiral Henry T. Mayo* was in command. He 
went abroad during the first months of the war to make 
a comprehensive study of conditions there. In the 
Atlantic Fleet there was constant drilling and fullest 
preparation for war service. German U-boats, as a 
matter of fact, did come to the American coast in 1918, 
sinking with a mine the cruiser San Diego and shelling 
or torpedoing several small merchant vessels. If disaster 
had come to the British Grand Fleet, the United States 
had ready a strong reserve for immediate service. 

Admiral Benson, as Chief of Naval Operations, had 
the duty of organizing the vast resources of the navy and 
coordinating our forces at home and abroad. His was 
an office of the very first importance, for all naval opera- 
tions, big or little, had to be directed from it. He went 
to Europe near the beginning and the close of hostilities 
that he might visit the Allied navies and confer with the 
naval leaders as to the most effective prosecution of 
the war. 

In Washington, at the heart of activities, was the 
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels. Closely in 
touch with the varied work of the navy, he was indefati- 
gable in representing its needs to Congress and securing 
the colossal appropriations required. Early and late he 
was at his desk ; he personally attended to a huge volume 
of naval business, and yet he was always ready to listen 
to the request of the humblest sailor. 



XXIX 



THE WORLD WAR (CONTINUED) 

American Submarines and Aircraft 

We have considered the fight made by the several 
kinds of surface craft to enforce the surface blockade of 
Germany and to break up the under sea, blockade with 
which that country was retaliating. There remains for 
discussion the fight made also by our submarines and 
aircraft. 

In neither of these types was our navy strong. Our 
submarines, such as we had, were small and designed, 
like our early battleships and torpedo boats of the Spanish- 
American War period, mainly for harbor defense. They 
lacked necessary comforts and they were years behind 
those of leading European powers. Further, the navy 
as a whole had little confidence in them. Of aircraft we 
had next to none, with a correspondingly small personnel 
trained in flying. 

Yet the experience of the Allies had plainly showed 
the value of both of these services for scouting and for 
offensive operations. Since America was determined to 
prosecute the war in every possible way, the Navy 
Department decided to send what was available and to 
build extensively. 

It was in October, 1917, that one submarine flotilla 
set out for the Azores, and two months later that another 
went to the British Isles. The latter could not have 
chosen a worse season for crossing, encountering gale after 
gale, some rising to the proportions of a hurricane. But 
the boats, seven in number, eventually reached Bantry 
Bay, Ireland, and there after undergoing a brief period 

501 



502 The United States Navy 



of instruction from selected British submarine officers 
they began regular patrol duty. Certain areas were 
assigned to them in St. George's Channel, Bristol Channel, 
and in waters to the south and west of Ireland, in 
all of which shipping was crowded and the U-boats had 
wrought havoc. 

The U-boats found the submarine of their opponents 
hard to contend with when their own attention was 
focused on commerce destruction. As they were out for 
long cruises they had to be saving in use of their storage 
batteries. Therefore generally they had to run on the 
surface using their Diesel engines. Thus if an Allied 
submarine approached submerged, since they themselves 
were low in the water, they were in as great danger of 
surprise as were the merchant ships from them. Con- 
fronted by such a peril, they acted like the merchant 
ships; they planned to give the hostile submarine a wide 
berth. The result was that the U-boats tended to operate 
farther and farther out at sea, where the chances of success 
were decidedly less. 

Our submarines, designated as the AL-boats, might 
well have been satisfied if this result had been their only 
service. But they were constantly seeking to destroy one 
of their foe. The exploit of the AL-2, Lieutenant Paul F. 
Foster, is one that deserves especial notice. 

The AL-2, while running awash on her way to Bantry 
Bay near the close of an eight-day patrol, changed her 
course to investigate a suspicious looking object that had 
been sighted in the dim distance. As she approached, a 
torpedo exploded only sixty feet away and a periscope 
appeared for a moment. But, for a reason that can only 
be conjectured — perhaps because the torpedo had boom- 
eranged, striking the ship that fired it — it did not harm 
the AL-2, and it did injure the U-boat. The skipper 
of the AL-2 j at once grasping the situation, ordered a 



American Submarines and Aircraft 503 



quick dive and circled around to ram the U-boat. He 
passed so near that through his hull he could hear the 
propellers, but he did not strike. Quickly the propellers 
stopped, and though the AL-2 searched for hours the 
officers detected no further sign of their enemy. It is 
very likely that the U-boat in order to avoid the AL-2 
had dived, whereas if she had remained on the surface 
she might have been saved. The one thing certain is 
that the British Admiralty three months later published 
confidential reports secured by their intelligence officers 
in Germany, showing that the JJB-65, which had been 
reported operating off Fastnet, Ireland, on the day of 
this occurrence, had never been heard from since. On 
receipt of this intelligence, the Admiralty credited the 
sinking of the UB-65 by indirect action, to the AL-2. 1 

Considering next the work of the aviation service, 
one is struck with how little they had to begin with and 
how quickly they expanded. A year previous to hostili- 
ties a Yale University aviation unit had begun training 
under the leadership of Trubee Davison and this volun- 
teer unit formed an important nucleus. The aviators 
were the first of our forces to land in France, seven officers 
and one hundred and twenty-two men arriving at St. 
Nazaire on the 5th of June, 1917. 

Soon American naval aircraft stations were building 
all along the western coast of France, areas were charted 
off and each station was assigned one of them for patrol- 
ling. At the conclusion of hostilities we had four kite 
balloon stations, eighteen seaplane stations, three dirigible 
stations, and five bombing plane stations. 2 

And this was as nothing in comparison with the huge 
plant that was under construction at Pauillac and else- 

1 Alden, "American Submarine Operations in the War." Naval 
Institute Proceedings, vol. xlvi, pp. 1035-1040. 

2 Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 12. 



504 



The United States Navy 



where. American equipment was lacking; nevertheless 
our men saw action and they made their presence felt. 
The Northern Bombing Group, commanded by Captain 
David C. Hanrahan, IT. S. Navy, included 305 officers 
and 2000 enlisted men working with 112 planes. They 
gave their attention to bombing the submarine bases at 
Zeebrugge and Ostend. The greatest single service of the 
aircraft, however, was the escorting of convoys that were 
approaching or leaving French ports. From their lofty 
positions they increased the means of picking up craft in 
the distance. Often they saw lurking U-boats, even 
though submerged. When unequal themselves to engag- 
ing the enemy, they accomplished their purpose by 
directing a destroyer to where a depth charge might 
prove effective. 

Figures show how active was this branch of our 
service. The American naval forces in the war zone 
under the command of Captains H. I. Cone and T. T. 
Craven had forty-four stations and made more than 5600 
war flights. 

The Northern Mine Barrage 

The United States had entered the war resolved to 
make use of every device that would help to defeat the 
U-boats. Nine days after hostilities began the Bureau 
of Ordnance put forward a scheme that was staggering 
in its immensity. This was the bottling up of the German 
craft in the North Sea, by laying a mine barrage from 
Norway to the Orkneys, a distance of 230 miles (about 
the same as from New York to Washington), where the 
water attains a depth of 1100 feet. 

The British had already sealed the southern entrance 
leading to the English Channel, and during the two years 
and a half had planted 30,000 mines in the Bight of 



The Northern Mine Barrage 505 



Heligoland. In 1917 they were using 7000 a month, 
and this was very nearly the limit of their capacity 
in production. 

There was thus a challenge and to this the Bureau of 
Ordnance applied itself. Soon its chief, Rear-Admiral 
Ralph Earle, was able to submit to the Navy Department 
and the British Admiralty a new type of mine, very 
greatly improved, the combined work of Commander S. P. 
Fullinwider, Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Wilkinson, 
and Mr. Ralph A. Browne. An adjustable anchoring 
device permitted it to be planted at any depth, and a long 
antenna, consisting of a thin copper cable attached to a 
float a few feet below the surface, was so delicate in its 
mechanism that the touching of this by a metallic sub- 
stance, as the hull of a boat, was sufficient to produce an 
electric current and explode the charge. Thus there was 
a danger for a submarine crossing the mine field either 
on the surface or to a depth of 240 feet. 

When the period of study, conference, experimenta- 
tion, and improvement was concluded there came the 
extensive organization required for production. No fac- 
tory in America had the machinery or capacity for turn- 
ing mines out in the numbers required. There was the 
safeguarding the secret, further, by distributing the work. 
Five hundred and forty contractors and sub-contractors 
were involved in this great project. A base was estab- 
lished on the James River; later two bases were estab- 
lished on the east coast of Scotland, with Rear- Admiral 
Joseph Strauss, II. S. Navy, in command of the whole 
operation overseas. 

It was on the 8th of June, 1918, that ten American 
mine layers commanded by Captain R, R. Belknap slipped 
out, attended by destroyers and screened by battleships, 
which got between them and the German coast, to plant 



506 



The United States Navy 



forty-seven miles of mines. Twelve other such expeditions, 
coming at regular intervals through the summer and 
early fall, were necessary to complete the undertaking. 
The barrage was the combined work of Great Britain, 
and the United States. Altogether 70,263 mines were 
planted, and of these the Yankee Mining Squadron 
planted 56,611. The width of the barrage was fifteen to 
thirty-five miles. So it took a submarine on the surface 
from one to three hours to pass through the danger zone, 
submerged from three to six hours. 

In June, almost immediately after the first planting, 
a U-boat badly damaged by a mine exploding nearby 
crawled into a Norwegian port and had to be interned 
for the remainder of the war. Other disasters followed, 
and when a U-boat which had been talking very glibly 
over her radio became suddenly silent as it reached the 
barrage, the inference was that something had happened. 
At the conclusion of the war German sources revealed 
that, on account of the barrage, seventeen 3 of their sub- 
marines had been lost or damaged to such an extent as to 
be no longer serviceable. 

The indirect results were probably still more import- 
ant. The one to six hours spent in passing through the 
mine field were nerve racking to the last degree and broke 
down many a man's morale. 

Had the war continued another year, American mine 
planting on a much larger scale would have occurred in 
other waters, including the Mediterranean. The knowl- 
edge of America's vast resources and the lavish manner 
in which she employed them in her enterprises brought 
Germany to a realization of the fact that she was 
near defeat. 



3 These figures are taken from Admiral Earle's statement in 
Makers of Naval Tradition, p. 311. 



Naval Operations on Land 507 



Naval Operations on Land 

The United States Navy, though its natural element 
is the sea, has never hesitated when there has been oppor- 
tunity to fight also on land. 

A second large project of the Bureau of Ordnance, 
also put forward by Kear-Admiral Ralph Earle, was con- 
structing mounted railway batteries of a size beyond any- 
thing ever before attempted, sending them to Trance, and 
operating them on the battle front. 

There were certain 14-inch guns designed for battle 
cruisers which had been authorized, but which the war 
had delayed the building of. The proposal of the Bureau 
of Ordnance was that these huge rifles should be mounted, 
not on permanent artillery bases of concrete or steel, 
which were slow of construction and often when battle 
came were not where they were most needed, but on 
mobile and independent mounts — that is, on especially 
designed railway cars. 

As in the case of the mine barrage, the work was 
advanced with the utmost expedition. By the middle of 
August, 1918, five of these monsters, under the command 
of Rear- Admiral C. P. Plunkett, were moving on the 
railways of France, and manned by navy crews were 
ready to go into action. For each gun there was a train 
of fourteen cars making the equipment and operation of 
the great piece complete, one or more cars being devoted 
to each of the following: armored magazine, machine- 
shop, crane, radio, kitchen, and berths. These cars as 
well as the mounts were all designed and contracted for 
by the Bureau of Ordnance. 

The first action in which they took part was near 
Laon, September 16. At once their great power was 
perceived. They had a range of thirty miles and could 
fire behind the enemy lines, reaching points hitherto out 
of reach of Allied artillery. They saw service with our 



508 The United States Navy 

army also in several later engagements. Of their per- 
formance Admiral Earle remarked, "By their fire the 
German railway lines were disrupted, especially at their 
most important junctions of Montmedy, Longuyon, and 
Conflans; and ammunition dumps supposed to be im- 
mune from damage were destroyed in the areas well back 
of the firing lines." 4 

The Marine Corps, established in 1798, almost im- 
mediately after the creation of the Navy Department, 
has had a history to be proud of, but it was in the last 
five months of the World War that it won its brightest 
laurels. At Chateau Thierry, Belleau Wood, in the offen- 
sive near Soissons, in the battle for the St. Mihiel salient, 
and in the capture of Blanc Mont Ridge near Rheims, 
the marines fought with a courage, a desperation, and 
an endurance that could not be surpassed. Their first 
engagement coming at a critical moment in the war, their 
service was out of all proportion to the number engaged, 
in the turning of the great German offensive into a retreat. 
The severity of their fighting was shown by the casualty 
lists; out of 8,000 men engaged they lost 1600 killed 
and 2513 wounded, that is, more than one-half. 5 Even 
a general account of their battles would be beyond the 
scope of this book, and as they were serving with the 
army under the command of General Pershing it is 
commonly treated in military history. 

The Surrender 

Early on the 21st of November, 1918, the Grand 
Eleet arriving at a rendezvous forty miles east of May 
Island, which guards the entrance to the Firth of Forth, 
was drawn up in two long columns six miles apart to await 



4 Makers of Naval Tradition, p. 313. 

6 Report of Secretary of Navy, 1918, p. 103. 



The Surrender 



509 



the German High Seas Fleet. The American Sixth 
Battle Squadron occupying a place about the middle of 
the northern column was thus present at the closing scene 
of the great drama. A British light cruiser had guided 
the German ships to the meeting place where was Admiral 
Sir David Beatty on the Queen Elizabeth, waiting to 
receive the surrender. Then, led by the Queen Elizabeth, 
the High Seas Fleet steamed down the long lane; first, 
five battle cruisers in single column, three cables apart, 
and nine ponderous dreadnoughts ; then three miles 
astern of the last battleship, six light cruisers, as before 
three cables apart; and, last, three miles astern of the 
rear light cruiser, fifty destroyers arranged in five groups. 6 

When the German fleet had reached a point where 
it was enveloped by the two columns, the Allied ships 
countermarched, turning outward, and escorted it to its 
anchorage. The German colors were still flying from the 
gaff. Near sunset Beatty gave his famous signal, " The 
German flag is to be hauled down at 3.57 to-day, and is 
not to be hoisted again without permission.' 7 

The victory had been won, and America had taken 
part during the last year or year and a half in almost 
every phase of the struggle. It would be folly to magnify 
what our forces did, and not to be profoundly grateful 
to our Allies, who threw larger numbers into the struggle 
and bore the brunt of fighting for a much longer period. 
On the other hand, it would be untrue to our dead and 
living if we failed to recognize their remarkable adapta- 
bility and spirit of cooperation, their thoroughness, and 
their eagerness as they threw all into the conflict. 

6 Under the terms of the Armistice the Germans were to sur- 
render ten battleships, six battle cruisers, eight light cruisers, fifty 
destroyers, and all submarines. The submarines had surrendered 
previous to the great day off the Firth of Forth, and a few of the 
other types were surrendered elsewhere. 



510 



The United States Navy 



Admiral Scheer, the redoubtable leader of the High 
Seas Fleet at Jutland and the one in charge of German 
naval affairs at the close, in a volume published a year 
after the war, 7 though with a curious logic depreciating 
what the British and American forces accomplished, 
nevertheless admits the general undermining of the Ger- 
man morale. He tells of the High Seas Fleet weakened 
in the effort to send out old and new U-boats. He tells 
of the U-boats becoming ineffective because of the better 
submarine defense and the loss of experienced U-boat 
captains. He tells of the plan cherished by German naval 
leaders, when their government, recognizing the inevita- 
ble, was making overtures for peace, of sending out the 
High Seas Fleet to give battle. Theirs was a forlorn and 
desperate hope, but not even the glory of dying in battle 
was granted them. When orders were given to get under 
way, October 29, 1918, the fleet mutinied. And the dis- 
affection spread with great rapidity throughout north- 
ern Germany. 

The end came quickly, for German morale had crum- 
bled. The tireless American destroyers, yachts, sub- 
chasers, aeroplanes, and mine-planters, the unending line 
of men, munitions, and supplies of every kind pouring 
from America, increasing instead of diminishing, when 
added to one side of a scale that for months and years 
had been balancing almost even, were of unquestioned 
weight in deciding the issue. 



7 Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War. 



XXX 



THE NAVY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Isolation Ended 

If the United States had an important part in the 
war, not less was her presence felt in the Peace Congress 
that met in Paris, January, 1919, to prepare the treaty 
that should be offered to the defeated Central Powers. 
President Wilson departed from all tradition by himself 
going as the head of the American commission, and 
though he was far from dominating the Congress he did 
succeed in writing into the treaty the world-famous 
document known as the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. The United States for many reasons has not 
become a member of the League, although in several of 
its activities, such as have the betterment of social and 
economic conditions for their aim, our country is actively 
cooperating. What is especially significant in this is 
that the American policy of isolation, adhered to for 
over a century, is ended. Although this country is not 
disposed to meddle in European politics, it is profoundly 
interested in the people of the various countries, as has 
been shown in innumerable ways since the World War. 

America, " in getting back to normalcy " (to use a 
favorite expression of President Harding's), could not 
return quite to her old way of looking at things. During 
the war her economic position had changed. The money 
center of the world had moved from London to New 
York. The lavish expenditures connected with every 
phase of military operations had involved the spending 
of more than one million dollars an hour for the eighteen 
months we were fighting, and had left us with a national 

511 



512 



The United States Navy 



debt amounting to twenty-five billions; yet the total 
national wealth had greatly increased and savings banks 
showed how general was the individual prosperity. The 
United States had developed markets in countries where 
heretofore England, Germany, or Italy had been the ones 
chiefly interested. And our manufacturing plants had 
been enlarged by the war needs to the point where they 
must look to foreign markets or face large losses. There- 
fore aside from the humanitarian instinct, which was 
genuine, we had reason to be interested in the recovery 
of the war-stricken nations and also in the welfare 
of others. 

The navy similarly in a double service, humanitarian 
and commercial, has been actively engaged. 

There was a stormy period in the Mediterranean before 
peace was to prevail. Since Rear-Admiral Mark L. 
Bristol was in command of our forces at Constanti- 
nople in August, 1919, when fighting supposedly was 
over, he was appointed High Commissioner of the United 
States — a position he filled with such general acceptance 
he has held it continuously since, now for eight years. 
His duties have been largely of a diplomatic character. 
In the early years of this service, having two cruisers 
and a detachment of destroyers under his command, he 
was of the greatest assistance to the Red Cross, the 
Kear East Relief, the Food Administration (which ren- 
dered aid to starving Russian peasants), and to Amer- 
ican commercial enterprises. His command rescued tens 
of thousands of fugitives fleeing before the Bolsheviks 
when Wrangel's offensive collapsed in Southern Russia ; 
and it saved no less than 262,000 Greeks and Armenians, 
when the Greek army routed by the Turks fell back upon 
Smyrna, and the Christian population in that region was 
utterly panic stricken. So just and efficient was this 
naval diplomat's management of affairs that he obtained 



The Navy After the War 



513 



great influence with the Turks. At the treaty-making 
conference of Lausanne, 1923, Admiral Bristol was one 
of the American representatives; and when Turkey and 
the western powers were unable to agree, it was he who 
saved the conference from breaking up without result. 

The Dawes Commission (1924) was evidence of 
America's interest in the rapprochement of France and 
Germany, aiming to save both those countries from eco- 
nomic ruin. Not without significance, however, at that 
time and since has been the stationing of a naval force 
in European waters; in the summer it visited ports in 
northern waters — ^English, French, Danish, etc. ; and in 
the winter visited ports in the Mediterranean — Spanish, 
Italian, Greek, Algerian, Egyptian, etc. The duty of the 
vice-admiral commanding this squadron (at present made 
up. of a light cruiser and destroyers) is, except in case of 
an emergency, largely diplomatic. His itinerary is made 
out long in advance and submitted to the State Depart- 
ment for approval. He not only visits the seaports, but 
often leaving his flagship goes inland to a national capital 
to represent his country at court or elsewhere. Many 
times it has happened that the presence of American 
officers and ships has served to safeguard American lives 
and property and has been stimulating to our commerce. 

The Navy After the War 

Following the Armistice and the treaty-making con- 
ference, there was no longer need of a navy expanded to 
such enormous proportions: it had reached a total in 
November, 1918, of nearly one-half million men, about 
ten times as large as the navy of 1913. Reductions in 
personnel soon began, and by 1922 there remained only 
86,000 enlisted men (the force authorized by Congress), 
and 20 per cent, less than the 5700 officers required. A 
service that could expand so rapidly and be efficient, and 

33 



514 



The United States Navy 



return to the normal without disintegration shows unusual 
adaptability. 

From the supreme test which war means our forces 
emerged with increased confidence. It was not merely 
because of the praise abroad and at home ; it was rather 
because of the consciousness that in the emergency they 
had done the work, and even where material had been 
inadequate they had gone ahead, their initiative and 
resolution largely compensating for what was lacking 
in equipment. 

A quickening of activity and interest was especially 
felt in the submarines and airships. 

The experience of our submarines operating about 
the Azores and the British Isles showed that these little 
craft, miserably uncomfortable though they were, could 
keep at sea in all weathers. Also it emphasized the need 
of large modern submarines. Three " fleet " submarines 
were authorized in the early period of the war and three 
more during the later period. When the last of these had 
been completed in 1925, they constituted, with the ninety- 
three coastal submarines also authorized during the war, 
a force that compares favorably with that of other navies. 
The AL-boats sent to Bantry Bay, 1918, were of about 
450 gross tons, surface displacement, and had a maximum 
speed of fourteen knots ; the fleet submarines of the V-class 
are of 2164 tons and have a surface speed of twenty-one 
knots; their cruising radius is 10,000 miles at eleven 
knots. As their name implies, they are designed to 
accompany the fleet; by reason of their speed they can 
keep up with fast battleships. 

There is considerable official reticence regarding the 
submarine service, as its success is largely dependent on 
surprise. But the exploits of the aeroplane can hardly 
be other than blazoned in the sky. The naval advance in 
this field during the ten years following 1917 would in 



The Navy After the War 



515 



itself fill a volume. We shall attempt scarcely more than 
to enumerate the outstanding exploits. 

It was the United States Navy that made the first 
flight across the Atlantic. In 1917-1918 among the 
planes building were some Navy-Curtis (NC) flying 
boats, of superior size and strength, being designed for 
war service off the French coast. The Armistice came 
about as the first was completed. But in May, 1919, 
three of these NC-boats set out from Far Rockaway, Long 
Island, for Plymouth, England, their schedule calling for 
flights, first to Newfoundland, then to the Azores, then to 
Portugal, and then to England. Sixty destroyers were 
stationed at intervals between the continents to guide the 
boats on their course, and to render assistance if needed. 
Two of the flying boats, lost in the fog when approaching 
the Azores, alighted in the rough sea, and although their 
crews reached safety the planes were so damaged that 
their flight ended there. The NC-J/., Commander A. C. 
Read, made the harbor of Horta, in spite of the fog, and 
in two weeks more had completed without mishap the 
other jumps, making the whole trip from New York to 
England in less than seventy-one flight hours. 

In 1922-1923 unusual circumstances provided a 
large number of naval vessels to be scrapped, among them 
a German dreadnought, several American pre-dread- 
noughts, and an American super-dreadnought that had 
been launched but not entirely completed. These the 
Government devoted to a series of tests made by the Avi- 
ation Service so that they might try their skill in landing 
bombs on or near the warships, and observe the destruc- 
tive power of these agents against obsolete and modern 
types. The results though instructive were not altogether 
convincing. Certain bombs, it is true, were highly de- 
structive, but though the ships were for the most part 
stationary targets, only a few bombs hit thei^ mark. 



516 The United States Navy 



What would have resulted if the ships had been under 
way and had kept the airships at a safe altitude by their 
anti-aircraft guns was not at all certain. 

The record of the NC-Jf was surpassed in 1924 when 
two U. S. Army planes made a flight around the world, 
26,000 miles in 365 flight hours. The navy actively cooper- 
ated by sending cruisers and destroyers to various points, 
establishing bases, giving information about weather con- 
ditions, and standing by in case of emergency. 

The navy had also become interested in the possibili- 
ties of the dirigible. In May, 1923, the Shenandoah was 
launched, 680 feet long, and soon had visited the more 
important cities of the northeast. In October of the 
next year she flew to the Pacific and back, crossing the 
Rockies twice and making a flight of 8100 miles without 
accident. During the same month the ZR-3, 658 feet 
long, flew to New York from Germany (where she 
had been built for the United States), and on being 
rechristened the Los Angeles was taken into the navy. 
In September, 1925, the Shenandoah, after having flown 
30,000 miles, came to a tragic end. She was caught in 
a violent squall, which twisted her about and finally tore 
her apart. The captain, Lieutenant-Commander Zachary 
Lansdowne, and thirteen of the crew in the stern, crash- 
ing to earth, lost their lives. The bow floating on, however, 
was safely landed by the navigating officer; with him 
twenty-five of the ship's company with an army observer 
were saved. 

At the time that the Shenandoah was making her ill- 
fated trip, the airplane PN-9 No. 1, Commander John 
Rodgers, was being searched for on the wide Pacific. She 
had left San Francisco for a flight of 2100 miles to 
Hawaii. Again destroyers and tenders were stationed at 
intervals along the route. All went well for 1700 miles, 
when the gasoline was exhausted and the air men entirely 



The Navy After the War 



517 



missed the tender from which they thought to refuel. So 
suddenly did their power give out that they did not have 
opportunity to radio a message informing the watchers 
of their position and plight. For nine days they drifted, 
or crept along under such kind of rig as they could 
extemporize. After thus cruising 400 miles they made 
the island of Kauai. When ten miles from its dangerous 
coast they were sighted by a patrolling submarine, which 
towed them in. 

The last night which we shall mention was that of 
Lieutenant-Commander Richard E. Byrd, IT. S. Navy 
(Ret), in 1926, from Kings Bay, Spitzbergen, to the 
North Pole. The fact that two other aeronautic expedi- 
tions were aiming that spring for the same goal and that 
the veteran Norwegian explorer Amundsen was in charge 
of one of them, also based on Kings Bay, gave additional 
excitement as of a race. It was at 12.30 a.m. on the ninth 
of May that Lieutenant-Commander Byrd with one com- 
panion rose from the ground and laid his course for the 
Pole. All went well until he was within an hour of it, 
when he detected an oil leak in the tank connected with 
the right-hand motor. The idea was suggested of landing 
on their skiis to make repairs. But Byrd was opposed 
to this, fearing that if they landed on the rough ice, they 
would never rise again. Next they considered turning 
back. Instead, Byrd decided to take the chances and 
push on to the Pole. This they flew over at 9.02 a.m., 
Greenwich time. After going a few miles beyond they 
circled about, gazing down on the great expanse of ribbed 
ice that stretched in every direction. After taking some 
still and motion pictures of the scene, they headed for 
Kings Bay again. Fortunately the oil, being of a heavy 
type, flowed slowly so that the motor connected with the 
leaking tank was still running smoothly as they returned 
to their base. They had made a total flight of 1545 statute 



518 



The United States Navy 



miles. As Doctor Grosvenor, President of the National 
Geographic Society remarked, Peary in the conquest of 
the Pole was absent from civilization 400 days; Byrd 
left his friends in the morning and returned in the 
evening. 

The most sweeping change in naval policy since the 
war consists in the maintenance of both an Atlantic and 
a Pacific Fleet. The importance of having a force in the 
Pacific had been recognized by Roosevelt, and he had sent 
the so-called Battle Fleet to California and then around 
the world. But a division of the fleet at that time was 
not regarded with favor by naval strategists because of 
the weakness that would exist for either part that could 
not quickly be supported by the other. The stationing of 
a fleet on both coasts was made practicable, however, by 
the construction of the Panama Canal, long urged by 
Mahan, and not less important for unified naval protec- 
tion than for the extension of commerce. The two fleets are 
now frequently merged into one for extensive maneuvers. 

A marked trend in this period, closely related to naval 
policy, is to be found in the emphasis placed on the edu- 
cation of officers and enlisted men ; the Naval War College, 
the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval Academy, 
the special schools, the courses organized for reserve 
officers in selected universities, and the courses offered 
to enlisted men on board ship and at shore stations, have 
all taken dn a new importance. 

The American Merchant Marine 

One of the lessons brought home by the war was that 
a merchant marine is an extremely important auxiliary 
to the navy. Our shipping during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth had suffered 
a sad decline. Although our foreign trade had enormously 



The American Merchant Marine 519 

increased from 1880 to 1914, our vessels engaged in this 
had actually decreased. "One and one-quarter million 
tons were registered for the foreign trade in 1880, while 
only a little over a million tons were so registered in 
1914." 1 In the World War America had to have ships 
if she was going to do her part ; besides, shipping then was 
profitable. With the gigantic shipbuilding program of 
the Emergency Fleet Corporation, there was launched in 
1919 over three and a half million tons. By this great 
effort we had that year a merchant marine ' second only 
to that of Great Britain and considerably larger than 
Germany's had ever been. What the United States had 
registered for foreign trade was nearly ten times what 
she had similarly registered, June 30, 1914. 

We finally had a merchant marine, but when peace 
came and all the countries attempted to restore their old 
time carrying trade, our economists discovered that since 
production had long been decreased there were not more 
than two-thirds of the cargoes to be transported; also 
that operating costs had increased threefold. This meant 
that ships sailed without full cargoes ; as a result, freight 
rates, which had been towering, came down with a crash. 
The Shipping Board sought to sell its ships to American 
purchasers, but many companies, organized at this time 
to purchase or build steamships, were confronted with 
failure. In consequence the Shipping Board has been 
obliged to continue operating a considerable number of 
its ships, though the policy of the Government is that as 
opportunity offers they shall be transferred to private 
ownership. 

The best statement of the national policy in regard 
to our shipping was that formulated by Congress in the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 : 



1 Herrick, History of Commerce and Industry, p. 537. 



520 



The United States Navy 



" That it is necessary for the national defense and for 
the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce 
that the United States shall have a merchant marine of 
the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels suffi- 
cient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and 
serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or 
national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated 
privately by citizens of the United States; and it is 
hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to 
do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage 
the maintenance of such a merchant marine." 

We still have a large merchant marine, but the part 
of it that is engaged in foreign trade is obliged to 
contend with unfavorable economic conditions such as 
proved a heavy handicap at the beginning of the century. 
In competition with the lower cost of building in foreign 
countries and still more the lower operating expenses 
when the ships sail under foreign flags, American mercan- 
tile companies find it hard to secure a return on their 
investment. An exception is found in the coast trade 
between American ports and the trade on the Great Lakes. 
By law, only American shipping may participate; so 
there is no competition. 

Then how shall a way be found to maintain our 
foreign shipping, which is necessary for the extension of 
American commerce in distant countries and for the 
highly valued reserve that a merchant marine furnishes 
for the navy % The problem still awaits a solution. 

The Washington Conference 

Had the United States Navy completed the building 
program authorized and begun during the World War, she 
would have had by 1925 the strongest navy in the world. 



The Washington Conference 521 



But in this competition there was the imposing of burdens 
which had been found so well nigh intolerable in Europe 
and which it was hoped the war had shown the folly of. 
Further, with the clash of interests in the Pacific there 
were all kinds of prophecies of war between the United 
States and Japan, in which even England might become 
involved. Many who were more calm in their analysis, 
nevertheless, pointed out that we were entering upon 
the same kind of rivalry as had brought the conflict 
between the Allies and the Central Powers. It was to 
avoid all these evils, real and imaginary, that the United 
States invited the following powers to meet with her at 
a conference in Washington : the British Empire, France, 
Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Japan, and China. 

The conference opened on Armistice Day, 1921. 
Secretary Hughes, who presided, with a directness char- 
acteristic of America, at once put his country's proposal 
before the delegates : it provided that no less than sixty- 
six capital ships, completed or undergoing construction, 
in the navies of the five powers, they should scrap, and 
then take a ten-year naval holiday. To make his proposal 
specific he proceeded to name the ships that each nation 
would sacrifice. Thus the tonnage of the United States 
and Great Britain as the plan was finally elaborated was 
not to exceed 525,000 each, of Japan 315,000, and of 
France and Italy 175,000 each. This would reduce their 
forces to the approximate ratios of 5:5: 3:1%: 1%. 
As one writer remarks of this proposal of Hughes, " He 
destroyed more British vessels in five minutes than the 
German navy had done in any battle of the war." 2 

However, the United States offered to scrap more of 

2 Adams, A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States, 
p. 420. 



522 



The United States Navy 



her force than would be required of all the others put 
together. 3 For a while Japan objected because of the 
position of inferiority assigned her, but finally assented 
when the United States agreed not to fortify further any 
of her possessions in the Orient. As Manila was inade- 
quately fortified, and Guam and the Aleutian Islands 
not at all, this arrangement placed them, in case of war, 
virtually at the mercy of Japan. Naturally such an 
expression of confidence in Japan produced a favor- 
able impression. 

Capital ships were to be limited to 35,000 tons dis- 
placement and their guns to 16-inch. Guns on other ships 
were to be limited to 8-inch. Battle cruisers being classed 
as capital ships, those that the United States had laid 
down were to be scrapped — except two for which there 
was the stipulation that they should be converted into 
aircraft carriers. 

Measures were also discussed for the limitation of 
other types of warships, especially the submarine. But 
in this little progress was made save that no cruisers 
beyond 10,000 tons were to be built, and the size of air- 
craft carriers was restricted. 

This agreement, known as the Treaty for the Limita- 
tion of Naval Armament was later ratified by the five 
powers concerned, and is to continue until the end of 
1936, after which it may terminate when any of the 
powers has given two years' notice. 

Of not less significance in fostering peace was a second 



3 The total tonnage of new capital ships to be scrapped ( in 
various stages of completion, but not including paper programs) 
was as follows: United States 618,000 tons; Great Britain 172,000 
tons; Japan 289,100 tons. 61th Congress, 2d Session: Senate 
Documents, vol. x, p. 797. 



The Washington Conference 5%3 



compact between the United States, the British Empire, 
France, and Japan, known as the Four-Power Treaty, 
in which they covenanted each to respect the others' rights 
in their insular possessions in the Pacific, and agreed 
further that, if there should arise a question concerning 
them which could not be settled by diplomacy, they should 
invite the four powers to a conference and refer the 
question to them for consideration and adjustment. 

Also of great importance to the United States was 
the E"ine-Power Treaty relating to China — which the 
conference framed and which was later ratified. In this 
the powers agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the inde-^ 
pendence, and the territorial and administrative integrity 
of China also to apply "more effectually the principle 
of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China 
for the trade and industry of all nations." 4 Thus England 
gave up Wei-Hai-Wei and Japan agreed to yield Shan- 
tung if China would reimburse her for what she had spent 
on its railways. 

Undeniably the United States had made this con- 
ference a success by coming forward and, without pres- 
sure, offering such large concessions. Many people grieved 
for the battleships and battle cruisers that we thus 
surrendered, and others were indignant that we had 
denied ourselves the means of protecting our possessions 
in the East. But, as certain ones who took the opposite 
view pointed out, by this conference the two-power treaty 
between Great Britain and Japan was ended; suspicion 
between the United States and Japan was at least for 
the time being largely removed ; and the principle of the 
Open Door in China was accepted by nine of the great 

4 For the text of these treaties, see 67th Congress, 2d Session: 
Senate Documents, vol. x. 



524 



The United States Navy 



nations. The price was large, but the return, it is hoped, 
will be commensurate. 

The Navy i:sr the Orient 

The history of China during the last forty years is 
increasingly complex, on account of the politics injected 
by the western powers and the quick changes in the 
Chinese themselves. 

That China is a part now of the modern world is 
shown by the fact that the unrest and unsettled conditions 
which, with Russia as a nucleus, spread through all 
Europe, touching America and gaining a foothold in 
Japan and the Philippines, should have gripped eastern 
China with a terrific intensity. Chinese students to the 
number of hundreds of thousands have become tremend- 
ously interested in politics and they are closely following 
the affairs of western nations. Merchants have developed 
a new solidarity and are uniting in chambers of commerce. 
There has been an enormous increase in the number of 
newspapers, magazines, and periodicals of all kinds, and 
some of them are exercising sane and constructive leader- 
ship. 5 A single spoken as well as written language is being- 
taught in private schools throughout the country. 6 Young 
men are showing a disposition to arrange their own mar- 
riages, being guided by love instead of allowing their 
parents to negotiate the affair. This radical tendency has 
shocked conservative parents and implies a wide depart- 
ure from age-old tradition. Millions imbued with an 
idea of nationalism have resented the slowness of the 
powers in reforming the tariff (to which the powers had 
pledged themselves in one of the treaties drawn up at the 

5 Article in Peking Leader, quoted in the Living Age, February 
15, 1927. 

6 Ibid. 



The Navy in the Orient 



525 



Washington Conference) ; they have been an easy prey 
for the Soviet emissaries busily working among them; 
and they have openly attacked the exploitation of China 
by Japan and the western powers. 

What the outcome may be is uncertain; how far it 
has extended into central and western China is a matter 
of conjecture ; but it seems to be scarcely less than revo- 
lution for the people whom it has affected. 

In consequence banditry has been widespread, and the 
most important provinces have all suffered from spasmodic 
outbreaks, at times rising to the proportions of civil war. 

The United States might withdraw but this would 
plunge the people deeper in misery, and as other powers 
would not follow, China would become indeed a prey. 
Since she has great fertility of soil, rich mineral and coal 
resources, and a vast population inured to labor, there 
are untold possibilities in China. 

If the United States does not withdraw there is work 
for her navy in carrying out the traditional policy, lately 
reaffirmed in the Nine-Power Treaty. 

The navy has ever been active in humanitarian ser- 
vice. Thus when Japan in 1923 was visited with a 
destructive earthquake, an American destroyer division 
rushed hospital supplies and every possible relief to 
Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe. When Chinese forces in 
their foolish fighting were about to shell a large and 
populous city, the commander of an American gunboat on 
the Yangtze brought the leaders of the opposing forces 
together under a truce, and prevented the disaster. 7 
Many times on the occasion of famine or floods the navy 
has given aid. 

The Yangtze Patrol has received especial attention 
of late, and is so important that in 1921 a flag-officer was 

7 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1923, p. 15. 



526 The United States Navy 



given command of it. 8 It is based on Hankow, 700 
miles from the mouth of the Yangtze. This great river, 
navigable for 1750 miles, floats about 59 per cent, of 
China's commerce, and reaches over one-half of the popu- 
lation of 159,000,000 included in the provinces bordering 
upon it. When one considers that in 1920 the United 
States exported to China merchandise to the extent of 
$119,000,000 and imported $227,000,000, and that at 
least one-half of this was handled via the Yangtze, one will 
realize how important are the little American gunboats 
that patrol up and down its long course. 9 

But what of the Nationalist uprising of the spring of 
1927 that in the brief interval since the preceding pages 
were written, has spread so swiftly? It is difficult to 
appraise the events of yesterday and still more to 
announce those of to-morrow. Merchants and mission- 
aries have been obliged to flee from the provinces border- 
ing on the Yangtze and also from the country to the 
south and to the north. It is to be noted, however, that 
when they have come within the reach of American gun- 
boats and destroyers safety has been assured. The out- 
look for American interests in China is uncertain, but 
it is already plain that the presence of our naval forces 
and marines, with those of the European powers, tends 
to exert a stabilizing influence and has saved thousands 
of lives. 

The Navy and Latin America 

Although as early as colonial times the West Indies 
attracted American traders by rum, molasses, and slaves, 
not until after the Spanish-American War was Latin 

8 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1922, p. 5. 

9 Ibid. 



The Navy and Latin America 



America, with all her richness, known to more than a 
small proportion of our people. The departure of Spain 
from Cuba and Porto Rico was the signal for a rush of 
investors to those islands. To a lesser degree the same has 
in later years been going on in neighboring islands; the 
guarantee of good order resulting from a treaty and tem- 
porary occupation by the United States has greatly 
stimulated confidence in the countries concerned. 10 

An area two and three-fifths times that of the United 
States has less than two-thirds her population. Lying 
much of it in the tropics and being unusually fertile, it 
promises to become one of the greatest food granaries in 
the world. Trade of Latin America with the United 
States has increased enormously so that now it absorbs 
18.5 per cent, of the total yearly exports of this country. 
During the last twenty years, people of the United 
States have invested in Latin America no less than 
$4,210,000,000. 11 

In our relations with Latin America three large poli- 
cies have been followed, and they have governed the opera- 
tions of the Department of the Navy as well as of State : 

1. Monroe Doctrine. — "The Americas are controlled 
politically by Americans only — Americans north and 
south in the large meaning of the term." 

2. Caribbean Policy. — "The policing of that import- 
ant region, keeping the peace, encouraging the mainte- 
nance of order, and seeking constructively to build up 
higher standards in those matters that make national 
life worth while." 

3. Pan- Americanism. — "The fraternal relationship 

10 Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, p. 11. 
u Barreda, " Latin America's Opposition to the New Monroe- 
ism," Current History, vol. xxv, p. 810. 



528 The United States Navy 



of all American nations from Cape Horn to the 
North Pole." 12 

All of these have been greatly stimulated by the con- 
struction of the Panama Canal. Indeed no other one 
event has had so great an influence in bringing the United 
States into close relations with Latin America. The 
Canal has developed a great trade route for us through 
the Caribbean, which now has become more important 
than it has been at any time since the palmy days of the 
Spanish Empire. This sea is second only to the Medi- 
terranean, with which in position it closely corresponds. 
The Canal is the center of traffic in the American tropics, 
and in connection with safeguarding it the United States 
is vitally interested in the welfare of the islands and the 
countries of Central and northern South America. Thus 
their health and sanitation have a new significance, and 
the avoidance of troubles that might invite foreign occu- 
pation is essential. European powers are still interested, 
and competition for their markets is likely to become 
keener and keener. 13 Furthermore, Washington recog- 
nizes a certain responsibility in protecting American 
commercial enterprise which, following the trade route, 
has entered these countries. 

We will consider how these three policies have been 
applied in the twentieth century. 

The Monroe Doctrine only once during this period 
has been more than remotely threatened. This was in 
1902, when Germany making an occasion out of the 
financial obligations of a bad debtor was about to resort 
to military occupation in Venezuela. Roosevelt promptly 
informed the Kaiser through the German ambassador 
that the whole American Atlantic Fleet under Admiral 
Dewey would sail for Venezuela to prevent the landing 



Dealey, Foreign Policies of the United States, p. 360. 
Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, p. 7. 



The Navy and Latin America 



529 



of his forces unless Germany agreed within forty-eight 
hours to arbitrate the dispute over the debts — the course 
already urged by our State Department. The Kaiser there- 
upon offered to arbitrate, and Roosevelt tactfully praised 
him for his peaceful intentions. 14 

Policing the Caribbean has involved us in many per- 
plexities. Regularly, some factions in the country con- 
cerned have felt that their independence was not respected, 
and other countries have regarded us with suspicion. The 
Dominican Republic, becoming more and more involved 
financially and feeling the pressure of several leading 
European powers, finally in 1905 turned to the United 
States for assistance. Roosevelt at once drew up a 
"protocol" by which the United States should send an 
officer to take charge of their customs. This officer ad- 
ministering their finances was to reserve 55 per cent, 
for the funding of the public debt and turn over to the 
people 45 per cent, for their government. When the 
United States Senate regarded this as a treaty and refused 
to ratify it, the determined President still held to the 
arrangement, calling it a modus vivendi. Within two 
years the public debt had been considerably diminished, 
and the Dominican government, profiting from honesty 
and stability in its finances, had more money for public 
purposes than ever before. Then the Senate, persuaded 
of the practicability of the plan, sanctioned it. All went 
well until a revolution was imminent, when the United 
States to carry out the provision for preventing the cus- 
toms houses from being looted and the finances wrecked 
landed blue jackets and marines (1916). The Dominican 
government, such as there was, objecting to this, there 
followed a military administration by Captain Harry 

14 Adams, A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States, 
p. 292. 

34 



530 



The United States Navy 



S. Knapp, U. S. Navy, which continued under him and 
others for eight years. It brought progress such as the 
Dominicans had never known before. It built 500 miles 
of macadamized national highways, modernized the port 
of Santo Domingo and improved others, taught sanita- 
tion, constructed hospitals, established schools and pro- 
vided means of securing educated teachers (increasing 
within four years the enrolment of school children from 
18,000 to over 100,000), encouraged industries of all 
kinds, and finally led the way to the election and placing 
in power of a native government. 15 When this had been 
accomplished, the American troops were withdrawn 
(1924). The financial supervision still continues. 

What happened in the Dominican Republic has its 
counterpart in Haiti', the western end of the island. In 
1915 internal affairs in that country were such that 
European intervention for some time had been imminent. 
The president after having murdered over 100 political 
prisoners was himself put to death in a shocking manner 
before the French legation, where he had fled for 
refuge. To rescue the country from chaos, Rear- Admiral 
Caperton landed at Port au Prince with a force of sea- 
men and marines. A new president on being elected 
cooperated with the United States in the establishing of 
peace. He negotiated a treaty, ratified in 1916, that 
makes that country for twenty years a political and fiscal 
protectorate of the United States. 16 Although he organ- 
ized a military government he was quick to cooperate 
with the civil government. As soon as conditions war- 
ranted it, more and more authority was given to the 

15 See report of military governor Admiral Thomas Snowden, 
included in the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920, pp. 
321-342. 

16 Latane, The United States and Latin America, p. 289. 



The Navy and Latin America 531 



latter, until now the marines are concentrated at two 
points — Port au Prince and Cape Haytien, where they 
are available to protect the government and to insure the 
continuance of the financial supervision. 

In Nicaragua the United States similarly landed 
marines at a time of revolution to protect important 
American interests. In 1916 there was concluded the 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, according to which in return 
for $3,000,000 Nicaragua gave to the United States the 
right to the San Juan River as a canal route and permis- 
sion for establishing a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca 
to protect the western end of the canal when constructed. 
Conditions in Nicaragua have not been stable and a guard 
of marines has been kept at the capital, Managua, and a 
warship at Corinto, almost continuouslv since 1912. 

In attempting to adhere to her third policy, Pan- 
Americanism, the United States has not had an easy 
course. The Central American Union (comprising the 
five republics of Central America) our country has held 
to with some resolution, but revolutions coming often 
break its members apart. There is no railway running 
the length of Central America and communications are 
for the most part lacking. 17 

Various nations have at times questioned the motives 
of the United States in assuming responsibility for the 
peace and good order of the Caribbean. There is always 
a liability connected with such a role, and what other 
government in the western hemisphere could or would 
look out for the small countries when involved in diffi- 
culties among their own people or with the strong powers 
of Europe ? 

Some other method may in time be found, but at 



17 Adams, A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States, 
p. 305. 



5m 



The United States Navy 



present it would seem that the United States must keep 
the Caribbean in order, or the Monroe Doctrine goes by 
the board and the islands and Central American republics 
are open for exploitation. 18 

To return, however, to Pan- Americanism, the United 
States has persistently advocated the principle, both in 
Washington and elsewhere contributing generously to its 
work. In recent years our country has cooperated with 
Brazil and Peru by sending a naval mission to each, not 
to urge those countries to build more ships, but to show 
them the highest standards of naval efficiency and to 
point the way towards getting the most from what they 
have. Perhaps our fleets in the future may visit more 
often the ports of Argentine, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. 

18 The following solution, remote though its realization may 
appear, breathes a lofty idealism: 

"In the great movement for world peace, the special duty of 
the United States would therefore seem to be this most difficult, 
though inspiring, task of helping to bring into harmony the Pan- 
American nations. If we labor whole-heartedly to foster like 
conceptions of rights and duties, and identic economic interests 
and sympathies, then may we decide in common those large ques- 
tions of mutual concern which are now left to the separate diplo- 
matic negotiations and agreements of the several American nations. 
Then may we constitute a genuine American legislative assembly. 
Then may we lay the solid foundations of unity, on the sound basis 
of law. Then may we look forward with justifiable optimism to 
the speedy establishment of an American International Supreme 
Court of Justice, maintained by an adequate sanction and thus 
worthy of all respect. But these magnificent projects will not be 
accomplished merely through a realization of their desirability or 
of their feasibility. 'The substitution of law for war' is a pain- 
fully slow process. It is to be done by 'doing the work that's 
nearest/ and the 'work that's nearest' for us is the splendid task 
of converting Pan-American Union into Pan-American Unity, based 
on positive law and true justice." Brown, International Realities, 
pp. 172, 173. 



The Navy and Latin America 533 



Where our warships have carried the flag, respect for our 
government has followed, American commerce has been 
stimulated, and new bonds of friendship have been 
cemented. The officers of our navy have been guided by 
the traditions of the service, and, though not themselves 
formulating American policy, have rendered indispensa- 
ble service in intelligently interpreting it and humanely 
carrying it out. 



AUTHORITIES 



This list includes the most important sources consulted, 
together with some general works that will be found of special 
help to the student who wishes to pursue the subject further. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

R. W. Neeser, Statistical and Chronological History of the 
United States Navy , 1775-1907. 1909 to date (in progress) . Vols. 
I-II. 

C. T. Habbeck, A Contribution to the Bibliography of the 
History of the United States Navy. 190G. 

J. N. Labned, History for Ready Reference. 1894-1901. 6 V. 

Excellent bibliographies of a general character will be found 
in the several volumes of The American Nation, edited by A. 
B. Hart. 

genebal 

W. O. Stevens and A. Westcott, A History of Sea Power. 
1920. 

H. F. Krafft and W. B. Norris, Sea Power in American His- 
tory. 1920. 

E. S. Maclay, A History of the United States Navy. 1901. 

3 v. 

J. R. Spears, The History of Our Navy. 1897-99. 5 v. 

J. F. Cooper, The History of the Navy of the United States 
of America. 1839. 2 v. 

G. F. Emmons, The Navy of the United States, 1775-1853. 
1852. A careful compilation of statistics. 

The American Nation: a History. Edited by A. B. Hart. 
1904-18. 28 v. 

THE REVOLUTION 

The Annual Register (Dodsley's Annual Register), 1758 to 
date (in progress). Published in London; state papers of 
various kinds. 

534 \ 



Authorities 



535 



Francis Wharton, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Corre- 
spondence of the United States. 1889. 6 v. 

C. 0. Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution. 1906. 
Deals largely with the administrative side of the early navy. 

Mrs. Reginald De Koven, Life and Letters of John Paul 
Jones. 2v. 1913. ■ An intensely interesting biography of the 
great leader. 

John Paul Jones Commemoration. Edited by C. W. Stewart. 
1907. 

J. H. Sherburne, Life and Character of the Chevalier John 
Paul Jones. 1825. 

John Fiske, The American Revolution. 1898. 2v. 

WARS WITH FRANCE AND THE BARBARY STATES 

The United States' Naval Chronicle. Edited by C. W. Golds- 
borough. 1824. 2 v. Contains official reports and letters relat- 
ing to the navy between the Revolution and the War of 1812. 

G. W. Allen, Our Naval War with France. 1909. 

G. W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsai-s. 1905. 

The Autobiography of Commodore Charles Morris. 1880. 

A. S. Mackenzie, Life of Stephen Decatur. 1846. 

D. D. Porter, Memoir of Commodore David Porter. 1875. 

war of 1812 

Niles's Weekly Register, 1811-1849. 75 v. A weekly, pub- 
lished in Baltimore, containing official reports and other con- 
temporary matter. 

The Naval Chronicle, 1799-1818 (London). 40 v. Contains 
British reports, court-martial proceedings, etc. 

The Naval Monument. Edited by Abel Bowen. 1816. Also 
contains official reports. 

William James, The Naval History of Great Britain. 1878. 
6 v. (Originally published 1822-24.) 

William James, Naval Occurrences in the Late War Between 
Great Britain and the United States of America. 1817. " Seri- 
ously marred by the bitterest controversial and partisan spirit." 
( Babcock. ) 

A. T. Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. 
1905. 2 v. Unquestionably the best work on the war. 

Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812. 1882. Next 
to Mahan's, the most reliable and scientific treatment of this 
subject. 

The Royal Navy. Edited by W. L. Clowes. 1897. 7 v. A 



536 



A uthorities 



valuable collection of articles on the history of the British Navy. 
Among the American contributors are Mahan and Roosevelt. 

I. N. Hollis, The Frigate Constitution. 1900. 

Samuel Leech, Thirty Years from Home. 1843. Contains a 
vivid narrative of the battle between the United States and the 
Macedonian, the author being an English lad in the Macedonian's 
crew. 

Albert Gleaves, James Lawrence. 1904. The work which 
exposed the myths surrounding the loss of the Chesapeake. 

J. F. Cooper, Lives of Distinguished American Naval Officers. 
1846. 2 v. 

See also biographies of Decatur, Morris, and Porter, already 
mentioned, and the biography of Farragut mentioned in connection 
with the Civil War. 

SUPPRESSION OF WEST INDIAN PIRACY, SLAVE TRADE, MUTINY ON THE 
SOMERS, ETC. 

A. H. Foote, Africa and the American Flag. 1854. 

J. R. Spears, The American Slave Trade. 1900. 

Proceedings of the Naval Court-Martial in the Case of A. S. 
Mackenzie, etc. Edited by J. F. Cooper. 1844. A complete 
record of the court-martial, to which is added the criticisms of 
the editor on the conduct of Commander Mackenzie. 

Park Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy. 1900. 
This contains also an excellent treatment of the mutiny on the 
Somers. 

See also biographies of Farragut and Porter. 

MEXICAN WAR 

Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy. 

H. H. Bancroft, History of California. 1884-90. 7 v. 

See biographies of Farragut and David D. Porter. 

PERRY'S EXPEDITION TO JAPAN 

Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the 
China Seas and Japan. 1856. 3 v. This was published by order 
of Congress and was compiled from original notes and journals 
of Commodore Perry and his officers, under his supervision. The 
first volume, by Francis L. Hawks, contains the material of chief 
interest. 

W. E. Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry. 1887. 



Authorities 



537 



C. 0. Paxjllin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval 
Officers, 1778-1883. 1912. Contains an excellent account not only 
of the service of Commodore Perry in Japan but also of Com- 
modore Kearney in China, and Commodore Shufeldt in Korea. 

CIVIL WAR 

Of the first importance, together with the Reports of the 
Secretary of the Navy, are the two following works: 

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the 
War of the Rebellion. 1894-1922. Vols. 1-30. 

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 1880- 
1902. 128 v. 

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 v. 1884-87. Nar- 
ratives by the Union and Confederate officers, of great interest 
and value. 

Also of importance are many of the papers read before the 
Loyal Legion and various other societies of veterans. 

D. D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War. 1886. 

$. T. Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy. 1887. 
Rear Admiral Du Pont, Official Dispatches and Letters of. 
1883. 

Loyall Farragut, The Life of David Glasgow Farragut. 1879. 
A. T. Mahan, Admiral Farragut. 1892. 
• J. R Soley, Admiral Porter. 1903. 

W. C. Church, The Life of John Ericsson. 1891. 2 v. 
J. M. Hoppin, Life of Andrew Hull Foote. 1874 
Gideon Welles, The Diary of. 3 v. 1911. 
J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, a History. 
1890. 10 v. 

J. M. Ellicott, The Life of John Ancrum Winsloio. 1902. 

Raphael Semmes, Memoirs of Service Afloat. 1869. 

Arthur Sinclair, Two Years on the Alabama. 1896. 

U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs. 1885-86. 2 v. Chapters 
20-22 and 31-39 relate to the combined movements of the army 
and navy against Forts Henry and Donelson and against Vicksburg. 

Henry Walke, Navel Scenes and Reminiscences of the Civil 
War. 1877. As commander of the Carondelet, the author had 
part in the most stirring scenes on the Western rivers. 

C. S. Alden, George Hamilton Perkins, Commodore, U. S. N., 
His Life and Letters. 1914. The letters by a young officer who 
took a distinguished part in the battles of New Orleans and 
Mobile Bay give a vivid picture of those engagements. 



538 



Authorities 



J. Wilkinson, The Narrative of a Blockade-Runner. 1877. 
The account of a captain in the Confederate Navy, highly success- 
ful in eluding the blockade. 

W. H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer, 1841-1865. 
1883. 

Daniel Ammen, The Atlantic Coast. 1883. 

A. T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters. 1883. 

A. T. Mahan, From Sail to Steam. 1907. 

J. R. Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers. 1883. 

H. W. Wilson, Ironclads in Action. 1896. 2 v. 

J. S. Barnes, Submarine Warfare. 1869. An account by a 
Union officer of the torpedoes, torpedo-boats, and submarines used 
during the war. 

J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States from 1850. 1893- 
1906. 7 v. 

B. J. Lossing, Pictorial History of the Civil War. 1866. 3 v. 
T. L. Harris, The Trent Affair. 1896. A careful and ex- 
haustive study. 

Mountague Bernard, A Historical Account of the Neutrality 
of Great Britain During the American Civil War. 1870. 

J. W. H. Porter, A Record of Events in Norfolk County. 
1892. Interesting data on the construction of the ironclad Mer- 
rimac. 

F. M. Bennett, The Monitor and the Navy Under Steam. 
1900. 

D. B. Phillips, The Career of the Ironclad Virginia. (In 
Virginia Historical Collection, vol. 6.) 

Charles Martin, Personal Reminiscences of the Monitor and 
Merrimac Engagement. 1886. 

T. O. Selfridge, Jr., The Story of the Cumberland. (Pub- 
lished for the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. 
1902.) 

I. N. Stiles, The Merrimac and the Monitor. (In Military 
Essays and Recollections. 1891.) 

Senate Report, No. 37, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. By Sen. Hale on 
the surrender of the navy yards at Pensacola and Norfolk. 

House Report, No. 1725, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (in vol. 6). Re- 
lating to the U. S. S. Monitor. 

F. A. Parker, The Battle of Mobile Bay. 1878. 

THE NAVY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 

Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy. 
Charles Morris, The Nation's Navy. 1898. 
J. D. Long, The New American Navy. 1903. 2 v. 



Authorities 



539 



G. W. Melville, In the Lena Delta. 1885. A personal narra- 
tive of the chief engineer of the Jeannette Expedition. 

The Voyage of the Jeannette. 1884. 2 v. DeLong's journal, 
edited by his wife, Emma DeLong. 

A. W. Greely, Handbook of Polar Discoveries. 1906. 

W. S. Schley and J. R. Soley, The Rescue of Greely. 1885. 

R. E. Peary, Nearest the Pole. 1907. 

R. E. Peary, The North Pole. 1910. 

Franklin Matthews, With the Battle Fleet. 1908. 

Franklin Matthews, Back to Hampton Roads. 1909. 

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy. 

F. E. Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and 
Spain. 2 v. 1911. The most authoritative work on the Spanish- 
American War. 

J. F. Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations. 
1923. A scholarly work. 

W. A. M. Goode, With Sampson Through the Wa". 1899. 

A. T. Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain and Other 
Articles. 1899. 

The Naval Annual. Edited by F. A. Brassey. 1893 to date 
(in progress). A reliable authority on naval statistics. 

H. W. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain. 1900. An able work, 
non-partisan in character, written by an Englishman. 

R. H. Titherington, A History of the Spanish-American 
War of 1898. 1900. 

Office of Naval Intelligence. Notes on the Spanish- American 
War. 1900. Contains comments by Spanish, German, and Ameri- 
can officers on the war. 



THE WORLD WAR 

Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy 
W. S. Sims and B. J. Hendrick, The Victory at Sea. 1920. 

A general account of the war. Admiral Sims, directing American 

naval affairs from the London office, was most intimately in 

touch with the large operations. 

Albert Gleaves, A History of the Transport Service. 1921. 

An authoritative account by the one in charge of the transport 

service. 



540 



Authorities 



C. S. Alden and Ralph Eakle, Makers of Naval Tradition. 
1925. Chap. XIV, on the World War, by Admiral Earle, is sig- 
nificant as written by the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, who 
was responsible for the Northern Mine Barrage and the Mounted 
Naval Railway Batteries. 

E. V. Izac, The Prisoner of the U-90 1919. A vivid account 
of the experience of an American lieutenant who was on the 
President Lincoln when torpedoed. Unfortunately out of print. 

Reinhard Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World 
War. 1920. Gives the other side. 

A. P. F. von Tirpitz, My Memories. 2 v. 1919. 

THE NAVY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

R. G. Adams, A History of the Foreign Policy of the United 
States. 1924. 

J. Q. Dealey, Foreign Policies of the United States. 1926. 
C. L. Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States. 1916. 
J. H. Latane, United States and Latin America. 1920. 
C. A. Herrick, History of Commerce and Industry. 1920. 
P. M. Brown, International Realities. 1917. 
Senate Documents, 61th Congress, 2d Session, 1921-1922. v. 10. 
Official report of the Washington Conference. 



INDEX 



A 

Act for the Better Government 
of the Navy, 60 

Adams, Capt., 230, 231 

Adams, Minister, 371 

Adams, 68 

Aeolus, 102, 106 

Aeroplane, early beginnings, 481 ; 
trans- Atlantic flight, 515 ff. 

Africa, 102 

Agrippina, 371, 374 

Aguinaldo, 434. 

AL-boats, 501-503. 

Alabama, hunted by the Wyom- 
ing, 365; cruise of, 371 ff.; 
map of cruise, 373; engages 
the Kearsarge, 376 ff. ; dia- 
gram of action, 381 ; the con- 
troversy, 383 ff.; claims, 387. 

Albatross passes Port Hudson, 
327. 

Albatross and the Fisheries 

Commission, 425 
Albemarle, 350 ff. 
Albemarle Sound, operations on, 

348 ff. ; and Pamlico Sound, 

map of, 349. 
Alden, James, sent to Norfolk, 

257; battle of Mobile Bay, 

334, 336. 
Alert, captures the Lexington, 

19; taken by Barry, 30. 
Alert, in Polar expedition, 418. 
Alert, in Central American 

waters, 423. 
Alfred, 13, 24. 

Algiers, treaty with Spain, 42; 
treaty with Portugal, 43; 
treaty with United States, 61 ; 



Dey of, makes use of the 
George Washington, 61; en- 
couraged by Great Britain, 
203; war with United States, 
203-206; treaty with United 
States, 206. 

Alleghany, 203, 204. 

Allen, W. H., on the Chesapeake, 
96; defeated by Maples, 151, 
152. 

Allen, W. H., Jr., 151, 152. 
Alliance, in Jones's fleet, 31 ff. ; 

under Barry, 40; sold, 42. 
Almirante Oquendo, 447 ff. 
Alphonso XII, 428. 
Alwyn, Lt., 114, 131. 
America, 39, 42. 
Amphitrite, 411, 449. 
Amy, 422. 

Anderson, Thomas O., 77. 

Andrea Doria, 13. 

Aquia Creek, 243. 

Arbuthnot, James, 158. 

Arctic Regions, map of, 417. 

Argus, in the Tripolitan War, 
84, 88, 89, 91; in Rodgers' 
squadron, 102, 118; captured 
by the Pelican, 151, 152; in- 
jures British commerce, 160. 

Ariel, 166, 169. 

Arkansas, 324, 325. 

Arkansas Post, 326. 

Armada, 157. 

Arnold, Benedict, 15 ff. 

Aroostook, 287. 

Arthur, Pres., 409. 

Atlanta, British brig, 158. 

Atlanta, Confederate ram, 396, 
397. 

Atlanta, U. S. Crusier, 410. 

541 



542 



Index 



Atlantic, 177. 

Augustin, Gen., 434, 440, 443. 
Avon, 157, 158. 

B 

Bagley, Worth, 459. 

Bahama, 371, 372. 

Bailey, Capt, 314, 320. 

Bainbridge, Joseph, 76. 

Bainbridge, Wm., surrenders the 
Retaliation, 53, 54; commands 
the George Washington, 61, 
62; commands the Essex, 64; 
loses the Philadelphia, 69 ff . ; 
plan for destroying the Phila- 
delphia, 76; report of the 
Intrepid disaster, 90; captures 
the Java, 126 ff. ; career of, 
132; commands squadron for 
Algiers, 204, 206. 

Ballard, Acting Lt., 135. 

Baltimore, 435 ff. 

Baltimore affair, 53, 54. 

Bancroft, George, 218, 219. 

Bankhead, J. P., 287. 

Banks, Gen., 327. 

Barbary States, map of, 63. 

Barclay, Robert H., defeated by 
Perry, 165 ff. 

Barclay, Thomas, 43. 

Barclay, 177, 178. 

Barnard, John G., 243. 

Barney, Joshua, 50. 

Barron, James, commands the 
President, 64; commands the 
Chesapeake, 96 ; court-marial 
of Porter, 209. 

Barron, Samuel, commands the 
Philadelphia, 64, 66; court- 
marial of Morris, 69; super- 
sedes Preble, 87; relieved, 90. 

Barron, Samuel (2d), 244, 377. 



Barry, John, commands the Lex- 
ington, 29, 30, the Alliance, 
40; appointed captain, 50; 
commands the United States, 
51. 

Bastard, Capt., 102. 

Battle Fleet, cruise of, 473 ff. 

Battleships, development of, 
478, 479; service in World 
War, 496 ff. 

Bayly, Lewis, 487. 

Beagle, 209. 

Bear, 416. 

Beatty, David, 509. 

Belknap, R. R., 505. 

Bell, H. H., 313, 314. 

Belmont, battle of, 292. 

Belvidera, 102. 

Benham, A. E. K., 422 ff. 

Benson, William S., 500. 

Benton, 290. 

Berceau, 59. 

Beresford, Capt., 149. 

Berkeley, Vice-Admiral, 94, 95. 

Beauregard, Gen., 393, 394. 

Biddle, James, in the Hornet, 
134; boards the Frolic, 147; 
captures the Penguin, 158, 
159; service in West Indies, 
208; goes to Japan, 226. 

Biddle, Nicholas, 13, 29. 

Bienville,' 247. 

Black Pock, 162. 

Black Warrior, 426. 

Blakely, Johnston, captures the 
Reindeer, 154 ff; captures the 
Mary, 157; sinks the Avon, 
157 ff.; captures the Atlanta, 
158. 

Blanco, Gen., 427, 434. 
Blockade of Southern ports, 241, 
242, 388 ff., 404. 



Index 



543 



Blockade-runner, 390 ff. 
Blue, Victor, 498. 
Blyth, Samuel, 153. 
Board of Admiralty, 12. 
Bombshell, 352. 

Bonhomme Richard, cruise of, 
map, 28; captures the Serapis, 
30 ff. 

Bonne Citoyenne, 127, 133, 149. 

Boston, frigate, 59, 68. 

Boston, cruiser, 375, 410, 435 ff. 

Boxer, capture of, 152, 153. 

Boxer trouble, 468-471. 

Bragg, Gen., 401. 

Breaking the line, explanation of 
the term, 172. 

Breese, Lt.-Comdr., 403. 

Brilliant e, 212. 

Bristol, Mark L., 512, 513. 

British Navy, during the Revo- 
lution, 13; in the War of 1812, 
101. 

Broke, J. M., 262, 264. 

Broke, Philip B. V., chases the 
Constitution, 102 ff. ; captures 
the Chesapeake, 135 ff. 

Brooklyn, steam sloop, battle be- 
low New Orleans, 315 ff. ; 
below Vicksburg, 324; battle 
of Mobile Bay, 330 ff. 

Brooklyn, cruiser, battle of San- 
tiago, 452 ff. 

Brown, Surgeon, 385. 

Browne, Ralph A., 505. 

Brumby, Thomas M., 463. 

Buchanan, Franklin, in expedi- 
tion to Japan, 230, 231; bat- 
tle of Hampton Roads, 266 ff. ; 
Battle of Mobile Bay, 338 ff. 

Buchanan, Pres., 239. 

Buckner, Gen., 296. 

Budd, Lt., 140, 142. 



Buford, Col., 301. 

Burgoyne, Gen., 18. 

Burnside, Gen., 348, 349. 

Burrows Wm. 152 153. 

Bush Lt., 113. 

Bushnell, David, 355. 

Bustamente, Capt., 457. 

Butler, Benjamin F., at Hatteras 
Inlet, 244; New Orleans, 312, 
319; Fort Fisher, 399, 400. 

Butt., Lt., 281. 

Byrd, Richard E., 517. 

Byron, Capt., 102. 

C 

Cabot, 13. 

Cairo, 290. 

Caldwell, Lt., 87. 

Caledonia, captured by Elliott, 

162, 164; battle of Lake Erie, 

166 ff. 
Camara, Admiral, 459. 
Cambon, Ambassador, 461. 
Campos, Gen., 426. 
Cand, Jack, 119. 
Canonicus, 399. 
Caperton, W. B., 530. 
Carden, John S., 118 ff. 
Carleton, Guy, 15. 
Carleton, Thomas, 17. 
Carolina, 198. 

Carondelet, building of, 290; at- 
tacks Fort Donelson, 297, 298; 
passes Island No. 10, 303-6; 
engages the Arkansas, 325. 

Carronades, explanatiou of the 
term, 46. 

Casembroot, Capt., 367, 370. 

Cassin, Lt., 196. 

Castilla, 442. 

Catalana, Salvatore, 77. 

Cayuga, 314 ff. 



544 



Index 



Celia, 70, 71. 
Ceres, 352. 
Cerf, 31 ff: 

Cervera, Admiral, 430, 433, 446 ff. 

Chads, Lt., 129. 

Chandler, Sec, 416. 

Charleston, naval operations be- 
fore, 393-7. 

Charleston, building of, 411; sent 
to Philippines, 444; lost, 464. 

Chase, Samuel, 12. 

Chauncey, Isaac, 162, 165, 173, 
189. 

Cherub, engagement with the 
Essex, 178 ff. 

Chesapeake, building of, 50 ; sent 
to Tripoli, 68; encounter with 
the Leopard, 94, 95; captured 
by the Shannon, 133 ff. ; dia- 
gram of action, 138. 

Chicago, 410. 

Chickamauga, 375. 

Chickasaiv, battle of Mobile Bay, 
334, 337, 343-5. 

Chicora, 394. 

China and the Boxer trouble, 
468-471; Nationalist uprising, 
524-526. 

Chipp, Lt., 415. 

Chippewa, 166, 170. 

Chub, 192 ff. 

Cincinnati, building of, 290; at- 
tacks Fort Henry, 294; at- 
tacked at Fort Pillow, 308. 

Civil War, 238 ff. 

Clark, Charles E., 430. 

Cleveland, Pres., 421. 

Collins, Pilot, 336. 

Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall, 426. 

Colonial Navy, 9 ff. 

Colorado, 399. 

Columbia, 259. 



Columbiads, 259. 

Columbus, in Esek Hopkins' 

fleet, 13. 
Columbus, goes to Japan, 226; 

destroyed at Norfolk, 259. 
Commerce, restrictions on, 96 ff. ; 

growth, 519. 
Commodore Hull, 352, 
Concas, Capt., 457. 
Cone, H. I., 504. 
Concord, 435. 

Conestoga, building of, 292 ; goes 
up the Tennessee, 296 ; at- 
tacks Fort Donelson, 297. 

Con-fiance, captured by Macdon- 
ough, 191 ff. 

Conger, E. H., 469. 

Congress, on Lake Champlain, 
17. 

Congress, building of, 50; in 
Rodgers' squadron, 102, 118; 
sails from Boston, 134; block- 
aded in Portsmouth, 144. 

Congress, destroyed by the Mer- 
rimac, 265, 268 ff. 

Connecticut, 471. 

Conner, David, in the action 
with the Peacock, 150; in the 
Mexican War, 222. 

Constellation, building of, 50, 51 ; 
captures the Insurgente, 55, 
56; engages the Vengeance, 
57, 58; sent to Tripoli. 68, 
90; blockaded, 144; sent to 
Algiers, 204, 205. 

Constitution, building of, 50, 51 ; 
in the Tripolitan War, 69, 84, 
88 ; chased by British squad- 
ron, 102 ff. ; captures the 
Guerriere, 109 ff. ; diagram of 
action, 111; captures the Java, 
126; diagram of action, 128; 



Index 



545 



blockaded in Boston, 134, 143; 
captures the Cyane and Le- 
vant, 198, 200, 201; in 1881, 
408. 

Contee, Lt., 229. 

Continental Navy, 15. 

Convoy room, 494. 

Conyngham, Gustavus, 19 ff. 

Cooke, Capt., 350-4. 

Cornwallis, Lord, 41. 

Corvette, explanation of the 
term, 46. 

Cottineau, Capt., 32. 

Cotton Plant, 352. 

Countess of Scarborough, cap- 
tured, 32, 38. 

Couronne, 377, 378. 

Cox, Acting Lt., 135, 142, 143. 

Cox, Capt., 105. 

Crane, Lt., 107. 

Craney, Lt., 217. 

Craven, T. A. M., battle of 
Mobile Bay, 334 ff. 

Craven, T. T., in command of 
Potomac Flotilla, 243; battle 
below New Orleans, 315-7. 

Craven, T. T., World War, 504. 

Cristobal Colon, 447 ff. 

Cromwell, Boatswain's Mate,, 
215, 216. 

Croyable, captured, 53. 

Cuba, insurrection in, 426 ff. ; 
blockade of, 432, 434, 445, 
446; Piatt amendment, 475, 
476. 

Cumberland, saved at Norfolk, 
257, 258; sunk by the Merri- 
mac, 264-8. 

Curtiss, G. H., 481. 

Cushing, Wm. B., 354 ff.; dia- 
gram of his launch, 357. 

Cyane, captured by the Constitu- 
tion, 198, 200, 201. 



D 

Dacres, James, commands the 
Guerriere, 102; defeated by 
Hull, 110 ff.; challenge to 
Rodger s, 116. 

Dahlgren, Rear-Admiral, com- 
mands South Atlantic squad- 
ron, 390; operations before 
Charleston, 397. 

Dahlgren gun, 260. 

Dale, Richard, in Mill prison, 
19; in engagement with the 
Serapis, 31 ff.; appointed cap- 
tain, 50; commands the Gan- 
ges, 52 ; sent to Tripoli, 64, 66. 

Daniel Webster, 368 ff. 

Daniels, Josephus, 500. 

Dauphin, 42. 

Davids. See Submarines. 

Davidson, Lt., 278, 284. 

Davis, Charles H., member of 
board of operations, 243; at 
Port Royal, 245; member of 
board on ironclads, 274; en- 
gages fleet at Fort Pillow, 
308; moves down the Miss- 
issippi, 322. 

Davis, John, 77. 

Davis, Pres., 388, 389. 

Davis, Rear-Admiral, 425. 

Davison, Trubee, 503. 

Deane, 42. 

Dearborn, Gen., 161, 162, 165. 

Decatur, James, 86. 

Decatur, Stephen (Sr.), 52. 

Decatur, Stephen, in the Medi- 
terranean, 69 ; burns the Phila- 
delphia, 76 ff. ; gunboat attack 
on Tripoli, 84 ff. ; captures the 
Macedonian, 117 ff. ; loses the 
President, 199, 200; expedition 
to Algiers, 204-6. 

Decatur, 110. 



546 



Index 



Deerhound, 378, 382 ff. 
De Grasse, Count, 41. 
De Haven, E. J., 413. 
Delaware, takes the Croyable, 52, 
53. 

Delaware, destroyed at Norfolk, 
259. 

Delaware, in World War, 498, 
499. 

DeLong, G. W., 414 ff. 

De Sartine, Minister, 30. 

Destroyers, American in World 
War, 486 ff. 

Detroit, 115, 162, 174. 

Detroit, British brig, destroyed, 
162, 164. 

Detroit, Barclay's flagship, 166 ff. 

Detroit, U. S. cruiser, 423. 

Dewey, George, services after 
battle of Manila, 424; battle 
of Manila Bay, 435 ff. ; pre- 
vents German interference, 
462, 463; Venezuelan affair, 
528. 

Dickinson, Capt., 159. 

Dolphin, brig, destroyed at 

Norfolk, 257, 259. 
Dolphin, cruiser, 410. 
Dominican Republic, 529, 530. 
Don Antonio de Ulloa, 441, 442, 
Don Juan de Austria, 442. 
Dorsey, Midn., 87. 
Douglas, Charles, 17. 
Downes, Capt., 396. 
Downes, John, 178, 182, 186, 205. 
Downie, Capt., 191 ff. 
Dragon, 280. 

Drake, captured by the Ranger, 
27 ff. 

Drayton, Percival, 334, 338, 339, 
342. 

Dreadnoughts, 478, 479. 



Du Pont, Samuel, member of 
board of operations, 243; cap- 
tures Port Royal, 244 ff. ; com- 
mands South Atlantic squad- 
ron, 390; operations before 
Charleston, 393-7. 

E 

Eads, J. B., 288. 

Eagle, sloop, 191. 

Eagle, brig, 191 ff. 

Earle, Ralph, 505, 507. 

Eastport, 296. 

Eaton, Win,, 66-8, 91, 92. 

Edsall, N. E., 466. 

Edward, 29. 

Edwin, 204. 

Effingham, 29. 

Ellet, Lt.-Col., 324, 325. 

Elliott, Gilbert, 350. 

Elliott, Jesse D., work on Lake 
Erie, 162 ff.; battle of Lake 
Erie, 167 ff.; controversy, 169, 
171, 172. 

Ellis. 354. 

Embargoes, in War of 1812, 

96-98. 
Endymion, 199, 200. 
Enlistment, term of, 57, 67. 
Enterprise, on Lake Champlain, 

17. 

Enterprise (2d), cruise in West 
Indies, 59; sent to Tripoli, 64; 
captures the Tripoli, 65; in 
second squadron before Tri- 
poli, 68, 69; burning of the 
Philadelphia, 76; bombardment 
of Tripoli, 84; captures the 
Boxer, 152, 153. 

Epervier, captured by the Pea- 
cock, 153; sent to Algiers, 204; 
engages the Mashuda, 205. 



Index 



547 



Ericsson, John, 274, 453, 455. 
Erie, 223. 
Espiegle, 150. 

Essex, frigate, sent to Tripoli, 
64, 68; in Bainbridge's squad- 
ron, 126; cruise of, under 
Porter, 175 ff.; map of cruise, 
181. 

Essex, gunboat, attacks Ft. 

Henry, 294; engages the 

Arkansas, 325. 
Essex case, 96, 97. 
Essex Junior, 178 ff. 
Everard, Capt., 191. 
Experiment, 30. 

F 

Fairfax, D. M., 252. 

Fajardo affair, 209, 210. 

Fanning, 489, 490. 

Farragut, David G., commands 
the Barclay, 178; account of 
the loss of the Essex, 180 ff.; 
service in West Indies, 208 ; in 
Mexican War, 222, 223; joins 
Davis, 308, 309; captures New 
Orleans, 310 ff. ; at Vicksburg, 
322 ff.; passes Port Hudson, 
327; victorious at Mobile Bay, 
330 ff. ; subsequent honors, 
347. 

Farrand, Comdr., 404. 

Finch, 192 ff. 

Finnis, Capt., 170. 

Firefly, 204. 

Flambeau, 204. 

Fleet in being, defined, 450. 

Florida, 371, 375, 387. 

Florida, World War, 498, 499. 

Floyd, Gen., 296. 

Flusser, Lt., 351, 352. 

Fly, 13. 



Foote, A. H., and the slave trade, 
213; construction of river 
gunboats, 290; takes Ft. 
Henry, 293 ff.; attacks Ft. 
Donelson, 296 ff. ; attacks 
Island No. 10, 299 ff.; moves 
on Ft. Pillow, 307; relieved 
by Davis, 308. 

Fort Beauregard, 246 ff. 

Fort Clark, 244. 

Fort Donelson, 296 ff. 

Fort Fisher, 398 ff.; plan of 
second assault, 402. 

Fort Gaines, 331 ff. 

Fort George, 165. 

Fort Hatteras, 244. 

Fort Henry, 293 ff. 

Fort Jackson, 312 ff. 

Fort McAllister, 394, 395. 

Fort Morgan, 331 ff. 

Fort Pillow, 307, 308. 

Fort Powell, 331 ff. 

Fort St. Philip, 312 ff. 

Fort Walker, 246 ff. 

Forton prison, 22. 

Foster, Paul F., 502. 

Four-Power Treaty, 523. 

Fox, Gustavus, made Ass't Seec. 
of the Navy, 240, 241; plans 
New Orleans expedition, 310; 
faith in monitors, 393. 

France, alliance with the U. S., 
30 ; war with the U. S., 51 ff . ; 
map of scene of war, 55; 
treaty of peace with the U. S., 
59; World War, 484 ff. 

Franklin, Benj., goes to France, 
19; commissions Conyngham, 
20. 

Franklin, Sir John, 412. 
Franklin, 68. 
Freeman, A. H., 466. 



548 



Index 



French, assistance of, 41. 
French floating batteries, 261. 
Frigate, explanation of the term, 

46; illustration, 47. 
Frigate and sloop actions in War 

of 1812 (map), 145. 
Frolic, defeated by the Wasp, 

146 ff. 
Frolic (2d), 153. 
Fullam, Master's Mate, 372, 383. 
Fullinwider, S. P., 505. 
Fulton, Robt., 355. 
Fulton, 261. 
Furor, 447, 449, 454. 

G 

Gaines, 334, 339. 
Galena, gunboat, 339. 
Galena, ironclad, 274, 387. 
Gamble, Lt., 179. 
Ganges, 52, 137. 
Garfield, Pres., 408, 409. 
Gates, Gen., 17. 
General Lezo, 442. 
General Monk, 40, 41. 
General Pike, 192. 
George Washington, 61, 68. 
Georgia, 371, 375. 
Georgiana, 178. 
Germantown, 256 ff. 
Ghent, treaty of, 198, 201, 202. 
Gilmer, J. F., 293, 299. 
Gilmore, 304. 
Gilmore, Gen, 396. 
Glasgow, 14. 
Gleaves, Albert, 496. 
Gloucester, 453 ff. 
Glynn, Comdr., 227. 
Goldsborough, Flag-Officer, 348, 
349. 

Governor Moore, 317, 318. 
Grampus, 306. 



Granger, Gen., 305. 

Grand Fleet, 496 ff. 

Grant, U. S., at Belmont, 292, 
293; captures Ft. Henry, 293 
ff.; captures Ft. Donalson, 296 
ff . ; at Pittsburgh Landing, 306, 
307; at Vicksburg, 326 ff.; at 
Ft. Fisher, 400. 

Graves, Admiral, 10. 

Great Lakes, importance in 
1812-15, 161 ff.; map of cam- 
paigns on, 163. 

Greeley, A. W., 416 ff. 

Green, Chas., 334. 

Greene, S. D., executive officer of 
the Monitor, 277 ff. ; com- 
mands Monitor, 283. 

Greenwich, 178. 

Greer, J. A., 252. 

Gridley, Capt., 439. 

Growler (Lake Ontario), 189 

Growler (Lake Champlain), 191. 

Guanabora, 423. 

Guerriere, boards the Spitfire, 
99; in Broke's squadron, 102; 
captured by the Constitution, 
109 ff. 

Guerriere (2d), sent against Al- 
giers, 204; captures the Mash- 
uda, 205. 

Gunnery, at end of 18th century, 
48; recent improvement in, 479, 

Guns, development after 1812, 
259, 260; recent developments 
in, 479. 

H 

Haiti, 530, 531. 
Halifax, 94, 95. 
Halleck, Gen., 293, 307, 324. 
Hamet Karamauli, 91 if. 
Hampton Roads, battle of, 255 
ff; map of, 265. 



Index 



549 



Hancock, John, 12. 
Hancock, 40. 

Hanrahan, David C, 504. 

Hardee, Gen., 397. 

Harrison, Gen., 171. 

Hartford, type of ship, 260; at 
New Orleans, 312 ff. ; up the 
Mississippi, 323; passes Port 
Hudson, 327; at Mobile Bay, 
330 ff. 

Harvard, 447, 449, 455. 

Hatteras, 374. 

Hatteras Inlet, 243, 244. 

Hay, John, 468, 470. 

Hayes, Capt.," 199. 

Hayes, Pres., 407. 

Hebert, Gen., 354. 

Henley, Midn., 86. 

Hermann, Lewis, 76. 

Higgins, Samuel, 360, 364. 

High Seas Fleet, surrender of, 
508, 509. 

Higgins, Samuel, 360, 364. 

Hillyar, Capt., 181 ff. 

Hist, 453, 455. 

Hobson, Naval Constructor, 451. 

Hoel, Master, 304. 

Hoke, Gen., 351, 352. 

Holland, John P., 480, 481. 

Hope, David, 118, 123, 125. 

Hopkins, Esek, 13, 14. 

Hopkins, J. B., 13. 

Hornet, sloop in Revolutionary 
Navy, 13. 

Hornet, in war with Tripoli, 91 ; 
in Rodger s' squadron, 102; in 
Bainbridge's squadron, 126 ff., 
175; blockades the Bonne Cito- 
yenne, 133; captures the Pea- 
cock, 149, 150; captures the 
Penguin, 158, 159, 198; leaves 
the Mediterranean (1807), 203. 



Hotchkiss, 411. 

Housatonic, 356. 

Howe, Gen., 18. 

Howell, Commodore, 446. 

Huger, Maj., 250. 

Hughes, Charles E., 521. 

Hughes, C. F., 498. 

Hull, Gen., 161, 162. 

Hull, Isaac, exploit at Port 
Plate, 59; before Tripoli, 69; 
escapes Broke's squadron, 103 
ff. ; takes prizes, 109; cap- 
tures the Guerriere, 109 ff. ; 
superiority to Carden in 
maneuvering, 124. 

Humphreys, Joshua, 44. 

Hunter, 166 ff. 

Hurlbut, Gen., 306. 

Hyder Ali, 41. 

Hyslop, Gen., 131. 

I 

Impressment, 53, 54, 93 ff. 
Indiana, 411, 433, 452 ff. 
Indianola, 328. 

Indian troubles and the War of 
1812, 98, 99. 

Ingram, Lt., 187. 

Insurgente, takes the Retalia- 
tion, 54; captured by the 
Constellation, 55 ff . ; loss of, 
59, 60. 

Intrepid, attack on the Phila- 
delphia, 77 fT.; blowing up of, 
88 ff. 

Iowa, 433, 452 ff. 

Iris, 40. 

Ironclads, introduction of, 261 ff. 
Isherwood, Engineer, 256, 409. 
Isla de Cuba, 440 ff. 
Isla de Luzon, 441. 
Isla de Mindanao, 442. 



550 



Index 



Island No. 10, captured, 299 ff.; 

map, 300. 
Israel, Lt., 88. 
Itasca, 318, 319. 
Izard, Gen., 192. 
Izard, Ralph, 76. 

J 

James, Reuben, 86. 

Jamestown, 269, 271, 278. 

Japan, Perry's expedition to, 
225 ff:; map of, 228; treaty 
with, 236, 365; civil war in, 
365 ff. 

Jarvis, Midn., 58. 

Java, captured by the Consti- 
tution, 126 ff. 

Jeannette expedition, 413 ff. 

Jeff Davis, 375. 

Jefferson, Pres , 97. 

Jersey, 22. 

John Adams, 68, 87, 90, 218. 

Johnson, Pres., 404. 

Johnston, A. S., 298, 306. 

Johnston, J. D., 343, 344. 

Jones, Catesby, 270 ff. 

Jones, Jacob, 146 ff. 

Jones, J. P., commissioned lieu- 
tenant, 13; early career, 24 ff. ; 
captures the Drake, 27 ff. ; 
captures the Serapis, 30 ff . ; 
later career, 39, 43; letter to 
Marine Committee, 419. 

Jouett, J. E., 334, 338. 

K 

Katahdin, 324. 
Kate, 393. 

Kearny, Brig.-Gen., 221. 
Kearny, Lawrence, 226. 
Kearsarge, action with the Ala- 
bama., 376 ff.; diagram, 381. 



Kell, Lt., 383, 385, 386. 
Kempff, Admiral, 469. 
Kennebec, 318, 319, 324. 
Kennon, Beverly, 318. 
Keokuk, 395. 
Keystone State, 394. 
Kineo, 319. 
Knapp, H. S., 530. 
Knowles, Quartermaster, 342. 

L 

Lackawanna, 338, 342-4. 
Lady Prevost, 166, 168. 
Lafittes, 207. 

Lake Champlain, first battle of, 
15 ff.; map, 16; second battle 
of, 190 ff.; plan of battle, 194. 

Lake Erie, battle of, 168 ff.; 
plan of battle, 169. 

Lake Ontario, operations on, 
189, 190. 

Lamb, Col., 398 ff. 

Lambert, Capt., 129 ff. 

Lancefield, 368 ff. 

Landais, Pierre, 31 ff. 

Lang, Jack, 147. 

Langdon, John, 26. 

Lanrick, 368 ff. 

Lansdale, P. V., 466. 

Latin America and the United 
States, 526 ff. 

Lawrence, James, at Tripoli, 76 
ff. ; commands the Hornet, 102, 
126; commands the Chesa- 
peake, 133 ff. ; action with the 
Shannon, 137 ff. ; captures the 
Peacock, 149, 150. 

Lawrence, 166 ff. 

Laws, Alex., 76, 77. 

Lay, Engineer, 356. 

Lear, Tobias, 90, 91, 203, 204. 

Lee, Admiral, 398. 



Index 



551 



Lee, Consul-Gen., 427. 
Lee, R. E., 398, 404. 
Lee, 10. 

Lee, (blockade runner), 392. 

Leech, Samuel, 122. 

Leopard, 94, 95. 

Levant, 198, 200, 201. 

Lexington, 19, 29. 

Lexington, gunboat, 292, 293,- 

296, 306, 307. 
Lincoln, Pres., and Trent affair, 

253; election in 1864, 346. 
Lindsay, 328, 329. 
Linnet, 192 ff. 
Little Belt, 99. 
Little Belt (sloop), 166, 170. 
Llewellyn, Asst. Surg., 372. 
Lockwood, Lt., 418. 
Long, Sec, 447. 

Long guns, explanation of the 

term, 46. 
Loring, Commodore, 53, 54. 
Los Angeles, 516. 
Louisiana, 198. 

Louisiana, Confederate ironclad, 
321. 

Louisiana, gunboat, 400. 
Louisville, construction, 290; 

drawing of, 291; attacks Ft. 

Donelson, 297, 298. 
Lovell, Gen., 320. 
Low, Lt., 372. 
Luckenback, 488. 
Ludlow, Lt., 135. 
Lundy's Lane, 190. 
Lusitania, 483. 
Lyman, Midn., 187. 
Lynch, Cap., 348. 

M 

McCall, Ed. R., 153. 
McCalla, B. H., 464, 469. 



McCauley, C. S., 255 ff. 
McClellan, Gen., 309, 310. 
McClernand, Gen., 292, 326. 
McCulloch, 435. 

Macdonough, Thomas, takes part 
in burning the Philadelphia, 
76; defeats the British on 
Lake Champlain, 191 ff. 

McDougal, David, action at 
Shimonoseki, 365 ff. 

Macedonian, captured by the 
United States, 117 ff.; block- 
aded in New London, 144; sent 
to Algiers, 204. 

Mackenzie, A. S., mutiny on 
Somers, 214-8. 

Mackinac, 162. 

McKinley, Pres., 423 ff. 

McKnight, Lt., 182, 187. 

Macomb, Comdr., 361. 

Macomb, Gen., 192. 

Madison, Pres., 100. 

Mahan, A. T., 424, 425. 

Mahopac, 399. 

Maine, 427-9. 

Majestic, 199. 

Mallory, Sec, 262. 

Manassas, 316, 317, 321. 

Manhattan, 334, 339, 343. 

Manila, battle of, 437, ff . ; dia- 
gram, 438 ; the city taken, 459, 
463. 

Manila, 442. 

Manly, John, 11. 

Manners, Wm., 155 ff. 

Maples, Capt., 151, 152. 

Marblehead, 451, 452. 

Maria, 42. 

Maria Teresa, 447 ff. 
Marine Committee, 11 ff. 
Marine Corps, established, 52; 
in World War, 508. 



552 



Index 



Marques del Duero, 442. 
Marston, Capt., 278. 
Mary Ann, 203. 
Mashuda, 205. 
Mason, James M., 251 ff. 
Mastico, 76. 

Massachusetts, 411, 433, 451 ff. 

Mattabesett, 352, 353. 

Maury, Matthew Fontaine, 425. 

Mease, Purser, 35. 

Mayo, Henry T., 500. 

Medusa, 367. 

Melampus, 95. 

Mellish, 24. 

Melville, G. W., with Jeannette 
expedition, 414 ff. ; in Greely 
relief party, 418. 

Memphis captured, 308. 

Mercedita, 394. 

Merchant marine disappearance 
of, after the Civil War, 387; 
growth during World War, 
518-520. 

Merrimac, burned at Norfolk, 
256-9, 262; a new type, 260; 
rebuilding of, 262-4; de- 
stroys the Cumberland, 264-8; 
destroys the Congress, 268- 
272; engages the Monitor, 278 
ff. ; later career, 286 ; attempt 
to break the blockade, 390. 

Merrimac (collier), 451, 457. 

Merritt, Gen., 444. 

Metacomet, 334, 337-£. 

Metcalf, Sec, 473. 

Mexican War, 220 ff. 

Mexico refuses to sell California, 
220 ; treaty with, 225. 

Miami, 351-3. 

Miantonomah, 411. 

Miles, Gen., 458, 459. 

Milford, 24. 



Mill prison, 19, 22. 

Miller, Rear-Admiral, 423. 

Minneapolis, 449. 

Minnesota, at Hampton Roads, 
265, 270; attacked by the 
Merrimac, 278 ff.; at Fort 
Fisher, 399. 

Mississippi, in Perry's expedition 
to Japan, 227 ff. ; the battle 
below New Orleans, 317; 
burned, 327. 

Mississippi (Confederate iron- 
clad), 321. 

Mississippi and tributaries, map 
of, 289. 

Mobile captured, 404. 

Mobile Bay, battle of, 330 ff.; 
diagram of, 333. 

Monadnock, 399, 411, 444. 

Monaghan, Ensign, 466. 

Monitor, contract for, 273, 274; 
transverse section (drawing), 
275; trip to Hampton Roads, 
272, 277 ; engages the Merri- 
mac, 278 ff.; later career, 286, 
287. 

Monocacy, 435. 

Monongahela, 338, 340, 344. 

Montague, 149, 175. 

Montauk, 394, 395. 

Monterey, 411, 444. 

M ontezuma, 54. 

Montgomery, Capt., 220. 

Montojo, Admiral, 436 ff. 

Morgan, 334, 339. 

Morocco, 61, 71. 

Morris, Charles, in the Tripoli- 
tan War, 76; the burning of 
the Philadelphia, 77 ff. ; the 
chase of the Constitution 103 
ff. ; battle of the Constitution 
and the Guerriere, 113. 



Index 



553 



Morris, G. U., ?64. 
Morris, Richard V., 68, 69. 
Morris, Robert, 12. 
Morrison, 226. 
Mound City, 290. 
Mounted Naval Railway Bat- 
teries, 507. 

N 

Nahant, 396, 397. 
Nanshan, 435. 
Napoleon, decrees of, 96. 
Napoleon, Louis, 328, 329. 
Napoleon, 211. 
Nashville, 375, 394. 
Naugatuck, 287. 
Nautilus, 69, 84, 88, 89, 91, 102. 
Naval Academy, 218, 219. 
Naval Boards, in the Revolu- 
tion, 12. 

Naval Committee, in the Revo- 
lution, 11 ff. 

Navy, in the Revolution, size of, 
15; building of a new, 44; at 
outbreak of the Civil War, 238 
ff. ; changes in, after 1850, 
406; decay of, after the Civil 
War, 406 ff. ; rehabilitation of, 
409 ff. ; in Polar exploration, 
412 ff. ; diplomatic and special 
services of 419 ff . ; in Spanish- 
American War, 433; humani- 
tarian service, 512, 525. 

Nelson, C. P., 491. 

Newark, 411, 466, 469. 

New Ironsides, contracted for, 
274; torpedo attack on, 356; 
description of, 395; at Ft. 
Fisher, 399, 401. 

New Orleans, battle of, 198. 

New Orleans, expedition against, 
310 ff. 



New York, frigate, 68. 

New York, Ship-of-the-line, 259. 

New York, cruiser, 452 ff. 

New York, battleship, 498, 499. 

Nicaragua, 531. 

Niagara, 166 ff. 

Nicholson, Capt., 40, 50, 51. 

Nicholson, 489, 490. 

Nields, H. C, 338. 

Nine-Power Treaty, 523. 

Nissen, Consul, 74, 206. 

Non-Intercourse Act, 98. 

Norfolk, 54. 

Norfolk Navy Yard, abandoned, 

255 ff. 
North Carolina, 217. 
North Dakota, 50, 473. 
North Pole, 418, 517. 
Northern Mine Barrage, 504-506. 



O'Brien, 9, 10. 

Octorora, 334, 337, 338. 

Ohio, 166, 171. 

Olympia, 435 ff. 

Oneida, 317, 318, 338, 339. 

Ontario, 204. 

Open Door, 468. 

Orders in Council, 97 ff. 

Oregon, 411, 430, 451 ff. 

Ossipee, 344, 345. 

Ottawa, 250. 

P 

Page, Octavius, 135. 

Pallas, 31 ff., 38. 

Palmer, Surgeon, 340. 

Palmetto State, 394. 

Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds 

(map), 349. 
Panama Canal, 528. 
Pan-Americanism, 532. 



554 



Index 



Paris, Declaration of, 388. 

Parrott guns, 260. 

Patrick Henry, 269, 271, 278. 

Patterson, Master-Comdt., 207. 

Paulding, Hiram, sent to Nor- 
folk, 257, 258, 262; member of 
board on ironclads, 274. 

Pawnee, 257, 258. 

Peacock, captured by the Hor- 
net, 149, 150. 

Peacock (2d), takes the Eper- 
vier,, 153, 154; attack on 
British commerce, 160. 

Peake, Wm, 150. 

Pearson, Capt., 32 ff. 

Peary, Robt. E., 418, 419. 

Pelican, captures the Argus, 151, 
152. 

Pembroke, 366, 367. 

Pendergrast, Lt., 269. 

Penguin, taken by the Hornet, 

158, 159. 
Pennsylvania, 257, 259. 
Pensacola, 312 ff. 
Pensacola, surrender of yard, 

258. 

Perkins, G. H., at New Orleans, 
317, 318; Mobile Bay, 343. 

Perry, M. C, in West Indies, 
208; the slave trade, 213; 
Mexican War, 224-5; com- 
mands expedition to Japan, 
225 ff. ; as a diplomat, 419. 

Perry, O. H., Lake Erie, 164 ff.; 
West Indies, 208. 

Petrel, 411, 435. 

Phelps, Lt.-Comdr., 295. 

Philadelphia, sent to Tripoli, 64, 
68; blockade duty, 66, 70; 
under Preble, 69; loss of, 71 
ff. ; burning of, 77 ff. 

Philadelphia, cruiser, 423. 



Philippines, war in, 434 ff., 
462-465. 

Phillips, Capt., 53, 54. 

Phoebe, 178, 180 ff. 

Pillow, Gen., 296. 

Pillsbury, Rear-Admiral, 425. 

Piracy, in West Indies, 207-11. 

Pittsburg, building of, 290; at- 
tacks Ft. Donelson, 297, 298; 
passes Island No. 10, 305, 306. 

Pittsburg Landing, battle of, 
306, 307. 

Piatt, Lt., 209. 

Plunkett, C. P., 507. 

Pluton, 447, 454. 

Plymouth, 227, 257, 259. 

Poictiers, 149. 

Polar explorations, the navy in, 

412 ff., 517. 
Polk, Pres., 220. 
Pomone, 199, 200. 
Pope, Gen., at Island No. 10, 

301-6; Ft. Pillow, 307. 
Porcupine, 166. 

Porter, David, in action with 
the Insurgente, 56; with a 
prize crew, 57; first lt. of the 
Philadelphia, 72; commands 
Essex, 126; cruise of the 
Essex, 175 ff.; in West 
Indies, 208-11; court-martial 
of, 210. 

Porter, David D., in Mexican 
War, 222-5 ; plans for capture 
of New Orleans, 310; com- 
mands mortar boats, 312, 319; 
suggests tactics, 321 ; attacks 
Vicksburg, 323 ; commands 
river squadron, 326; attacks 
Arkansas Post, 326; co- 
operates with Grant, 326-8; 



Index 



555 



ordered against Ft. Fisher, 
347; captures Ft. Fisher, 
398 ff. 

Porter, J. L., 262. 

Porter, W. D., 294, 325. 

Port Hudson, 327. 

Porto Rico, 449, 458, 459. 

Port Royal, capture of, 244 ff. ; 
diagram of battle, 246. 

Port Royal, 287. 

Post captain, explanation of the 
term, 136. 

Potomac flotilla, 242, 243. 

Powhatan, 236, 408. 

Preble, Edward, commands 
squadron before Tripoli, 69; 
disciplinarian, 70; loss of the 
Philadelphia, 74, 75; plans to 
destroy the Philadelphia, 76; 
blockade and bombardment of 
Tripoli, 84 ff. ; Intrepid dis- 
aster, 88 ff . ; returns, 90 ; com- 
ments on treaty with Tripoli, 
91; services in the war, 92; 
rounds Cape of Good Hope, 
176. 

Preble, battle of Lake Cham- 
plain, 191 ff. 

Preble goes to Japan, 227. 

President, building of, 50; sent 
to Tripoli, 64; under Barron, 
90; action with the Little 
Belt, 99; cruise under Rodgers, 
99, 102, 118; chase of the Bel- 
videra, 102; runs the blockade, 
134; captured, 198-200. 

Pressqu'isle (Erie), naval base, 
164, 166. 

Provost, Geo., 191-2, 194, 198. 

Prince of Orange, 20. 

Princeton, 261, 274. 

Pring, Capt., 191. 



| Prisoners, in the Revolution, 22, 
23; in the Civil War, 389, 390. 

Privateering, during the Revolu- 
tion, 10, 40, 41; War of 1812, 
201 ; Civil War, 388, 389. 

Providence, 13, 24. 

Q 

Queen Charlotte, 166 ff. 
Queen of the West, 328. 

R 

Raccoon, 178, 180. 

Radford, Wm, 265, 268. 

Rais Hammida, 205. 

Raleigh, in the Revolution, 29. 

Raleigh, Confederate ram, 354. 

Raleigh, battle of Manila, 435. 

Randolph, 29. 

Ranger, cruise of, under Jones, 
24 ff. ; map of cruise, 28; en- 
gagement with the Drake, 27 ff. 

Ranks, relative, in army and 
navy, 14. 

Raritan, 259. 

Razee, explanation of the term, 
46. 

Read, A. C, 515. 
Reina Cristina, 439 ff. 
Reina Mercedes, 451. 
Reindeer, 154-7. 
Reprisal, 19. 
Resolution, 149. 
Retaliation, 53, 54. 
Retribution, 375. 
Revenge, 21. 
Rhode Island, 287. 
Richmond, 330 ff. 
Rifled cannon, 260. 
River Defense Fleet, at Fort 
Pillow, 307, 308; engages 



556 



Index 



Roanoke, 265, 270. 
Roanoke Island, capture of, 348, 
349. 

Roberts, Col., 302. 

Robertson, Lt., 197. • 

Robinson, Lt., 69. 

Robion, Capt., 441. 

Rodgers, John, commands prize 
crew of the Insurgente, 57; in 
the Tripolitan War, 90; the 
Little Belt affair, 99; chases 
the Belvidera, 102. 

Rodgers, John, at Port Royal, 
250; begins construction of 
Mississippi River flotilla, 290, 
292; commands the Wee- 
hawken, 396, 397. 

Rodgers, John, flight to Hawaii, 
516. 

Rodgers, T. S., 497. 

Rodman, Hugh, 498. 

Roe, Capt., 353. 

Rogers, Midn., 215. 

Ronckendorff, Comdr., 374. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, Russian- 
Japanese War, 471; Moroccan 
affair, 472 ; cruise of the Battle 
Fleet, 473; and Latin America, 
528, 529. 

Roosevelt, 418. 

Rowan, Comdr., 348, 349. 

Rowe, John, 76. 

Russell, Lord, 371. 

S 

Sagasta, Prime Minister, 427, 
428. 

St. Lawrence, 265, 270. 

St. Louis, building of, 290; at- 
tacks Ft. Donelson, 297, 298; 
attacks Island No. 10, 301. 



St. Louis, scout cruiser, in Span- 
ish-American War, 447. 
St. Mary's Isle, 27. 
St. Paul, 449. 
Sallie, 375. 

Saltonstall, Dudley, 13. 
Samoan affair, 465-468. 
Sampson. Wm. T., commands 

North Atlantic squadron, 432 ; 

blockades Cuba, 445 ff. ; battle 

of Santiago, 452 ff. 
San Diego, 500. 

San. Jacinto and the Trent, 251 
ff. ; seeks the Alabama, 374, 
377. 

San Juan de Ulloa, Vera Cruz, 
223, 224. 

San Juan, Porto Rico, bombard- 
ment of, 449. 

Santiago, battle of, 452 ff. 

Saranac, 446. 

Saratoga, battle of Lake Cham- 
plain, 191 ff. 

Saratoga, in Perry's expedition 
to Japan, 227. 

Sassacus, 352, 353. 

Saugus, 399. 

Savannah, 389, 390. 

Sawyer, Vice-Admiral, 102. 

Scales, Archibald H., 498, 499. 

Scapa Flow, 497 ff. 

Schley, W. S., conducts relief of 
Greeley party, 418; commands 
Flying Squadron, 446; block- 
ades Cienfuegos, 449; block- 
ades Santiago, 450; at battle 
of Santiago, 454, 455. 

Schofield, Gen., 403. 

Schools for officers and enlisted 
men, 518. See also Naval 
Academy. 

Scorpion, 166, 169, 170. 



Index 



557 



Scott, Winfield, 190, 222, 255. 
Scourge, 84. 
Screw propellers, 260. 
Secretary of the Navy, office 

created, 52. 
Selkirk, Earl of, 27. 
Selma, 334, 339. 
Semmes, Raphael, 371 ff. 
Serapis, battle with the Bon- 

homme Richard, 30 ff. 
Sever, James, 50. 
Seymour, Vice-Admiral, 467. 
Shafter, Gen., 452, 458. 
Shannon, flagship of Broke's 

squadron, 102; captures the 

Chesapeake, 137 ff. 
Shark, 208. 
Shaw, John, 59. 

Shenandoah, cruiser, 371, 375, 
387. 

Shenandoah, dirigible, 516. 

Sheridan, Gen., 346. 

Sherman, Thomas W., 244. 

Sherman, Wm. T., captures At- 
lanta, 346; captures Savan- 
nah and Charleston, 397. 

Ship-of-the-line, illustration, 45; 
explanation of the term, 46. 

Ships, development, 1812-1861, 
260-2 ; recent developments, 
478, 479. 

Shot, comparative weight of 
American and British, 117. 

Shufeldt, Robert W., 237. 

Sibylle, 40. 

Sicard, Rear-Admiral, 432. 

Simms, Charles, 266. 

Sims, W. S., 485. 

Sinclair, Lt., commands the 

Argus, 102. 
Sinclair, Lt., of the Alabama, 

account of the action with the 



Kearsarge, 378 ff. ; testimony 
in the Alabama-Kearsarge con- 
troversy, 384, 386. 

Siren, 69, 77, 78, 84. 

Sixth Battle Squadron, 498-500, 
509. 

Slave trade, 211-4. 

Slidell, John, 251 ff. 

Sloat, Commodore, 220, 221. 

Sloop actions in the War of 

1812, 144 ff.; map, 145. 
Sloop of war, explanation of the 

term, 46; illustration, 49. 
Small, Seaman, 215, 216. 
Smith, John, in the Tripolitan 

War, 69, 102. 
Smith, Joseph, on board to in- 
vestigate building of armor- 

clads, 274. 
Smith, Joseph B., commands the 

Congress in the Civil War, 268, 

269. 

Smith, Melancton, 352. 
Solebay, 24. 

Somers, Richard, 69, 85, 88 ff. 
Somers, battle of Lake Erie, 
166 ff. 

Somers, mutiny on, 214-8; loss 
of, 372. 

Southfield, 351, 352, 358. 

Spain, alliance with the United 
States, 30. 

Spanish-American War, causes, 
426 ff. ; comparison of navies, 
433; campaign in the West 
Indies (map), 448; losses, 459, 
460; treaty of peace, 460, 461. 

Spark, 204. 

Spences, J. M., 335. 

Spencer, Philip, 214-8. 

Sperry, Rear-Admiral, 425. 

Spitfire, 99, 224, 225. 



558 



Index 



Springs, explanation of the term, 

184. 
Stack, Lt., 35. 

State navies in the Revolution, 
41. 

Stembel, Comdr., 292. 

Sterrett, Andrew, 64 ff. 

Stewart, Charles, commands the 
Siren, 69, 76; captures the 
Cyane and the Levant, 200, 
201. 

Stimers, Chief Engineer, 279. 

Stockton, Commodore, 220 ff. 

Stodder, Master, 279. 

Stoddert, Benj., 52. 

Stonewall Jackson, 318. 

Stringham, Silas H., 244. 

Strauss, Joseph, 505. 

Subchasers, 491, 492. 

Submarines, early forms of, 355, 
356; recent developments in, 
480, 481; World War, 485, 
501 ff. ; later developments, 
514. 

Sumter, 372, 375. 
Surprise, 20. 

Susquehanna, in Perry's expedi- 
tion, 227 ff.; at Port Royal, 
245. 

T 

Talbot, Silas, 50. 

Tallahassee, 375. 

Tattnall, Josiah, in the Mexican 
War, 224; at Port Royal, 248, 
249; destroys the Merrimac, 
286. 

Taussig, J. K., 486, 487. 
Taylor, Capt., 224. 
Taylor, Gen., 222. 
Tecumseh, 98, 174. 
Tecumseh, 334-8, 345. 



Tenedos, 134, 136, 199, 200. 

Tennessee, captured by Farragut, 
331 ff.; illustration, 341. 

Terror, monitor, 441, 449. 

Terror, Spanish torpedo-boat de- 
stroyer, 447. 

Terry, Gen., 400 ff. 

Texas, 452 ff. 

Thames, battle of, 174. 

Thetis, 416. 

Thorn, Jonathan, 76. 

Thornton, Lt.-Comdr., 384. 

Thurot, 21. 

Ticonderoga, 191 ff. 

Tigress, 166 ff. 

Tilghman, Gen., 295, 296. 

Tingey, Capt., 137. 

Torpedo, invention of, 355 ff. 

Torpedo-boat, early forms of> 
355 ff.; recent development of, 
480. 

Torpedo-boat destroyer, 480. 
Torpedo bureau, in the Confeder- 
ate Navy Dept., 356. 
Toucey, Sec, 239. 
Townsend, Capt., 102. 
Trajano, 423. 

Transport service, World War, 
492 ff. 

Treaty, with France, 23, 59; 
with Algiers, 50, 51, 206; 
with Great Britain, 52, 93, 
201; with Morocco, 61; with 
Tunis, 61, 206; with Tripoli, 
61, 91, 206; with Mexico, 
225; with Japan, 236, 365; 
with Spain, 460; Limitation 
of Naval Armament, 521, 522; 
Four-Power Treaty, 523 ; Nine- 
Power Treaty, 523. 

Trent affair, 251 ff. 



Index 



559 



Tripoli, treaty with, 61, 91, 206; 
war with, 64 ff. ; harbor of 
(map), 79; bombardment of, 
84 ff. 

Tripoli, action with the Enter- 
prise, 65. 
Trippe, Lt., 86. 
Trippe, 166, 170. 
Trumbull, 40. 

Truxtun, Thomas, promoted to 
captaincy, 50; commands the 
Constellation, 51, 52; captures 
Insurgente, 55, 56; commands 
squadron against Tripoli, 67; 
resigns, 68. 

Tunis, treaty with, 61, 206. 

Tyler, 292, 293, 296, 297, 325. 

U 

U-58, 489, 490. 
UB-65, 503. 
Unicorn, 30. 

United States, building of, 50, 
51 ; in Rodgers' squadron, 102 ; 
captures the Macedonian, 117 
ff. ; plan of engagement with 
the Macedonian, 120; block- 
aded at New London, 144, 
199; destroyed, 259. 

V 

Valley City, 363, 364. 

Van Brunt, Capt., 280, 284. 

Vanderbilt, 377. 

Varuna, 317, 318. 

Vengeance, brig., 31 ff. 

Vengeance, frigate, 57, 58. 

Venezuela Affair, 528. 

Vera Cruz., naval operations be- 
fore, 221 ff. 

Vicksburg, attacked by the ships,. 
322 ff. 



Vincennes, 226. 

Virginia. See Merrimac. 

Virginius affair, 409, 426. 

Vixen, schooner, blockades Tri- 
poli, 69-71; at bombardment 
of Tripoli, 84, 86; in the 
Intrepid disaster, 88, 89. 

Vixen, steamer, 224. 

Vixen, gunboat, 453, 455, 456. 

Vizcaya, battle of Santiago, 447 
ff. 

Volontier, 54. 

von Ketteler, Baron, 470. 

W 

Wabash, at Port Royal, 245 ff.; 
at Ft. Fisher, 399. 

Wadsworth, Lt., 88. 

Wainwright, Lt.-Comdr., 453. 

Wales, Capt., 153. 

Walke, Henry, 292, 302-6. 

War of 1812, causes of, 93 ff., 
100; declared, 100; prepara- 
tion for by Congress, 100; 
comparison of naval forces, 
101; results of, 201. 

Ward, J. H., 242, 243. 

Warley, Lt., 354 ff. 

Warrington, Lewis, 153. 

Washington, Geo., fits out a 
fleet, 10, 11; assisted by 
De Grasse, 41. 

Washington, Thomas, 498. 

Washington, 42. 

Washington Conference, 520-524. 

Wasp, schooner in Revolutionary 
Navy, 13. 

Wasp, sloop of war (1st), de- 
feats the Frolic, 146-9. 

Wasp, sloop of war (2d), build- 
ing of, 153; captures the Rein- 
deer, 154-7; captures the 



560 



Index 



Avon, 157, 158; success 

against British commerce, 

160; loss of, 187. 
Wasp, British sloop on Lake 

Champlain, 191. 
Waterbury, Gen., 18. 
Watson, Lt., 209. 
Watson, J. C, 342. 
Watson, W. H., 151, 152.. 
Watts, Lt., 140. 

Weather-gage, explanation of 
the term, 119. 

Weehawken, 396, 397. 

Welles, Gideon, 240, 241, 376. 

Wessells, Gen., 352. 

Weyler, Gen., 426, 427. 

Whinyates, Thomas, 146 ff. 

Whipple, Abraham, 13. 

Whipple, Wm., 26. 

White Squadron, 410 ff. 

Whitehaven, 27. 

Whitehead, 352. 

Whiting, J. W., 336. 

Wickes, Lambert, 19. 

Wiley, H. A., 498. 

Wilkes, Charles, and the Trent 
affair, 251 ff. ; commands Ant- 
arctic expedition, 412. 

Wilkinson, Capt., 392. 

Wilkinson, T. S., 505. 

Williams, Col., 322, 324. 

Williamson, W. P., 262. 

Wilson, Seaman, 304. 

Wilson, Joseph, 385. 

Wilson, Henry P., 496. 



Winnebago, 334, 337, 343. 

Winona, 318, 319. 

Winslow Comdr., 376 ff. 

Winslow, 459. 

Wise, Gen., 348. 

Wissahickon, 319. 

Wood, E. P., 441. 

Wood, J. T., 268. 

Wood, W. C, 464. 

Woodford, Minister, 429, 432. 

Woodman, Acting Master's Mate, 

361, 364. 
Worden, J. L., commands the 

Monitor, 277 ff. ; destroys the 

Nashville, 394, 395. 
World War, 483 ff. 
Wright brothers, 481. 
Wyalusing, 352. 

Wyoming, at Shimonoseki, 365 
ff. ; search for the Alabama, 
374, 377. 

Y 

Yale, 447. 

Yangtze Patrol, 525, 526. 
Yankee, 452. 
Yantic, 416. 
Yarmouth, 29. 

Yeo, James Lucas, 165, 173, 189. 
Yezaiman, Kayama, 232, 233. 
York, capture of, 165. 
Yorktown, 411. 

Z 

Zafiro, 435. 
Zouave, 269. 



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Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: April 2010 

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